



Europäisches  
Patentamt  
European  
Patent Office  
Office européen  
des brevets

# Abstracts of decisions

## 2023

Selected case law of the Boards of Appeal  
edited by the Legal Research Service  
of the Boards of Appeal



Boards  
of Appeal

## **Note to the Readers**

The publication "Abstracts of decisions" is a collection of summaries of key aspects of selected Boards of Appeal decisions. Each summary is drafted in the language of the underlying decision. The 2023 collection is a compilation of the "Abstracts of decisions" issues published in 2023.

## **Disclaimer**

This publication is prepared by the Legal Research Service of the Boards of Appeal for information only. It must therefore not be relied on in any way, in particular in proceedings before the European Patent Office or the Boards of Appeal. Abstracts, no matter how carefully prepared, cannot serve as substitutes for the decisions themselves. The full decisions can be found in the [decisions database](#) of the Boards of Appeal website.

## **Copyright note**

The abstracts included in this publication may not be reproduced or transmitted by any means or in any form or by any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the editors.

## **Edited by**

Legal Research Service of the Boards of Appeal

For comments and requests please contact: [BOA\\_legalresearchservice@epo.org](mailto:BOA_legalresearchservice@epo.org)

# Abstracts of decisions – 2023 collection

## Table of contents:

### Article 24 EPC

T 1656/17	Board 3.X.XX.....	1
T 1493/20	Board 3.2.04.....	3

### Article 52 EPC

T 0761/20	Board 3.5.06.....	5
-----------	-------------------	---

### Article 53 EPC

T 0529/19	Board 3.2.02.....	7
T 0318/21	Board 3.3.02.....	9

### Article 54 EPC

T 0043/18	Board 3.2.02.....	11
T 1688/20	Board 3.2.07.....	13
T 0670/20	Board 3.3.07.....	15
T 0438/19	Board 3.3.03.....	17
T 0558/20	Board 3.3.10.....	19

### Article 56 EPC

T 1001/18	Board 3.4.03.....	21
T 1349/19	Board 3.3.09.....	23
T 1750/19	Board 3.3.07.....	25
T 0605/20	Board 3.3.07.....	27
T 0547/21	Board 3.3.02.....	29
T 0929/18	Board 3.5.01.....	31
T 1105/17	Board 3.5.06.....	33
T 0297/20	Board 3.5.03.....	35
T 0335/20	Board 3.3.08.....	37
T 0702/20	Board 3.5.06.....	39
G 0002/21	Enlarged Board of Appeal.....	41
T 1158/17	Board 3.5.01.....	43
T 0814/19	Board 3.3.07.....	44
T 2039/18	Board 3.2.06.....	46

T 1571/19	Board 3.3.09 .....	48
T 1779/19	Board 3.3.06 .....	50
T 1245/20	Board 3.5.07 .....	52
T 0211/21	Board 3.3.09 .....	53
T 1618/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	54
T 2565/19	Board 3.3.04 .....	55
T 2852/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	57
T 0366/20	Board 3.5.07 .....	58
T 0814/20	Board 3.5.06 .....	60
T 0703/18	Board 3.3.09 .....	61
T 1079/18	Board 3.3.02 .....	63
T 1518/20	Board 3.3.09 .....	65
T 0873/21	Board 3.3.07 .....	67
T 2465/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	69
T 0215/20	Board 3.3.02 .....	71
T 1623/21	Board 3.4.02 .....	73
T 1768/20	Board 3.5.07 .....	75
T 1986/20	Board 3.5.01 .....	77
T 0258/21	Board 3.3.07 .....	79
T 1045/21	Board 3.3.07 .....	81
T 1445/21	Board 3.3.07 .....	83
T 0116/18	Board 3.3.02 .....	85

## Article 69 EPC

T 1473/19	Board 3.2.02 .....	87
T 1844/19	Board 3.3.05 .....	89
T 0450/20	Board 3.2.02 .....	91
T 0367/20	Board 3.2.03 .....	93

## Article 72 EPC

J 0005/23	Board 3.1.01 .....	95
-----------	--------------------	----

## Article 76 EPC

T 0795/21	Board 3.3.07 .....	97
-----------	--------------------	----

## Article 83 EPC

T 0500/20	Board 3.2.04 .....	99
T 2319/18	Board 3.4.01 .....	101
T 1983/19	Board 3.2.05 .....	103
T 0149/21	Board 3.5.03 .....	105

T 0867/21	Board 3.5.03 .....	107
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Article 84 EPC

T 0169/20	Board 3.3.06 .....	109
T 2685/19	Board 3.5.02 .....	111
T 1761/19	Board 3.2.05 .....	113
T 1924/20	Board 3.5.03 .....	115
T 1354/18	Board 3.5.04 .....	116
T 2391/18	Board 3.2.03 .....	118
T 2565/19	Board 3.3.04 .....	120
T 2968/19	Board 3.2.03 .....	122
T 1296/19	Board 3.3.02 .....	124
T 1382/20	Board 3.2.03 .....	126
T 1426/21	Board 3.2.01 .....	128
T 0042/22	Board 3.3.04 .....	130
T 0111/22	Board 3.3.09 .....	132
T 1266/19	Board 3.3.08 .....	134
T 0694/20	Board 3.3.04 .....	136
T 2151/22	Board 3.2.01 .....	138

## Article 87(1) EPC

T 1303/18	Board 3.3.02 .....	140
T 0411/19	Board 3.3.04 .....	142
T 1946/21	Board 3.2.03 .....	144
G 0001/22 and G 0002/22	Enlarged Board of Appeal .....	146
T 2719/19	Board 3.3.04 .....	148

## Article 88 EPC

T 0335/20	Board 3.3.08 .....	150
T 0933/18	Board 3.3.08 .....	152

## Article 99 EPC

T 1121/21	Board 3.3.03 .....	154
T 1522/21	Board 3.2.07 .....	156

## Article 104(1) EPC

T 0561/19	Board 3.3.10 .....	158
T 1807/15	Board 3.5.02 .....	160
T 0967/18	Board 3.3.04 .....	162
T 1484/19	Board 3.3.08 .....	164

## **Article 109 EPC**

T 2381/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	166
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Article 110 EPC**

T 2503/18	Board 3.2.05 .....	168
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Article 111 EPC**

T 2916/19	Board 3.3.03 .....	170
T 1731/19	Board 3.2.06 .....	172

## **Article 112(1)(a) EPC**

T 0116/18	Board 3.3.02 .....	174
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Article 112a(2)(c) EPC**

R 0006/20	Enlarged Board of Appeal .....	176
-----------	--------------------------------	-----

## **Article 113 EPC**

T 1456/22	Board 3.4.01 .....	178
T 1558/21	Board 3.2.04 .....	180
T 2054/19	Board 3.2.02 .....	182

## **Article 114 EPC**

T 1776/18	Board 3.3.09 .....	184
T 1984/19	Board 3.2.06 .....	186
T 0375/21	Board 3.3.04 .....	188

## **Article 116 EPC**

T 2303/19	Board 3.3.07 .....	189
T 1158/20	Board 3.2.01 .....	190
T 1624/20	Board 3.3.05 .....	192
T 1041/21	Board 3.2.04 .....	194
T 0758/20	Board 3.2.01 .....	196
T 2432/19	Board 3.2.06 .....	198
T 0489/20	Board 3.3.07 .....	200
T 0618/21	Board 3.2.01 .....	201
T 1171/20	Board 3.5.06 .....	203

## **Article 116(1) EPC**

J 0006/22	Board 3.1.01 .....	205
T 2024/21	Board 3.2.06 .....	207

T 0245/19	Board 3.2.05 .....	209
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Article 117 EPC

T 1117/16	Board 3.2.05 .....	211
T 1708/18	Board 3.3.04 .....	213
T 0042/19	Board 3.2.01 .....	215
T 0423/22	Board 3.2.01 .....	217
T 1138/20	Board 3.5.03 .....	219
T 1076/21	Board 3.3.05 .....	221

## Article 122 EPC

T 2012/20	Board 3.3.05 .....	223
T 1482/21	Board 3.2.02 .....	225
J 0006/22	Board 3.1.01 .....	227

## Article 123(2) EPC

T 0088/21	Board 3.3.05 .....	229
T 1099/21	Board 3.3.02 .....	231
T 0532/20	Board 3.5.02 .....	233
T 1133/21	Board 3.3.09 .....	235

## Article 123(3) EPC

T 2257/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	237
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Article 125 EPC

T 2726/17	Board 3.4.01 .....	239
T 1128/19	Board 3.3.04 .....	240
T 2907/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	242

## Article 135 EPC

T 1283/19	Board 3.5.07 .....	244
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Rule 6 EPC

T 0084/19	Board 3.3.08 .....	245
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Rule 76 EPC

T 1408/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	247
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Rule 88(2) EPC

T 2024/20	Board 3.3.05 .....	249
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Rule 99 EPC**

T 2197/16	Board 3.2.05 .....	251
T 1828/19	Board 3.3.10 .....	253

## **Rule 116 EPC**

T 1219/19	Board 3.3.08 .....	255
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Rule 124(1) EPC**

T 1482/21	Board 3.2.02 .....	257
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Rule 139 EPC**

T 0433/21	Board 3.3.06 .....	259
T 1678/21	Board 3.5.04 .....	261
J 0003/21	Board 3.1.01 .....	263
T 0158/21	Board 3.5.02 .....	265
T 0695/18	Board 3.5.03 .....	267
T 1558/21	Board 3.2.04 .....	269
T 0130/19	Board 3.3.03 .....	271

## **Rule 140 EPC**

T 0806/21	Board 3.3.04 .....	272
T 1846/20	Board 3.3.02 .....	274
T 0255/22	Board 3.2.03 .....	276

## **Rule 142 EPC**

J 0009/21	Board 3.1.01 .....	278
T 0956/19	Board 3.3.04 .....	280
T 0967/18	Board 3.3.04 .....	282

## **Article 12(2) RPBA 2007**

T 1842/18	Board 3.2.04 .....	284
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Article 11 RPBA 2020**

T 2907/18	Board 3.2.06 .....	286
-----------	--------------------	-----

## **Article 12(4) RPBA 2020**

T 0714/20	Board 3.5.06 .....	287
T 0108/20	Board 3.2.04 .....	289
T 0221/20	Board 3.2.05 .....	291
T 0019/20	Board 3.3.03 .....	293



T 1800/20	Board 3.4.02 .....	295
T 0364/20	Board 3.3.02 .....	297

### **Article 12(5) RPBA 2020**

T 1041/21	Board 3.2.04 .....	299
T 0503/20	Board 3.2.01 .....	301

### **Article 12(6) RPBA 2020**

T 1617/20	Board 3.3.02 .....	303
T 0141/20	Board 3.3.10 .....	305
T 1362/20	Board 3.2.08 .....	307

### **Article 13(1) RPBA 2020**

T 1303/18	Board 3.3.02 .....	309
T 1117/16	Board 3.2.05 .....	311

### **Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

T 0574/17	Board 3.2.03 .....	313
T 1968/18	Board 3.2.05 .....	315
T 2599/19	Board 3.4.02 .....	317
T 2866/18	Board 3.2.03 .....	319
T 0084/19	Board 3.3.08 .....	321
T 1058/20	Board 3.3.06 .....	323
T 0218/20	Board 3.2.04 .....	325
T 1807/15	Board 3.5.02 .....	327
T 0532/20	Board 3.5.02 .....	329
T 1361/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	331
T 0463/19	Board 3.4.02 .....	333
T 1906/19	Board 3.4.01 .....	335
T 2465/19	Board 3.4.03 .....	337
T 0599/21	Board 3.5.05 .....	339
T 0116/18	Board 3.3.02 .....	341

### **Article 15a(1) RPBA 2020**

T 1501/20	Board 3.2.08 .....	343
-----------	--------------------	-----

### **Article 15a(2) RPBA 2020**

T 1946/21	Board 3.2.03 .....	345
-----------	--------------------	-----

## Article 24 EPC | T 1656/17 | Board 3.X.XX

### Article 024 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1656/17</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.X.XX
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.12
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 024 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 106 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	suspected partiality – formation of the board in its alternate composition – notice of self-recusation – objection of suspected partiality of original board – admissibility (yes) – allowability (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/05, J 0015/04
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.J.2.3.</a> , <a href="#">III.J.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">III.J.3.2.</a> , <a href="#">III.J.5.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1656/17](#) the appellant raised an objection of suspected partiality against all members of the board under Art. 24(3), first sentence, EPC. The objection was deemed admissible and an alternate board was formed. A technically qualified member of the alternate board then informed it in a notice of exclusion that they considered that they should not take part in the appeal proceedings as there existed a close family relationship between them and a person who had been involved in the first-instance proceedings. As per G 1/05, if a member of a board of appeal in a notice of withdrawal under Art. 24(2) EPC gives a ground which could by its nature constitute a possible ground for an objection of partiality, that ground should normally be respected. It can be expected that the member submitting the notice knows best whether a possible suspicion of partiality might arise (see J 15/04). The alternate board decided that in the case in hand the technically qualified member concerned should be replaced. It was at least arguable that a board member who had family ties to a person involved in the first-instance proceedings might have an interest in confirming the findings of those proceedings and could therefore appear to be biased. Following the replacement of said member, the alternate board in its final composition was competent to decide on the appellant's objection of suspected partiality.

In its main request, the appellant had raised an objection against all three members of the original board, and in its auxiliary request, against only the chair. A large part of the appellant's allegations of suspected partiality concerned the behaviour and statements of the chair and not of the two other members of the original board. However, the board

stated it was clear that a chair, when presiding over the oral proceedings, was normally acting after consultation with or with the tacit consent of the other board members. The appellant could therefore legitimately assume that the actions of the chair, in this case, were supported by the other two members.

An objection on the ground of suspected partiality is not admissible if, while being aware of a reason for objection, the party has taken a procedural step (Art. 24(3), second sentence, EPC). Although the appellant claimed that it had not taken any procedural steps while being aware of a reason for objection, it had filed an objection under R. 106 EPC at the end of the oral proceedings on 21 October 2022. In the board's view, such an objection was without doubt to be classed as a procedural step within the meaning of Art. 24(3), second sentence, EPC. The appellant's objection of suspected partiality was, however, not limited to facts occurring before the objection under R. 106 EPC was filed. It was based on a chain of events that also encompassed facts that occurred after this objection had been filed. Moreover, the board understood the appellant's submission to mean that it was not until all the events had occurred that it had become aware of the original board's biased attitude against it. Consequently, the board considered that the filing of the objection under R. 106 EPC did not render the subsequent objection of suspected partiality inadmissible.

In examining the appellant's request, the board observed that the appellant had not presented any proof of actual partiality of the three members of the original board. Rather, its case was based on circumstances which in its view gave rise to an objectively justified fear of partiality. This was to be examined in an objective test. The board was not convinced that the described chain of events as a whole could give rise to a suspicion of partiality. For this to be the case, a certain preconceived attitude would have to be at least partially discernible or inherent in each or some of the events. However, none of the single chain links referred to by the appellant contained elements which could suggest that the original board was influenced in its decision making by extraneous considerations or prejudices.

As a result, the appellant's suspicion of partiality was not objectively justified regarding either the chair or the other two members of the original board.

123-11-23

## Article 024 EPC | T 1493/20 | Board 3.2.04

### Article 024 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1493/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.02
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 024(1), 024(3), 117(1)(e) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 121 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 1(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	suspected partiality – admitted (no) – objection not substantiated – lack of technical knowledge not a valid ground under Art. 24(3) EPC – business distribution scheme
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/05
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.J.5.3.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1493/20](#) beantragte der Beschwerdeführer in der mündlichen Verhandlung die Ablehnung der Kammer wegen Befangenheit gestützt auf angebliche mangelnde technische Kenntnisse auf dem Gebiet von Windenergieanlagen. Die Kammer entschied in ihrer ursprünglichen Besetzung über die Zulässigkeit des Antrages.

Die Kammer ging davon aus, dass der Antrag auf eine Ablehnung nach Art. 24 (3) EPÜ gerichtet war. Andere Möglichkeiten der Ablehnung von Kammermitgliedern seien weder im EPÜ noch in der VOBK normiert. Die Kammer erläuterte, dass Art. 24 (3) EPÜ eine Ablehnung aus einem der in Art. 24 (1) EPÜ genannten Gründe oder wegen Besorgnis der Befangenheit vorsieht. Im vorliegenden Fall hatte sich der Beschwerdeführer auf Letzteres berufen ohne allerdings weiter zu erklären, inwiefern sich eine Befangenheit der Kammermitglieder aus deren angeblich mangelnden technischen Kenntnissen ergeben sollte. Ein solcher Kausalzusammenhang war auch für die Kammer nicht ersichtlich.

Aus der abschließenden Aufzählung der Ablehnungsgründe in Art. 24 (3) EPÜ ergebe sich jedoch, dass ein Ablehnungsantrag nicht auf jeden beliebigen Grund gestützt werden könne, selbst wenn die vorgebrachten Tatsachen, die die Kammermitglieder betreffen, zumindest subjektiv als nachteilig für die Sache eines Beteiligten angesehen werden könnten. Eine Ablehnung wegen mangelnder technischer Kenntnisse sei daher kein zulässiger Ablehnungsgrund nach Art. 24 (3) EPÜ. Es bleibe dabei, dass weder im EPÜ noch in der VOBK die technische Inkompetenz einer Kammer auf einem ihr gemäß Geschäftsverteilungsplan zugeordneten technischen Gebiet als ein Grund für

deren Ablehnung vorgesehen sei. Den Versuch, dies dennoch durch die Hintertür einer dadurch angeblich begründeten Besorgnis der Befangenheit zu erreichen, hielt die Kammer für nicht statthaft, und den darauf gerichteten Antrag für unzulässig.

Lediglich ergänzend wies die Kammer darauf hin, dass eine technische Beschwerdekammer grundsätzlich dazu verpflichtet sei, die ihr gemäß ihrer sachlichen Zuständigkeit vom Präsidium über den Geschäftsverteilungsplan gemäß Art. 1 (2) VOBK 2020 zugewiesenen Fälle zu verhandeln (G 1/05). Die Zuordnung einer sachlichen Zuständigkeit für ein technisches Gebiet beruhe auf der Annahme der technischen Kompetenz einer Kammer auf diesem Gebiet. Schließlich habe eine Kammer auch die Möglichkeit, ggf. eine Begutachtung durch Sachverständige (Art. 117 (1) e) und R. 121 EPÜ) von Amts wegen einzuholen, wenn sie der Ansicht ist, dass ihre eigenen Fachkenntnisse für die Beurteilung des Falls nicht ausreichen.

Daher verwarf die Kammer den Antrag des Beschwerdeführers auf ihre Ablehnung wegen mangelnder technischer Kenntnisse auf dem Gebiet der Windkraftanlagen und der damit begründeten Besorgnis der Befangenheit als unzulässig.

124-11-23

## Article 52 EPC | T 0761/20 | Board 3.5.06

### Article 052 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0761/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.22
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 052, 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	patentable invention – field of technology – computer implemented invention – mathematical method – inventive step
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.9</a> , <a href="#">I.A.2.4.6.b</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 761/20](#) the invention related to automated assessment of scripts written in examination, in particular English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) examinations.

The board held that though G 1/19 was related to computer-implemented simulations, its reasons apply to computer-implemented methods other than simulations as well. The board assumed that the claimed invention served the purpose of supporting its users in evaluating linguistic competences. The question remained whether the assessment of linguistic competences, or maybe merely providing a grade, was a technical purpose.

The board held that what was decisive, according to established case law of the Boards of Appeal, was whether the invention made a contribution which may be qualified as technical in that it provides a solution to a technical problem. If this was the case, a contribution to a field of technology could be said to also be present. It was noted that the "field" of this contribution may be different from the one to which the patent more generally relates: for instance, inventions within the broad field of "educational technology" could make contributions in the field of computer science.

In G 1/19, the Enlarged Board followed its earlier case law and "refrain[ed] from putting forward a definition for 'technical'", because this term must remain open. Nonetheless, the Enlarged Board provided considerations as to what may be considered technical. The referring board in G 1/19 had suggested that a technical effect might require a "direct link with physical reality, such as a change in or a measurement of a physical entity".

The Enlarged Board in G 1/19 accepted that such a "direct link with physical reality [...] is in most cases sufficient to establish technicality" and, in this context, that "[i]t is generally acknowledged that measurements have technical character since they are based on an interaction with physical reality at the outset of the measurement method". It also stressed that an effect could also be "within the computer system or network" (i.e. internal rather than "(external) physical reality").

It recalled that potential technical effects might also be sufficient "effects which, for example when a computer program [...] is put to its intended use, necessarily become real technical effects".

And it also considered that calculated data, while "routinely raising concerns with respect to the principle that the claimed subject-matter has to be a technical invention over substantially the whole scope of the claims" might contribute to a technical effect by way of an implied technical use, "e.g. a use having an impact on physical reality".

While the Enlarged Board of Appeal thus found that a direct link with physical reality may not be required for a technical effect to exist, it did, in this board's view, confirm that an at least indirect link to physical reality, internal or external to the computer, is indeed required. The link can be mediated by the intended use or purpose of the invention ("when executed" or when put to its "implied technical use").

Returning to the case at hand, the board found that automated script grading, by itself or via its intended use for evaluating linguistic competences, did not have an implied use or purpose which would be technical via any direct or indirect link with physical reality.

The claimed computer-implemented method of automated script grading did not provide a contribution to any technical and non-excluded field, be it by way of how the automation is carried out, or by way of its use; an inventive step according to Art. 56 EPC could therefore not be acknowledged.

107-10-23

## Article 53 EPC | T 0529/19 | Board 3.2.02

### Article 053 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0529/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.24
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 53(c) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	exception to patentability (no) – diagnostic method
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/04
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.B.4.6.1a</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 529/19](#) the board referred to Opinion G 1/04 where the Enlarged Board came, among other things, to the following conclusion:

"1. In order that the subject-matter of a claim relating to a diagnostic method practised on the human or animal body falls under the prohibition of Article 52(4) EPC [EPC 1973], the claim is to include the features relating to:

- (i) the diagnosis for curative purposes stricto sensu representing the deductive medical or veterinary decision phase as a purely intellectual exercise,
- (ii) the preceding steps which are constitutive for making that diagnosis, and
- (iii) the specific interactions with the human or animal body which occur when carrying those out among these preceding steps which are of a technical nature."

The Enlarged Board further stated that the method steps to be carried out when making a diagnosis as part of the medical treatment of humans or the veterinary treatment of animals for curative purposes include:

- (i) the examination phase involving the collection of data,
- (ii) the comparison of these data with standard values,
- (iii) the finding of any significant deviation, i.e. a symptom, during the comparison, and



(iv) the attribution of the deviation to a particular clinical picture, i.e. the deductive medical or veterinary decision phase.

The board in T 529/19 stated that the interpretation of the scope of exclusion from patentability under Art. 52(4) EPC 1973 elaborated in Opinion G 1/04 is still valid for Art. 53(c) EPC.

Claim 1 of the main request at hand defined a method "of determining skin health of an area of skin". The steps of this method included calculating a ratio between the intensities measured for two fluorescent emissions induced on the area of skin and comparing this ratio to a control ratio. In the decision under appeal, the examining division had found that the phases (i) to (iii) of G 1/04, were present in the steps of the method recited by claim 1. It further found that the phase (iv) of G 1/04 was derivable from the wording "[a] method of determining skin health" at the beginning of claim 1. The appellant contested the latter finding and submitted that the method of claim 1 did not include the attribution of the deviation to a particular clinical picture.

The board observed that claim 1 left open what the determined "skin health" was. For example, it could refer to the quotient between the two ratios being compared in step (vi) of claim 1 or to some other parameter related to skin health, which may at most be an intermediate finding of diagnostic value. Although the term suggested that some assessment of the skin health was made, neither the claim wording nor the relevant passages of the description indicated that the assessment would actually include the attribution to a particular clinical picture. Even if the method were construed as including some judgment of skin ageing for the assessed skin area, this would not represent the attribution to a particular clinical picture. Establishing that skin ageing is greater than expected for an individual would be, at most, an intermediate finding of diagnostic value. The board thus held that the method of claim 1 did not include the attribution of the deviation to a particular clinical picture, i.e. the deductive medical or veterinary decision phase and was therefore not excluded under Art. 53(c) EPC.

093-09-23

## Article 053 EPC | T 0318/21 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 053 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0318/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.25
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 053(c) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	exceptions to patentability (yes) – method for treatment by surgery
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/07, T 0992/03, T 0836/08
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.B.4.4.5c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 318/21](#) beantragte der Beschwerdeführer der Großen Beschwerdekammer folgenden Fragen vorzulegen:

„Ist ein beanspruchtes Verfahren, das auf die Ermittlung einer Position und einer Orientierung eines Endoskops in einem Hohlraum gerichtet ist, schon deshalb als "Verfahren zur chirurgischen oder therapeutischen Behandlung des menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers" nach Art. 53 c) EPÜ vom Patentschutz auszuschließen, wenn der Hohlraum ein körperinnerer Hohlraum eines menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers sein kann und es für die Bestimmung der Position und Orientierung unerlässlich ist, dass eine Datenerfassung an mehreren Zeitpunkten und an mehreren Positionen und/oder Orientierungen des Endoskops erfolgt, auch wenn kein Verfahrensschritt der Bewegung des Endoskops in dem Hohlraum beansprucht wird und das Verfahren keinen funktionellen Zusammenhang mit den Wirkungen des Endoskops auf den Körper vorsieht (s. G 1/07)?“

Falls die Frage mit 'ja' beantwortet wird, worin ist ein Unterschied zu dem Sachverhalt zu sehen, der der Entscheidung T 836/08 zugrunde lag?“

Die Kammer stellte fest, dass die Bewegung eines Endoskops in einem Hohlraum eines menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers eine chirurgische Behandlung im Sinne des Art. 53 c) EPÜ darstelle. Der Beschwerdegegner machte allerdings geltend, dass die Bewegung des Endoskops nicht beansprucht sei. Er machte geltend, das Verfahren bestimme lediglich eine Betriebseigenschaft des Endoskops und entspreche einem "Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Geräts" im Sinne von G 1/07. Außerdem bestehe kein funktioneller Zusammenhang zwischen dem beanspruchten Verfahren und den

Wirkungen des Endoskops auf den Körper, so dass das Verfahren nicht als Behandlungsverfahren im Sinne von Art. 53 c) EPÜ anzusehen sei. Die Kammer stellte diesbezüglich fest, dass weder die Entscheidung G 1/07 noch die darin unter Punkt 4.3.2 der Gründe zitierten Entscheidungen definieren, was unter funktionellem Zusammenhang ("functional link") im Falle eines chirurgischen Eingriffs zu verstehen ist. Darüber hinaus ist das Fehlen oder Vorhandensein eines funktionellen Zusammenhangs nur insoweit relevant, als das beanspruchte Verfahren nur den Betrieb einer Vorrichtung betrifft (G 1/07). Die Entscheidung G 1/07 stellt nämlich fest, dass ein Verfahren - auch wenn das Verfahren als Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Geräts angesehen werden sollte - als ein Verfahren zur chirurgischen Behandlung vom Patentschutz auszuschließen ist, wenn es einen chirurgischen Schritt aufweist oder umfasst (G 1/07). Im vorliegenden Fall war der chirurgische Schritt - die Bewegung des Endoskops im Körperinneren - nicht lediglich ein vorbereitender Schritt, der vorgelagert und nicht Bestandteil des Verfahrens war. Vielmehr war die Bewegung des Endoskops Teil der beanspruchten Datenerfassung.

Anders als in T 992/03, in der die zuständige Kammer feststellte, dass die Verabreichung von polarisiertem <sup>129</sup>Xe-Gas ein vorbereitender Schritt sei, der nicht Teil des beanspruchten Verfahrens war, war im vorliegenden Fall der strittige Schritt der Endoskopbewegung kein vorbereitender Schritt, der vorgelagert war, sondern Teil des beanspruchten Verfahrens.

Der Beschwerdeführer zitierte auch T 836/08, in der die zuständige Kammer befand, dass ein Verfahren zum Ermitteln der Position des distalen Endes eines Knochenführungsdrahts mit einem optischen Tracking- und Navigationssystem nicht invasiv sondern ein passives Mess- und Auswerteverfahren war, das nicht unter die Ausschlussbestimmung von Art. 53 c) EPÜ fiel. Nach Ansicht der Kammer scheint die T 836/08 keine allgemein etablierte Rechtsprechung darzustellen (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 10. Auflage, Juli 2022, I.B.4.4.4d), erster und zweiter Absatz). Auf jeden Fall umfasste - nach der Ansicht der zuständigen Kammer - das Verfahren zum Ermitteln der Position keine Bewegung des Knochenführungsdrahts. Folglich war der Vergleich mit der Bewegung des Endoskops im vorliegenden Fall nicht überzeugend und eine Vorlage an die Große Beschwerdekammer nicht angebracht. Da in einer Ausführungsform die Bewegung des Endoskops in einem Hohlraum eines menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers stattfand, umfasste das vorliegende Verfahren eine derartige Bewegung.

Somit stellte das beanspruchte Verfahren ein Verfahren zur chirurgischen Behandlung des menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers im Sinne des Art. 53 c) EPÜ dar.

125-11-23

## Article 54 EPC | T 0043/18 | Board 3.2.02

### Article 054 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0043/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.06.01
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 087 and 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	novelty – chemical compounds – purity
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88, G 0001/03, G 0002/10, T 0990/96, T 1085/13
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.6.2.1a</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 43/18](#) the board agreed with the rationale and the conclusion of T 1085/13 in relation to the assessment of novelty. T 1085/13 was based on the observation that in G 2/10 the Enlarged Board of Appeal had stated that the overriding principle for any amendment to be allowable under Art. 123(2) EPC was that the subject-matter of an amended claim must be at least implicitly disclosed to the skilled person using common general knowledge in the application as filed. The Enlarged Board further referred to decision G 1/03, which stated that the European patent system must be consistent and the concept of disclosure must be the same for the purposes of Art. 54, 87 and 123 EPC.

Therefore, the conclusion in T 1085/13 was that a claim defining a compound as having a certain purity lacked novelty over a prior-art disclosure describing the same compound only if the prior art disclosed the claimed purity at least implicitly, for example by way of a method for preparing said compound, the method inevitably resulting in the purity as claimed. Such a claim, however, did not lack novelty if the disclosure of the prior art needed to be supplemented, for example by suitable (further) purification methods allowing the skilled person to arrive at the claimed purity. The question of whether such (further) purification methods for the prior-art compound were within the common general knowledge of those skilled in the art and, if applied, would result in the claimed purity, was not relevant to novelty, but was rather a matter to be considered in the assessment of inventive step.

In the present case, claim 1 of the patent in suit was directed to a pharmaceutical dosage form comprising oxycodone hydrochloride having less than 25 ppm of a specific

impurity. In the contested decision, the opposition division had concluded that D1-D3 and D15 did not, even implicitly, disclose the purity recited in claim 1. However, the opposition division reasoned that, following T 990/96, the disclosure in D1-D3 and D15 of oxycodone hydrochloride had made this compound available to the public in all desired grades of purity. The exceptional situation whereby, according to T 990/96, novelty could be acknowledged where all prior attempts to achieve the claimed purity by conventional purification processes had failed, was not applicable to claim 1. Furthermore, the opposition division had concluded a lack of novelty despite accepting that the evidence on file demonstrated, at the effective date of the patent, that there was no specific [oxycodone hydrochloride] preparation available on the market which would have met the claimed purity criteria.

In view of the above, and in line with T 1085/13, the board established that it was abundantly clear that in the present case, the prior art would need to be supplemented with suitable further purification methods in order to (potentially) arrive at the claimed purity, which could not lead to a lack of novelty of the claimed subject-matter, but was rather a matter to be considered in the assessment of inventive step. The board thus concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1 was novel.

011-02-23

## Article 054 EPC | T 1688/20 | Board 3.2.07

### Article 054 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1688/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.19
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 087 and 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	novelty – selection invention – sub-range – gold standard
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/89, G 0011/91, G 0001/03, G 0002/10, G 0001/16, T 0198/84, T 0279/89, T 0234/09, T 1085/13, T 0261/15, T 1472/15, T 0437/17
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.6.3.1</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1688/20](#) the board referred to the three criteria developed in T 198/84, as summarised in T 279/89, according to which a selection of a sub-range of numerical values selected from a broader range was considered novel, when each of the following criteria was satisfied: (a) the selected sub-range is narrow compared to the known range; (b) the selected sub-range is sufficiently far removed from any specific examples disclosed in the prior art and from the end-points of the known range; and (c) the selected range is not an arbitrary specimen of the prior art, i.e. not a mere embodiment of the prior art, but another invention (purposive selection, new technical teaching).

For criterion (c), the board concurred with the most recent decisions, including T 261/15, according to which the criterion of purposive selection was relevant for the question of inventive step rather than for novelty. Indeed, since 2019, the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO stated that only criteria (a) and (b) needed to be fulfilled (see G-VI, 8 (ii) - November 2019 version).

With regard to criteria (a) and (b), the present board was not convinced that the relative terms "narrow" and "sufficiently far removed" provided objective, solid and consistent criteria for establishing novelty of a selected sub-range. The board was of the view that these terms were generally open to such a broad interpretation that the decision whether criteria (a) and (b) were met could also depend on the subjective perception of the deciding body on which values were to be considered "narrow" or "sufficiently far removed".

Furthermore, the board was of the opinion that, at least in the present case, the remaining criteria (a) and (b) did not need to be assessed for the question of novelty. The board started its analysis by recalling that the European patent system must be consistent and the concept of disclosure must be the same for the purposes of Art. 54, 87 and 123(2) EPC (G 1/03, G 2/10 and G 1/16). The board observed that the various tests developed for different cases of amendments were only meant to provide an indication of whether an amendment complied with Art. 123(2) EPC as interpreted according to the "gold standard" (G 3/89, G 11/91 and G 2/10) and should not lead to a different result (see in particular T 1472/15 and T 437/17, regarding the essentiality test).

The board thus held that the same approach should hold true for deciding on novelty of the claimed subject-matter with respect to the prior art, i.e. that no test or list of criteria should lead to a different result than when applying the "gold standard" directly, which was the absolute requirement in terms of disclosure.

In light of the above, the board concluded that in cases where under application of the "gold standard" it could be established whether the skilled person, using common general knowledge, directly and unambiguously derived a claimed sub-range from a particular disclosed range of the prior art, no supporting test or criteria was necessary to reach a conclusion. Thus, none of the three criteria initially developed in T 198/84 needed to be applied.

In the case in hand, the board concluded that, applying the "gold standard" the skilled person could not directly and unambiguously derive the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted from the disclosures of the cited prior art documents. It underlined in its assessment that it was consistent case law that general information, such as a range defined by its boundaries, could not anticipate a more specific technical feature, such as a specific value in that range. This also applied in the case that the alleged value was an adjacent value to be considered after one or the other boundary value.

012-02-23

## Article 054 EPC | T 0670/20 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 054 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0670/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.02
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 054 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	novelty – availability to the public (no) – obligation to maintain secrecy (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0007/07
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.3.4.7</a> , <a href="#">I.C.3.4.12</a> , 10th edition

In [T 670/20](#) the parties agreed that the clinical trials of documents D19 and D20 had been carried out in accordance with the EMEA Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice. These guidelines explicitly required adherence to the prescribed protocol and assurance of drug accountability. This set-up of the trials of documents D19 and D20 implied that the patients who decided to participate in the trials had agreed, following their informed consent, to use the provided medication according to instruction or to return the unused medication. Accordingly, the participating patients who were provided with the tablets under investigation entered into a special relationship with the investigators of the trials and were with regard to the provided tablets not members of the public that could freely dispose over these tablets.

The board acknowledged that the statements in documents D19 and D20 encouraging patients to discuss their participation in the trials indicated that the patients were not under a duty of confidence with respect to their participation to the trials and the information regarding the trial provided to them in that context. However, the board found no reason why the absence of the patients' duty of confidence with respect to the information relevant to their participation in the trials should affect the obligations of the participating patients regarding the use and return of the tablets provided to them, which resulted from their decision to participate in the trials. The board noted that the patients' agreement to use the provided medication according to instruction or to return the unused medication obliged the patients irrespectively of any sanction (and lack thereof) on non-compliance and therefore disqualified the patients as members of the public with respect to the medication provided to them. The possibility of non-compliance to the instructed use and return of the tablets by the participating patients did not affect the essence of this agreement.



In T 7/07 the competent board had concluded on the basis of the available information that apparently the sponsor of the trial had effectively lost control over the drugs after these had been handed out to the participants of the trial as members of the public who were not bound to secrecy.

The board held that in the present case the tablets were not provided to the participants of the trial as members of the public, which distinguished the circumstances of the trials of documents D19 and D20 from the circumstances of the trial considered in T 7/07. Accordingly the board held that the public had not gained access to the claimed tablets during the trials reported in documents D19 and D20 and that the main request therefore complied with the requirement of novelty.

021-03-23

## Article 054 EPC | T 0438/19 | Board 3.3.03

### Article 054 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0438/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.27
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	A
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 112(1)(a) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	state of the art – availability to the public – composition or internal structure can be analysed and reproduced without undue burden – referral to the Enlarged Board
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88, G 0006/88, G 0001/92, T 0206/83, T 0026/85, T 0952/92, T 0977/93, T 0326/01, T 0370/02, T 0946/04, T 1553/06, T 2045/09, T 2458/09, T 0510/10, T 0023/11, T 0877/11, T 2048/12, T 1833/14, T 0505/15, T 2068/15, T 1452/16, T 1666/16, T 1540/21, <i>Takeda UK v F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG</i> [2019] EWHC 1911
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.3.2.4d</a> ), <a href="#">I.C.4.11.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 438/19](#) the board identified boards' diverging approaches in applying G 1/92 with regard to the following aspects: (i) interpretation of "available to the public" leading to the exclusion from the state of the art within the meaning of Art. 54(2) EPC of a commercial product (including its chemical composition/internal structure) or only of its chemical composition/internal structure, (ii) the degree of detail required for the analysis of said product and (iii) the requirements for its reproducibility.

With regard to point (i), boards had reached diverging conclusions when it was found that the product put on the market could not be analysed or reproduced, deciding either that (a) its chemical composition (or internal structure) was not state of the art, i.e. adopting the wording of the conclusion of G 1/92, or that (b) the product itself was not state of the art, thus including its chemical composition or internal structure based on G 1/92, point 1.4 of the Reasons. On point (ii), whereas some boards had taken as a criterion the exact composition of the product, in other decisions such a strict condition had not been required. The situation was similar with regard to the reproducibility condition (point (iii)). Whereas some boards had taken as a criterion the ability to exactly reproduce the product, in other decisions such a strict condition had not been required.

In the light of the case law as at the date of G 1/92, the rationale underlying G 1/92 appeared to be that the enablement of a disclosure was a necessary condition for this disclosure to have been made available to the public within the meaning of Art. 54(2) EPC. However, in the light of the travaux préparatoires, "available to the public" in Art. 54(2) EPC appeared to be intended to express the possibility for the public to take note of the prior art, i.e. the accessibility to the public of the prior art, without any requirement as to its enablement. In addition, partial properties or structural information of a product put on the market were frequently reported in documentation published before the relevant filing date. There was no apparent reason why such partial information about products put on the market reported in said literature without any information as to the reproducibility of said product, which information might even be the result of a partial analysis of said product performed by the authors of the publication, should be treated differently from any information which could be gained from a partial analysis of the same commercial product.

The board also explained that a decision on the ability of the skilled person to reproduce a product put on the market, which one could understand as the ability to reproduce it identically, would not only require an assessment of the level of detail or type of characterisation required for analysing a given product, but also a definition of the degree of variance which can be accepted in order to qualify the product reproduced to be identical to that put on the market. This would appear in the field of polymers to entail the use of subjective criteria, resulting in legal uncertainty when novelty and inventive step needed to be examined in the light of said product. It was however clear from G 1/92 that the Enlarged Board, for reasons of legal certainty, did not wish to provide a definition of the state of the art which would result in a subjective assessment of novelty.

The board therefore referred the following questions to the Enlarged Board:

- "1. Is a product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application to be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?
2. If the answer to question 1 is no, is technical information about said product which was made available to the public before the filing date (e.g. by publication of technical brochure, non-patent or patent literature) state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, irrespective of whether the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?
3. If the answer to question 1 is yes or the answer to question 2 is no, which criteria are to be applied in order to determine whether or not the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden within the meaning of opinion G 1/92? In particular, is it required that the composition and internal structure of the product be fully analysable and identically reproducible?"

094-09-23

## Article 054 EPC | T 0558/20 | Board 3.3.10

### Article 054 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0558/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.10
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 053(c), 054(5) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	novelty – novelty of use – second (or further) medical use
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/08
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.7.2.4c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 558/20](#) the board had to decide on the proper assessment of novelty under Art. 54(5) EPC, in particular when a claim defines a combined surgical and therapeutic method. The invention concerned a bone regenerative material for use in a method of treating a patient suffering from a degenerative bone condition that can be characterized by a loss of bone mineral density. The method comprised surgical steps of forming a void in a localized area of intact bone and filling it with the bone regenerative material.

In its decision, the opposition division came to the conclusion that claim 1 of the granted patent could not benefit from the novelty exception in Art. 54(5) EPC; the claim had to be interpreted as being directed to a material suitable to be used in the method defined in the claim. The claim thus lacked novelty over the prior art.

The board stated that Art. 54(5) EPC did not, as such, define any criteria to be applied for assessing whether a claim drafted according to the wording of the article was novel or not. It held that novelty of the claim over the prior art must be assessed in the usual way, i. e. by comparing the features of the claim, the nature of the substance or composition as well as the use and method steps, with the disclosure of the prior art. In the present case, the opposition division had first examined whether the specific use of the substance or composition defined in the claim was already known or not. If the use was already known, the claim could not benefit from the novelty exception.

The board's approach by contrast meant reading the claim as it was drafted, assuring that the method fell under Art. 53(c) EPC, then considering the use and method features as limiting and assessing whether the specific use defined by them was already known

from the prior art. This, in the board's view is aligned with Art. 54(5) EPC and follows its logic.

The respondent argued that the therapeutic use defined in the claim, i. e. the use of the bone grafting materials defined therein for the treatment of degenerative bone conditions, was already known as such. The board however held that the claim defined a method for treating a patient suffering from a degenerative bone disease comprising two steps, firstly creating a void in an intact bone, and secondly filling the void with bone regenerative material. This was the "specific use in a method" referred to in Art. 54(5) EPC, and this use needed to be compared with the prior art. The surgical step was clearly a part of the therapeutic method. Without it, the bone grafting material could not deploy its therapeutic activity. The method defined in the present claim had to be assessed as a whole. The respondent's approach to mentally split the method into different parts, associate to some of them an effect of the substance or composition defined in the claim as opposed to others, and ignore the ones, which were not considered associated in this way was not valid in the present case because the surgical step was an integral part of the therapeutic method in which the substance was used. In view of Art. 53(c) EPC, referring to both therapeutic and surgical methods individually the board had some doubts whether, in general, such an approach was at all justified, but this was not decisive here. Thus, the surgical method steps could not be ignored when assessing novelty of the claim.

The opposition division had also held auxiliary request 2 to lack novelty, since the method steps therein did not provide a "new technical teaching", a terminology taken from the Enlarged Board's decision G 2/08, which implied that for establishing novelty a new technical teaching was required.

The board held that, as set out above, in a claim drafted according to Art. 54(5) EPC the method steps had to be taken into account when deciding on novelty. In the present case, requiring additional surgical steps clearly provided a new technical teaching compared to the prior art, because additional physical actions had to be undertaken. It disclosed forming a channel and using this channel as an access to form a void greater than the channel in the bone, whereas in the prior art, a hole was drilled, but nothing more. The method defined in the claim was thus not just verbally different from the prior art, but differed in tangible, physical method steps and thus novel.

126-11-23

## Article 56 EPC | T 1001/18 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1001/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – problem and solution approach
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0495/91
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.2.2.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.4.4.3a</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1001/18](#) the invention related to a coin token assembly for use in a vending machine dispensing coin tokens. The board found D3 to be the most suitable spring-board for the problem and solution approach, whereas the impugned decision relied on D1 as the closest prior art. The board found that D1 had a completely different purpose to that of the present invention.

The main difference between the claimed invention and D3 was that the coin tokens were made of plastic having a thickness of 0.5 to 4 mm, rather than paper. The technical effect disclosed in the originally filed application was that the tokens could be counted by weighing. None of the cited documents D1 to D4 disclosed any other effect related to the use of plastic coin tokens.

The board stated that since the problem and solution approach defines the problem based on the effect of the differences from the closest prior art, and the effect is derived primarily from the disclosure of the invention, the effect documented in the present application documents alone was taken as the basis for the problem formulation. The board concluded that any further, undocumented effects would be speculative and should not be additionally included in the problem formulation (with reference to T 495/91, point 4.2 of the Reasons, as well as to the "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office", 10th edition, 2022, I.D.4.2.2). Consequently, the problem was formulated as "modifying D3 such that a supply of used coin tokens can be counted in simple manner".

Considering obviousness, the board found the paper coins in D3 were not suitable for counting by weighing and D3 did not give any hint either to count the tokens by

weighing or to use another material (e.g. plastic) instead of paper. Therefore, given the teaching of D3 alone, the skilled person would not have considered a count by weighing. While D2 taught that a token could be made of plastic in form of a coin, it did not disclose counting them by weighing, and so the board found the skilled person would have had no reason to replace the paper tokens of D3 by the plastic tokens disclosed in D2 in order to solve the objective problem. Furthermore, even if, for some reason, the skilled person had considered combining the teaching of D2 with the teaching of D3, this would not have led to the claimed invention.

In summary, the board concluded the skilled person would have no incentive to modify the vending machine of D3 to make it suitable for dispensing plastic coins, which were suitable for counting by weighing. Therefore, starting from D3, the skilled person would not arrive at the combination of features (A) to (N).

The board judged that, taking into account the available prior art, the coin tokens assembly of claim 1 involved an inventive step within the meaning of Art. 56 EPC. It therefore ordered the decision under appeal be set aside and remitted to the department of first instance with the order to grant a patent on the basis of claims 1 to 13 of the main request submitted during the oral proceedings.

001-01-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1349/19 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1349/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – ex post facto analysis (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.6.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1349/19](#) the objective technical problem was the provision of an alternative vegetable-derived fat composition which could mimic the fat composition of human milk and which could be produced in a simple and cost-effective manner. It was not contested that this problem had been solved by the provision of the claimed composition.

In order to show that the claimed solution to the underlying problem did not involve an inventive step, the appellant (opponent 3) relied primarily on D14. In the appellant's opinion, in order to provide a composition better suited to replace human milk, the skilled person would have increased the amount of C8:0 and C10:0 fatty acids in the fat blend of D19. They would have considered medium chain triglyceride oil (MCT oil) as the best source of C8:0 and C10:0 fatty acids. Consequently, they would have included 7% of the MCT oil mentioned in the patent to achieve a content of C8:0 and C10:0 fatty acids within the claimed ranges. The appellant went on to contend that the skilled person would also have been inclined to (a) reduce the randomised palm olein content to allow for the added 7% MCT oil; they would have also reduced the amount of palm olein, rather than that of soybean, sunflower and palm kernel oil, and (b) to replace 4% of the OPO-rich fat with 3% high oleic sunflower and 1% flaxseed oil.

The appellant acknowledged that, starting from D19, several steps had to be taken to arrive at the claimed composition. However, in its opinion, these steps were "interconnected such that a change in one will have an influence on one or more of the other steps". This meant that only two obvious modifications were required: the replacement of some of the palm olein with MCT oil and the replacement of some of the OPO-rich fat with high oleic sunflower oil and flaxseed oil.



The board was not convinced and found a lack of incentive in the prior art to perform the steps suggested by the appellant.

The appellant further argued that, starting from D19, the skilled person was "likely to combine the teaching of D5, D9, D11, D14, D22 and D23 (to account for the known variation in human milk fat content) and thus arrive at a range for the amount of each fatty acid in human milk". In its opinion, a broad range defining possible amounts of each fatty acid could be created, combining the lowest and highest amounts of the fatty acids observed in the various milks disclosed in these documents. It then contended that, since the ranges in claim 1 were encompassed in, or at least overlapped with, these broadly defined ranges, the claimed composition was the result of a mere juxtaposition of obvious features selected by "cherry-picking" from the prior art.

The board concluded that the appellant's arguments involved a convoluted set of sequential steps conceived starting from the compositions defined in claim 1 and working backwards, in an attempt to bridge the considerable gap with the composition described in D19. Since these steps were not suggested by the prior art, the board held they could only be taken by exercising hindsight.

002-01-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1750/19 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1750/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.21
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – non-obvious alternative – skilled person
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0007/93, G 0003/14, T 0910/02, T 0663/10, T 0671/12, T 1742/12, T 0166/17
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.6.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1750/19](#) the board found that D4 was a suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step. The appellant, on obviousness, argued that the skilled person knew from D8 that basically any low molecular weight compound having two functional groups that react with isocyanate may be used as a chain extender, and that as the lactic acid-ethylene glycol dimer in Example 17 of D1 was a diol, the skilled person would have considered it to be an alternative to the chain extender in D4 1,4-butenediol.

The board disagreed, finding that D4 could only be combined with Example 17 of D1 with hindsight; the skilled person had no motivation to replace the chain extender in Example 2 of D4 with the lactic acid-ethylene glycol dimer in Example 17 of D1.

The board stated it was apparent that the teaching of D4 and the teaching of D1 were incompatible and that the skilled person starting from D4 and seeking an alternative polyurethane had different options for modifying the original polymer, one of which was replacing the chain extender with an alternative chain extender. Should the skilled person select this option, they would certainly not turn to D1. They would look for compounds already known as polyurethane chain extenders rather than selecting a compound having a different function in a document containing teaching that is incompatible with the starting point. The common general knowledge disclosed in D8 did not change this conclusion; D8 would not give the skilled person any incentive to select a compound from D1, which did not contain any teaching relating to chain extenders, just because the compound contained two hydroxyl groups.

The board found that the subject-matter of claim 1 was inventive and met the requirements of Art. 56 EPC. This was also the case for the other independent claims of the main request.

003-01-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0605/20 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0605/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – formulation of the technical problem – no pointer to the solution – ex post facto analysis
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0002/81, T 0800/91, T 0971/92, T 1170/02, T 0249/12, T 1087/15, T 0116/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.2.1</a> , <a href="#">I.D.4.2.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 605/20](#) D3 represented the closest prior art. The difference between the composition of claim 1 as granted and the most pertinent exemplified compositions in document D3 relied upon by the appellant-opponents as starting points in the prior art was not in dispute and concerned the presence of propylene glycol in the composition claimed in the patent instead of the isotonic agents mannitol or glycerol in the compositions described in document D3.

Contrary to the arguments from the appellant-opponents the board found that the undesired phenomena observed in the patent with the use of the compositions comprising mannitol or glycerol of document D3 would not inevitably manifest themselves upon the practical implementation of the teaching of document D3. It held that the recognition of the relevance of these phenomena should therefore be considered to form part of the technical contribution described in the patent. A specific reference in the formulation of the objective technical problem to the avoidance of these phenomena would risk to unfairly direct development towards the claimed solution, which was not permissible, as it would introduce aspects of hindsight in the assessment of obviousness of the solution (see in particular T 800/91).

The appellant-opponents objected that the patent merely presented an allegation regarding the stability of compositions comprising propylene glycol as defined in the claims as granted. The board observed, however, that the report in the patent on the maintained stability of the compositions comprising propylene glycol concerned a verifiable observation rather than merely some allegation.

The maintained stability of the compositions comprising propylene glycol did not imply an actual improvement with respect to the compositions comprising mannitol or glycerol as described in document D3. However, the board found no reason why the formulation of the objective technical problem could not refer to the purpose of maintaining the stability of the compositions.

In light of the above the board concluded that the problem to be solved starting from the mannitol or the glycerol based compositions of document D3 may be formulated as the provision of liraglutide containing compositions having optimized manufacturability and usability whilst maintaining stability.

Assessing the solution, the board found D3 itself provided no suggestion towards any advantage from the use of propylene glycol over mannitol or glycerol. On the contrary, document D3 recommended mannitol and glycerol as the preferred isotonic ingredients. It concluded that as the solution to the identified objective technical problem, the replacement of the isotonic agents mannitol and glycerol in the compositions of document D3 by propylene glycol was therefore not obvious to the skilled person.

The board did not recognise any divergence between T 1087/15 and T 800/91 as argued by the appellant-opponents. In T 1087/15 it was considered that knowledge of the claimed invention was indispensable in order to formulate the objective technical problem irrespective of the choice of the starting point in the prior art. The board agreed; knowledge of the claimed invention was inevitable in order to be able to analyse it for compliance with the requirement of inventive step. It was precisely for that reason the technical problem underlying a claimed invention had to be formulated, according to the established jurisprudence, in such a way that it did not contain pointers to the solution or partially anticipate the solution. The assessment of the solution for obviousness in light of the prior art would otherwise be unduly influenced by an ex post facto view on the matter. The board stated it was in line with this jurisprudence that according to T 800/91 the technical problem should not be tendentiously formulated in a way that unfairly directs development towards the claimed solution.

The board concluded that the patent as granted also met the requirement of inventive step and ordered that the appeals be dismissed.

004-01-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0547/21 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0547/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.06
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – common general knowledge – obvious solution – objective technical problem
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.2.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 547/21](#) D2 was the closest prior art, the aim of the disclosed process therein being, inter alia, to increase the concentration of solids in skim milk or whey, an aim shared by the application at issue. The board noted that it could only be acknowledged that recirculating the UF permeate as disclosed in the application led to a further increase in the solids content if the skilled person would have implicitly inferred this effect on the basis of common general knowledge. The board accepted this assumption and deemed the objective technical problem was to provide a process that led to a further increase in the solids content.

On obviousness, the board agreed with the examination division that "the skilled person would be aware that a valuable product [e.g. lactose] still present in the UF permeate can be recovered by a second pass through the system. Indeed, recirculation loops are known in the art particularly for the purpose of recouping useful products from a first pass through a membrane system" (text in square brackets added by the board). Therefore, in view of the objective technical problem posed, the claimed recirculation would have represented an obvious technical measure that the skilled person starting from D2 would have selected on the basis of common general knowledge. It followed that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request would have been obtained without exercising any inventive skill.

The appellant argued that recirculating the UF permeate to the RO step was not disclosed in either D2 or any of the other documents referred to in the decision under appeal, which, it argued, were instead aimed at fractionating the skim milk or whey. Therefore, the skilled person would not have contemplated returning the UF permeate to the RO in the system since doing so would have deprived the prior-art processes of

one of their purposes, i.e. producing a UF permeate rich in lactose. The board was not convinced by the argument; the fact that recirculating the UF permeate leads to an increase in the solids content of the UF retentate had to be regarded as belonging to common general knowledge. Therefore, no secondary document disclosing this feature was needed. What was relevant for the assessment of inventive step was the general teaching in D2 to increase the concentration of solids in skim milk or whey by using the combination of RO and UF.

The board found that the appellant's argument was an attempt to replace the objective technical problem with the one allegedly aimed at in the closest prior art. However, the objective technical problem is the problem solved by the distinguishing feature of the claimed invention over the closest prior art, not a problem allegedly aimed at in that closest prior art. The board further held that the fact that other possibilities would have been known to the skilled person, as argued by the appellant, had no bearing on the conclusion that the claimed solution was obvious to the skilled person on the basis of common general knowledge.

The board concluded that, starting from D2, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request did not involve an inventive step within the meaning of Art. 56 EPC in view of common general knowledge.

005-01-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0929/18 | Board 3.5.01

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0929/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.05.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 056 and 092 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – notorious knowledge – additional search
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1242/04, T 0690/06, T 1515/07, T 1411/08, T 2467/09, T 0698/11
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.B.4.1.3a</a> , 10th edition

In [T 929/18](#) the examining division had refused the application for lack of inventive step without referring to any prior art documents.

In particular, claim 5 referred to mobile user devices in a "peer-to-peer" data sharing group. Each mobile user device of the data sharing group stored the shared data and maintained a list of the mobile user devices in the data sharing group. Messages from one mobile user device were directed to the respective members of the group through a relay or router, and the messages contained the addresses of the group members.

The examining division considered that the "peer-to-peer" data sharing group was administrative in nature and that the implementation via the relay or router was an insignificant technical detail, essentially being mapped onto the router in a conventional network. Thus, the technical character of independent claim 5 resided solely in the implementation of an administrative scheme on a notoriously known electronic data processing system comprising a local and a remote computer communicating over a network and exchanging data.

The board disagreed with the view of the examining division. Essentially, the board, referring to decision T 1411/08, held that a mobile user device of a peer-to-peer data sharing group was a technical feature of the infrastructure of the system, which went beyond a notorious data processing system.



Therefore, the board remitted the case to the examining division for an additional search to be carried out (Guidelines C-IV, 7.2). The board noted that the Guidelines did not define what such an additional search should cover. In the board's view, in a case like this, where no search had been carried out, the additional search should be just as complete as a normal prior art search under Art. 92 EPC. Furthermore, in the interest of proper administration, the results of the search ought to be presented in the public file, either in a separate document or in a communication of the examining division. At a minimum, the field of search and the relevant documents should be indicated. Should the search not reveal any relevant documents, a statement to that effect would allow the applicant, a board of appeal and third parties to conclude that the search had been completed.

013-02-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1105/17 | Board 3.5.06

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1105/17</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC 1973
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – programming language
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1539/09, T 0790/14
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.9</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1105/17](#) the board stated that it had consistently been decided by the boards of appeal (see, e.g. T 1539/09 and T 790/14) that the design or provision of programming language constructs per se did not contribute to the solution of a technical problem and could not therefore contribute to the presence of an inventive step.

In the present case, the alleged effect of the new programming language construct was to "allow [...] a programmer to specify event-handling mechanisms in JAVA using more concise, less verbose syntax" in order "to make programmers more efficient" by "reducing the amount of code that programmers need to write".

It was true that having to write "less verbose" source code may "spare" the programmer some "burden", namely the mental burden of having to conceive the more verbose syntax or the "mechanical" effort of inputting that code into a computer. The compiled code generated was – and was defined to be – the same as if the more verbose syntax had been used (see claim 1, lines 7-12). Hence, the invention had no effect on the compiled code eventually carried out.

Moreover, the mentioned advantages were only relative to a programming language with a "more verbose" syntax. The choice of the "less verbose" programming language could not, for the purposes of inventive step, be distinguished from the choice of any programming language. Programmers may make this choice according to one or several of the following reasons: (1) according to subjective preferences, (2) according to circumstances such as which programming language has already been chosen in a given project or (3) for which the compiler happens to be available on the available hardware, but, indeed, also (4) according to which programming language provides certain commands. At least the first three were non-technical reasons for the choice.

Since the claim language did not exclude these, it could be left open whether consideration (4) (contributed by the appellant) might, in certain circumstances, be acceptable as technical.

The board considered that sparing the programmer some mental burden during programming was not, in itself, a technical problem. This was also the case because it could not be determined objectively: programmers may differ as to which programming constructs they find simpler to understand and deal with.

022-03-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0297/20 | Board 3.5.03

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0297/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.17
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – guided human-machine interaction
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0115/85, T 1802/13, T 0336/14
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.10b</a> , 10th edition

In [T 297/20](#) the board held that the mere change, by an operator, of the degree of abstraction of a graphical view ("condensation") of a power grid did not credibly assist a user in performing a technical task by means of a continued and/or guided human-machine interaction process within the meaning of T 336/14 and T 1802/13 and thus could not bring about a technical effect.

The application at hand concerned the presentation of information on a visual display regarding control stations and power lines of a power grid for a "Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition" (SCADA) system. Such a system was typically used for supervising, monitoring and controlling a large and complex power grid. Overviews of such grids on screen can render it difficult for an operator to see "the big picture". The invention in question tried to address this by controlling the level or degree of abstraction with which the control stations and power lines were represented and seeking a balance between the amount and the accuracy of the visually represented information. The board stated that this was not bound to be a technical problem.

The board recalled that a feature relating to the presentation of information may only contribute to an inventive step if it brought about an overall technical effect. Within the context of graphical user interfaces, this was the case if the feature credibly assisted the user in performing a technical task by means of a continued and/or guided human-machine interaction process regarding both the type of the information presented, i.e. "what" is presented, and the manner in which it was presented, i.e. "how" it is presented (T 336/14, T 1802/13).

The appellant referred to case T 115/85 in support of its argument that giving a visual indication constituted a technical problem. The board, however, held that the situation envisaged in T 115/85 where visual feedback on displayed operation states was

provided for enabling a technical system's proper functioning had to be distinguished from the one where the information presented was exclusively aimed at the mental activities of the system user as the final addressee (T 336/14). The information presented in the former situation could be typically seen as "technical information" whereas in the latter situation, the presented information had no technical effect.

In the present case, even when construing features in the appellant's favour, the board could not recognise any "continued and/or guided human-machine interaction process" associated with these features, let alone one that would assist the user in carrying out a technical task (i.e. a task with an underlying credible technical effect). This conclusion applied to both the features relating to "what" was presented and to "how" it was presented. Instead, those features all related to subjective factors, such as a user's personal taste or preference about how much detail should actually be presented. Such subjective factors were of a non-technical nature. The board concluded that there was no credible technical effect.

023-03-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0335/20 | Board 3.3.08

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0335/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.29
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	problem and solution approach – closest prior art – skilled person – distinguishing features may come from another prior-art document or from the common general knowledge
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/15, T 0609/02
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.3.2.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 88\(3\) EPC.](#)

In [T 335/20](#) the board found that D9 provided an enabling disclosure of the suitability of PGRN replacement for the treatment of FTD (see also T 609/02). Since document D9 dealt with the same disease as claim 1, identified low levels of PGRN as the cause of the disease and provided an enabling disclosure of the suitability of PGRN replacement for the treatment of FTD, it was considered to be a suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step in claim 1.

It was undisputed that D9 did not provide any information on the specific therapeutics to be used for the replacement of PGRN or any technical teaching for reducing the therapeutic application to practice. The opposition division had held that this lack of information as to how to reduce the therapeutic application to practice meant that the "therapeutic use" was not directly and unambiguously derivable from the disclosure of D9, with the result that this document did not disclose "in an enabling manner, a method of treating FTD", and therefore was not directed to the same, or to a similar, purpose as claim 1. The respondents furthermore submitted that, since D9 was not an enabling disclosure of a therapeutic application, it was not a disclosure of such an application at all, and that the closest prior art could not be a teaching in a document that could not be reduced to practice by the skilled person on the basis of that document.

The board considered that D9 provided an enabling disclosure of what it proposed, i.e. PGRN replacement therapy as a therapeutic strategy to treat FTD. It was not necessary

for D9 to provide an enabling disclosure of what was claimed. When applying the problem-and-solution approach in the assessment of inventive step, information that was not disclosed in the prior art is considered in determining the distinguishing features, the resulting technical effect, and the formulation of the objective technical problem to be solved. To what extent the claimed subject-matter differed from the disclosure in D9 was thus relevant when determining the distinguishing features. The teaching towards the distinguishing features may then come from another prior-art document or from the common general knowledge of the skilled person. D9's lack of disclosure as regards implementation of the proposed PGRN replacement therapy did not therefore disqualify it from being the starting point for the assessment of inventive step.

024-03-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0702/20 | Board 3.5.06

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0702/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.07
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – excluded matter – neural network
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.11e</a> , 10th edition

In [T 702/20](#) the board held that a neural network defines a class of mathematical functions which, as such, was excluded matter. As for other "non-technical" matter, it could therefore only be considered for the assessment of inventive step when used to solve a technical problem, e.g. when trained with specific data for a specific technical task. According to the board, the claim as a whole specified abstract computer-implemented mathematical operations on unspecified data, namely that of defining a class of approximating functions (the network with its structure), solving a (complex) system of (non-linear) equations to obtain the parameters of the functions (the learning of the weights). According to the claim, the neural network had a new structure because the hierarchical neural network was formed by loose couplings between the nodes in accordance with a sparse parity-check matrix of a low-density parity-check code.

The appellant argued that the proposed modification in the neural network structure, in comparison with standard fully-connected networks, would reduce the amount of resources required, in particular storage, and that this should be recognized as a technical effect, following G 1/19.

The board noted that, while the storage and computational requirements were indeed reduced in comparison with the fully-connected network, this did not in and by itself translate to a technical effect, for the simple reason that the modified network was different and would not learn in the same way. So it required less storage, but it did not do the same thing. For instance, a one-neuron neural network required the least storage, but it would not be able to learn any complex data relationship. The proposed comparison was therefore deemed incomplete, as it only focused on the computational requirements, and insufficient to establish a technical effect. The claimed invention thus lacked inventive step.



As a further remark, the board stressed that there could be no reasonable doubt that neural networks can provide technical tools useful for automating human tasks or solving technical problems. In most cases, however, this required them to be sufficiently specified, in particular as regards the training data and the technical task addressed. In this particular case, the board could not see, considering the content of the application, for which type of learning tasks the proposed structure may be of benefit, and to what extent.

025-03-23

## Article 056 EPC | G 0002/21 | Enlarged Board of Appeal

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>G 0002/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	EBA
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.23
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	A
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 052(1), 056, 083, 100, 101(2), 112(1)(a), 112(2), 113(1), 117(1), 125 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 004, 150 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	point of law of fundamental importance – uniform application of law – post-published evidence – rephrase referred questions (no) – extend scope of referred questions (no) – exception to principle of free evaluation of evidence (no) – inventive step, reliance on technical effect (yes, based on the application as originally filed) – sufficiency of disclosure (obiter dictum)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/97, G 0004/97, T 0482/89, T 0838/92, T 0609/02, T 0893/02, T 1110/03, T 0474/04, T 1329/04, T 0545/08, T 1545/08, T 0419/12, T 0919/15, T 0184/16, T 0031/18, T 0116/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.3.3</a> , <a href="#">II.C.7.2.</a> , <a href="#">III.G.4.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [G 2/21](#) the points of law referred to the Enlarged Board addressed two issues: whether the principle of free evaluation of evidence required a qualification in respect of certain evidence relied upon for a purported technical effect in the assessment of inventive step, and the relevant criteria to be applied with regard to such a technical effect (which the referring board in T 116/18 referred to as "ab initio plausibility", "ab initio implausibility" and "no plausibility").

The EBA found the principle of free evaluation of evidence could be defined in abstract and general terms as allowing and, by the same token, requiring a judicial body, like the boards of appeal, to decide according to its own discretion and its own conviction, by taking account of the entire content of the parties' submissions and, where appropriate, any evidence admissibly submitted or taken, without observing formal rules, whether a contested factual assertion is to be regarded as true or false. The only decisive factor was whether the judge was personally convinced of the truth of the factual allegation, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The principle of free evaluation of evidence qualified as a universally applicable principle in assessing any means of evidence by a board of appeal. This was enshrined in the right of each party to proceedings under the EPC to give evidence in appropriate form pursuant to Art. 113(1) and 117(1) EPC. This principle was also known and applied in various EPC Contracting States with a civil law system.

Notwithstanding the specific drafting of the referred questions, the EBA turned to referred questions two and three of the referral. It concluded that the term "plausibility" found in the case law of the boards of appeal and relied upon by the referring board in questions 2 and 3 of the referral, did not amount to a distinctive legal concept or a specific patent law requirement under the EPC, in particular under Art. 56 and 83 EPC. It held that the relevant standard for the reliance on a purported technical effect when assessing whether or not the claimed subject-matter involved an inventive step concerned the question of what the skilled person, with the common general knowledge in mind, would understand at the filing date from the application as originally filed as the technical teaching of the claimed invention. The technical effect relied upon, even at a later stage, needed to be encompassed by that technical teaching and to embody the same invention.

The EBA stated that irrespective of the actual circumstances of a particular case, the guiding principles set out above should allow the competent board of appeal or other deciding body to take a decision on whether or not post-published evidence may or may not be relied upon in support of an asserted technical effect when assessing whether or not the claimed subject-matter involved an inventive step.

For these reasons the EBA answered the referred questions of law as follows:

1. Evidence submitted by a patent applicant or proprietor to prove a technical effect relied upon for acknowledgement of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter may not be disregarded solely on the ground that such evidence, on which the effect rests, had not been public before the filing date of the patent in suit and was filed after that date.
2. A patent applicant or proprietor may rely upon a technical effect for inventive step if the skilled person, having the common general knowledge in mind, and based on the application as originally filed, would derive said effect as being encompassed by the technical teaching and embodied by the same originally disclosed invention.

The scope of the point of law defined by the referred questions and the reasons for the referring decision did not allow for or require that the referred questions be re-phrased by adding a reference to the issue of sufficiency of disclosure and Art. 83 EPC. In obiter dictum, however, the EBA observed that the notion of "plausibility" had been used in particular concerning second medical use and summarised examples of decisions in line with T 609/02. The scope of reliance on post published evidence was much narrower under sufficiency of disclosure. For the disclosure of the invention to be sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by the person skilled in the art, the proof of a claimed therapeutic effect had to be provided in the application as filed.

041-05-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1158/17 | Board 3.5.01

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1158/17</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.12
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – technical contribution – routing an electronic message and ensuring its integrity – no mere automation of an administrative scheme
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1082/13
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.11.h</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 1158/17](#) the invention concerned a system for secure delivery of business mailings, for example contracts or invoices. The board was not convinced by the contested decision's finding that the claimed components were not technical because they modelled the roles of humans interacting within the framework of the administrative postal scheme. The board considered that a similarity to a business or administrative solution was not a sufficient reason for denying a technical contribution of a claim feature applied in a technical context and involving technical considerations. Put another way, technical considerations in the technical context could not be negated merely on the basis of a non-technical analogy.

The board disagreed with the contested decision, according to which at the high level of abstraction at which they were claimed and disclosed in the application, the claimed components modelled the roles of groups of persons interacting within the framework of the administrative postal scheme. The board illustrated the insufficiency of such reasoning by looking at the following example. The analogy to a post office, essentially invoked by the contested decision, is used in technical literature in order to describe functionality of the transport layer (layer 4) of the OSI model. However, in the board's view, it would not be sound to assert, only based on this analogy, that communication protocols implementing this layer's functionality lack technical character.

042-05-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0814/19 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0814/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.19
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	Inventive step – non-obvious solution – broad claims
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.9.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 814/19](#) the objective technical problem was found the provision of an olaparib formulation suitable as a pharmaceutical dosage form for administration to patients.

The appellant (opponent) contested that this problem was solved across the whole breadth of claim 1 because the claim was drafted too broadly; claim 1 did not define any amounts or weight ratios of olaparib and the matrix polymer, so the claim would encompass formulations with high drug loadings that would not exhibit the required stability and bioavailability for administration to patients.

The board disagreed. It was not disputed that the higher the drug loading, the more likely crystallisation was to occur. Crystallisation would reduce bioavailability to some extent, but some degree of crystallisation did not make the formulation necessarily unsuitable for administration to patients. Furthermore, the skilled person could not be expected to work within unreasonable ranges of drug loadings that would result in a massively oversaturated product that would no longer qualify as a solid dispersion. Therefore, the board considered that the formulations proposed in claim 1 were a suitable solution to the objective technical problem.

On the issue of obviousness, the appellant cited documents D2 and D3 as prior art to be combined with D5. The board agrees with the respondent (patent-proprietor) that this combination of documents could only be made with hindsight.

The board found that gathering the knowledge presented in the patent for the first time required a considerable amount of research and could in no way be derived from D5 (closest prior art). The fact that this research belonged to the common methodology for developing drugs did not render its results obvious. The essential point was that, on the

filing date of the patent, the skilled person did not know that olaparib was particularly difficult to formulate because it required high drug loadings and presented bioavailability and stability issues. Therefore, the skilled person would have formulated olaparib in any of the conventional formulations suggested on pages 18 and 19 of D5, rather than as a solid dispersion. They had no motivation to turn to D2 or D3, which were concerned with the issue of improving the bioavailability of sparingly soluble drugs.

Concluding, the board found that the skilled person would therefore not have arrived at the solid dispersion of claim 1 without the knowledge made available in the patent. The subject-matter of the main request involves an inventive step, as required by Art. 56 EPC.

043-05-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 2039/18 | Board 3.2.06

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2039/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.24
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 056, 083 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – non-obvious alternative – skilled person – no equation of requirements of Art. 56 and 83 EPC
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0460/87
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.5.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.8.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2039/18](#) befand die Kammer, dass ausgehend von dem Unterscheidungsmerkmal des Anspruchs 1 gegenüber D5 die zu lösende objektive technische Aufgabe darin zu sehen sei, eine geeignete Oxidationsschutzschicht für die Schaufelspitze (einer thermischen Strömungsmaschine) zu finden.

D5 offenbare sämtliche Merkmale des Anspruchs 1, außer dass die Schaufelspitze lediglich mit einer homogenen metallischen Abdeckschicht aus MCrAlY versehen sei. Die Kammer teilte die Ansicht des Beschwerdeführers (Einsprechenden) nicht, dass Anspruch 1 keinen technischen Vorteil gegenüber D5 offenbare und daher keine technische Aufgabe formuliert werden könne. Sie stimmte dem Beschwerdeführer zwar dahingehend zu, dass die Schaufelspitze von D5, wenn sie kubisches Bor-Nitrid enthalte, ein gezieltes Einschleifen der Schaufelspitze in den Hitzeschild ermögliche und dass die beanspruchte MCrAlY-Abdeckschicht dasselbe bewirken müsse. Jedoch sei die beanspruchte MCrAlY-Abdeckschicht aus D5 nicht bekannt und biete somit die Grundlage für die Formulierung der zu lösenden technischen Aufgabe. Insoweit sei nicht entscheidend, ob es auch Anhaltspunkte für eine verbesserte Beschichtung gebe, da auch eine alternative Lösung Grundlage für die objektive Formulierung der Aufgabe sein könne.

Die Kammer legte ferner dar, dass D8 zwar eine Schicht aus MCrAlY auf einer Schaufel der Turbine offenbare, jedoch nichts über ein gezieltes Einschleifen einer mit MCrAlY beschichteten Schaufelspitze in den Hitzeschild, wie es Anspruch 1 des Streitpatents verlange. Die Fachperson könne D8 keine Lehre entnehmen, eine entsprechend harte

MCrAlY-Beschichtung auszuwählen, um das beanspruchte Einschleifen der Schaufelspitze in den Hitzeschild (wie in der D5) zu ermöglichen.

Der Beschwerdeführer machte geltend, die Kammer habe in Bezug auf Art. 83 EPÜ festgestellt, dass die Fachperson in der Lage sei, eine angemessene Härte der Schaufel im Verhältnis zur Beschichtung zu wählen. Daraus folge, dass dieses relative Härteverhältnis das Vorliegen einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit nicht begründen könne. Die Kammer stimmte dem nicht zu. Eine solche Gleichsetzung der Anforderungen von Art. 83 und 56 EPÜ sei nicht gerechtfertigt. Die Fähigkeit der Fachperson, eine Erfindung auf Grundlage der Informationen im Streitpatent und im allgemeinen Fachwissen auszuführen, sei völlig unabhängig davon, ob ihr Gegenstand für dieselbe Fachperson im Hinblick auf den Stand der Technik naheliegend sei. So wäre die Fachperson im vorliegenden Fall, wie in Bezug auf Art. 83 EPC erläutert, in der Lage, eine bestimmte Beschichtung mit einem bestimmten Härtegrad auf Grundlage der Beschreibung des Streitpatents und des allgemeinen Fachwissens herzustellen, um die Erfindung auszuführen. Das bedeute jedoch nicht, dass die Fachperson ausgehend von einer bestimmten Druckschrift (hier D5) ohne Veranlassung entsprechende Maßnahmen ergreifen würde. Hierzu reiche es nicht, dass die Fachperson über entsprechende Fähigkeiten verfüge, es müsse vielmehr auch eine Veranlassung für die Maßnahme bestehen. Diese dürfe nicht aufgrund einer retrospektiven Betrachtung konstruiert werden.

Das weitere Argument des Beschwerdeführers, dass eine einfache einstufige Änderung von D5 erforderlich wäre, um den beanspruchten Gegenstand zu erreichen, überzeugte die Kammer ebenso wenig.

Die Kammer kam zu dem Schluss, dass ausgehend von D5 und im Lichte der objektiven technischen Aufgabe, die Fachperson aus D8 keine Lehre erhalte, wie sie zum beanspruchten Gegenstand gelangen kann, ohne eine erfinderische Tätigkeit auszuüben (Art. 56 EPÜ). Die gleiche Schlussfolgerung ergebe sich, wenn man von Dokument D5 ausgehe und dieses mit der technischen Lehre von D10 kombiniere. Die Kammer entschied folglich, dass der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit beruht.

053-06-23



## Article 056 EPC | T 1571/19 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1571/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.09
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – closest prior art – most promising springboard too short to reach out to cited secondary document
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1028/05, T 1685/10
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.3.4.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1571/19](#) the appellant (opponent) argued that the skilled person, starting from D5 (the closest prior art) and faced with the underlying problem, would have taken into account the teaching of D3, which, like the opposed patent, related to a feed composition (for fish) for treating inflammatory symptoms in the heart and the liver caused by HSML, a viral disease. The teaching of D3 was limited to the treatment of HSML. However, the appellant argued the pathology and the symptoms of CMS and HSML were similar. Therefore, the skilled person would have reasonably expected the composition of D3 to be beneficial in the treatment of CMS.

The board was not persuaded by these arguments. D5 showed that no therapy was known for treating and preventing diseases caused by PMCV in fish at the time of priority. Furthermore, it showed that the field of clinical nutrition of salmon was still in its infancy and that the therapeutic utility of feed compositions for fish could only be speculated upon. At the time of priority the skilled person could, at most, have had a tenuous hope that a fish feed composition for treating the claimed diseases would be developed in the future. The skilled person starting from D5 would barely have considered the teaching of D3. Even if they had, they would not have considered the idea of using the composition of D3 to treat and prevent diseases caused by PMCV, in particular CMS, to have a reasonable expectation of success. Therefore, they would not have endeavoured to test the utility of this composition for these therapeutic uses.

The appellant selected D5 as the closest prior art, the "most promising springboard" towards the claimed invention. Nonetheless, the board considered this springboard too short to allow the skilled person to reach out to D3 and to overcome the considerable

gap separating the closest prior art from the subject-matter defined in claim 1. It concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1, as well as that of the following claims, which were narrower in scope, involved an inventive step (Art. 56 EPC).

054-06-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1779/19 | Board 3.3.06

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1779/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – reformulation of the technical problem – skilled person – implicit disclosure inevitable (no) – general or arbitrary alternative (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0012/81, T 0666/89, T 0270/97
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.3.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.9.21.9a</a> , 10th edition

[T 1779/19](#) concerned an appeal against the decision to reject the opposition against the European patent, which disclosed in claim 1 a "Method for preventing chlorine deposition on the superheater of a boiler in which a fuel with a chlorine content is burned, and to which boiler a compound with a sulphate content is fed in the superheater area [...] characterized in that the said compound is ferric(III) sulphate,  $\text{Fe}_2(\text{SO}_4)_3$  and/or aluminium(III) sulphate,  $\text{Al}_2(\text{SO}_4)_3$ , and the said compound as a water solution and in a drop size of 1-100  $\mu\text{m}$ ". The board identified document D5 as the closest prior art.

The appellant (opponent) argued that following the principles set out in T 666/89, the definition of a step of feeding a solution of ferrous sulphate in D5 implicitly encompassed feeding a solution of ferric sulphate, because Fe(III) spontaneously reacted in contact with air to give Fe(II), so that at least a portion of the ferrous sulphate would be in the form of ferric sulphate.

The board did not agree. With reference to T 12/81, T 666/89 and in particular T 270/97, the board stated that the key requirement for such an implicit disclosure was inevitability. To implicitly anticipate a given product, the prior art document must disclose a reaction carried out under specific conditions which would inevitably lead to the product in question. The board did not contest that ferrous sulphate was oxidised to ferric sulphate in the presence of air. There was however no basis to conclude how far this reaction would go in D5, which did not disclose a reaction but a solution of ferrous sulphate, and there was no information in D5 how this solution was made and how long

and under which conditions it should be stored. The presence of ferric sulphate was thus highly likely or even certain, but there was no way to conclude that this presence would go beyond trace levels.

The board further found that there was no evidence that the invention provided an improved effectiveness when compared to a method of preventing chlorine deposition using a ferrous sulphate solution as disclosed in D5. The proposed solution therefore did not successfully solve the problem presented in the patent. However, the board considered that the experiments in the patent at least demonstrated that the claimed method performed significantly better than other known alternatives. This implied that the claimed additives had been identified as particularly effective for the purpose of preventing chlorine deposition, so they could not be considered to be arbitrarily selected. Thus, the claimed subject-matter did not simply provide a (general or arbitrary) alternative, but rather an alternative which was highly effective when compared to other commonly used additives. The problem to be solved was therefore reformulated as the provision of an alternative method which ensured a high effectiveness in the prevention of chlorine deposition.

Considering obviousness, the board found that a skilled person seeking to solve the underlying problem of finding alternatives which were highly effective in preventing chlorine deposition would consult D4, and that in doing so it would consider using ferric sulphate as an additive in the method of document D5 without the need of inventive skills.

As to the obviousness of using a droplet size of 1 to 100  $\mu\text{m}$ , the board noted that, since the patent did not indicate how the feature "a drop size of 1-100  $\mu\text{m}$ " should be interpreted, all technically reasonable alternatives should be considered to be covered by the claim. The interpretation proposed by the proprietor was also rather broad, only excluding sprays with significantly coarse droplet sizes. It further acknowledged that the patent did not associate the droplet size with any specific technical effect, and that the examples of the patent did not even specify the droplet size in the tests, so this feature could only be considered as providing an alternative. The board concluded that the relevant question to assess the inventiveness of this feature was whether a skilled person starting from D5 would have considered spraying non-coarse droplets as an obvious alternative.

In view of the teachings in D5, the board concluded a skilled person would readily understand that coarse droplet sizes should be avoided and that the nozzles used in the relevant embodiment of figures 1 and 2 should be configured to form relatively small droplets. In doing so the skilled person would arrive at the droplet size range defined in claim 1 without exercising inventive skill. The subject-matter of claim 1 as granted was obvious and therefore not inventive in view of D5 combined with the teachings of D4, and so did not meet the criteria set out in Art. 56 EPC.

065-07-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1245/20 | Board 3.5.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1245/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.03
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical problem – graphical user interface
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.10</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1245/20](#) the application related to methods of identifying an application type of unknown data that may be encountered during a data recovery process. The board held that the construction of the mapping according to the claimed invention was performed based on non-technical rather than technical considerations. The mapping itself was also considered to be non-technical. The board was also not convinced that there was a credible increase in the speed of the mapping of the retrieved data to a particular application type over the whole scope of the claim.

One question that arose was whether the method of claim 1 had the potential to cause technical effects. But the mapping and display of the data record in a respective column of the user interface resulting from the claimed method was not specifically adapted for any technical use (G 1/19). Since the board did not see any technical effect from the implementation of the claimed method in a computer system derivable over the whole scope of the claim, the claimed subject-matter did not achieve a technical effect over the prior art acknowledged in the application. Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the sole request lacked an inventive step.

066-07-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0211/21 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0211/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.03
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical problem – obviousness – automation – human intervention
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.10</a> , 10th edition

In [T 211/21](#) the board held that the decision to carry out and monitor manufacturing processes automatically rather than involving the assistance of a skilled artisan, is taken balancing different factors. It has advantages and drawbacks. Automatic systems typically afford higher production rates, increased productivity and involve less labour costs. However, it is commonly recognised that, despite the higher labour costs, human intervention has other advantages: a skilled artisan can offer experience, technical ingenuity and abilities and perform tasks that automated systems cannot yet imitate. The skilled artisan can back up an automated system and, if necessary, override a pre-programmed system setting. This leads to increased flexibility and, possibly, increased accuracy of the manufacturing and monitoring activities. Thus, there are good reasons to enable human intervention in an automatic system.

Therefore, to complement automation with human intervention, providing means enabling a skilled artisan to actively intervene in an automated process for producing foods and to provide a backup to pre-programmed procedures was considered by the board to be an obvious measure. Including a user interface having two separate push-buttons to enable the skilled artisan to send a request for assistance and for triggering data transmission was also considered to be obvious by the board. User interfaces having touch buttons are commonly used in the field. Furthermore, the claimed user interface, push-buttons, control unit and remote processor performed the same functions implemented by the components of the automated systems of the aforementioned prior-art documents. Therefore, the board held that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request did not involve an inventive step.

067-07-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1618/19 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1618/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – mixture of technical and non-technical features – simulations – direct link with reality
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.11b</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1618/19](#) the claimed subject-matter related to a concrete apparatus, namely a blending control system in a refinery, and a corresponding method. The claimed blending control apparatus/method comprised a computer modelling apparatus/method. The modelling was performed for an active refinery process in an actual refinery. The feeding of the model with the input parameters (flow and product parameters of the "rundown components supplied from the splitter" and refinery product commitments) as well as the direct conversion of the simulation results ("blend recipes", "blend events", "blend timing", "split ratio") into output signals for the control of the blender and splitter in the refinery process could be considered technical inputs / outputs according to G 1/19, OJ 2021, A77, point 85 of the Reasons, and were therefore technical or have a technical effect.

The feeding of process parameters of a running process, i.e. the refinery process, into the simulation and the conversion of calculated process parameters into control signals were thus indications of a "direct link with physical reality" (G 1/19) and of a "further technical effect" that goes beyond the mere technical implementation of the algorithm in a computer (G 1/19). Consequently, it was irrelevant whether the final step of implementing the optimisation results by means of control signals, i.e. to the splitter and blender, was explicitly claimed (as would be recommended in principle according to G 1/19), if the skilled person understands from the wording of the claim, that the simulation results were directly converted into control signals of the splitter and blender, as was the case here. Consequently, the board held that the entire subject-matter of claims 1 and 6 was technical.

079-08-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 2565/19 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2565/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.29
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – try and see situation
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.7.2.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 84 EPC.](#)

In [T 2565/19](#) the board identified the problem to be solved as the provision of a method which can be used to discriminate between a TRH receptor sub-type in human cortex from one in human pituitary. The question to be answered in assessing the obviousness of the claimed method was whether the skilled person starting from the disclosure in document D2 and seeking to solve the technical problem formulated above, would have carried out the differential binding experiments disclosed in document D2 on human tissue.

The board noted that in some decisions, especially in the field of biotechnology, the boards had asked whether in the cases in point it was obvious for the skilled person to try a suggested approach, route or method with a reasonable expectation of success. However, in the present case, the board did not consider this to be the right approach.

In the case in hand the appellant (applicant) argued that the skilled person had to make at least four choices as to which steps to carry out. In view of the uncertainty inherent in each choice, the skilled person could not have considered that there was a reasonable expectation of success in finding a human homologue of a potential rat receptor. Further uncertainty was present because at the relevant date, the skilled person assumed that in humans, in contrast to the situation in rats, only one receptor sub-type was present. The board considered that the importance of research on humans in a medical context would have led the skilled person to repeat the experiments done in rats in document D2 in humans, even in the face of alternative explanations for the results and even in the face of the knowledge that only one type of TRH receptor had been found in humans. This consideration was similar to the situations described in the case law



where "neither the implementation nor the testing of an approach suggested by the prior art involves any particular technical difficulties". In such circumstances it had been held that the skilled person would have at least adopted a "try and see" attitude.

The appellant had also argued that the skilled person, considering applying the methods disclosed in document D2 to human tissue, would have faced difficulties obtaining and working with human tissue due to the fact that it had to be obtained post-mortem and because many variables affected the quality of such tissue, as well as because of anatomical differences between rat and human tissue.

The board was not convinced by these arguments either. It accepted it was common knowledge in the art that working with post-mortem human tissue and brain tissue in particular was associated with particular practical problems. However, given that the skilled person was seeking to replicate an animal model in humans, they had no choice but to turn to human tissue.

In view of the above considerations, the board concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1 lacked an inventive step as too did the auxiliary requests.

080-08-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 2852/19 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2852/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – mixture of technical and non-technical features – technical effect
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0279/05
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.11</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2852/19](#) the invention related to optimising the occupancy of an event. The aim was to avoid seats remaining empty if visitors could not reach the event location in time. The invention proposed to automatically determine whether visitors to an event were in a defined area at a certain distance from the venue. GPS data from visitors' cell phones was used for this purpose. If ticket buyers were not in said area shortly before the start of the event, an alert was sent to them, and their ticket was resold in case of cancellation.

The board held that there were two effects: (i) was optimising the seat occupancy; and (ii) was to increase the profit by reselling seats shortly prior to the event in case a visitor had cancelled its venue. Effect (i) was held to be technical. Effect (ii) was held to be non-technical. The problem was therefore formulated as optimising the seat occupancy and prompting the user to indicate whether they plan to attend the event and offer the seat for sale. The board found, inter alia, that it was obvious in view of the prior art, that the size of the area was reduced (e.g. from a 5-mile radius at 7:30 PM to a 2-mile radius at 7:45 PM) as an event start time approached. In view of the prior art, it was also held to be obvious that the reminder sent to the attendee contained a link or a request to cancel the reservation if the appointment time could not be met. The claimed invention therefore lacked an inventive step.

081-08-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0366/20 | Board 3.5.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0366/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.27
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – technical effect
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.11c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 366/20](#) the board was of the opinion, that no technical effect of the distinguishing features could be derived over the whole scope of the claim.

The application related to devices and methods for managing the identity of media content data. It is common for the same media content to be available from numerous sources, each of which may use a different proprietary identification scheme for describing, via the use of metadata, its creator or the artist's name, the (song) title, track number, or other associated information. The appellant had argued that the objective technical problem to be solved was "how to provide, at a client node, a more efficient non-duplicate downloading and file identity reconciliation". According to the appellant, the claimed solution provided downloading of non-duplicate media files along with reconciliation of file identities based on received metadata of media files selected for possible download. By contrast, the prior art taught a solution for downloading of non-duplicate media files based on received initial portions of the files selected for possible download and was concerned at most with reconciling metadata based on file identifiers. As a further advantage, the claimed solution avoided conflicts due to having copies of the same file identifier (associated with respective copies of the same file) that were locally stored in association with the same or similar metadata.

The board stated that claim 1 did not define how the "first master identifier" received from a server node corresponded to the "first set of metadata" provided by the client to this server node. Since the first master identifier seemed to be determined based only on the metadata, and since the metadata may be incomplete or incorrect or otherwise not identifying for the media content or may not capture differences in actual content of the media content data files (for example due to different versions of the same song,

movie etc.) the result of the claimed method seemed to be essentially unpredictable with respect to the detection of duplicate media content files over the whole scope of the claim.

Moreover, the claim did not define what "processing" was performed on the first master identifier to identify whether a second master identifier was stored in the database of local identification data and metadata that matched the first master identifier. Since there was no technical effect over the whole scope of the claim, no technical problem was solved over the whole scope of the claim and the claimed method therefore lacked an inventive step.

082-08-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0814/20 | Board 3.5.06

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0814/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – effect made credible within the whole scope of claim
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 814/20](#) the board was satisfied that the claimed method for the re-identification of objects captured by image cameras was a technical purpose because it was tantamount to an objective measurement in physical reality: is the object observed now the same as the one observed earlier? It remained to be appreciated whether the claimed method provided a technical effect over substantially the whole scope of the claim (see G 1/19, point 82 of the Reasons).

The board held that the claimed method for the re-identification of objects captured by image cameras would not "work" under all imaginable circumstances. It was probably safe to say that no computer vision method does. For instance, the present method may fail to re-identify objects largely changing appearance. However, the skilled person would understand, from the present claims and the description, the kind of situations and its parameters for which the method was designed. The method credibly worked over that range of situations. In the board's judgment, this was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a technical effect be present over substantially the whole scope of the claims.

On obviousness, in the board's view, the skilled person, starting from D3, may have considered Fisher Vectors to measure image similarity for classification purposes instead of the MAP adaptation method, but would not combine the two in the claimed manner. Thus, the claimed matter was not obvious in view of the prior art at hand and the board concluded the subject-matter of claim 1 involves an inventive step in the sense of Art. 56 EPC.

083-08-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0703/18 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0703/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.23
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – problem invention (no) – problem and solution approach
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0002/83
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.12.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 703/18](#) the patent related to an infant formula containing combinations of lutein and docosahexaenoic acid. For the respondent the correct technical problem was the one identified in the decision under appeal. In its view, the patent involved one of the rare cases of a "problem invention". It had not been recognised in the art that bioavailability of lutein from formula milk was lower than that achieved by human milk. Once this was known, the solution would have been obvious.

The board noted that one reason why "problem inventions" were rare might be that they were somewhat at odds with the problem-solution approach. It was generally accepted that the formulation of the technical problem should not contain pointers to the solution or partially anticipate the solution. In contrast to this, "problem inventions" tended to do both.

The board referred to the findings in T 2/83 on "problem inventions", in which the board held that "The discovery of a yet unrecognised problem may, in certain circumstances, give rise to patentable subject-matter in spite of the fact that the claimed solution is retrospectively trivial and in itself obvious ('problem inventions')". The board in the case in hand found that although this passage of T 2/83 referred to a device, it was not apparent why the reasoning in it would not apply also to claims directed to compositions.

The decision T 2/83 conceded that the discovery of an unrecognised problem might in certain circumstances give rise to patentable subject-matter. This might be so even though once the formulation of the problem was accepted, the question of whether the solution was obvious became irrelevant. The board in the case in hand noted that a

situation might arise in which, if a subject-matter claimed was assessed as a "problem invention", an attack based on lack of inventive step could be successfully directed only against the recognition of the problem, not against the claimed solution. At the same time, T 2/83 made it clear that in the context of a clearly desired improvement, side effects which might be interpreted as a solution of a yet unknown problem should not be decisive for patentability.

In the case in hand, the board noted that while the issue with bioavailability of lutein was new information, bioavailability of trace elements and lipids from infant milk had been well investigated. Second, the "gold standard" for preparing an infant formula was and remained human milk. Therefore, when formulating the problem to be solved, one had to draw closely on the teaching available in the art on human milk. D16 itself disclosed that the individual concentration of lutein and zeaxanthin in human milk was distributed over a wide range. Third, the patent in suit related to preparing an infant formula, with preterm infants explicitly mentioned throughout the patent.

Considering the above, the board found it was not justified to accept the formulation of a "problem invention". Instead, the technical problem had to be regarded as that of providing a nutritional formula (with lutein) suitable for infants, including newborns.

As to obviousness, the board held the skilled person tasked with solving the problem would turn to D18, which showed that the concentration of lutein found in human milk, and especially in milk of mothers of newborn infants, was considerably higher than that disclosed by example 1 of D16. In view of this, the board stated the solution that the skilled person would have provided would be to increase the concentration of lutein, a straightforward exercise. D16 suggested the addition of a commercially available ingredient. The board had no reason to doubt that the skilled person would have considered a concentration within the range suggested in claim 2 of D16.

The board found therefore that claim 1 as granted lacked inventive step. It decided that the decision under appeal was to be set aside and the patent revoked.

095-09-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1079/18 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1079/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.30
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – obvious solution – try and see situation (yes) – bonus effect (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0595/90
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.9.5</a> , <a href="#">I.D.9.20.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1079/18](#) D2 was found by the board to be the closest prior art and form A was singled out as clearly preferred among the solid forms of febuxostat disclosed therein, in particular because it was the most suitable for the preparation of pharmaceutical formulations. This was the same context as that in which form I was also praised in the patent. The board found that the objective technical problem could be formulated as providing a pharmaceutical composition containing a crystalline form of febuxostat which was non-hygroscopic and had higher solubility.

Against the background of the common general knowledge concerning polymorphs outlined in the decision, the board found that the skilled person, faced with the problem of providing a crystalline form of febuxostat that has a higher solubility than form A, would clearly be inclined to check whether form A underwent an endothermic phase transition into a new higher-melting form at higher temperatures. Such a form existed or it did not. It found that that the skilled person would have been in a "try and see" situation. Against the background of the common general knowledge and the objective technical problem, the skilled person would most certainly have thought of using DSC to find new solid forms - if only because DSC measures heat flow and is the method of choice for determining exo- and endothermic processes when heating a sample.

The board found that by performing a DSC analysis of form A, the skilled person aiming at higher solubility would have identified form I as being the desired form, i.e. a higher-melting form that results from form A by an endothermic phase transition at higher temperatures. In view of the heat-of-transition rule, they would have expected form I to be an enantiotrope of form A and form I to have a higher solubility than form A at temperatures below the transition temperature (somewhere between approx. 175 and



200 °C), i.e. at ambient temperature. Further, the fact that form I merely retained the non-hygroscopicity of form A could be considered merely as a bonus effect that the skilled person inevitably achieved because they were primarily looking for a crystalline form of febuxostat with higher solubility.

The board could not agree with the patent proprietor's argument based on decision T 595/90 that form I was inventive already because no way of making it had been found by the effective date of the patent. In T 595/90, the board held at point 5 of the Reasons that "an otherwise obvious entity, may become nevertheless non-obvious and claimable as such, if there is no known way or applicable (analogy) method in the art to make it and the claimed methods for its preparation are therefore the first to achieve this in an inventive manner". However, the present case was different in that the skilled person would have obtained form I in an obvious manner, i.e. the process carried out until form I was obtained was also not based on an inventive step.

It followed that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request did not involve an inventive step. The main request was not allowable. The board ordered that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be revoked.

096-09-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1518/20 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1518/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.16
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – obvious alternative – reasonable expectation of success (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0588/93
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.5.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1518/20](#) the board found that starting from D1 as the closest prior art, a skilled person seeking to provide a mere alternative surface-crosslinking process for superabsorbent polymers (SAPs) exhibiting good CRC, AUP, SRC and gel strength would have applied the teaching of D11 to the polymer synthesis process found in the examples of D1, and would have had a reasonable expectation of succeeding in arriving at SAP materials with (at least) comparable properties.

The respondent argued that D11 gave no pointer that would cause a skilled person to select the heating conditions stipulated by claim, citing T 588/93 in support of the argument that some kind of a pointer was needed which would prompt a skilled person to apply the relevant teaching from the prior art. In the case in hand three selections from three ranges had to be made in D11 (to arrive at the heating conditions in claim 1).

The board held, however, that for providing an alternative method, no particular pointer from the prior art was needed to combine the teaching of secondary sources of information with that of the closest prior art. In such a scenario, in the absence of any counter-indicators that would provide teaching leading away from applying the relevant disclosure in order to modify the solution proposed in the closest prior art, a skilled person would apply such teaching rather than being conceptually and notionally confined to the disclosure of the provided examples. The case at hand also differed from that underlying T 588/93, in which the (closest) prior art adduced contained teaching leading away from modifying a feature characterised in this teaching as being essential. In the case at hand, however, no such constellation was apparent.

The board concluded that applying the teaching of D11, a skilled person would arrive at the subject-matter of claim 1 in an obvious way. Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 lacked an inventive step and did not meet the requirement of Art. 56 EPC. The first and second auxiliary requests were likewise found not to involve an inventive step. The third auxiliary request was not taken into account (Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020).

097-09-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0873/21 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0873/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – synergistic effect substantiated in post-published evidence derivable from original application – synergistic effect in post-published evidence encompassed by technical teaching of original application in light of the common general knowledge
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 873/21](#) the application related to compound (A) (also referred to as velagliflozin) and compound (B) (also referred to as pergolide) for use in the treatment and/or prevention of Equine Metabolic Syndrome (EMS), Equine Pituitary Pars Intermedia Dysfunction (PPID or equine Cushing's syndrome) and/or laminitis in an equine animal. The appellant argued that the technical effect resulting from the distinguishing feature was an improved insulin sensitivity, in particular a synergistic interaction of compound (A) and compound (B) and that this was demonstrated by the supplemental experimental data in D16.

The board found that the therapeutic synergistic effect substantiated in D16 was derivable from the original application, and that the data of D16 only provided a quantification of the obtained improvement in insulin sensitivity described in the original application. Accordingly, the board considered that the synergistic effect relied upon by the appellant was encompassed by the technical teaching of the original application in light of the common general knowledge regarding the therapeutic effects of compound (A) and compound (B) and was embodied by the present combination since it was clearly the preferred combination in the original application. In line with G 2/21, the technical effect demonstrated by the post-published experimental data provided in D16 was thus to be taken into account when assessing the inventiveness of the claimed subject-matter.

The board concluded it was credible that the synergistic effect observed in D16, in particular on insuline concentrations would be advantageous in the treatment of EMS, PPID and laminitis in an equine animal. Hence, the objective technical problem underlying the main request resided in the provision of a further combination of active agents containing compound (B) for use in the treatment of EMS, equine PPID and/or laminitis in an equine animal which provides a synergistic effect on insulin resistance. The board found that the skilled person would not have found in the prior art any suggestion towards the present solution to the above defined objective technical problem and that consequently the main request fulfilled the requirements of Art. 56 EPC.

108-10-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 2465/19 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2465/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – arbitrary modification (no) – non-obvious alternative (yes) – technical effect derivable from the original application (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/21, T 1294/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.1.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.9.21.1</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2465/19](#) there was agreement that, as set out by the examining division in the decision at issue, D1 represented the closest state of the art and that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request differed from D1 by feature i): "wherein the control contact region is spaced apart from the current shifting region so that the current shifting region is electrically isolated from the control contact region". The examining division found that D1 and the application solved the same (subjective) technical problem and that feature i) had no (additional) advantage or surprising/ beneficial effect and was therefore not important.

The examining division further set out that the original description was not only totally silent about any such advantage or beneficial/surprising effect, but that a statement in the application indicated that direct contact between the current shifting region and the base contact region would not have much influence, supporting its view that feature i) was not important and rather represented an arbitrary modification. It concluded that an arbitrary modification of a known device having only disadvantages as compared to that known device could not justify an inventive step.

The appellant accepted that D1 and the application had the common goal to reduce surface recombination. It argued that this did not prove, however, that the novel feature of the invention provided no advantage. The appellant further submitted that the disclosure of advantages in the description was not a requirement for inventive step, as long as such advantages were derivable from the application.

The board accepted that the application did not explicitly mention any particular additional advantage or surprising beneficial effect. However, it found that contrary to the view of the examining division, feature i) could not be said to have only disadvantages with respect to D1 (closest prior art). Nor could this feature be said to be arbitrary. The board noted with reference to Headnote II of G 2/21 that the technical effect of an invention over the closest prior art need not be explicitly stated in the application, as long as it is derivable from the original application, in particular since the closest prior art may not have been known to the applicant when drafting it.

The board found that the passage of paragraph [88] cited by the examining division did not support its view that feature i) was not important. The distinguishing feature i) did not represent an arbitrary modification of the device of D1 having only foreseeable disadvantages in the sense of section I.D.9.21.1 of the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (10th edition, 2022), on which no acknowledgement of an inventive step could be based, but rather represented an alternative solution to a known problem as referred to in section I.D.4.5 of the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (10th edition, 2022), having particular properties with respect to the solution known from D1.

The board concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request involved an inventive step within the meaning of Art. 56 EPC with respect to D1 as closest state of the art and combined with the common general knowledge of the skilled person.

137-12-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0215/20 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0215/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.19
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (yes) – non-obvious solution – solution in prior art a mere allegation – skilled person – reasonable expectation of success (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0777/08
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.9.5</a> , 10th edition

In [T 215/20](#) the board held that the objective technical problem could be considered to be that of providing a pharmaceutical composition comprising a crystalline form of dapagliflozin which is more stable, i.e. less hygroscopic.

As regards obviousness, the appellant (opponent) argued the skilled person would have turned to D4 because it offered solutions to the problem of providing a crystalline form of an API as well as to the problem of providing a form that is less hygroscopic. Consequently, the subject-matter of claim 1 did not involve an inventive step over a combination of D1 and D4.

The board stated that for this argument to be correct, the skilled person, in order to take the teaching of D4 into account, would also have had to have had a reasonable expectation of success, i.e. a reasonable expectation that this teaching would solve the objective technical problem. However, the board reasoned that this was not the case. The skilled person would have considered the effect suggested by D4, namely the universal decrease in hygroscopicity, to be a mere allegation. Given the generally recognised high unpredictability of properties of crystalline forms, the skilled person would not have had a reasonable expectation of obtaining a less hygroscopic form of dapagliflozin.

The board therefore distinguished the current case from T 777/08 on which the appellant relied. In that case the deciding board held that the skilled person would have had a reasonable expectation that providing a crystalline form of the API would have solved the objective technical problem. The current case was different in that, first, the



effect relied on for inventive step was different (filterability and drying characteristics in T 777/08 vs hygroscopicity in the case at hand) and, second, although a solution to the objective technical problem may have been suggested by D4, the skilled person would not have had a reasonable expectation that the solution offered by D4 would have solved this problem.

In summary, the board held the subject-matter of claim 1 involved an inventive step over amorphous dapagliflozin as disclosed in D1 in combination with D4 because the skilled person, considering the teaching of D4, would not have had a reasonable expectation of obtaining a form of dapagliflozin which was less hygroscopic than amorphous dapagliflozin.

The board concluded the subject-matter of claim 1 involved an inventive step within the meaning of Art. 56 EPC. The reasoning applied, *mutatis mutandis*, also to the subject-matter of dependent claims 2 to 5. The board ordered the decision under appeal be set aside and remitted the case to the opposition division with the order to maintain the patent in amended form.

138-12-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1623/21 | Board 3.4.02

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1623/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.25
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – identification of technical and non-technical features – problem-solution approach
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1623/21](#) the board found the reasons of the appealed decision for showing that the subject-matter of claim 1 lacked an inventive step not convincing.

Contrary to the examining division's view expressed in the appealed decision, overlaying information onto a received sensory work at a specific instance relative to the epoch time amounted to a technical task. Indeed, as explained by the applicant, the technical task underlying the playback method of claim 1 included identifying a source of the overlay information, controlling the communication of the network media player with the identified source of the overlay information, controlling the subsequent playback carried out by the network media player and defining a point in time at which the overlay was overlaid onto the sensory work.

In view of the method steps referred to above, the board was not convinced that claim 1 only defined "non-technical display of information". To convincingly argue lack of inventive step, it was not sufficient to assert that the skilled person was aware of the underlying technology. It must also be shown that the skilled person had a clear incentive to apply the presumably known technology in a particular way, namely to arrive at the claimed subject-matter.

At least some of the method steps of claim 1 were technical features having a technical content going beyond the mere display of information. Therefore, the technical content of these features should not have been ignored when assessing the inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1. Rather, the assessment of inventive step should, in principle, have been carried out on the basis of the problem-solution approach,

including the definition of an objective technical problem solved by the distinguishing technical features of claim 1. If the problem-solution approach was not used, the examining division should have explained the reasons for not using it, which they had not.

139-12-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1768/20 | Board 3.5.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1768/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.03
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – technical and non-technical features – simulation – design model
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.9.2.11b</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1768/20](#) the application related to generating a design model for a chip design by means of a design tool and simulation. The board stated that decision G 1/19 was now the essential case law that had to be considered when assessing inventive step in the current case. According to point 97 of G 1/19, "calculated technical effects should be distinguished from potential technical effects which, for example when a computer program or a control signal for an image display device is put to its intended use, necessarily become real technical effects".

The Enlarged Board of Appeal saw no difference regarding the technicality of a simulated physical system in the event that the computer-implemented simulation was claimed as part of a design process, in particular for verifying a design.

The board considered that, in the current case, the result of the calculations effected by the method steps of claim 1 was a design model with an "improved" characterisation that is obtained by simulation of a standard cell which was provided in a library file. Such a library file was used by customers in later stages of the overall design process, but the method of claim 1 did not contain steps specifying the use of the produced library file in later design or manufacturing steps. A use of the design model in a manufacturing step would have been particularly relevant since the Enlarged Board considered the inclusion of a manufacturing step to be an argument in favour of patentability.

Since the result of the method of claim 1 was calculated data for an improved design that was obtained using simulation, it followed from decision G 1/19 that the improved design did not contribute to inventive step since no "further" technical effect, such as

controlling a machine in the foundry during a manufacturing process, was derivable. The board was aware that a "further" technical effect relating to the internal operation of the computer system could also be achieved by the claimed method. However, the only feature of the claimed method that concerned details of its implementation in a computer system was that results were provided in a library file, i.e. that result data were stored in a file, which was well known. Moreover, since the data was as such non-technical, only the storing of the data in a file could be regarded as being technical, but this was also known. Consequently, the steps of the claimed method represented a non-technical algorithm.

The appellant had argued that the invention was an "exceptional case" in the sense of decision G 1/19 for which the calculated behaviour of components (standard cells) of a physical system (microchip), exclusively for the purpose of manufacturing the microchip was the basis for a technical contribution. The properties of standard cells calculated during characterisation were specifically and exclusively calculated, provided and used for production purposes. While this was not explicitly stated in the claims, this followed from the context of microchip fabrication and the skilled person's common general knowledge. The appellant also argued that the library file contained data that was used by the machines in the foundry.

Regarding the appellant's argument that the claimed invention was an exceptional case according to points 98 and 128 of decision G 1/19, it was important to consider whether the design produced by the method had a potential technical effect in the sense of point 97 of decision G 1/19 (e.g. because the design was produced as a computer program or a television control signal). The exceptional cases mentioned in G 1/19 are to be understood only as cases where the simulation and/or design result, when put to its intended use, without any further human interaction, achieves a technical effect such as controlling a technical device. Such a strict approach is desirable to establish legal certainty by drawing a clear line for the technicality of design processes producing a design. A design consisting merely of geometrical data such as a layout mask could not be said to have a potential technical effect in the sense of decision G 1/19. Since the library file was not directly used to control the machines in the foundry and even further human input was necessary before its use in a manufacturing step, the library file produced by the method of claim 1 could not be considered to have an implied technical effect. Consequently, the board was not convinced that the current case was an "exceptional case" in the sense of decision G 1/19. It therefore followed that the method of claim 1 lacked an inventive step.

151-13-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1986/20 | Board 3.5.01

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1986/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.10.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – providing route guidance based on pre-stored location data without continuous position measurement
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 2035/11
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.9.2.11d</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1986/20](#) the board made reference to T 2035/11 and distinguished the claimed invention from a real-time navigation system. The claimed invention concerned a system for supporting an operator in the tasks of shipping or warehousing articles, specifically by offering guidance to the designated articles. The examining division had found that the technical features of claim 1 of all requests were known from the prior art. The remaining features, such as using signs for guiding an operator and storage locations of articles as position information, were, in the division's view, not based on technical considerations and, thus, could not contribute to inventive step.

The appellant argued, inter alia, that the invention solved the same technical task, albeit by different technical means, as the navigation system of T 2035/11, namely "providing real-time route-guidance information to a user in dependence on the user's real world position".

The board referred to T 2035/11, which established that providing real-time route-guidance information was a technical task solely if the navigation system encompasses route-planning functionality as well as a position-determining device [...] configured to provide route-guidance information in dependence on the actual real-world position of the system. Further, this involves an interaction between the user and the navigation system, wherein the navigation system continuously measures the user's position using technical means and, on the basis of these measurements, provides the user with information aimed at enabling the user to manage the technical task of moving a vehicle to a desired destination. It is only in the context of such a system that a route-planning algorithm contributes to its technical character.

The board found that the claimed system measured the operator's actual position only once, specifically at the outset of the shipping/warehousing procedure. All subsequent positions were either predetermined or at the very least derived from locations stored in a database. In the event that the operator diverged from the provided guidance, the system's ability to provide accurate real-time route guidance was compromised, given that the positional information of the preceding article became erroneous. In the board's assessment, the fundamental disparity lay in the fact that the system outlined in claim 1 of the invention did not constitute a closed loop wherein, irrespective of the user's actions, a position measurement is automatically fed back to the system for the purpose of updating route guidance information.

162-14-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0258/21 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0258/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.24
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – no experimental data in original application – effect substantiated by post-published evidence not contemplated in original application – technical effect could not be taken into account for assessment of inventive step in accordance with G 2/21
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 258/21](#) the appeal was filed by the applicant against the decision of the examining division to refuse the patent application.

Claim 1 of main request read as follows: "1. A medicament comprising an effective amount of a short acting dihydropyridine compound wherein the short acting dihydropyridine compound is clevidipine or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt or ester thereof for use in a method of reducing ischemic stroke damage [...]." D1 (closest prior art) disclosed the use of dihydropyridines for lowering blood pressure in hypertensive crises resulting from complications such as hemorrhagic stroke, cerebral ischemia, encephalopathy or myocardial ischemia. The claimed subject-matter differed from D1 in that the management of hypertension with clevidipine occurred in a patient with an ischemic stroke to reduce ischemic stroke damage.

The board observed that the original application did not provide any experimental data. No technical effect directly linked to the identified distinguishing feature, namely the reduction of ischemic stroke damage, had thus been demonstrated in the application documents. In this context, the board underlined that the choice of clevidipine over nicardipine did not constitute the distinguishing feature over D1 as identified by the appellant.



In its letter dated 14 July 2023, the appellant referred for the first time to the achievement of "an optimal balance of efficacy, precision (titrability) and safety". In the same letter, the appellant also argued that clevidipine would have higher activity and lower side effects than other hypertensive agents. In particular, it would not show the drawbacks in terms of hypoperfusion of nicardipine, which was indicated as preferred anti-hypertensive agent in case of acute ischemic stroke in D1. According to the appellant these surprising effects would be substantiated by the post-published Annex 3 and Annex 4.

In the board's view, the effect of an improved activity and reduced side-effects using clevidipine compared to other antihypertensive agents, in particular nicardipine in patients with specifically ischemic strokes, was not to be taken into account nor convincingly demonstrated. The board noted with reference to G 2/21, point 2 of the Order, that this effect had neither been contemplated nor even suggested in the original application. Indeed the original application did not mention any comparison to other anti-hypertensive agents and it encompassed the treatment of both hemorrhagic and ischemic stroke. It followed that this technical effect relied upon by the applicant could not be taken into account for the assessment of inventive step in accordance with G 2/21.

Moreover, even if said technical effect had been derivable from the original application, the board observed that Annex 3 and Annex 4 were merely abstracts reporting results of "ongoing" studies. These documents did not provide any detailed results nor any details on the protocols used. The meaningfulness of the appellant's exploitation of the data provided in these abstracts was therefore *prima facie* questionable. Furthermore, the study of Annex 4 appears to be a retrospective case study which was not designed as a clinical trial.

As a result, starting from D1, the board held the objective technical problem could thus be formulated as the provision of a medicament that can be used in a method of reducing ischemic stroke damage in a subject with an ischemic stroke.

163-14-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1045/21 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1045/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.09.05
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – obvious alternative – comparative tests
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.3.2</a> , <a href="#">I.D.4.1.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.4.2.</a> , <a href="#">I.D.4.5.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1045/21](#) the board held that the technical problem could not be formulated as the provision of an effective and thus improved treatment of ALS with edaravone, wherein the improvement resides in the provision of a further (new) treatment option for ALS, because D1 already described an effective treatment of ALS with edaravone. The fact that the claimed treatment might be confirmed, in the patent, to be effective in the claimed patient population could not be regarded as an improvement. The alleged confirmation, i.e. by a phase III study as opposed to a phase II study, of the efficacy of edaravone in the treatment of ALS was not a technical effect resulting from the differentiating feature, namely the %FVC of 80% or more.

The appellant further relied on the achievement of an improved efficiency in relation to the selection of patients having a %FVC of 80% or more, based on the data for subgroups (3) and (5) in table 5 of the patent.

The board explained that according to established case law, if comparative tests were chosen to demonstrate an inventive step on the basis of an improved effect over a claimed area, the nature of the comparison with the closest state of the art had to be such that the alleged advantage or effect was convincingly shown to have its origin in the distinguishing feature of the invention compared with the closest state of the art (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th edition, 2022, I.D.4.3.2). The board held that it rested with the proprietor to properly demonstrate that the purported advantages of the claimed invention had successfully been achieved (see G 2/21, OJ 2023, A85, point 26 or the Reasons).

Further, in the board's opinion, no meaningful conclusion could be drawn from a comparison of these subgroups (3) and (5), because there was no demonstration that these subgroups actually differed only by a %FVC of 80% or more, and that any improvement in the outcome had its origin in this differentiating feature. It was also neither shown nor credible that the characteristics of subgroups (3) and (5) were sufficiently similar to allow a comparison and draw conclusions as to the effect of the sole %FVC feature.

It was accordingly concluded that no improvement was convincingly shown to arise over D1, i.e. D1 credibly showed the efficacy of the edaravone treatment, and the selection of the claimed patient population was not associated with any improvement. The technical problem was therefore the provision of an alternative application of edaravone in the context of treating ALS. The board held that considering the formulation of the problem as the provision of an alternative, the solution consisting in selecting a subgroup of patients characterised by the claimed %FVC of 80% or more did not involve an inventive step.

164-14-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 1445/21 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1445/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step (no) – comparative tests – post-published evidence encompassed by the technical teaching of the originally disclosed invention (yes) – technical effect credibly demonstrated by experimental data of the patent and of the experimental report (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/21, T 0197/86, T 1962/12
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.3.2</a> , <a href="#">I.D.4.3.3</a> , <a href="#">I.D.9.21.9</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1445/21](#) the claimed invention related to near anhydrous liquid detergent and conditioner products comprising encapsulated perfumes which are perfectly stable therein. The appellant relied on the experimental data in the patent as granted, and on the experimental data in the experimental report filed on 16 April 2021 to demonstrate the existence of a technical effect.

The board agreed with the opposition division that the examples of the patent were not appropriate to show an improvement over the closest prior art associated with the reduced amount of water in the compositions. The experimental report showed a better olfactive performance for the compositions having 9% or 8.5% by weight of water in comparison to the compositions comprising 60% by water. It also showed that the fresh samples had in all cases a better olfactive performance than the sample stored for 3 days at 37°C.

The respondents (opponents) considered that the post-published experimental report could not be relevant according to G 2/21, since the olfactive performance or intensity was not related to the problem of the contested patent. The problem of the contested patent was the stability of the fragrance microcapsules, and the measurement of said olfactive performance was not related to or encompassed by this technical problem. The board disagreed with this argument. It found it was indeed obvious that the measurement of the olfactive performance of the composition was directly related to the

stability of the microcapsules containing the fragrance. The olfactive performance tested in the experimental report was regarded as encompassed by the technical teaching of the originally disclosed invention.

The board noted however that the comparison between a composition comprising 60% by weight of water with a composition according to the invention comprising 9 or 8.5% was not suitable in the present case to substantiate the presence of an improvement over the prior art. When making a comparison with the closest prior art, the comparison had to be such as to show convincingly that the alleged beneficial effects or advantageous properties were due to the distinguishing characteristic of the invention compared to the closest state of the art. Only comparative tests centred on the closest embodiment in relation to the invention were suitable for this purpose, because it is only from there that the unexpected effect must come (see T 197/86, OJ 1989, 371; or T 1962/12). This was not the case with the present report, wherein a comparison had been made with formulations having a water content of 60%, i.e. very far from the upper limit of water (10%) defined in claim 1. Consequently, the experimental report did not appear to provide a valid comparison over the disclosure of the closest prior art.

Accordingly, the experimental data of the patent and of the experimental report did not credibly demonstrate the existence of a technical effect linked with an amount of water not above 10% by weight. Consequently, the problem was as defined by the respondents and the opposition division in its decision, namely the provision of an alternative composition comprising aminoplast type microcapsules. The board noted that it was established case law that the simple act of arbitrarily selecting one among equally obvious alternative variations was devoid of any inventive character. The use of the microcapsules disclosed in D7 in an anhydrous composition was clearly contemplated in D7; the claimed subject-matter was therefore found to be obvious in view of D7 alone.

Consequently, the claimed subject-matter lacked an inventive step and the main request did not meet the requirements of Art. 56 EPC. Auxiliary requests 1-8 likewise did not meet the requirements of Art. 56 EPC. The appeal was dismissed.

165-14-23

## Article 056 EPC | T 0116/18 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 056 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0116/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 056 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 042(1)(c) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Bundesgerichtshof X ZB 15/67 (Rote Taube)
<b>Keywords</b>	inventive step – post-published evidence – purported technical effect – interpretation of G 2/21 – experimental proof or a positive verbal statement not necessarily required in the application as filed
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/07, G 0001/19, G 0002/21, T 0536/07, T 1642/07, T 1677/11, T 0184/16, T 0031/18, T 1442/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.D.4.3.3</a> , 10th edition

See also abstracts under [Article 112\(1\)\(a\) EPC](#) and [Article 13\(2\) RPBA 2020](#).

In [T 116/18](#) (of 28 July 2023) the board observed that in contrast to the questions referred to the Enlarged Board (EBA) in its interlocutory decision of 11 October 2021, which focussed on whether certain evidence proving a certain technical effect could be taken into consideration, Order no. 2 of G 2/21 focused on whether this technical effect, which said evidence proved, could be relied on. The board could not see, however, why this difference in wording should imply any difference in substance.

The board found that the EBA's focus on the application as filed and the filing date (point 93 of the Reasons) was intended to prevent the filing of applications directed purely to speculative inventions made only after the filing date. The requirement(s) established in Order no. 2 had to be looked at with the eyes of the skilled person "having the common general knowledge in mind, and based on the application as originally filed". Even though not stated explicitly in Order no. 2, the board found that the common general knowledge thus had to be that existing on the filing date of the application.

The board explained that Order no. 2 required that, for a patent applicant or proprietor to be able to rely on a purported technical effect for inventive step, the skilled person

would derive said effect as being (i) encompassed by the technical teaching, and (ii) embodied by the same originally disclosed invention. The board noted that the EBA did not refer to any of the plausibility standards it had identified in its referring decision, but used new legal terminology that had not been applied so far in the context of inventive step. What mattered however was that when deciding whether a purported technical effect may be relied upon for inventive step, it was the requirement(s) defined by the EBA in Order no. 2 that had to be applied, rather than simply using any rationale developed in the previous plausibility case law. The board further interpreted the linking of requirements (i) and (ii) with "and" to mean that both were separate requirements which had to be met cumulatively for a patent applicant or proprietor to be able to rely on the purported technical effect.

As to the definitions of "technical teaching" and "invention", the board referred to the adoption by the EBA (in particular in G 2/07, G 1/19) of the reasoning in the "Rote Taube" decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH 27.3.1969, X ZB 15/67). It concluded the term "technical teaching" in requirement (i) had the same meaning as the term "same originally disclosed invention" in requirement (ii), namely the broadest technical teaching of the application as filed contained in it with regard to the claimed subject-matter. In the light of this, the board held that for requirement (i) to be met, the purported technical effect together with the claimed subject-matter needed only to be conceptually comprised by the broadest technical teaching of the application as filed. It might be sufficient that the skilled person, having the common general knowledge in mind, and based on the application as filed, recognised that said effect was necessarily relevant to the claimed subject-matter.

As regards requirement (ii), in the board's view, the following question was to be asked: would the skilled person, having the common general knowledge on the filing date in mind, and based on the application as filed, have legitimate reasons to doubt that the technical teaching at issue, i.e. the purported technical effect together with the claimed subject-matter, was an embodiment of the originally disclosed invention, i.e. the broadest technical teaching of the application as filed? The board took the view that it was not necessarily a precondition for requirement (ii) to be satisfied that the application as filed contained experimental proof that the purported technical effect was actually achieved with the claimed subject-matter at issue. It was also not necessarily a precondition for requirement (ii) to be fulfilled that the application as filed contained a positive verbal statement about the purported technical effect.

The board's overall conclusion regarding requirement (ii) was thus the following: requirement (ii) is met unless the skilled person, having the common general knowledge on the filing date in mind, and based on the application as filed, would have legitimate reason to doubt that the purported technical effect can be achieved with the claimed subject-matter. For requirement (ii) to be satisfied, experimental proof of the purported technical effect or a positive verbal statement is not necessarily required in the application as filed.

172-15-23



## Article 69 EPC | T 1473/19 | Board 3.2.02

### Article 069 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1473/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.30
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 084, 123(2) and (3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC
<b>Keywords</b>	claim interpretation – amendments – added subject-matter (yes) – inescapable trap (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88, G 0002/10, G 0001/16, T 0556/02, T 1279/04, T 0197/10, T 1646/12, T 1167/13, T 1514/14, T 0131/15, T 2365/15, T 1127/16, T 0030/17, T 1776/18, T 2773/18, T 2007/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.3.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.3.9d</a> , <a href="#">II.E.3.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1473/19](#) the parties presented two possible interpretations for a feature in claim 1 of the granted patent. The interpretation of such feature was relevant for assessing compliance with Art. 123(2) and (3) EPC. Although the tests to be carried out under these provisions were different, a patent claim had to be interpreted in a uniform and consistent manner.

The board noted that according to established case law, patent claims must be interpreted through the eyes of the person skilled in the art, taking into account the whole disclosure of the patent. There was, however, a significant body of case law according to which the description and the drawings should only be used to interpret ambiguous features. There were also different views in the case law on the extent to which Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC should be applied when interpreting patent claims in proceedings before the EPO.

In the present decision the board held that Art. 69 EPC and its Protocol were the only provisions of the EPC containing rules for the interpretation of patent claims. Art. 84 EPC, first sentence, did not contain any such rules. The board acknowledged a difference between the subject-matter of a patent claim, which was assessed under Art. 54(2), 56, 83 and 123(2) EPC, and its extent of protection, which was assessed under Art. 123(3) EPC and in national infringement proceedings. However, it did not consider this difference a convincing reason not to apply Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol when determining the claimed subject-matter in proceedings before the EPO. The board



explained that there was a close link between the claimed subject-matter and the extent of protection. The extent of protection of a patent claim could be understood as the (infinite) set of embodiments which infringe that claim. This set could conceptually be divided into two distinct subsets. Although not identical to the claimed subject-matter, the first subset of the extent of protection was directly defined thereby and formed by embodiments which infringe the claim by realising the claimed features. The second subset was formed by embodiments which infringe the claim by equivalent means. When assessing whether an embodiment falls under the first subset, it is assessed whether that embodiment can be subsumed under the claimed features. To this end, the claimed features must be interpreted – and the claimed subject-matter thereby determined – in accordance with the rule on how "to interpret the claims" given in Art. 69(1) EPC in conjunction with Art. 1 of the Protocol. Such an interpretation of the claimed features for the purposes of establishing the first part of a patent claim's extent of protection was not different from interpreting these features when determining the claimed subject-matter for the purposes of assessing compliance with Art. 54, 56, 83 and 123(2) EPC. Assessing whether an embodiment falls under the second subset, i.e. equivalents under Art. 69(1) EPC in conjunction with Art. 2 of the Protocol, was a second step in the determination of the extent of protection which followed claim interpretation. As the "invention" in Art. 54, 56 and 83 EPC (see T 92/21) and, with regard to claim amendments, also the "subject-matter" under Art. 123(2) EPC (see G 2/10) referred to the claimed subject-matter only, equivalents were not to be taken into account when assessing compliance with these provisions.

The board concluded that Art. 69 EPC in conjunction with Art. 1 of the Protocol could and should be relied on when interpreting claims and determining the claimed subject-matter in proceedings before the EPO, including for the purpose of assessing compliance with Art. 123(2) EPC. In addition, the board pointed out that although Art. 69(1), second sentence, EPC generally required that account be taken of the description and the drawings when interpreting a claim, the primacy of the claims according to Art. 69(1), first sentence, EPC limited the extent to which the meaning of a certain claim feature may be affected by the description and the drawings. The established case law that limiting features which were only present in the description but not in the claim could not be read into a patent claim was thus fully compatible with relying on Art. 69 EPC in conjunction with Art. 1 of the Protocol as a legal basis for determining a patent claim's subject-matter. The primacy of the claims also limited the extent to which the description could serve as a dictionary for the terms used in the claims. The board further clarified that claim interpretation was overall a question of law which must as such ultimately be answered by the deciding body, and not by linguistic or technical experts. It did, however, involve the appraisal of linguistic and technical facts which may be supported by evidence submitted by the parties.

006-01-23

## Article 069 EPC | T 1844/19 | Board 3.3.05

### Article 069 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1844/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 069 and 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	interpretation of claims – using the description to interpret the claims – novelty
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0121/89, T 0607/93, T 0470/96, T 1208/97, T 0881/01, T 1279/04, T 0916/09, T 1646/12
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">I.C.4.8.</a> , <a href="#">I.C.5.2.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.3</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.4</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 1844/19](#), la revendication 1 du brevet tel que délivré se référait à une laine minérale ayant une composition chimique "sensiblement dépourvue d'oxyde de bore". Cette caractéristique était la seule caractéristique distinctive possible par rapport au document M08, qui comprenait un exemple ayant 1,100 % B<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>.

La question cruciale était de savoir s'il était admissible de consulter la description du brevet en litige pour établir la limite supérieure de la quantité d'oxyde de bore et, le cas échéant, quelle valeur en découlait.

La chambre a indiqué que la jurisprudence contenait de nombreuses décisions dans lesquelles la description et les dessins étaient utilisés pour interpréter des revendications ambiguës (Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, 10<sup>e</sup> édition, 2022, II.A.6.3.3). En même temps, il était généralement reconnu qu'aux fins de l'appréciation de la nouveauté et de l'activité inventive, on ne pouvait se fonder sur l'art. 69 CBE pour voir dans la revendication une limitation implicite qui n'était pas suggérée dans le libellé explicite de ladite revendication (Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, II.A.6.3.4 et I.C.5.2. ; T 1208/97). En outre, dans plusieurs décisions, les chambres de recours avaient souligné que, dans la procédure devant l'OEB, le titulaire du brevet a la possibilité de restreindre ses revendications afin de refléter des limitations plus strictes définies dans la description. Elles avaient conclu qu'il n'était pas possible de limiter l'étendue d'une revendication en y incorporant implicitement des caractéristiques qui ne figuraient que dans la description (Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, II.A.6.3.4 ; T 881/01 ; T 1279/04 ; T 916/09).

De plus, la chambre a noté que selon la décision T 1646/12, il convenait d'éviter deux extrêmes. D'une part, il ne fallait pas voir dans les revendications, par extrapolation, des caractéristiques restrictives qui figuraient certes dans la description, mais pas dans les revendications. D'autre part, on ne devait pas non plus considérer la revendication comme entièrement distincte de la description ; lorsque les revendications manquaient de clarté, la personne du métier ne pouvait se dispenser de rechercher des éléments de clarification dans les autres revendications, mais également dans la description et dans les dessins (Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, II.A.6.3.2).

En l'espèce, l'intérêt de se référer à la description apparaissait seulement dès lors qu'il fallait décider quelle valeur précise d'une quantité faible en oxyde de bore était encore couverte par la revendication. Cependant, définir l'objet de la protection demandée était la fonction même des revendications (art. 84 CBE). Le titulaire avait choisi de ne pas préciser de valeur limite dans la revendication, mais d'utiliser à la place l'expression vague « sensiblement dépourvu d'oxyde de bore ». Dans la présente affaire, bien qu'il fallait interpréter cette expression vague, y attribuer un sens restreint à l'aide de la description serait revenu au premier des deux extrêmes considérés dans la décision T 1646/12 et devait donc être évité.

Le présent cas était plutôt similaire à celui d'une revendication qui n'était pas difficile à comprendre mais qui était rédigée en termes trop généraux. Dans un tel cas de figure, il n'était normalement pas possible d'interpréter la revendication de manière restrictive en s'appuyant sur la description (Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, I.C.4.8. ; T 607/93). Similairement, dans l'affaire T 470/96, la chambre avait conclu que toute interprétation techniquement raisonnable d'une revendication vague et ambiguë était justifiée s'il s'agissait de comparer la revendication avec l'état de la technique ; si l'intention avait été de spécifier une interprétation plus étroite ou une signification spécifique, il aurait été nécessaire de modifier la revendication sur la base des informations précises figurant dans la description.

Au vu de ce qui précède, la chambre a conclu que l'objet de la revendication 1 considérée n'était pas nouveau.

026-03-23

## Article 069 EPC | T 0450/20 | Board 3.2.02

### Article 069 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0450/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.09
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 054 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC
<b>Keywords</b>	claim interpretation – claim interpretation in the light of the description (yes) – limitations – novelty
<b>Cited decisions</b>	R 0019/11, T 1646/12, T 1354/18, T 1473/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.3.4</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 450/20](#) the board followed the approach taken in T 1473/19, according to which the principles of claim interpretation as set out in Art. 69 EPC and Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of this provision are to be applied in proceedings before the EPO. In the present case the understanding of the term "permanently attached" in claim 1 was relevant for assessing novelty in opposition appeal proceedings.

The board stated that according to Art. 69(1), first sentence, EPC, only the claims determined the extent of protection. The description and the drawings had no such function, and must only be used to interpret the claims. This meant that the description and the drawings could only be used for interpreting features which were already present in the claims, but not for adding further - positive or negative - claim features or for replacing existing claim features by others.

Claim 1 itself neither defined nor specified the term "permanently attached" further. The description of the patent did not provide a definition of this term either. The board confirmed that patent claims must be interpreted through the eyes of the person skilled in the art and this included taking account of the skilled person's common general knowledge. The prior-art documents invoked by the respondent (patent proprietor) were, however, not suitable evidence for proving the skilled person's understanding of the term "permanently attached" according to common general knowledge.

In the board's opinion, the intended use of the claimed apparatus according to the patent was the appropriate criterion for determining the required duration or durability of the attachment. Hence, it understood that a "permanently attached" tapering portion did not exclude that the same tapering portion could be released from the push or guide

wire. The respondent disagreed with this understanding, arguing that the description defined "permanent" as the opposite of "releasable". The respondent referred, among other things, to a passage of the description stating that figures 19a and 19b - which depicted a releasable device - showed "two variations of a separating arrangement by which the distal segment 1 according to an example not in accordance with the invention is detachably connected to a guide wire". The board pointed out that the exclusion of the releasable device depicted in those figures was only present in the description, but not in the claims. Assigning to the term "permanently attached" in claim 1 the meaning - on account of the description - that it excluded any releasable device as depicted in such figures would go beyond the mere interpretation of this claim feature in light of the description. It would amount to adding a further limitation to the claim which was only present in the description - and this would not be in line with the principle of primacy of the claims (see T 1473/19).

The board further pointed out that, unlike the description of the patent, the application as filed was not referred to in Art. 69(1), second sentence, EPC as part of what must be taken into account when interpreting a patent (T 1473/19). The application as filed often differed from the patent as granted, both regarding the claimed invention and the contents of the description, and it usually could not, for this reason alone, provide guidance for interpreting the claims of the patent as granted. In view of this, the board did not consider the incidental statement in the application as filed, according to which the attachment "may be permanent or a releasable mechanism", to be a sufficient reason to interpret claim 1 as granted such that it excluded an attachment involving a releasable mechanism.

The board concurred with the statement in T 1473/19 that claim interpretation was, overall, a question of law which must, as such, ultimately be answered by the deciding body, and not by linguistic or technical experts. This being so, a board of appeal was not limited to the claim interpretations advanced by the parties but may also adopt a claim interpretation of its own. Relying on documentary evidence was not a precondition for the adoption of a certain claim interpretation by a board of appeal. In this context evidence could only be relied upon to prove facts, such as how the person skilled in the art understood a certain technical term in a certain prior-art document at a certain point in time, but not to ultimately ascertain whether a certain claim interpretation was correct or not.

See also [T 1494/21](#) issued by the same board on the same date as [T 450/20](#) (joint hearing).

127-11-23

## Article 069 EPC | T 0367/20 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 069 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0367/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.10.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 100(c), 123(2), 123(3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claim interpretation in the context of the description – primacy of the claims – interpretation according to Art. 69 EPC – interpretation to assess added subject-matter
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88, G 0002/10, G 0003/14, T 0874/97, T 0190/99, T 0396/99, T 0556/02, T 1018/02, T 1408/04, T 0073/19, T 1473/19, T 3097/19, T 0450/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2.</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.3.3.</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.3.9d</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 367/20](#) the board held that to assess whether an amended patent claim contains added subject-matter under Art. 123(2) EPC, the claimed subject-matter must first be determined by interpreting the claim (i.e. establishing the meaning of the claimed features) from the perspective of the person skilled in the art. In a second step, it must be assessed whether that subject-matter is disclosed in the application as filed.

Regarding claim interpretation, the board stressed that a claim feature must not be interpreted in isolation but in the context of the whole document it forms part of. The context to be considered for the interpretation of a feature in a claim therefore did not include only the other features in that claim and other claims but also the description and the drawings.

According to the board, the general principle that the claims of a patent, being a part of a document as a whole, need to be construed in their context was recognised early in the case law and had also been understood to underlie Art. 69 EPC (see T 556/02 and T 3097/19). Moreover, the established principle that patent claims must be interpreted through the eyes of the person skilled in the art, who should try with synthetical propensity to arrive at an interpretation of the claim which is technically sensible and takes into account the whole disclosure of the patent, was formulated for the first time



with reference to Art. 69 EPC (see T 190/99, T 396/99). The limitation on the weight which can be given to the description in relation to the claims was also in earlier case law derived from Art. 69(1), first sentence, EPC (see T 1018/02). This had been taken up recently and referred to as the primacy of the claims (see T 1473/19, T 450/20, T 73/19), which in particular prohibits reading features into the claims which are only present in the description or the drawings.

The board endorsed decision T 1473/19, which stated that the first step in determining the extent of protection in accordance with Art. 69 EPC consisted in determining the claimed subject-matter under the "general principles" of claim interpretation in Art. 1 of the Protocol on its interpretation. The interpretation and determination of the subject-matter of the same claim in the same opposition (appeal) proceedings before the EPO should be uniform and consistent, including for the purpose of Art. 123(2) and (3) EPC. Moreover, the board in T 1473/19 had stated that the EPO in opposition (appeal) proceedings, and the national courts and the UPC in revocation proceedings, had concurrent jurisdiction on (post-grant) patent validity and that national courts applied the rules for the interpretation of claims in Art. 69 EPC also in revocation proceedings. The board in the case in hand noted that the grounds for opposition under Art. 100(a) to (c) EPC corresponded literally – including in their reference to the "subject-matter" of the patent – to the grounds for revocation under Art. 138(1)(a) to (c) EPC (see also Art. 65(2) UPCA), and that Art. 68 EPC regulated the effect of the revocation or limitation of a European patent in an identical manner for both opposition and revocation proceedings. The board cited decisions of courts in several contracting states (AT, CH, DE, ES, FR, GB, NL) as examples of national case law on claim interpretation according to Art. 69 EPC in respect of revocation proceedings.

In the case in hand the board, taking account of feature M11 and the description, concluded that feature M5.1 ("a first switching pipe (62) which is connected to the fluid flows in parallel with the third heat exchanger (53)") should be understood as requiring that the first switching pipe (not the fluid flows) be in parallel with the third heat exchanger. Hence, feature M5.1 could be deduced directly and unambiguously from the application as filed. On the respondent's argument that feature M5.1 allowed both interpretations as to which parallelism was required, the board held that only the subject-matter which is actually claimed – as opposed to subject-matter merely hypothetically claimed – must be disclosed in the application as filed. The deciding body must not adopt two mutually exclusive claim interpretations simultaneously and must – if decisive for the outcome of the case – not leave the interpretation in that regard open either. For completeness, the board distinguished the present case, concerning two mutually exclusive interpretations of a certain claim feature, from situations where a claim feature could be interpreted in a broad manner to encompass "a multitude of possibilities" (T 1408/04), i.e. different embodiments of the same, broad subject-matter.

173-15-23

## Article 72 EPC | J 0005/23 | Board 3.1.01

### Article 072 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>J 0005/23</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.1.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.09.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 072 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 002 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Articles 31, 32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
<b>Keywords</b>	assignment of a European patent application – the meaning of "signature" in Article 72 EPC – materials to be considered in the systematic interpretation of the EPC
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0005/83, G 0002/12, G 0003/14, G 0003/19, J 0010/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.H.1.1.</a> , <a href="#">III.H.1.2.2.</a> , <a href="#">III.H.6.</a> , <a href="#">III.M.2.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [J 5/23](#) the applicant had filed an appeal against the Legal Division's decision rejecting the request to record the transfer of the application. The appeal hinged on how the term "signature" in Art. 72 EPC was to be understood and, in particular, whether it encompassed electronic signatures in the form of "text string signatures" without any further qualification.

The Legal Board recalled that when interpreting the provisions of the EPC, the principles of interpretation laid down in Art. 31 and 32 of the VCLT 1969 must be applied. Starting out with the wording of the term, the Legal Board found that in the given context of a contract the term "signature" signified mostly a handwritten depiction of someone's name. The Legal Board then examined the underlying purpose of the provision in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. It noted that the general rationale underlying Art. 72 EPC was that there must be clear and unambiguous formal requirements for the transfer of a European patent application, resulting in a sufficient level of authenticity of the assignment contract. It would be at odds with the rationale of this provision if – without any explicit legal basis – any type of text in electronic form referring to the name of a person were considered a "signature" within the meaning of Art. 72 EPC.



The Legal Board further established that in the systematic interpretation of the EPC, the material to be taken into account included the entirety of the articles of the EPC, as well as the Implementing Regulations to it. The latter encompassed the Implementing Regulations to the EPC 1973 as well as subsequent amendments.

As to R. 2(1) EPC the Legal Board stated that this provision regulated how documents might be filed "in proceedings before the European Patent Office". The phrase "where the Convention provides that a document must be signed" in R. 2(2) EPC had to be read not in an isolated manner but in the context of the entire provision, taking account of the contents of R. 2(1) EPC and the title of R. 2 EPC. The Legal Board concluded that the scope of application of R. 2 EPC in its entirety was limited to formal requirements for filing documents in proceedings before the EPO. Such formal requirements concerned a relationship between the EPO, a public authority, and a party to proceedings before the EPO, which was usually a private party. Art. 72 EPC, on the other hand, regulated formal requirements for assignment contracts. This usually concerned a relationship between two or more private parties. Hence, R. 2 EPC and Art. 72 EPC regulated entirely different matters. Moreover, unlike Art. 72 EPC, R. 2 EPC did not have any impact on national law.

Regarding the "Decision of the President of the EPO dated 14 May 2021 concerning the electronic filing of documents" (OJ 2021, A42), the Legal Board noted that, as the scope of application of R. 2 EPC was limited to formal requirements for filing documents in proceedings before the EPO, the power conferred to the President of the EPO in R. 2(2), second sentence, EPC, was subject to the same limitation.

The appellant had also referred to the "Notice from the European Patent Office dated 22 October 2021 concerning electronic signatures on documents submitted as evidence to support requests for registration of a transfer of rights under Rules 22 and 85 EPC and requests for registration of a licence or other rights under Rule 23 EPC" (OJ 2021, A86). According to the Legal Board, while a notice from the EPO might be a source of legitimate expectations (see J 10/20), it was, as such, only a document providing information. The Notice was not a legal instrument passed by a competent legislative body, so it could neither implement nor specify any articles of the EPC. It was not part of the material referred to in Art. 31(2) and (3) VCLT and was not to be taken into account for a systematic interpretation of Art. 72 EPC.

In conclusion, the Legal Board, applying the general rule of interpretation pursuant to Art. 31 VCLT to the term "signature" in Art. 72 EPC, held that in the absence of a different definition in the Implementing Regulations, this term must be understood as referring to a handwritten depiction of someone's name, written on the assignment "contract" referred to in Art. 72 EPC.

152-13-23

## Article 76 EPC | T 0795/21 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 076 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0795/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.24
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 076(1), 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	divisional application – amendments – subject-matter extends beyond content of earlier application – deletion of features – singling out a sub-group of compounds
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/93, G 0001/03, G 0002/10, T 0859/94, T 0615/95, T 0050/97, T 0801/02, T 0948/02, T 0783/09, T 1937/17
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.1.6.2a</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.6.3</a> , <a href="#">II.F.2.1.1</a> , 10th edition

In [T 795/21](#) the parent application as originally filed defined variables X and Y for the compounds of formula I as follows: "X and Y are independently selected from the group comprising H, F, Cl, Br, I, OH and methyl (-CH<sub>3</sub>)". It was not in dispute that amended claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 included the limitation of the meaning of Y to F in combination with the deletion of H from the list of options for X with respect to the compounds of formula I.

The board observed that, in accordance with established jurisprudence regarding the deletion of meanings from multiple lists defining variables in a generic formula, it was not sufficient that the remaining subject-matter still related to a generically defined group of compounds. In order to comply with Art. 123(2) EPC the deletion must not result in a particular combination of specific meanings which was not originally disclosed and which thereby generates another invention. In other words, the amendment may not lead to a particular combination which was not derivable from the originally disclosed subject-matter and was therefore potentially suitable to provide a technical contribution.

In the patent as granted, the definition of the compounds of formula I had already been limited by restricting Y to a single meaning. Whilst such limitation was not objectionable as sole amendment, the combination of this limitation of Y with the further deletion of H from the list of options for X in claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 singled out a sub-group of compounds which was well suitable to provide a technical contribution generating another

invention. The original disclosure did not provide any pointer to this sub-group of compounds.

The board noted that in G 2/10 (point 4.3 of the Reasons) the Enlarged Board explained that the notion of a "technical contribution", as referred to in G 1/93 (point 16 of the Reasons) in the context of conflicting requirements under Art. 123(2) and (3) EPC and in G 1/03 (points 2.6 and 4 of the Reasons) in the context of disclaimers for undisclosed subject-matter, was not intended to modify the "gold standard" for the assessment of amendments. The board agreed with the considerations in T 1937/17 that, accordingly, in the context of an amendment which was found to be allowable or not allowable under the "gold standard" any investigation as to the potential for a technical contribution was without relevance.

However, the deletion of options from multiple lists of separate characteristics inherently included an aspect of combination and potentially involved an aspect of arbitrariness, which may complicate the assessment of whether such amendments remained within the limits of what the skilled person would directly and unambiguously derive from the original disclosure.

Following the explicit reference in G 2/10 to the applicability of the existing jurisprudence regarding the singling out of compounds or sub-classes of compounds or other so-called intermediate generalisations not specifically mentioned nor implicitly disclosed in the application as filed (see G 2/10, point 4.5.4 of the Reasons), the board understood in this context the notion of:

"the remaining generic group of compounds differing from the original group only by its smaller size" versus "singling out an hitherto not specifically mentioned sub-class of compounds";

and the notion of:

"mere restriction of the required protection" versus "generating another invention" or "suitable to provide a technical contribution to the originally disclosed subject-matter",

as developed in the jurisprudence not as modifications of the "gold standard" for the assessment of amendments in the form of additional or alternative criteria, but rather as considerations which may arise from the application of this standard when assessing amendments by deletion of options from multiple lists and which may affirm the result of such assessment.

Accordingly, the board considered that the observation that the deletion of options for X and Y in accordance with claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 was suitable to provide a technical contribution to the originally disclosed subject-matter supported the assessment that this amendment was not in compliance with the "gold standard". The board therefore concluded that auxiliary request 4 did not fulfil Art. 76(1) EPC.

084-08-23

## Article 83 EPC | T 0500/20 | Board 3.2.04

### Article 083 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0500/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.18
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 100(b) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	sufficiency of disclosure (yes) – invention to be performed over whole range claimed – invention not sufficiently disclosed across the entire breadth of the claim – approach developed in the field of chemistry – inappropriate for claimed inventions not involving a range of parameter values or compositions – field of mechanics – providing a single detailed example
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/03, G 0002/21, T 0857/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.C.5.4.</a> , <a href="#">II.C.5.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 500/20](#) the invention concerned a wind turbine aimed at damping or eliminating undesirable edgewise oscillations of the rotor blades that might appear in an idling power producing situation. The control of the wind turbine altered the nacelle yaw angle if it detected the presence of blade edgewise oscillations. The appellant (opponent) held that the invention was not sufficiently disclosed.

The board considered the arguments put forward by the appellant were without merit, for example as to the alleged contradiction in the claim features. The board also stressed that as variously stated in case law, isolated cases of non-working or not ideally working embodiments were of no import for the issue of sufficiency in the light of the large number of conceivable and realisable alternatives indicated in the description (G 1/03, point 2.5.2 of the Reasons; T 857/16).

Moreover, the board added that the general argument (made in this case and unfortunately more widely in mechanics), that the invention would not be sufficiently disclosed across the entire breadth of the claim misapplied an approach developed mainly in the field of chemistry for inventions where a central aspect of the claimed invention was a range of compositions or of parameter values. There it was important

that an effect associated in the patent with the range was plausible or plausibly demonstrated across the whole breadth of the claimed range. Otherwise the claimed invention would be insufficiently disclosed, because the effect was not plausible across the whole breadth of the range.

The board stated that in claimed inventions that did not involve a range of parameter values or compositions, basing an argument of insufficiency on this approach was inappropriate and could be rejected offhand for that reason. This was especially so where, as in the present case, an invention was directed at a broadly defined concept expressed in terms of generic structural or functional features of an apparatus or of a method. There it normally sufficed to provide a single detailed example or embodiment to illustrate how this concept could be put into practice in such a way that the underlying principles could be understood by the relevant skilled person who could reproduce the claimed invention using their common general knowledge without undue burden. In its Catchword the board said that: “in claimed inventions that do not involve a range of parameter values or compositions but are directed at a concept expressed in terms of generic structural or functional features of an apparatus or of a method, it is not enough to demonstrate insufficiency to conceive of an example that falls within the terms of the claim that does not work because it does not achieve the claimed effect fully or at all so that therefore the invention would not be sufficiently disclosed across the entire breadth of the claim”. The board found that such an example did not prove that the claimed concept did not work; rather it reflected the limitations that were inherent in any technological endeavour and which may provide the scope for future (inventive) development. To successively argue insufficiency in a case such as this, a very high burden of proof applied: the party must demonstrate through cogent argument based on the underlying principles, if necessary supported by evidence, that the claimed concept did not work, because it did not achieve the desired effect in any measure or indeed was counter to the laws of nature. Or they must demonstrate that the disclosure lacked information on an important aspect of the claimed invention, without which the skilled person could not realise the claimed invention without undue burden. The appellant failed to present any such arguments.

027-03-23

## Article 083 EPC | T 2319/18 | Board 3.4.01

### Article 083 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2319/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.16
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 083, 084, 100(b) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Protocol on the interpretation of Article 69 EPC
<b>Keywords</b>	sufficiency of disclosure (no) – contradiction within the claim – claim interpretation – relation between Article 83 and Article 84 EPC
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1513/12
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2.</a> , <a href="#">II.C.8.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2319/18](#) stellte die Kammer im Rahmen der Prüfung der Ausführbarkeit fest, dass Anspruch 12 in der erteilten Fassung widersprüchliche Merkmale enthielt. Der Widerspruch ergebe sich aus den sich gegenseitig ausschließenden und über eine gewisse Zeitdauer andauernden, sich aus dem Verringern der Versorgungsspannung und der kurzzeitigen Aktivierung der Versorgungsspannung ergebenden Zuständen.

Die Kammer war der Ansicht, dass das Heranziehen allgemeiner Auslegungsprinzipien diesen Widerspruch nicht ausräumen könne. Die Merkmale des Anspruchs 12 seien für sich klar. Es sei aber nicht ersichtlich, welche technische Wirkung durch die Merkmalskombination des Anspruchs 12 erreicht werden sollte, da bestimmte Angaben fehlten. Für die Suche nach einer technisch sinnvollen Auslegung des Anspruchs bekomme die Fachperson dementsprechend keinerlei Hinweise.

Die Kammer stellte klar, dass sie an die Auslegung der Ansprüche durch die Parteien nicht gebunden war (T 1513/12). Sie [teilte die Auffassung des Einsprechenden nicht](#), dass das Verfahren der Figur 6 der Definition in Anspruch 12 entspreche. Sie merkte an, dass das Flussdiagramm der Figur 6 nur dann von Bedeutung sein könnte, wenn die Fachperson aus dem Anspruchswortlaut erkennen würde, dass das Flussdiagramm einem Ausführungsbeispiel der beanspruchten Erfindung entspricht. Dies sei jedoch nicht der Fall. Aus den für sich genommen klaren Merkmalen des Anspruchs 12 ergebe sich eine nicht sinnvolle und somit unbestimmte Definition des beanspruchten Verfahrens (Art. 83 EPÜ). Eine Auslegung des Anspruchs 12 im Sinne des Ausführungsbeispiels der Figur 6 sei unter den vorliegenden Umständen ausgeschlossen. Das Heranziehen eines Ausführungsbeispiels als Grundlage für eine

alternative, wenn auch sinnvolle Auslegung des Anspruchs würde jeden Dritten vor die Aufgabe stellen, zu bestimmen, was oder welche Merkmalskombination des Ausführungsbeispiels unter den Anspruchswortlaut fällt. Aus Gründen der Rechtssicherheit sei eine solche Vorgehensweise bei der Auslegung eines Anspruchs, der widersprüchliche Merkmale enthält, ausgeschlossen.

Ferner hob die Kammer hervor, dass Art. 1 des Protokolls über die Auslegung des Art. 69 EPÜ die Bedeutung der Ansprüche und die der Beschreibung und Zeichnungen bei deren Auslegung unterstreiche. Der Schutzbereich ergebe sich weder aus dem genauen Wortlaut der Patentansprüche noch aus dem, was sich für die Fachperson nach Prüfung der Beschreibung und der Zeichnungen als Schutzbegehren des Patentinhabers darstelle. "Die Auslegung soll vielmehr zwischen diesen extremen Auffassungen liegen und einen angemessenen Schutz für den Patentinhaber mit ausreichender Rechtssicherheit für Dritte verbinden."

Infolgedessen kam die Kammer zu dem Schluss, dass sich keine sinnvolle Auslegung des Anspruchs aus dem Anspruchswortlaut ergebe. Das Verfahren des Anspruchs 12 sei wegen des Vorhandenseins von sich gegenseitig ausschließenden Zuständen nicht ausführbar im Sinne des Art. 100 b) EPÜ.

055-06-23



## Article 083 EPC | T 1983/19 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 083 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1983/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.03
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 100(b) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	sufficiency of disclosure – invention to be performed over whole range claimed – field of mechanics
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 2773/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.C.5.2.</a> , <a href="#">II.C.5.4.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1983/19](#) befasste sich die Kammer mit der Frage der Ausführbarkeit der Erfindung "über den gesamten beanspruchten Bereich" auf dem Gebiet der Mechanik.

Der Beschwerdeführer II (Einsprechender) hatte vorgetragen, dass die Ansprüche gewisse Aspekte der Erfindung (Gleitringdichtung), wie z.B. das Material und die Abmessungen der Gleit- und Gegenringe oder die Kraft, die das balgartige Federmittel aufbringen könne, nicht festlegten, dass aber der Fachmann nicht in der Lage sei, für alle vom Anspruch abgedeckten Varianten die geltend gemachte Wirkung zu erzielen.

Dieser Vortrag überzeugte die Kammer nicht. Entscheidend sei, dass das Patent dem Fachmann einen Weg aufzeigt, die Erfindung auszuführen.

Die vor allem im Kontext der Chemie entwickelte Rechtsprechung, der zufolge die Erfindung über den gesamten beanspruchten Bereich ausführbar sein muss, sei nicht ohne Abstriche auf die Mechanik übertragbar. Zu fast jedem Anspruch der Mechanik ließen sich beliebig viele Ausführungsbeispiele erdenken, die nicht ausführbar sind. Dies führe aber nicht dazu, dass die Erfindung als solche nicht ausgeführt werden könne (siehe auch T 2773/18).

Wenn zum Beispiel, wie vom Beschwerdeführer II eingeräumt, für jeden Fachmann offensichtlich sei, dass aus keramischem Material oder harten Metallen bestehende Gleit-Gegenringe durch ein balgartiges Federmittel nicht verformt werden können, dann würde der Fachmann eben keine solchen Gleit- oder Gegenringe verwenden, um die Erfindung in die Tat umzusetzen. Das bedeute aber nicht, dass er außerstande wäre, die Erfindung auszuführen.



Somit stand nach Auffassung der Kammer der Einspruchsgrund gemäß Art. 100 b) EPÜ der Aufrechterhaltung des Patents wie erteilt nicht entgegen.

153-13-23

# Article 083 EPC | T 0149/21 | Board 3.5.03

## Article 083 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0149/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 100(b) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 042(1)(e) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	sufficiency of disclosure – invention to be performed over whole range claimed and indication of at least 'one way' – recent case law from the boards in the field of mechanics
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0409/91, T 0435/91, T 1905/10, T 0862/11, T 2431/11, T 1542/12, T 2305/14, T 0941/16, T 2210/16, T 0222/17, T1306/17, T 2773/18, T 1921/19, T1983/19, T 0500/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.C.5.2.</a> , <a href="#">II.C.5.4.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 149/21](#) betraf die Erfindung ein Verfahren zur Reduzierung des Energieverbrauchs einer Walzwerkanlage. Der Einspruch (Art.100 (b) EPÜ) wurde zurückgewiesen. In der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer argumentierte der Beschwerdegegner (Patentinhaber), dass es nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern hinreichend sei, dass zumindest ein Weg zur Ausführung der Erfindung in der ursprünglichen Anmeldung aufgezeigt werde, um das Erfordernis von Art. 83 EPÜ zu erfüllen. Ob auch andere "exotische" Szenarien unter den Schutzgegenstand fielen, sei in diesem Zusammenhang unerheblich.

Die Kammer stimmte zu, dass das Streitpatent wenigstens einen Weg zur Ausführung der beanspruchten Erfindung im Einzelnen angebe und somit zumindest R. 42 (1) e) EPÜ erfülle. Nach der ständigen Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern müsse jedoch die Ausführbarkeit der beanspruchten Erfindung im gesamten beanspruchten Bereich gegeben sein. Demnach sei die Angabe wenigstens eines Weges zur Ausführung der beanspruchten Erfindung zwar notwendig, aber nicht hinreichend für die Erfüllung des Erfordernisses von Art. 83 EPÜ. Die Kammer betonte zudem, dass diese Rechtsprechung in der Regel auch nicht auf das jeweilige Fachgebiet beschränkt sei: dasselbe Kriterium sei nämlich – neben dem Bereich der Chemie – auch auf dem Gebiet der Elektrotechnik, Physik, und Mechanik mehrfach bestätigt und angewandt worden. Eine Qualifizierung dieser Rechtsprechung nach verschiedenen technischen

Feldern wäre nach Auffassung der Kammer schon allein aufgrund des Gebots einer harmonisierten Anwendung des EPÜ in Bezug auf das Erfordernis der Ausführbarkeit auch schwer vermittelbar.

Die Kammer wies jedoch auch darauf hin, dass in kürzlich ergangenen Entscheidungen aus dem Bereich der Mechanik (vgl. T 2773/18, T 500/20 und T 1983/19) die Ansicht vertreten wurde, dass das aus dem Bereich der Chemie stammende Kriterium "im gesamten beanspruchten Bereich" nicht unbedingt auf andere technische Gebiete wie die Mechanik anwendbar sei. Insbesondere sei in diesem Zusammenhang z. B. in T 1983/19 betont worden, dass die vor allem im Kontext der Chemie entwickelte Rechtsprechung, der zufolge die Erfindung "über den gesamten beanspruchten Bereich" ausführbar sein muss, nicht ohne Abstriche auf die Mechanik übertragbar sei, da sich zu fast jedem Anspruch der Mechanik beliebig viele Ausführungsbeispiele erdenken ließen, die nicht ausführbar wären. Dies führe aber nicht dazu, laut T 1983/19, dass die "Erfindung als solche" nicht ausgeführt werden könne. Vielmehr genüge es, dass das Patent dem Fachmann lediglich einen Weg aufzeigt, die Erfindung auszuführen.

Auch der Beschwerdegegner hatte sich im vorliegenden Fall dieses Argument zu Nutze gemacht. Die Kammer war jedoch der Auffassung, dass die Angabe eines Weges zur Ausführung der beanspruchten Erfindung zwar für das Erfüllen des Erfordernisses nach R. 42 (1) e) EPÜ hinreichend sein mag, aber nicht notwendigerweise für das Erfüllen von Art. 83 EPÜ. Vielmehr sollte gemäß der Rechtsprechung der in diesem Artikel genannte Fachmann über alle technischen Gebiete hinweg durch das Streitpatent und sein allgemeines Fachwissen in die Lage versetzt werden, die beanspruchte Erfindung über den gesamten Bereich auszuführen, d. h. nach allen technisch möglichen Auslegungsvarianten, die der fachkundige Leser nach objektiven Kriterien aufgrund seines allgemeinen Fachwissens heranziehen würde. Mit anderen Worten sollten nach Ansicht der Kammer bei der Prüfung nach Art. 83 EPÜ alle "technisch sinnvollen" Anspruchsauslegungen berücksichtigt werden, wobei nicht nur jene Anspruchsauslegungen als "technisch sinnvoll" gelten könnten, bei denen die Erfordernisse des EPÜ als erfüllt gelten. Das Erfordernis, dass die Offenbarung die Ausführung der beanspruchten Erfindung "in ihrem gesamten Bereich" ermöglichen muss, steht auch im Einklang mit dem grundlegenden rechtspolitischen Anliegen, dass prinzipiell das durch ein Patent verliehene Ausschließungsrecht bezüglich seines Schutzbereichs durch den tatsächlichen Beitrag des Patents zum Stand der Technik begründet sein sollte.

Der Meinung der Kammer nach war der vorliegende Fall in diesem Zusammenhang keine Ausnahme. Die angefochtene Entscheidung wurde letztendlich aufgehoben und das Patent widerrufen.

154-13-23

## Article 083 EPC | T 0867/21 | Board 3.5.03

### Article 083 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0867/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.09.21
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 100(b) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 42(1)(e) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	sufficiency of disclosure – invention to be performed over whole range claimed and indication of at least "one way"
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0409/91
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.C.5.2.</a> , <a href="#">II.C.5.4.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 867/21](#) betraf die Erfindung eine Antenneneinrichtung für Hörinstrumente. Die Kammer befasste sich zuerst ausführlich mit der für diesen Fall relevanten Frage der Auslegung von Anspruch 1. Danach befasste sich die Kammer mit der Frage der Ausführbarkeit.

Es sei im Streitpatent wenigstens ein Weg zur Ausführung der beanspruchten Erfindung offenbart.

Gemäß Art. 83 und 100 b) EPÜ ist es die "Erfindung", die so deutlich und vollständig zu offenbaren ist, dass ein Fachmann sie ausführen kann. Dabei ist die "Erfindung" nach Ansicht der Kammer als "die in den Ansprüchen definierte Erfindung" zu verstehen, im Einklang mit dem in den Art. 52, 54 und 56 EPÜ verwendeten Erfindungsbegriff. Demnach ist die "Erfindung", und damit auch die Frage, ob diese ausführbar ist, auf die Gesamtheit der Anspruchsmerkmale bezogen. Alle möglichen, für den Fachmann technisch sinnvollen Ausführungsformen, die unter die Merkmale des Anspruchs fallen, sind daher grundsätzlich in der Anmeldung bzw. im Patent so deutlich und vollständig zu offenbaren, dass ein Fachmann sie ausführen kann. Insofern kann das Erfordernis der Ausführbarkeit nur dann als erfüllt angesehen werden, wenn der Fachmann die in den Ansprüchen definierte Erfindung im gesamten beanspruchten Bereich unter Verwendung der Angaben in der Anmeldung bzw. dem Patent und des einschlägigen allgemeinen Fachwissens nacharbeiten kann. Dieses Erfordernis verlangt allerdings nicht, dass für jede einzelne, unter den Anspruch fallende, technisch sinnvolle Ausführungsform in der Anmeldung oder im Patent ein separater, eigener Weg zu offenbaren ist. Die Ausführbarkeit kann sich nämlich für unter den Anspruch fallende, aber nicht ausdrücklich in der Beschreibung offenbarte Ausführungsformen auch aus

dem allgemeinen Fachwissen – unter Umständen zusammen mit dem ausdrücklich in der Beschreibung angegebenen Weg – ergeben. Insofern mag die Offenbarung eines Weges ausreichen, allerdings eben nur unter der Bedingung, dass dieser eine Weg auch – zusammen mit dem allgemeinen Fachwissen – den gesamten beanspruchten Bereich abdeckt. Die Erfüllung des Erfordernisses der Ausführbarkeit setzt somit voraus, dass die Anmeldung bzw. das Patent in deutlicher und vollständiger Weise zumindest einen Weg aufzeigt, mittels dem der Fachmann die beanspruchte Erfindung über den gesamten beanspruchten Bereich ausführen kann (siehe Orientierungssatz).

Im Zusammenhang mit der Anspruchsauslegung kam die Kammer jedoch im vorliegenden Fall, aus Gründen die sie detailliert ausführte, zu dem Schluss, dass dies im vorliegenden Fall nicht gegeben sei. Die angefochtene Entscheidung wurde aufgehoben und das Patent widerrufen.

155-13-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 0169/20 | Board 3.3.06

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0169/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.23
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069(1), 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 042(1)(c), 043(1) and (6) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – claim interpretation – legal basis for claim interpretation – support by the description
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/98, G 0003/14, T 0016/87, T 0311/93, T 0303/94, T 0523/00, T 1018/02, T 0056/04, T 1321/04, T 1408/04, T 0197/10, T 1646/12, T 1845/14, T 1844/15, T 2365/15, T 1127/16, T 1902/16, T 1473/19, T 0470/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.3.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.3</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.4</a> , 10th edition

In [T 169/20](#) the board disagreed with the findings in T 16/87 and more recent decision T 1473/19 and considered that the provisions of Art. 69(1) EPC did not apply to the interpretation of the claims for the purpose of assessing patentability. The board held that the provisions in Art. 84 EPC and R. 42 and 43 EPC provided an adequate legal basis for claim interpretation when assessing the patentability of an invention. In particular, the requirement that the claims shall be "supported by the description" in Art. 84 EPC, 2nd sentence, provided a direct and unambiguous indication of the description's function as an aid for understanding the subject-matter of the claims.

According to the board, the wording of Art. 84 EPC, 2nd sentence, implicitly limits the support given by the description to interpreting the claims in exceptional cases where such support is both necessary and possible. If the wording of a claim is unclear for a person skilled in the art, the description could fulfil its supporting function by illustrating the meaning of the unclear feature/s. Conversely, when the wording of a claim is clear for the skilled person, the supporting role from the description is neither necessary nor justified. In particular, the support of the description should not be used for restricting or modifying the subject-matter of the invention beyond what a person skilled in the art would understand when reading the wording of the claims within the relevant technical context. Moreover, if the invention according to the description is narrower or different

from that in the claim, the supporting role of the description under Art. 84 EPC could not be fulfilled, since an interpretation on this basis would not represent an illustration of the subject-matter of the claim with the aid or support of the description but a restriction or modification of the scope of the invention. The board thus considered that the condition "supported by the description" in Art. 84 EPC provided a legal basis for determining how and when claims should be interpreted in the light of the description.

After reviewing the case law concerning claim interpretation, the board concluded that, despite the discrepancies regarding the relevant legal provisions to be applied for interpreting the claims, the established practices of the boards in deciding when and how the claims should be interpreted in the light of the specification were reasonably homogeneous. Hence, in a number of decisions the boards had concluded that the specification could be used to interpret ambiguous or unclear features or to confirm the most obvious interpretation of the claims. The specification had also been relied upon by the boards to determine the underlying technical context of the invention. On the other hand, there was also a broad consensus in the boards that the specification should not be used to read restrictive features not suggested by the wording of the claims, or to give a different meaning to a claim feature which in itself imparted a clear and credible technical teaching to the skilled reader. If a claim was ambiguous and could be interpreted in more than one technically reasonable way (none of them being more obvious or apparent than the rest), it would not be permissible to restrict its meaning in view of the description by discarding one of the technically reasonable interpretations.

The board also addressed the following expressions: "the patent is its own dictionary" and "the terms used in patent documents should be given their normal meaning in the relevant art, unless the description gives the term a special meaning". In the present board's view, the above expressions had been a major source of confusion in the debate on claim interpretation, as they seemed to indicate that it would be permissible to rely on the definition of a feature given in the description to modify its meaning in the claim, even if the claim wording was as such clear and technically reasonable and/or if the meaning assigned in the description deviated from the conventional meaning of the feature within the relevant technical context. Such an approach would not only be contrary to the legal framework proposed by the present board (as well as that based on Art. 69(1) EPC) but would also be at odds with the well-established principle of the primacy of the claims.

In the underlying case the board concluded that the wording of claim 1 of the main request was clear and technically meaningful taking into account the technical context of the invention presented in the description. Thus, there was no reason to interpret it in light of the description.

031-04-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 2685/19 | Board 3.5.02

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2685/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.12
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – support in the description (no) – adaptation of the description
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1024/18, T 1989/18, T 2293/18, T 1516/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.5.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2685/19](#) nahm der Patentinhaber in der Beschreibung des Hilfsantrags III<sub>bis</sub> im Vergleich zu der der angefochtenen Einspruchsentscheidung zugrundeliegenden Fassung der Beschreibung mehrere Änderungen vor:

- die Ersetzung von "In nicht beanspruchten Ausführungsformen kann vorgesehen sein, dass" durch "Es ist vorteilhaft",
- die Streichung von "nicht beanspruchte(n)", sowie
- die Streichung der Einfügung "Wobei lediglich in Figur 5 eine erfindungsgemäße Ausführungsform dargestellt ist".

Die Kammer befand, dass der Hilfsantrag III<sub>bis</sub> nicht die Erfordernisse des Art. 84 Satz 2 EPÜ erfüllt. Sie folgte insoweit nicht der vom Beschwerdeführer (Patentinhaber) zitierten Entscheidung T 1989/18, wonach, falls die Ansprüche kein Klarheitsproblem aufweisen, die Beschreibung keinen Anlass für eine Unklarheit des beanspruchten Gegenstandes bieten könne. Die Kammer gab an, dass sie sich vielmehr der ständigen Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern anschließt, wie sie auch jüngst in den Entscheidungen T 1516/20, T 1024/18 sowie T 2293/18 bestätigt wurde. In den genannten Entscheidungen werde sehr deutlich und überzeugend aufgezeigt, dass das Kriterium der Stützung der Ansprüche durch die Beschreibung in Art. 84 Satz 2 EPÜ ein eigenständiges Kriterium ist, das nicht der Klarheit der Ansprüche unterzuordnen ist.

Die Beschreibung sei daher gemäß ständiger Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern an geänderte Ansprüche anzupassen. Dies bedeute unter anderem, dass nicht mehr unter den geänderten Anspruchswortlaut fallende Ausführungsformen in der Beschreibung als solche zu kennzeichnen seien.



Da die mit dem Hilfsantrag III<sub>bis</sub> vorgelegte Beschreibung nicht klarstellte, dass die beanspruchte Erfindung lediglich die dem Gegenstand der Ansprüche entsprechende Ausführungsform betraf, bestand ein Widerspruch zwischen den Ansprüchen und der Beschreibung, aufgrund dessen die Ansprüche, entgegen dem Erfordernis des Art. 84 Satz 2 EPÜ, nicht durch die Beschreibung gestützt waren.

044-05-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 1761/19 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1761/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 056, 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – interpretation of process claims with product-like features – "process-by-product" claims
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.7.4.</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 1761/19](#), la chambre s'est penchée sur l'interprétation des revendications de procédé comportant des caractéristiques de type produit (que l'on pourrait qualifier de revendications "process-by-product").

En particulier, la revendication 1 de la requête principale portait sur un procédé de personnalisation d'au moins deux cartes (...), comprenant les étapes (2.1) à (4) et caractérisé en ce que (5.1) ce procédé était un procédé de personnalisation d'au moins deux cartes en matière plastique et (5.2) ayant une épaisseur comprise entre 0.5 mm et 4 mm, (5.3) du type carte à puce, ou carte de fidélité ou d'identification.

La chambre a estimé que les caractéristiques (5.1) à (5.3) n'étaient pas des caractéristiques de procédé mais des caractéristiques définissant les cartes qui sont personnalisées lors de la mise en œuvre du procédé revendiqué, à savoir leur matériau (matière plastique), leur épaisseur (entre 0,5 et 4 mm) et leur type (carte à puce, carte de fidélité ou carte d'identification). Aux yeux de la requérante (opposante), ces caractéristiques ne définissaient le procédé que dans la mesure où elles avaient un impact sur les caractéristiques de procédé. La chambre a observé que ce raisonnement de la requérante semblait fondé sur une analogie par rapport à la pratique de l'OEB concernant les revendications de produits caractérisés par leur procédé d'obtention ("product-by-process").

Pour la chambre, l'analogie en question n'était pas pertinente. Les revendications du type "product-by-process" sont admises dans les cas où il n'est pas possible de définir le produit obtenu autrement que par son procédé d'obtention. Cette situation n'est pas

comparable à celle d'une revendication de procédé précisant que ce procédé concerne un produit bien précis. Dans ce cas, la caractéristique de produit limite tout simplement le procédé à son application à ce produit, sans qu'il soit nécessaire ni même utile d'examiner si elle a un effet sur les étapes du procédé proprement dites. Autrement dit, la caractéristique de produit en question ne constituait pas une façon de définir, faute de mieux, une propriété d'une étape du procédé qui se soustrayait à une définition directe, mais elle circonscrivait de manière directe la portée du procédé. Tout raisonnement par analogie avec les revendications de type "product-by process" était donc à proscrire.

Au vu de ce qui précède, la chambre a conclu que les caractéristiques (5.1) à (5.3) limitaient le procédé à un procédé de personnalisation de cartes du type carte à puce ou carte de fidélité ou d'identification, réalisées en matière plastique et ayant une épaisseur comprise entre 0,5 mm et 4 mm. Ces caractéristiques devaient être prises en compte dans l'examen de la brevetabilité, sans qu'il fût nécessaire de vérifier si – et à quel point – elles modifiaient les étapes du procédé (2.1) à (4).

En l'espèce, les caractéristiques (5.1) à (5.3) étaient pertinentes pour évaluer la nouveauté et l'activité inventive.

056-06-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 1924/20 | Board 3.5.03

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1924/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.16
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 056, 084, 100(a) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – interpretation – claim construction for assessing inventive step
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1127/16, T 2764/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1924/20](#) the board noted that the respondent's (patent proprietor's) line of argumentation regarding E1's disclosure and inventive step concerning claim 8 hinged upon a claim construction that was based on the description of the opposed patent. The board held that such a line of argumentation was not convincing; a skilled reader of a patent claim would, for many reasons, interpret the claims based essentially on their own merits (see e.g. T 2764/19 and T 1127/16). This was because the "subject-matter of the European patent" (cf. Art. 100(a) EPC) is defined by the claims and only by them. The board explained that the description and drawings were, however, typically used by the deciding body to determine the above-mentioned "skilled reader" and, hence, the view point from which the claims are interpreted. This meant that, when interpreting the claims, the description and drawings could not be relied on as a sort of fall-back or supplementary-guidance tool for filling up gaps or for resolving inconsistencies in a claim to the patent proprietor's advantage. Such a reliance on the description and the drawings by the patent proprietor would normally fail to convince. The present case was no exception to this.

057-06-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 1354/18 | Board 3.5.04

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1354/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.17
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – interpretation of claims – claim construction for assessing novelty
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.1</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1354/18](#) befasste sich die Kammer mit der Auslegung des Anspruchs 1 des Patents. Dieser Anspruch spezifiziert unter anderem, dass "die Kameraeinheit (10) und das Schutzelement (12) beweglich aneinander angelenkt sind". Wie aus der angefochtenen Entscheidung zu entnehmen ist, befand die Einspruchsabteilung, dass dieses Merkmal (nachstehend Merkmal 5) bedeute, dass die Kameraeinheit und das Schutzelement unmittelbar über ein (einziges) Gelenk beweglich seien. Nach Ansicht der Kammer ist die Einspruchsabteilung durch eine rein linguistische Analyse des Begriffs "anlenken" – der die Kammer nicht zustimmte – zu ihrem Ergebnis gelangt.

Die Kammer wies darauf hin, dass Patentansprüche eine technische Lehre vermitteln und an einen Leser mit Fachkenntnissen auf dem Gebiet der Anmeldung gerichtet sind. Für die zutreffende Auslegung von Anspruchsmerkmalen müsse daher stets deren technischer Wortsinn im technischen Gesamtzusammenhang aller Merkmale aus Sicht des Fachmanns maßgeblich sein und nicht eine rein linguistische Analyse des Wortlauts einzelner Begriffe. Den in Patentdokumenten verwendeten Begriffen sei daher vorrangig die im einschlägigen Stand der Technik übliche Bedeutung zu geben. Hierbei könne es ohne Weiteres sein, dass der Fachmann auf dem einschlägigen technischen Fachgebiet bestimmte Begriffe unter Zugrundelegung seines allgemeinen Fachwissens anders als auf Grundlage einer rein linguistischen Analyse versteht. Ebenso sei es möglich, dass die Patentschrift selbst einzelnen Merkmalen eine bestimmte Bedeutung beimisst, die von einem rein linguistischen Verständnis abweicht; insofern könne ein Patentdokument sein eigenes Wörterbuch darstellen. Die Auslegung müsse zu einem technisch sinnvollen Ergebnis führen, wobei den Ansprüchen normalerweise die breiteste technisch sinnvolle Bedeutung beizumessen sei. Die

linguistische Analyse des Merkmals 5 könne die Analyse des technischen Wortsinns bestenfalls ergänzen oder bestätigen, nicht aber ersetzen.

Die Kammer merkte an, dass sich der technische Wortsinn des Merkmals 5 nicht bereits aus einem bestimmten technischen Verständnis der streitigen Begriffe durch den Fachmann aufgrund seines allgemeinen Fachwissens ergebe. Sofern der Beschwerdegegner (Patentinhaber) hingegen ein bestimmtes technisches Verständnis dieser Begriffe durch den Fachmann aufgrund seines allgemeinen Fachwissens behauptet habe, habe er diese Ansicht nicht durch geeignete Beweismittel wie Ausführungen in Lehrbüchern oder Fachlexika untermauert, die sich aus technischer Sicht mit den Begriffen "aneinander", "anlenken" und deren Kombination beschäftigen und aus denen sich ergeben würde, dass der Fachmann sie stets so wie vom Beschwerdeführer behauptet versteht. Der Kammer sei ein solches feststehendes technisches Verständnis aufgrund allgemeinen Fachwissens auch nicht bekannt.

Die Kammer entnahm vielmehr der Patentschrift selbst das maßgebliche technische Verständnis des Merkmals 5. Sie war der Ansicht, dass die Beschreibung der Formulierung "beweglich aneinander angelenkt" eine bestimmte Bedeutung zuweise, die weder eine mittelbare Verbindung noch eine Verbindung über eine Mehrzahl von Gelenken ausschließt. Daher kam die Kammer zu dem Schluss, dass die Einspruchsabteilung das Merkmal 5 des Anspruchs 1 des Patents zu eng und damit unzutreffend ausgelegt hatte.

085-08-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 2391/18 | Board 3.2.03

## Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2391/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.19
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 084, 101(3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 080 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – support in the description – inconsistency already present in the granted version – adaptation of the description (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/14
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.5.3.</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.5.1.2b)</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.5.2.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2391/18](#) the appellant (opponent) had argued that the description had to be adapted to amended claim I of the main request, since there was an inconsistency between said claim and the description. In particular, paragraph [0017] of the description referred to a weighing device which **provides for** a support structure, whereas amended claim I specified a weighing device **coupled with** a support structure.

The appellant had also put forward the argument that such an inconsistency, even if - as observed by the board - it was already present in the granted version, had to be addressed by adapting the description to the wording in the claim. The reason for the alleged obligation to remove such an inconsistency was seen in a possible lack of support of the claims by the description within the meaning of Art. 84, second sentence, EPC.

The board stressed that Art. 84 EPC was not a ground for opposition. Therefore, such amendment to the description was not "occasioned by a ground for opposition" within the meaning of R. 80 EPC.

Moreover, the board considered that the conclusions of the Enlarged Board in G 3/14 had to be taken into consideration in this context. The allegedly required amendment to paragraph [0017] related to an alleged inconsistency that already existed in respect of a feature present in the granted claims. Therefore, even without the allegedly required amendment to the description, there was no reason for the board (or the opposition division) to come to the conclusion that the requirements of the Convention (in particular

the requirements of Art. 84 EPC) within the meaning of Art. 101(3)(a) EPC were not fulfilled. The reason for this was the conclusion of the Enlarged Board in G 3/14, in which the Enlarged Board found that when considering whether, for the purposes of Art. 101(3) EPC, a patent as amended meets the requirements of the EPC, the claims of the patent may be examined for compliance with the requirements of Art. 84 EPC only when, and then only to the extent that the amendment introduces non-compliance with Art. 84 EPC.

According to the board, in a case such as the present one, where the amendment to the claims did not introduce an issue of non-compliance with Art. 84 EPC, an opposition division or a board of appeal could not examine the claims of the patent for compliance with the requirements of Art. 84 EPC, including the requirement of "support by the description". There was thus no reason for the board to object to the wording of paragraph [0017] of the description.

086-08-23



## Article 84 EPC | T 2565/19 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2565/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.29
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – clarity (no) – receptor defined only by locational and functional features
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.3.1.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 56 EPC.](#)

In [T 2565/19](#) the board remarked that the claimed subject-matter was an isolated TRH receptor, i.e. a product. The receptor was defined only by locational and functional features, i.e. the tissue from which it could be isolated: "from human CNS tissue" and its ability to bind the compounds defined in the claim, "wherein the compound having the structure GlpW-Pro-X binds to the TRH receptor sub-type in human CNS tissues but does not bind to the TRH receptor sub-type in human pituitary tissue". Neither of these features conveyed any structural information about the claimed product, for instance whether it was a protein or not, or if it were a protein, what its sequence might be.

The board referred to the criteria established by the boards in the case law to determine whether or not a claim was clear (see G 2/88, point 7 of the Reasons, and CLB, 10<sup>th</sup> edition, II.A.3.1.). The board held that in the absence of any structural features, the claim could not be considered as clear because it failed to enable the protection conferred by the patent (or patent application) to be determined and it did not define the claimed subject-matter in a manner which allowed a meaningful comparison with the state of the art to be made. Indeed, in the absence of any structural information about the claimed subject-matter, it was not possible to determine if the claimed product was novel. For instance, there was no way of ruling out that the functional and locational features defined in the claim did not simply re-characterise a known molecule.

The appellant (applicant) had argued that a receptor could be defined solely by its binding properties to its ligand, which was in line with the definition of a receptor from a

number of online scientific dictionaries. Moreover, it had maintained that the EPC did not require that an applicant had to sequence a protein in order to be entitled to claim it.

The board was not persuaded by the appellant's (applicant's) arguments and concluded that, applying the criteria developed by the boards in the case law, the claim lacked clarity.

087-08-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 2968/19 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2968/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069(1), 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – clarity – claim interpretation – conciseness
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/04, G 0003/14, T 1646/12, T 1473/19, T 0169/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2968/19](#) wendete sich der Anmelder mit der Beschwerde gegen die Zurückweisung der Anmeldung. In der angefochtenen Entscheidung vertrat die Prüfungsabteilung u.a. die Auffassung, dass Anspruch 1 durch die Verwendung des unklaren Merkmals "ALC-Steuerung" die Erfordernisse von Art. 84 EPÜ nicht erfülle.

Der Beschwerdeführer (Anmelder) berief sich auf einen "allgemeinen Grundsatz", gemäß dem die Patentanmeldung ihr eigenes Wörterbuch darstelle. Er argumentierte weiter, dass Art. 69 (1) EPÜ und dessen Auslegungsprotokoll analog im Prüfungsverfahren anzuwenden seien. Für den Beschwerdeführer folgte aus alledem, dass das Merkmal "ALC-Steuerung" in Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags in Zusammenschau mit der Beschreibung hinreichend deutlich sei.

Die Kammer merkte an, dass Art. 69 (1) EPÜ sich auf die Ermittlung des Schutzbereichs des erteilten Patents bezieht und damit in Verfahren vor dem EPA im Wesentlichen in Zusammenhang mit Art. 123 (3) EPÜ Anwendung findet. Trotzdem bleibe die Beschreibung zur Auslegung von Anspruchsmerkmalen nicht grundsätzlich unberücksichtigt. In der Entscheidung T 1646/12 sei zur Auslegung von erteilten Patentansprüchen im Lichte der Beschreibung Folgendes festgestellt worden:

"In diesem Zusammenhang gilt es zwei Extreme zu meiden. Zum einen ist es nicht zulässig, die Ansprüche und die Beschreibung gewissermaßen als kommunizierende Gefäße zu betrachten, zum Beispiel, indem man einschränkende Merkmale, die zwar in der Beschreibung beschrieben sind, aber nicht in den Ansprüchen, in letztere hineinliest. Eine solche Übertragung von einschränkenden Merkmalen kann nicht durch

Auslegung, sondern nur durch eine Änderung der Ansprüche erreicht werden. Zum anderen kann man den Anspruch auch nicht als von der Beschreibung völlig getrennt betrachten. Der Fachmann, der einen Anspruch auslegt, muss sich zumindest vergewissern, ob die Ausdrücke des Anspruchs ihrem üblichen Wortsinn nach zu verstehen sind oder ob die Beschreibung für diese Ausdrücke eine besondere Bedeutung definiert."

Der Kammer zufolge ist diese Abwägung in analoger Weise auch auf die Überprüfung der Kriterien von Art. 84 EPÜ bei Änderungen der Ansprüche anzuwenden. Allerdings sei im Prüfungsverfahren, im Gegensatz zur Auslegung erteilter Patentansprüche, zunächst dem Grundsatz Genüge zu tun, dass die fehlenden wesentlichen Merkmale in den Anspruch aufzunehmen sind und die Bedeutung der Merkmale für die Fachperson aus dem Wortlaut des Anspruchs allein klar hervorgehen sollte (vgl. G 1/04, Nr. 6.2 der Gründe).

Werde ein komplexes technisches Merkmal ("ALC-Steuerung") durch lediglich einen schlagwortartigen Begriff im Anspruch wiedergegeben, so seien die Untermerkmale, die dieses komplexe Merkmal möglicherweise bestimmen, zumindest nicht expliziter Teil des Anspruchswortlauts. Zur Beurteilung der Deutlichkeit sei zwischen Untermerkmalen zu unterscheiden, die sich für die Fachperson aus der im Anspruch verwendeten Begrifflichkeit bereits aus dem allgemeinen Fachwissen in dem technischen Kontext des Patents direkt und unmittelbar erschließen, und die somit implizit Teil des Anspruchsgegenstandes sind, sowie anderen Untermerkmalen, die zwar in der Beschreibung als wesentlicher Teil des komplexen Merkmals dargestellt werden, sich jedoch für die Fachperson nicht unmittelbar und eindeutig aus dem Fachwissen als implizit offenbart ergeben. Das Fehlen der letztgenannten Untermerkmale könne einen Mangel an Deutlichkeit begründen.

Der vom Beschwerdeführer angeführte Rückgriff auf die Beschreibung im Sinne eines eigenen Wörterbuchs könne zur Auslegung der Ansprüche eines Patents im Einspruchsverfahren zulässig sein, wenn Merkmale einem Einwand unter Art. 84 EPÜ nicht mehr zugänglich sind, jedoch trotzdem ausgelegt werden müssen (vgl. Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 10. Aufl. 2022, II.A.6.3.3; G 3/14, Nr. 55 der Gründe). Der Kammer zufolge sind jedoch einem solchen Rückgriff bei der Anspruchsauslegung Grenzen gesetzt (vgl. "primacy of the claim" in T 1473/19, T 169/20), insbesondere in der Weise, dass im Anspruch fehlende (und nicht aus dem fachgerechten Verständnis der im Anspruch verwendeten Begrifflichkeiten implizit definierte) Merkmale nicht in den Anspruch hineinzulesen sind.

Die Kammer stellte darüber hinaus klar, dass das Erfordernis der Knappheit in Art. 84 EPÜ eine eigenständige Bedingung ist, gemäß der verhindert werden soll, dass die eindeutige Auslegbarkeit des Anspruchs beispielsweise durch redundante Merkmale kompromittiert wird. Sie sei jedoch nicht so anzuwenden, dass hierdurch die Erfordernisse an die Deutlichkeit gemäß Art. 84 EPÜ eingeschränkt werden.

Folglich entschied die Kammer, dass der Hauptantrag nicht die Erfordernisse des Art. 84 EPÜ erfüllte.

088-08-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 1296/19 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1296/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.08
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – clarity
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0010/93
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.2.3.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.3.1.</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 1296/19](#), la chambre a estimé que la revendication 1 de la requête principale ne remplissait pas les exigences de concision et clarté de l'art. 84 CBE.

La revendication 1 portait sur un composé de formule (I) comprenant un groupe R1. La définition de R1 incluait, entre autres, un groupe isoamyle et un groupe isopentyle. Ces deux groupes désignent le même substituant (3-méthylbutyle). La chambre a considéré que l'utilisation de ces deux groupes dans une même liste induisait un manque de concision. Le fait que la définition de R1 est claire n'implique pas nécessairement que la revendication contenant cette définition soit concise.

En plus, la chambre a considéré que l'utilisation des mots "et où" dans ladite revendication rendait la définition des formules (IIa), (IIb), (IIIa) et (IIIb) vague. Il n'était pas clair par exemple pour un composé de formule (I) pour lequel A était de formule (IIa), (IIb), (IIIa) ou (IIIb) si dans ces formules x ne pouvait avoir qu'une valeur de 1 (selon la condition exprimée après les mots "et où") ou pouvait également être un nombre entier supérieur à 1 (selon la première définition de "x" dans la revendication 1, x était "un nombre entier supérieur à 0"). Il en était de même avec R6 qui ne pouvait être qu'un groupe méthyle (selon la condition exprimée après les mots "et où") ou un groupe alkyle en C2-C4 (selon la première définition de "R6" dans la revendication 1, R6 était "un groupe alkyle en C1-C4").

La requérante (demanderesse) avait soumis que les formules (IIa), (IIb), (IIIa) et (IIIb) ne comprenaient que des définitions redondantes et non pas contradictoires. La chambre ne partageait pas cet avis. Les définitions de "x" et les définitions de "R6" n'étaient pas identiques. Elles n'étaient donc pas redondantes l'une envers l'autre. Comme elles n'avaient pas la même signification, il y avait une contradiction dans la

revendication 1. Au moins pour cette raison, les exigences de l'art. 84 CBE n'étaient pas remplies. De plus, si les définitions étaient redondantes, cela impliquerait un manque de concision des définitions.

098-09-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 1382/20 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1382/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – claim interpretation for assessing novelty
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1354/18, T 1473/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1382/20](#) befasste sich die Kammer mit der Auslegung des Anspruchs 1 des Hauptantrags im Rahmen der Neuheitsprüfung. Dieser Anspruch spezifizierte unter anderem, dass die Fixiereinrichtung die Lagesicherung der Stützprofile "dergestalt frei [gibt], dass die beiden Stützprofile, unter Verdrängung des Füllprofils nach oben aus dem Spalt heraus, aufeinander zu bewegbar sind".

Die Kammer befand, dass der Ausdruck "unter Verdrängung" eine Gleichzeitigkeit zwischen der Bewegbarkeit der Stützprofile und der Verdrängung des Füllprofils zum Ausdruck bringe. Zum Beleg dieses Verständnisses hatte der Beschwerdegegner (Patentinhaber) einen Auszug aus Duden, "Das große Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache", Band 6, 1981, Seite 2703, zur Präposition "unter" (Eintrag I.4.) vorgelegt. Der Kammer zufolge bestätigte der vorgelegte Auszug aus Duden das Verständnis der Kammer, wonach die beanspruchte Vorrichtung so ausgestaltet sein müsse, dass die Freigabe der Lagesicherung eine Bewegbarkeit bedinge, bei der gleichzeitig das Füllprofil nach oben aus dem Spalt verdrängt werde.

Der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechende) hatte eingewandt, dass sich der Anspruch an einen technischen Fachmann, nicht an einen Linguisten richte, und nach dem Verständnis des Fachmanns zu beurteilen sei. Darüber hinaus hatte der Beschwerdeführer argumentiert, dass die in Figur 2 des Streitpatents aufeinander aufliegenden Gleitflächen 36 und 37 zwischen den Stützprofilen und dem Füllprofil nur eine optionale Ausgestaltung seien, welche erst im abhängigen Anspruch 7 spezifiziert sei. Zudem offenbare Absatz [0012] im Sinne einer "Öffnungsklausel", dass sich das Heraustreten des Füllprofils konstruktiv in verschiedener Weise vollziehen lasse, z.B. auch durch eine Änderung der Geometrie des Füllprofils. Die Verdrängungsbewegung des Füllprofils müsse daher nicht sofort und insbesondere nicht gleichzeitig mit der

Bewegung der Stützprofile stattfinden. Die Kammer sah in den vom Beschwerdeführer zitierten Passagen jedoch weder einen Widerspruch noch eine "Öffnungsklausel" zu dem klar formulierten Anspruchsmerkmal.

Die Kammer stimmte dem Beschwerdeführer zu, dass sich ein Patentanspruch nicht an einen Linguisten, sondern an die Fachperson richte. Demnach sei ein Patentanspruch nicht aus Sicht eines Linguisten und auf Grundlage einer rein linguistischen Analyse, sondern vielmehr aus Sicht der Fachperson auszulegen (vgl. T 1354/18). Der Kammer zufolge müssen allerdings bei der Bestimmung des – stets sprachlich angegebenen – technischen Anspruchsgegenstands aus fachmännischer Perspektive die geltenden Regeln der Sprachlehre ebenfalls berücksichtigt werden (vgl. T 1473/19). Der vom Beschwerdegegner herangezogene Duden belege im vorliegenden Fall auch keine nur Linguisten geläufige Sonderbedeutung des mit der Präposition "unter" eingeleiteten Ausdrucks. Vielmehr entspreche das im Duden wiedergegebene Verständnis dieses Ausdrucks im Zusammenhang mit Anspruch 1 dem geltenden allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch, an dem sich auch der fachkundige Leser eines in deutscher Sprache formulierten Anspruchs bei der Bestimmung des davon umfassten technischen Gegenstands orientiere.

128-11-23



## Article 84 EPC | T 1426/21 | Board 3.2.01

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1426/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.27
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 042 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Guidelines F-IV, 4.4 – March 2023 version
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – clarity (yes) – support in the description (yes) – claim-like clauses – adaptation of the description
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1444/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.5.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1426/21](#) the board followed decision T 1444/20 finding that the "specific embodiments of the invention" drafted as claim-like clauses in the description (of the new main request), which were consistent with the claims did not render the claims unclear pursuant to Art. 84 EPC and met the requirements of R. 42 EPC.

The board noted that the Guidelines 2023, Part F, Chapter IV, 4.4 indicate that "claim-like clauses must also be deleted or amended to avoid claim-like language prior to grant since they otherwise may lead to unclarity on the subject-matter for which protection is sought". The board held that in the present case the "claim-like clauses" did not render the subject-matter for which protection was sought unclear, because the text in the description was consistent, and not in contradiction, with the set of claims. Moreover, the claim-like clauses disclosed as "aspects" on pages 11 and 12 could not be mistaken for claims. It was obvious that they were part of the description and were not part of the claims defining the protection to be sought.

According to the board, R. 42 EPC did not rule out claim-like clauses in the description. In the present case, the claim-like clauses could be considered as embodiments of the invention defined in terms of technical features. These claim-like clauses did not change or impair the understanding of the technical problem and the solution defined in the description. Therefore, there was no reason to require their deletion.

The board concluded that the amendments to the description according to the (new) main request had removed the previous inconsistencies between the claim-like clause

embodiments and the claims. The claims were thereby supported by the description pursuant to Art. 84 EPC.

129-11-23

# Article 84 EPC | T 0042/22 | Board 3.3.04

## Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0042/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.17
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 076(1), 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – claim interpretation – interpretation in the light of the description and the claims as a whole – subject-matter of divisional application extends beyond content of earlier application (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0454/89, T 1018/02, T 1023/02, T 0056/04, T 1404/05, T 1172/08, T 0197/10, T 2221/10, T 1896/11, T 1646/12, T 1603/13, T 0935/14, T 1817/14, T 1127/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.4.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 42/22](#) claim 1 of the main request was a product claim directed to a modified nucleotide, i.e. to a chemical compound as such, which comprised the following components: (i) a purine or pyrimidine base, (ii) a deoxyribose sugar moiety having a 3'-azidomethyl group and (iii) triphosphate.

The appeal turned on the interpretation of the term "3'-azidomethyl" in claim 1. In particular, the question was whether claim 1 was directed to nucleotides having an azidomethyl group directly bound to the 3' carbon of the deoxyribose (interpretation 1) or whether it was directed to nucleotides having an azidomethyl group bound via an oxygen to the 3' carbon of the deoxyribose (interpretation 2).

After examining what the skilled person understood by the term "3'-azidomethyl" in claim 1, the board concluded that the symbol "3' " without any letter following the number denoted for the skilled person "3'-C", i.e. being directly bound to the carbon atom at position 3' (interpretation 1).

A second point addressed in this decision was whether the term "3'-azidomethyl" in claim 1 was to be interpreted in light of the description. In the case at hand, the board held that claim 1 was clear and no technical inconsistencies between the terms in the claim had been identified. Moreover, it considered that interpretation 1 was technically sensible. In the board's judgement, the meaning of a term in a claim which was clear could not vary depending on how well the claim was aligned with the description. Also, in decisions T 1127/16 and T 1896/11, the competent board in each case had considered claim wording which imparted a clear and credible technical teaching when interpreted on its own, although this teaching did not correspond to the invention in the description. The board in each of those cases had held that the description could not be used to give a different meaning to the claim.

The board in the current case disagreed with T 1023/02, which had held that a given term in the claim should be interpreted according to the teaching in the description. It followed instead the line of decisions establishing that there was no need to use the description to interpret a claim which was clear and allowed a technically sensible interpretation (see e.g. T 1018/02, T 1172/08, T 197/10, T 1896/11, T 1127/16).

Hence, the board concluded that there was no reason to use the description to interpret claim 1. In a case such as this one, where the claim and the description related to different compounds, a technically reasonable interpretation based on the literal wording of the claim should not be discarded and replaced by a different interpretation finding a basis solely in the description.

An additional point addressed by the board was whether independent claim 1 was to be interpreted in the context of claim 6 and whether doing so would change the claim interpretation. In the board's view, the interpretation of product claim 1 could not be dependent on whether or not method claim 6 was present in the claim set. Instead, each claim should be interpreted independently. Contrary to the view of the respondent (patent proprietor), the board did not find in Art. 84 EPC support for the contention that all claims needed to be interpreted together. In addition, the board noted that the appellants (opponents) had provided a technically sensible interpretation of claim 6 which was also compatible with interpretation 1 of claim 1. The board pointed out that in line with the case law, a technically sensible interpretation could not be disregarded even if additional interpretations were possible. As such, it was not relevant for the current case which additional interpretations could follow from interpreting claim 6.

Hence, the board came to the conclusion that claim 1 should be given interpretation 1. Regarding the basis for the claimed subject-matter in the grandparent and parent applications as filed, the board decided that the claim related to subject-matter extending beyond the content of the earlier applications as filed (Art. 76(1) EPC).

130-11-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 0111/22 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0111/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 084, 100(c), 123(2), 123(3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – claim interpretation – interpretation in the light of the description – added subject-matter (yes) – extension of the scope of protection (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1172/08, T 1646/12, T 0073/19, T 1473/19, T 0169/20, T 0450/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.3.4</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.3.9d</a> ), <a href="#">II.E.2.3.1c</a> ), <a href="#">II.E.2.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 111/22](#) the board interpreted the feature "wherein component (ii) comprises 10-45 wt.% of palatinose" in claim 1 of the patent as granted (main request) in order to compare the claimed subject-matter with the original disclosure.

The appellant (patent proprietor) had argued that claim 1 was unclear on how to calculate the range 10-45 wt.% of palatinose and thus the description had to be used for interpretation. In the description, this amount was calculated referring to the total amount of available carbohydrates. This was evident from page 5, lines 15 to 20 of the description as filed. Therefore, according to the appellant, the skilled person would have interpreted claim 1 as granted calculating the 10-45 wt.% of palatinose on the basis of the "available carbohydrates composition" and not on the basis of the amount of component (ii).

The board recalled that patent claims must be interpreted through the eyes of the person skilled in the art, who should try with synthetic propensity to arrive at an interpretation which is technically sensible and takes into account the whole disclosure of the patent. However, the extent to which the meaning of a claimed feature may be affected by the description and/or the drawings was limited. There was a consensus within the boards about the primacy of the claims in claim interpretation (see T 1473/19, T 73/19 and T 169/20). This meant that in case of a clear conflict between the claims and the description, the claims took precedence. In other words, if a person skilled in the art understood a claim in a certain manner without doubt, taking into account the

rules of grammar, the ordinary meaning of the terms used and common general knowledge, this understanding usually took precedence over an incidental and conflicting statement in the description, in particular if that statement was only made in the context of an alleged embodiment.

Thus, the board concluded that the requirement in claim 1 that the composition contain a component (ii) "wherein component (ii) comprises 10-45 wt.% of palatinose" could only be understood so that it was component (ii) - and not the entire amount of carbohydrate in the composition - which comprised 10-45 wt.% of palatinose. This interpretation corresponded to the unambiguous wording of claim 1 and was "technically sensible". The board noted that there were no reasons to adopt a different claim interpretation based on the preferred embodiment described in paragraph [0021] of the description.

Since no basis for the feature "wherein component (ii) comprises 10-45 wt.% of palatinose" could be found in the application as originally filed, claim 1 of the main request contained added subject-matter, contrary to the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC. The same conclusion applied *mutatis mutandis* to auxiliary requests 1 to 7.

Claim 1 of auxiliary requests 8 to 11 required that "15-45 wt.% of component (ii), based on the available carbohydrate composition, consists of palatinose". The appellant had argued that by virtue of Art. 69 EPC, paragraph [0021] of the granted patent, which defined the amount of palatinose on the basis of the available carbohydrate composition, had to be taken into account to determine the scope of protection of the granted patent. Hence, the scope of protection was not extended.

The board pointed out that Art. 69(1), second sentence, EPC could not be relied upon for replacing a claim feature with a different one which could only be found in the description (see T 450/20). Reading the statement in paragraph [0021] into the clear wording of claim 1 as granted to establish compliance with Art. 123(3) EPC would have the consequence that the wording of this claim merely served as an empty shell (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed. 2022, II.E.2.3.1c), in particular T 1172/08). This would undermine the principle stipulated in the first sentence of Art. 69(1) EPC and reiterated in decision T 1473/19 that the claims have primacy for determining the extent of protection conferred by the European patent. In the board's view, it would also be at odds with providing a reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties as required by Art. 1 of the Protocol on the Interpretation of Art. 69 EPC. The board concluded that claim 1 of auxiliary requests 8 to 11 extended the scope of protection beyond that conferred by the patent as granted (Art. 123(3) EPC).

131-11-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 1266/19 | Board 3.3.08

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1266/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.18
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – claim interpretation – interpretation in the light of the description – claim interpretation to assess novelty
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1646/12, T 0169/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.4</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1266/19](#) claim 1 of the main request (patent as granted) was directed to a method which comprised at least six process steps. The process steps (i) to (v) defined a chronological order in which the claimed method had to be performed. It was, however, disputed between the parties whether step (vi) had to be performed as last step in the method as defined in claim 1.

Step (vi) read as follows: "determining a statistical value for an allele call in a genotyping assay that cannot be derived from the read number alone", ("step (vi)").

The respondent (patent proprietor) had submitted that step (vi) had to be carried out as last process step. This was the necessary result of the claim's structure which mentioned this feature as its last step and the skilled person's interpretation of claim 1 in the context of the patent's teaching as a whole. Reference in this regard was made to the patent and the case law of the Boards of Appeal, in particular decision T 1646/12.

The board did not agree with the respondent and noted that neither the process steps (i) to (v) nor the preamble of claim 1 mentioned the terms cited in step (vi). Claim 1 was also silent on using formal identifiers for the at least six process steps, such as, for example, (a) to (f). Nor could the use of step (vi) as last process step be derived from the structure of claim 1 in any other way. On the contrary, the use of the term "including" in claim 1 which immediately followed the preamble left the order of the steps open, since this term in the context of patent claims was commonly understood to have the same meaning as comprising.

The board also considered that the skilled person reading claim 1 was familiar with the terms "statistical value", "allele call", "genotyping assay" and "read number" as mentioned in step (vi) and aware of their meaning. These terms were thus clear in themselves and in their relation to each other. In such a situation, it was established case law that terms in a claim must be given their broadest technical sensible meaning, and that a definition in the description which is absent from a claim cannot give these terms and, hence, the claim as a whole a more narrow/restrictive meaning. In the present case it was thus neither necessary nor justified to rely on isolated passages of the description to interpret the claim more narrowly, let alone to read into claim 1 further limitations as derivable from the description only which were absent from the claim (see T 169/20).

Besides, the board observed that step (vi) did not specify "how" and "when" the statistical value was to be determined, except for indicating the purpose of its determination. Accordingly, step (vi) included the determination of statistical values in any way and at any time of the claimed method as long as such a value served the indicated purpose.

The board further pointed out that decision T 1646/12 specified that two extremes should be avoided when interpreting the claims. Firstly, it was not permissible to regard the claims and the description as communicating vessels, so to speak, for example by reading limiting features mentioned in the description but not in the claims into the latter. Such a transfer of limiting features could not be achieved by construction, but by amending the claims only. Secondly, the claim cannot be considered as being completely separate from the description either. According to the board, in the present case the respondent applied the first extreme by arguing that the skilled person, based on the description, would interpret that step (vi) had to be carried out after steps (i) to (v).

The board concluded that claim 1 did not set any chronological order for the application of step (vi). Hence, step (vi) comprised any statistical value irrespective of when and how the value had been obtained, except that the value must be used for an allele call in a genotyping assay that could not be derived from the read number alone.

The respondent had also submitted that the term "allele call" used in step (vi) was defined in the description as "determining whether a subject is homozygous or heterozygous at a locus" which limited claim 1. The board disagreed and recalled that, as set out above, it was established case law that terms in a claim must be given their broadest technical sensible meaning, and that a definition in the description which was absent from a claim could not give the claim a more narrow/restrictive meaning.

174-15-23



## Article 84 EPC | T 0694/20 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0694/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.05
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069, 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – claim interpretation – interpretation in the light of the description (yes) – claim interpretation to assess sufficiency of disclosure and inventive step
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0367/20, T 1473/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.6.1.</a> , <a href="#">II.A.6.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 694/20](#) befasste sich die Kammer mit der Auslegung des Anspruchs 1 des Hauptantrags, die für die Prüfung der Ausführbarkeit und der erfinderischen Tätigkeit relevant war.

Die Kammer wies darauf hin, dass die Fachperson nach ständiger Rechtsprechung einen Patentanspruch mit der Bereitschaft lese, diesen auf technisch sinnvolle Weise zu verstehen. Ebenso unumstritten sei in der Rechtsprechung, dass den in einem Patentanspruch verwendeten Begriffen ihre normale Bedeutung im betreffenden Fachgebiet zu geben sei.

Der Kammer zufolge ist es in der Rechtsprechung hingegen streitig, ob und inwieweit bei der Auslegung eines Patentanspruchs auf die Beschreibung zurückzugreifen ist. Nach einer ersten Meinung in der Rechtsprechung komme dies nur dann in Betracht, wenn der Wortlaut des betreffenden Patentanspruchs mehrdeutig sei. Nach einer zweiten Meinung in der Rechtsprechung sei dagegen Art. 69 EPÜ auf die Auslegung der Ansprüche anwendbar, so dass die Auslegung stets im Lichte der Beschreibung zu erfolgen habe (siehe z.B. T 367/20, T 1473/19).

Im vorliegenden Fall kam die Kammer zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Merkmale "Eicosapentaensäure (EPA) und Docosahexaensäure (DHA)" des Anspruchs 1 für die Fachperson mehrdeutig seien und aus diesem Grunde ein Zurückgreifen auf die Beschreibung in jedem Fall zulässig und geboten sei. Andere Merkmale des Anspruchs 1 seien einer eindeutigen Interpretation zugänglich, die wiederum durch die

Beschreibung bestätigt werde, so dass die Frage, ob die Beschreibung zu konsultieren ist, unbeantwortet bleiben könne.

Die Kammer zog die Beschreibung des Patents zur Auslegung der Begriffe "Eicosapentaensäure (EPA)" und "Docosahexaensäure (DHA)" heran und schlussfolgerte, dass die Fachperson dieses anspruchsgemäße Merkmal als nicht auf die freien Säuren beschränkt verstehen würde.

175-15-23

## Article 84 EPC | T 2151/22 | Board 3.2.01

### Article 084 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2151/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 084 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 043(2), 043(4) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	claims – clarity – different meaning of the term "vitre" in claims 1 and 12 – two independent claims in the same category
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.2.2.1</a> , <a href="#">II.A.3.1.</a> , 10th edition

Dans la décision [T 2151/22](#), la chambre rappelle que l'exigence selon laquelle les revendications doivent être claires s'applique à chacune des revendications prises individuellement, qu'elles soient indépendantes ou dépendantes, ainsi qu'aux revendications dans leur ensemble.

La signification du terme "vitre" dans la revendication 1 est différente de celle de la revendication 12 de la requête principale. Dans la revendication 1, "la vitre" ne comportait pas les corps profilés et les revêtements, qui étaient décrits comme faisant partie du vitrage. En revanche, dans la revendication 12, "la vitre" comportait au moins un corps profilé et un ou deux revêtements, ce qui semait le doute quant aux caractéristiques faisant partie du vitrage et celles faisant partie de la vitre. De plus, la revendication 12 renvoyait aux revendications 1 à 11, ce qui rendait la signification des termes "vitre" et "vitrage" d'autant plus incertaine. En effet, "la vitre" de la revendication 12, comprenant au moins un corps profilé et un ou deux revêtement(s) extérieur(s), devait être adaptée pour un vitrage selon l'une des revendications 1 à 11 qui contenait déjà deux corps profilés et un ou deux revêtement(s) extérieur(s). Si la vitre de la revendication 12 était utilisée pour le vitrage de la revendication 1, alors ce dernier comporterait au moins trois corps profilés et deux ou quatre revêtements. Un tel vitrage serait en discordance avec la description. La chambre a conclu que la requête principale ne satisfaisait pas aux exigences de l'art. 84 CBE.

Dans la requête auxiliaire 0 la requérante (demanderesse) avait proposé de supprimer l'expression "pour un vitrage suivant l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 11" de la revendication 12. En effet, la requérante avait estimé que cette modification rendait les

revendications plus claires, puisque les revendications 1 et 12 devenaient indépendantes. La chambre a rejeté cet argument, au motif que la suppression de cet élément n'écartait pas l'incohérence dans la signification du terme "vitre" entre la revendication 1 et la revendication 12.

Dans la requête auxiliaire 0' le terme "vitre" a été remplacé par le terme "élément de vitrage" dans la revendication 12. Tout d'abord, la chambre a noté que la revendication 1 et la revendication 12 étaient claires lorsqu'elles étaient considérées individuellement et lorsqu'elles étaient considérées ensembles. De plus, la revendication 1 de vitrage comprenait toutes les caractéristiques de la revendication 12 de l'élément de vitrage. La question qui se posait était donc de savoir si selon la règle 43 CBE, les revendications 1 et 12 pouvaient être formulées sous la forme de deux revendications indépendantes, l'une visant le vitrage et l'autre l'élément de vitrage.

La chambre a jugé que dans cette affaire, la requérante avait montré que le jeu de revendications ne pouvait être simplement modifié pour qu'une seule revendication indépendante suivie de revendications dépendantes couvre de manière adéquate les modes de réalisation de l'invention sans compromettre la clarté du jeu de revendications. Deux revendications formulées comme indépendantes étaient donc plus appropriées pour revendiquer l'ensemble des modes de réalisations de l'invention dans le cas présent. De plus, dans la présente demande de brevet, le vitrage et l'élément de vitrage pouvaient être considérés comme ayant un lien entre eux. La chambre a donc estimé que les conditions de la règle 43(2)a) CBE étaient satisfaites en l'espèce.

176-15-23

## Article 87(1) EPC | T 1303/18 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 87(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1303/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.21
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 087(1), 089, 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	priority – identity of invention (no) – validity of earliest priority (no) – burden of proof
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/98, G 0001/03, G 0002/10, T 0517/14, T 1684/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.3.1</a> , <a href="#">III.G.5.1.2d</a> , <a href="#">III.G.5.2.1</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 13\(1\) RPBA 2020.](#)

[T 1303/18](#) was an appeal against the opposition division's decision to revoke the patent. The patent had been granted with an earliest priority date of 28 November 2007 claimed from D49. The respondents (opponents) objected to the validity of this earliest priority. Citing G 2/98, they contended that the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted was not directly and unambiguously disclosed in D49. The appellant (patent proprietor) argued that the claims as granted and the whole disclosure of D49 concerned the same invention within the meaning of Art. 87(1) and G 2/98, namely, polymorphic form II of rosiglitone. Thus, the earliest priority date was valid.

The board applied G 2/98 and concluded that the polymorphic form defined in claim 1 as granted was not directly and unambiguously disclosed in D49. Thus, the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted did not enjoy the claimed earliest priority date of 28 November 2007. The earliest priority date was therefore not valid.

According to the board, the fact that the same characterisation methods were used to describe the disclosed compound in both the patent and D49 played no role when assessing identity of the invention under G 2/98. The fact that the same figures resulted from that characterisation in the patent and D49 was also irrelevant. What was decisive was whether, using common general knowledge, a compound as defined in claim 1 of the patent was directly and unambiguously disclosed in D49 as a whole. In this respect, the board recalled that the disclosure as the basis for the right to priority under Art. 87(1) EPC and as the basis for amendments in an application under Art. 123(2) EPC had to be interpreted in the same way (see G 1/03 and G 2/10).

The board noted that in claim 1 as granted, the claimed compound was said to be polymorphic form II of rotigotine and was defined by at least one of four properties, namely properties a) to d). A comparison of the definition in terms of property a) given in claim 1 as granted with the disclosures in D49 revealed certain differences. In light of those differences, at least two selections were needed within D49 to arrive at the claimed compound as defined by property a). However, D49 contained no pointer towards those specific selections. Moreover, the error margin in property a) had been broadened as compared with the error margin in D49 and no disclosure of this broadening could be found in D49. In the board's opinion the skilled person, at the relevant date of the subsequent filing, would not have derived the compound as defined by property a) in claim 1 as granted directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the disclosure in D49. Similar conclusions were drawn for the other three properties. Thus, the definition given for the compound referred to in granted claim 1 differed in numerous aspects from that disclosed in D49. It could therefore not be concluded that the compound of granted claim 1 was the same as that disclosed in D49.

The appellant submitted that only form I and form II of rotigotine were known at the earliest priority date and form II was clearly distinguished from form I. Stating that the priority from D49 was not valid amounted to insinuating that a third polymorphic form of rotigotine existed but this was clearly wrong. The board, however, concurred with the respondents that by accepting this argument, the earliest priority would become retroactively invalid if another crystal form of rotigotine was discovered later, which would fall under the definition given in claim 1 as granted but not under the disclosure of D49. Hence, this argument ran against the principle of legal certainty and had to fail.

The board was not convinced by the appellant's argument that structural properties allegedly lacking in D49 were implicitly disclosed to the skilled person since they were inherent to polymorphic form II and accessible by using the disclosed analytical methods. According to the board, priority had been claimed from a written disclosure (D49) and it was from this disclosure that the skilled person should have been able, at the relevant date, to derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted. However, as set out above, D49 did not disclose the same compound as that defined in claim 1 as granted.

The board also disagreed with the appellant's submission that the respondents bore the burden of proving that claim 1 as granted defined a compound different from the one disclosed in D49. No evidence in this respect had been presented. According to the board, it was the appellant (patent proprietor) who introduced various differences between the compound defined in granted claim 1 and that disclosed in D49. If, despite these differences, the appellant asserted that the compound of granted claim 1 was the same as that disclosed in D49, it was the appellant who bore the burden of proving this. In fact, it was for an applicant to ensure, where priority from a previous application was claimed, that the same invention was defined, according to the required standard, in the subsequent application as filed.

014-02-23

## Article 87(1) EPC | T 0411/19 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 087(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0411/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 087(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	priority – enabling disclosure in priority document (no) – same invention (no) – validity of earliest priority date (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.3.1.6</a> , 10th edition

In [T 411/19](#) appellant II (opponent 2) argued that the subject-matter of claim 1 was not entitled to the earliest priority date because the application from which priority was claimed (P1) did not sufficiently disclose the suitability of the claimed compounds for the claimed therapeutic use, i.e. for the treatment of macular oedema or retinal vein occlusion.

The board recalled that, according to the established case law of the boards, a claimed second medical use met the requirements of Art. 83 EPC if the patent disclosed the suitability of the product for the claimed therapeutic application, if this was not known to the skilled person at the relevant date. In the board's opinion, this standard applied to priority documents equally because the priority document had to disclose the invention claimed in the subsequent application in such a way that it could be carried out by a person skilled in the art. The question to be answered in determining if the subject-matter of claim 1 could validly claim priority from P1 was therefore whether P1 disclosed that the claimed compounds were suitable for treating macular oedema and retinal vein occlusion.

The board observed that it had not been disputed that P1 disclosed Kunitz domain peptides according to the general formula of claim 1 of the patent and stated that these were useful in the treatment of ophthalmic disorders in humans and animals. Macular oedema and retinal vein occlusion were both mentioned in lists of treatable ophthalmic disorders. There was therefore a literal disclosure of the subject-matter of claim 1.

The board noted, however, that P1 contained no experimental data or other evidence of any kind that went beyond a mere allegation that the peptides defined in that document were indeed suitable for treatment of any of the ophthalmic disorders listed. That the peptides mentioned were suitable was not at all self-evident because it was the essence of the contribution to the art of the invention purportedly made in P1. In the absence of such evidence, it could not be concluded that P1 provided even an initial plausibility that the claimed compounds were suitable for treating the disorders in question. Appellant I had referred to certain passages as providing a link between particular plasma kallikrein inhibitors and the ophthalmic disorders. The board was of the view that these were no more than a summary of the background knowledge in the art on proteases, including kallikreins and their inhibitors and did not at all constitute evidence that peptides defined in P1 were suitable for treatment of any ophthalmic disorder by inhibiting plasma kallikrein.

The board concluded that P1 did not disclose the invention of claim 1 in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. The invention claimed in claim 1 of the main request was therefore not the "same invention" in the sense of Art. 87(1) EPC as the invention disclosed in P1. It could therefore not validly claim priority from P1.

089-08-23



## Article 87(1) EPC | T 1946/21 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 087(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1946/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.05
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 087(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 131(1) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 4A(1) Paris Convention, Guidelines A-III, 6.1 – March 2023 version
<b>Keywords</b>	priority – transfer of priority right on filing date of subsequent application – validity of priority date (yes) – partial priority (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/98, G 0001/15, T 0577/11, T 1496/11, T 1201/14, BPatG 11 W (pat) 14/09
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.2.2.1</a> , <a href="#">II.D.2.2.2</a> , <a href="#">II.D.5.3.3</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstracts under Article 15a\(2\) RPBA 2020.](#)

In [T 1946/21](#) the appellant (opponent) and the intervener argued that the right to priority had not been validly transferred to the respondent (patent proprietor) because the written agreement had only been signed on the filing date of the subsequent application. As the smallest time unit under the EPC was a day, an assignment on the day of the filing of the subsequent application was insufficient. Moreover, claim 1 as granted did not correspond to a "generic 'OR'-claim" within the meaning of G 1/15 and no partial priority could be acknowledged. Therefore, the respondent was not entitled to claim priority from D29, which became novelty destroying.

The board held that it was sufficient for the applicant or patent proprietor to demonstrate that the assignment of the priority right was effective before the actual filing of the subsequent application. The law did not set forth any other condition. In particular, the assignment need not be effective before the filing date of the subsequent application. This was the case for the person who was "successor in title" either of the patent application including the right to priority or of only the right to priority.

There was also no reason to read such a requirement into the law. Doing so would lead to a situation where a successor in title who had obtained the right to priority on a certain day by way of an assignment always had to wait for the next day to file the subsequent application to enjoy its right to priority. Moreover, in that situation, no one would be able to enjoy the right to priority for a certain amount of time. It would also

mean that even though the applicant of the subsequent application had already obtained the right to priority and was in fact already the successor in title, it could not make use of the full 12-month period under Art. 87(1) EPC.

According to the board, at least for the EPC, there was no general rule that the smallest time unit was a day. The smallest time unit was a day when it came to calculating and computing time periods (see R. 131(1) EPC) and was applicable for example when calculating the 12-month period laid down in Art. 87(1) EPC. There was, however, no reason why this should be generally applicable to other situations, in particular for the determination of the requirement of "successor in title".

The appellant and the intervener had also relied on the principle of legitimate expectation, in particular because the Guidelines A-III,°6.1 had consistently referred to the requirement "before the filing date". The board pointed out that what the law requires from applicants for them to enjoy a right to priority cannot be determined by what is stated in the Guidelines, either directly or indirectly by way of creating a legitimate expectation.

Taking into account the evidence on file, the board found that the respondent had indeed demonstrated that the contracts regarding the transfer of the right to priority had been validly concluded when it filed the subsequent application. This was not contested by the other parties. Thus, the then applicant was indeed the "successor in title" who enjoyed the right to priority within the meaning of Art. 87(1) EPC.

On whether partial priority could be acknowledged, the board pointed out that the fact that very many alternatives could be identified was not a reason for denying that there was a generic "OR"-claim or, more generally, for not applying the findings in G 1/15. The appellant's and the intervener's argument essentially relied on the requirement of a "limited number of clearly defined alternatives" taken from G 2/98. However, this (additional) requirement for acknowledging partial priority was explicitly rejected by the Enlarged Board in G 1/15. The Enlarged Board acknowledged in G 1/15 that the task of determining the relevant disclosure of the priority document taken as a whole, and determining whether that subject-matter was encompassed by the claim in the subsequent application could generally be a demanding intellectual exercise but was common practice at the EPO and among practitioners of the European patent system. This exercise was, moreover, not difficult in the case in hand, in which the priority document itself was the allegedly novelty-destroying disclosure. In this situation, the (partial) priority of the claim based on this priority document was valid for every potentially novelty-destroying element disclosed in this very same priority document. Thus, the subject-matter of claim 1 (in its entirety) was novel over D29 since the claim enjoyed partial priority from that document for all the encompassed matter disclosed in it.

109-10-23

## Article 87(1) EPC | G 0001/22 and G 0002/22 | Enlarged Board of Appeal

### Article 087(1) EPC

<b>Cases Number</b>	<b>G 0001/22 and G 0002/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	EBA
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.10.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	A
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 060, 061, 072, 076, 087, 088, 089, 112(1)(a), 118, 139(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 014, 052, 053 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Articles 4, 19 Paris Convention, Article 11(3) PCT
<b>Keywords</b>	admissibility (yes) – rephrasing of referred questions (yes) – competence of the EPO to assess entitlement to priority (yes) – rebuttable presumption of entitlement – implied agreement
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/92, G 0003/93, G 0001/97, G 0002/98, G 0002/04, G 0001/15, J 0015/80, J 0019/87, J 0011/95, T 1008/96, T 0998/99, T 0015/01, T 0062/05, T 0788/05, T 0493/06, T 0382/07, T 0577/11, T 1933/12, T 2357/12, T 0205/14, T 0517/14, T 0725/14, T 1201/14, T 0239/16, T 2431/07, T 0844/18, T 1946/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.2.2.</a> , 10th edition

In consolidated cases [G 1/22 and G 2/22](#), the Enlarged Board ("EBA") considered the points of law referred to it by Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.04 (the "referring board") in T 1513/17 and T 2719/19 (consolidated). In the cases underlying the referral the priority claim had been found to be invalid. This had led to the revocation of the patent (T 1513/17) and the refusal of the application (T 2719/19) for lack of novelty.

The application on which the patent was granted in T 1513/17 (and from which the application derived in T 2719/19) was filed as an international application under the PCT (the "PCT application"). It named (i) the 3 inventors as applicants for the US only and (ii) other (legal) persons including the appellant ("Party B") as applicants for all other designated States. The PCT application claimed priority from a US provisional application filed in the name of the 3 inventors. The opposition division and the examining division found the priority claim to be invalid because only 1 of the 3 inventors had assigned the priority right to Party B prior to the filing of the PCT application. Thus, intermediate publications were novelty-destroying. The referring board referred two questions to the EBA: (I) whether the EPC conferred jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC; and (II) if so,

whether in the situation described above, Party B could validly rely on the priority right claimed in the PCT application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Art. 87(1) EPC. The EBA rephrased question I as: "*Is the EPO competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC?*". Both questions were admissible under Art. 112(1)(a) EPC.

The EBA noted that a strict distinction should be made between the title to the subsequent application and the right to claim the priority date for that application. Art. 60(3) EPC did not apply to the right of priority referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC, neither directly nor by analogy. The EBA concluded that the EPO was competent to assess priority entitlement and that this assessment should be made under the autonomous law of the EPC. According to the EBA, there is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC is entitled. This presumption was justified in view of (i) the interests of the parties involved, (ii) the lack of formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights and (iii) the necessary cooperation between the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant in the context of procedural requirements under Art. 88(1) EPC. The presumption also applies where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicants are not identical with the subsequent applicants. It therefore applied to the situation described in question II. The EBA also endorsed the concept of an implied agreement and concluded that, in the absence of substantial factual indications to the contrary, the joint filing of a PCT application sufficiently proved that the parties had entered into an implied agreement allowing Party B to rely on the priority.

The EBA answered the questions of law referred to it as follows:

I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC.

There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority.

II. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s).

In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary.

156/7-13-23

## Article 87(1) EPC | T 2719/19 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 087(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2719/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.11.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 087, 088 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	priority (yes) – application of G 1/22 and G 2/22 – presumption of entitlement – implied agreement – novelty (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/22, G 0002/22
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.2.2.</a> , 10th edition

[T 2719/19](#) (of 20 November 2023) was the referring case in G 2/22 (consolidated with G 1/22). The application from which the (divisional) application in suit derived had been filed as an international application under the PCT (the "PCT application"). It named (i) the three inventors ("Party A") as applicants for the United States of America (US) only and (ii) other (legal) persons including the appellant ("Party B") as applicants for all other designated States. The PCT application claimed priority from a US provisional application filed in the name of the three inventors. The examining division had found the priority claim to be invalid because only one of the three inventors had assigned the priority right to Party B prior to the filing of the PCT application. Thus, intermediate publications were novelty destroying and the examining division had refused the application.

By interlocutory decision T 2719/19 (of 28 January 2022) the board had referred two questions to the Enlarged Board: (I) whether the EPC conferred jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC (rephrased by the Enlarged Board as: "Is the EPO competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC?"); and (II) if so, whether in the situation described above, Party B could validly rely on the priority right claimed in the PCT application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Art. 87(1) EPC.

The board recalled that the Enlarged Board had decided that there was a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in

accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations was entitled to claim priority and that this presumption also applied in the factual situation of the case in suit, i.e. where the European patent application derived from a PCT application and where the priority applicant(s) were not identical with the subsequent applicant(s). Moreover, the Enlarged Board had ruled that in the situation of the case in hand, where the PCT application was jointly filed by Party A (as inventors and as applicants for the US only) and Party B, and claimed priority from an earlier patent application designating Party A as the applicant, the joint filing implied an agreement between Party A and Party B, allowing Party B to rely on the priority, unless there were substantial factual indications to the contrary (G 1/22 and G 2/22). According to the board, no substantial factual indications to the contrary were mentioned in the decision under appeal nor was the board aware of any.

The board noted that the examining division had not referred to the further need to examine the application if the priority were found to be validly claimed. Since the appeal was allowable and no other objections had been raised in the decision under appeal or in the communications of the examining division leading up to the decision, the board remitted the case to the examining division with the order to grant a patent based on the set of claims filed on 8 November 2016, with the description and drawings to be adapted thereto, as necessary.

177-15-23

## Article 88 EPC | T 0335/20 | Board 3.3.08

### Article 088(3) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0335/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.29
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054(2), 088(3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	priority – partial priority (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/15
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.5.3.3</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 56 EPC.](#)

In [T 335/20](#) the appellant (opponent) relied on D9 in the context of inventive step. D9 was part of the state of the art as defined in Art. 54(2) EPC only in respect of subject-matter that was not entitled to the priority of P3. The appellant asserted that claim 1 was only entitled to partial priority from P3, while the respondents (patent proprietors) submitted that the entire subject-matter of claim 1 was entitled to the priority of P3. The board had to determine whether the subject-matter of claim 1 was entitled to the priority of P3.

Claim 1 related to the medical use of "a PGRN polypeptide" in the treatment of frontotemporal dementia (FTD). The board construed the term "a PGRN polypeptide" in accordance with the definition provided in the patent and concluded that it did not denote a single specific PGRN polypeptide. Rather, it was a generic expression covering different PGRN polypeptides. Thus, claim 1, where directed to the use of a PGRN polypeptide, could be seen as a claim which encompassed "alternative subject-matter by virtue of one or more generic expressions or otherwise", i.e. a generic "OR" claim as referred to in G 1/15.

The board noted that, in line with the principles set out in G 1/15, in assessing whether subject-matter within claim 1 may enjoy partial priority from P3, the subject-matter disclosed in P3 that was relevant, i.e. relevant in respect of prior art disclosed in the priority interval – in this case D9 – had to be determined. Disclosed subject-matter that was relevant in view of D9 was that relating to the use of a human PGRN polypeptide in the treatment of FTD. To the extent that P3 disclosed any such subject-matter falling within claim 1, claim 1 would be entitled to priority in respect of that subject-matter.



According to the board, in the patent, the meaning of the human PGRN polypeptide included polypeptides having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 and other full-length polypeptides, whereas in P3 human PGRN polypeptide was explicitly limited to mean a polypeptide having the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:2 (SEQ ID NO:1 in the patent). Therefore, the meaning of human PGRN polypeptide was broadened from P3 to the patent. Hence, claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 could conceptually be divided into two parts. The first part, claim 1A, corresponded to the invention disclosed directly and unambiguously in P3 and was limited, as regards the use of human PGRN polypeptides, to a human PGRN polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. The second part, claim 1B, was the rest of the subject-matter of the claim and, as regards the use of human PGRN polypeptides, embraced the human PGRN polypeptide set forth in GenBank GI number 4504151 and disclosed in document D32. Claim 1A was entitled to the priority of P3, while claim 1B was not.

The patent proprietors did not dispute that the subject-matter of claim 1B was not entitled to priority from any other document.

The board concluded that the effective date of claim 1B was the filing date of the patent, and that the disclosure of document D9 was part of the state of the art as defined in Art. 54(2) EPC in respect of the subject-matter of claim 1B.

028-03-23



## Article 088 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0933/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.27
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 088 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	priority – partial priority (yes) – implicit feature (yes) – G 1/15 relevant (yes) – "OR" claim
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88, G 0001/92, G 0001/15, T 0666/89
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.D.5.3.3</a> , <a href="#">I.C.4.3.</a> , 10th edition

[T 933/18](#) was an appeal against the opposition division's decision to reject the opposition. The patent had been granted on a divisional application of an earlier European patent application (the parent application) filed as an international patent application. Claim 1 as granted related to a method for preparing a biosensor. Appellant I (opponent I) submitted that because the method of claim 1 was not entitled to priority contrary to the disclosure of Example 3 of the parent application, the latter anticipated the claimed method due to a "poisonous priority". It was uncontested that the disclosure of Example 2 of the priority document was identical to Examples 3 of the parent application and the patent application.

Appellant I argued that G 1/15 did not apply to the present case because the glycosylation level of the GLD enzyme disclosed in Example 2 of the priority document and in Examples 3 of the parent application and the patent application was an "intrinsic" feature of GLD and not an "implicit" one. Since intrinsic features were not assessed in G 1/15, let alone their impact on the concept of a "poisonous priority", G 1/15 was irrelevant to the present case.

The board disagreed for the following reasons. The case law had established that an intrinsic/inherent feature of a product normally related to a technical effect caused by an interaction with specifically selected outside conditions, i.e. a certain use of the product (see G 2/88), while structural features of a product were normally implicit to that product (see G 1/92). Example 2 of the priority document disclosed the transformation of an E. coli strain with a recombinant vector encoding a GLD gene for the production of an active GLD enzyme. It was uncontested that proteins recombinantly produced in E. coli were not glycosylated ("sugar-free", i.e. lacked any galactose, glucose, mannose and

arabinose residues as referred to in claim 1), because *E. coli* does not contain the enzymes required for glycosylation, i.e. for adding sugar residues to a protein. This belonged to the common general knowledge of the skilled person. Furthermore, the absence or presence of sugar residues on a protein were a structural feature of this protein. A skilled person reading Example 2 of the priority application (and Examples 3 in the parent application and the patent application) therefore immediately understood that the GLD recombinantly produced in *E. coli* was sugar-free (i.e. not glycosylated) although this was not explicitly mentioned. The production of sugar-free GLD in *E. coli* was thus the clear and unambiguous consequence of the explicit disclosure of this working example in view of *E. coli*'s generally known inability to produce glycosylated proteins. It was established case law that such a feature was implicit (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed.°2022, I.C.4.3 and T 666/89). Thus, G 1/15 applied to the present case.

Appellant I had contested whether claim 1 as granted belonged to the so called "AND" or "OR" claim category as defined in G 1/15. The board noted that the method in claim 1 comprised as an embodiment the use of GLD or variants thereof. These variants lacked any galactose, glucose, mannose and arabinose since the content of these sugars was defined as "10 myg or less per myg of protein", which included 0 myg/myg GLD, i.e. a "sugar-free" GLD. If, as asserted by appellant I, the disclosure of a sugar-free GLD in Example 3 of the parent application fell necessarily within the subject-matter of claim 1, then this applied likewise to the sugar-free GLD of Example 3 of the patent application too. Moreover, since both Examples 3 were identical to Example 2 of the priority document, claim 1's embodiment of a sugar-free GLD was present in the priority document too. According to the board, this finding corresponded to the practice under Art. 88 EPC established by the case law.

The board concluded that the embodiment of claim 1 using a sugar-free GLD for the preparation of a biosensor had to be regarded as an "OR" claim as defined in G 1/15, since sugar-free GLD was an implicitly disclosed feature in Examples 2 and 3 of the priority document and the patent application, respectively. Consequently, this embodiment of claim 1 was entitled to partial priority. Therefore, the parent application could not anticipate the claimed method.

099-09-23

**Article 99 EPC | T 1121/21 | Board 3.3.03**
**Article 099 EPC**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1121/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 099 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 076(2)(a), 077(1), 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	admissibility of opposition (yes) – lack of clear indication of opponent (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/99, G 0001/12, T 0025/85, T 0615/14, T 0579/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.2.2.1</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.2.2.4c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1121/21](#) the opposition division in the appeal at issue had rejected the opposition as inadmissible pursuant to R. 77(1) EPC, having found an apparent lack of a clear indication of the opponent in the notice of opposition and in the accompanying letter.

The board noted that the letter of opposition clearly identified one single legal person, namely Evonik Degussa GmbH and could not identify in the opposition letter any concrete indication that the opposition could have been filed by Evonik Industries AG, as suggested in the appealed decision and by the respondent (patent proprietor); this company was not mentioned at all in the letter. The opposition division had found a basis for its assumption in the logo, mentioning "Evonik Industries" on the top of pages 2 to 13 of the letter of opposition. The board observed that a logo was merely a graphical symbol, often present on letterheads, designed to communicate quickly the corporate identity. Due to its function, its generic presence on official papers and its typical symbolic representation, the board found that a logo alone could not be a sufficient legal identification of a company for the purposes of R. 76(2)(a) EPC.

The respondent further based its argument that Evonik Industries AG was the true opponent on the sentence in the notice of opposition indicating payment of the opposition fee would be paid from an account owned by Evonik industries. The board found this sentence could not be interpreted as meaning that Evonik Industries AG was the opponent. The fact alone that Evonik Industries AG was the owner of the deposit account was completely irrelevant to the question of the identification of the opponent. It was a generally accepted principle that in proceedings before the EPO fees can be paid

by any third person. The fact that fees were paid by another company within the Evonik group was not sufficient to raise reasonable doubts as to the identity of the party to the proceedings.

As to the fact that in the accompanying letter the address of Evonik Patent Association was indicated as "c/o Evonik Industries AG", the board had difficulties in following how a mere indication of the postal address of the association of representatives, Evonik Patent Association, may have an objective bearing on the identification of the opponent that they represented.

In the absence of any concrete mentioning of Evonik Industries AG in the relevant documents, except for the accompanying letter as owner of the deposit account and in the "c/o" address of the association of representatives, the board found no reasonable support for the assumption that Evonik Industries AG could be the opponent in the present case.

The board was also not convinced by the argument that Dr Forster – who had signed the letter of opposition – could be considered as the opponent; the fact that his name, contact data and the further responsibilities (Legal, IP Management & Compliance IP Management) were indicated on the letter merely indicated that he, as representative, was the contact person and did not cast any doubts on the fact that the letter clearly originated from Evonik Degussa GmbH. The wrong indication in the accompanying letter of Dr Forster in the box mentioning the represented party was an obvious mistake that could not plausibly lead to the opponent's designation being understood as the natural person Dr Forster.

The board distinguished the present case from T 25/85, cited by the respondent, in which at expiry of the opposition period the name of the opponent was completely missing, and from T 579/16 in which two distinct entities were mentioned in the notice of opposition and in Form 2300, so that there were objective doubts upon expiry of the opposition period as to the identity of the opponent.

In view of the above considerations, the board concluded that the opposition was admissible and remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution.

058-06-23

## Article 99 EPC | T 1522/21 | Board 3.2.07

### Article 099 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1522/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.16
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 099(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 116(1) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 11, 12(6) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	late-filed evidence – admitted (no) – late-filed evidence – error in use of discretion at first instance (no) – remittal (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.4.5.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1522/21](#) the opposition division had admitted document D11 into the proceedings finding it prima facie relevant. The opponent had filed document D11 after the nine-month period under Art. 99(1) EPC but before the final date for making written submissions according to R. 116(1) EPC. The patent proprietor argued that the opposition division had not exercised its discretion in a reasonable way because D11 had not been filed in reaction to any amendment to the claims and could not have been considered as being prima facie relevant as its contents were not detrimental to the maintenance of the patent.

The board noted that according to established case law, evidence submitted after the nine-month period was generally to be regarded as late-filed, unless special circumstances applied. It was however also established case law that if a discretionary decision of an opposition division was challenged in appeal, it was not for the board to review all the facts and circumstances as if it were the opposition division. A board should only overrule the way in which an opposition division has exercised its discretion if it comes to the conclusion that the opposition division used the wrong principles, failed to take into account the right principles, or exercised its discretion in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.

In the board's view the opposition division in the case in hand had exercised its discretion reasonably and according to the right criteria. During the oral proceedings before the opposition division, both parties had presented their arguments on the content and admissibility of D11. The minutes of the proceedings contained these discussions. The opposition division had based its ruling on the principle of prima facie

relevance, which was a decisive principle in such decisions. Consequently, there was no justification to overturn the opposition division's discretionary decision and to exclude D11 from the proceedings.

The patent proprietor had also requested that the case be remitted to the opposition division in the event that D11 was admitted into appeal proceedings. However pursuant to Art. 11 RPBA 2020, the board stated it should only remit the case if there were special reasons for doing so. The board observed that the appealed decision was already based on D11 and, thus, subject to review by the board in accordance with Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020. The board therefore did not remit the case to the opposition division.

140-12-23

## Article 104(1) EPC | T 0561/19 | Board 3.3.10

### Article 104(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0561/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.10
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.08
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 104(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	apportionment of costs (yes) – second oral proceedings in opposition
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0336/86, T 0028/91, T 1016/93, T 1771/08
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.R.2.1.1a</a> , <a href="#">III.R.2.2.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 561/19](#) the board confirmed the opposition division's decision to award a different apportionment of costs pursuant to Art. 104(1) EPC.

At the first oral proceedings before the opposition division, the appellant (opponent) had filed experimental evidence (D15), which was allegedly very relevant for the issue of sufficiency of disclosure. The opposition division admitted D15 into the proceedings before adjourning the oral proceedings. In its decision, the opposition division ordered that the costs incurred as a result of the second oral proceedings had to be borne by the appellant.

The appellant argued that a different apportionment of costs could not be granted merely because a further oral proceedings was needed. Only a party that had been negligent or willing to harm the other should bear the other party's costs. There was no negligence or will to harm with the filing of D15.

The board held, however, that negligence, will to harm or abuse of procedure was not a prerequisite for a different apportionment of costs. It sufficed that there was no good justification for the late filing and that the late filing was the cause of both the adjournment of the oral proceedings and extra costs for the other party. If a party chose to file evidence so extremely late, the risk was that said evidence would not be admitted into the proceedings or that, if the evidence was admitted, the party would have to bear costs incurred as a result by the other party.

In the present case, it was not disputed that the oral proceedings had been adjourned solely due to the filing and admission of D15 during the first oral proceedings. The appellant provided no good reason for filing this evidence at that point in time. Hence,

the board concluded that the additional costs caused by the adjournment had to be borne by the party causing it, so the opposition division's decision in this respect was correct.

045-05-23



## Article 104(1) EPC | T 1807/15 | Board 3.5.02

### Article 104(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1807/15</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.02
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 104(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 16(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	apportionment of costs (no) – postponement of oral proceedings – referral to the Enlarged Board – late filed submissions – abuse of procedure (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.R.2.1.1b</a> , <a href="#">III.R.2.2.3</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 13\(2\) RPBA 2020.](#)

In [T 1807/15](#) the respondent (patent proprietor) had requested that costs be apportioned to the appellant (opponent) because: (a) the appellant had not given advance notice to the respondent of its intention to request a referral to the Enlarged Board and (b) the appellant had made submissions E17-E11 after the first oral proceedings, in each case causing unnecessary work for the respondent's representative.

In its Catchword the board stressed that the postponement of oral proceedings due to a request for a referral of a question of law to the Enlarged Board which was not announced in advance by the party making the request would normally not justify apportionment of costs. Since there was no guarantee that such a request would be successful, all parties would normally have to prepare for a discussion on the substance of the case irrespective of whether the request was announced in advance or not. The board further noted that it was a party's right to request a referral, and exercising this right was not a reason for a different apportionment of costs. The exercise of this right should in particular not be limited by the threat of apportionment of costs.

Moreover, the board held that preparation for discussions on admission and also for a discussion as to the substance in the case that late submissions were taken into account was part of the normal preparatory work of each party. It was not apparent to the board, and it had not been substantiated by the respondent, that higher costs had

been incurred by the timing of the submissions in question after the first summons, compared to the hypothetical situation that the appellant had filed them with the statement of grounds of appeal. Whether submissions were ultimately relevant for the decision would normally not play a role in deciding whether they justified a different apportionment of costs, unless maybe they were so irrelevant that they could be considered an abuse of the procedure. It was not apparent to the board, and had not been argued by the respondent, that this was the case here.

Therefore, the request for apportionment of costs was refused.

100-09-23

## Article 104(1) EPC | T 0967/18 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 104(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0967/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 104(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(3), 13(2), 16(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	apportionment of costs (no) – severe negligence (no) – additional costs due to the delay (no) – RPBA 2020 apply to requests for apportionment of costs
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0014/19, J 0009/21, T 1045/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.R.2.2.3</a> , <a href="#">III.R.2.1.1b</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Rule 142 EPC.](#)

In [T 967/18](#) both parties had filed a request for a different apportionment of costs under Art. 104 EPC.

Two weeks before the oral proceedings **the respondent (opponent)** had filed a request that the costs it incurred in preparing and filing the reply to the statement of grounds of appeal be borne in full by the appellant. The respondent had argued that the RPBA 2020 did not apply to requests for apportionment. Even if they applied, its request did not constitute an amendment of its case, so it was not subject to Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020.

The board disagreed. There was no textual reason why the request for apportionment filed under Art. 16(1) RPBA 2020 should not be considered part of an appeal case. An appeal case was implicitly defined in the rules of procedure and included all "requests, facts, objections, arguments and evidence" presented by a party in the appeal proceedings (see Art. 12(3) RPBA 2020). The generic term "requests" covered requests on the costs of the proceedings. Therefore, adding such a request changed the appeal case.

In the current case, the board had serious doubts as to whether the request could be admitted under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. The reasons as to why this request was filed only two weeks before the oral proceedings were only explained for the first time at the oral proceedings and were not convincing. The request could have been made earlier.

However, in view of the lack of case law on the applicability of the RPBA 2020 to a request for apportionment indicated by the respondent, and as the request in question was not allowable, the board preferred to decide on the merits. Therefore, the request was admitted into the proceedings.

From the exceptional nature of the cost apportionment provided under Art. 104(1) EPC and the reference to the abuse of procedure contained in Art. 16(1)(e) RPBA 2020, the board drew the following inference. More than just a mistake made by a party or a negligent delay in a procedural act which may occur in proceedings and which may lead to additional activities and costs was required for the order of a different apportionment. The abuse of procedure referred to such extreme situations where "the exercise of rights is predominantly intended to cause damage and other legitimate purposes take a back seat" (J 14/19). Therefore, while the board considered that negligent behaviour may also justify apportionment, the negligence must be serious enough to be considered equivalent to wilful misconduct. In the current case, the board concluded that the patent proprietor's conduct in failing to notify the EPO of its entry into voluntary administration was the result of an error of assessment. This error was not due to such a gross lack of care that could be considered equivalent to wilful misconduct.

The **appellant (patent proprietor)** considered that it was an abuse of procedure of the respondent to file its request only two weeks before the oral proceedings which could have been filed earlier in the proceedings. The board agreed that the request of the respondent could and should have been filed earlier. However, in cases where there was an unjustified delay in filing a request, the question was whether this conduct resulted in additional costs that would not have been incurred if there had been no delay. In the current case, there was no evidence that this had occurred. Indeed, the appellant would have had to prepare the submissions filed on 10 March 2023 in any event. The board had no evidence that higher costs were incurred due to time pressure.

Consequently, the requests of the respondent (opponent) and the appellant (patent proprietor) for a different apportionment of costs under Art. 104 EPC were refused.

110-10-23

## Article 104(1) EPC | T 1484/19 | Board 3.3.08

### Article 104(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1484/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 104(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 103(3)(a), 103(4)(a), 103(4)(c), 103(6) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 16(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	apportionment of costs (no) – requests on apportionment costs and partial reimbursement of appeal fee filed after completion of the decision-making process – partial reimbursement of appeal fee ordered by the board of its own motion
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0012/91, J 0012/86, T 0041/82, T 0117/86, T 0323/89, T 0614/89, T 0765/89, T 0773/91, T 0490/05, T 1663/13, T 1556/14, T 0488/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.R.2.2.3</a> , <a href="#">V.A.11.12.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1484/19](#) of 04.07.2023 the board decided on requests for reimbursement of the appeal fee and apportionment of costs filed on the day of completion of the internal decision-making process for the previous decision T 1484/19 of 29.11.2022.

With its letter dated 24 November 2022, the patent proprietor (respondent) had stated that it no longer approved the text in which the patent had been granted and would not submit an amended text. It had also withdrawn all auxiliary requests filed during appeal proceedings.

On the morning of 29 November 2022, the board sent to the postal service for dispatch its decision revoking the patent in the absence of a text agreed by the respondent (T 1484/19 of 29.11.2022). On the same day, at 14.55 hrs, appellant 2 (opponent 2) had requested a partial reimbursement of the appeal fee under R. 103(3)(a) EPC and apportionment of costs.

The board concluded that the completion of the decision-making process within the meaning of decision G 12/91 had to be determined with reference to a date and not an hour or an exact time on a date. Consequently, appellant 2's requests were filed after the decision-making process had been completed. However, the board questioned whether decision G 12/91 was concerned with a decision as to substance by contrast

with the situation in the current case. The board stated that by analogy to the withdrawal of an appeal, it could be argued that the decision of 29 November 2022 brought the appeal proceedings to a close for the substantive merits of the appeal (which were no longer open for consideration in view of the respondent's withdrawal of its approval of any text for maintenance of the patent) while leaving ancillary questions open to a decision. Consequently, the board would have the power to decide on the requests for reimbursement of the appeal fee and for apportionment of costs filed after the completion of the internal decision-making process.

The board noticed that a different approach had been taken in T 1556/14 of 15 October 2020. In that case the board had held that a request for apportionment of costs could be admissible despite being filed after termination of the appeal proceedings if the request could not have been submitted earlier. In the current case, the board left open whether and, if so, to what extent legal certainty imposed limitations as to the admissibility of a request for apportionment of costs filed after termination of the appeal proceedings as the request for apportionment of costs was not allowable for the following reasons.

The current circumstances did not correspond to any of the situations justifying a different apportionment of costs which are mentioned in Art. 16(1) RPBA 2020. The board did not see anything in the timing of the respondent's letter which amounted to improper conduct of the proceedings or even to an abuse of proceedings justifying a different apportionment of costs. Based on the principle of party disposition, an appellant is entitled to withdraw its appeal and an applicant or patent proprietor is entitled to withdraw its approval of the text of a patent at any time during pending appeal proceedings. Except for where the exercise of the rights conferred by this principle contravenes a party's obligation to act in good faith (as exemplified in Art. 16(1) RPBA 2020), this principle may not be restricted by the threat of an apportionment of costs. For the withdrawal of an appeal, this has been confirmed in the case law and recently acknowledged by the legislators in amended R. 103(4)(a) EPC. Indeed, reimbursement of 25% of the appeal fee is provided even for the withdrawal of an appeal during oral proceedings before the decision is announced. In the board's opinion, the same holds true for a patent proprietor's withdrawal of its approval pursuant to Art. 113(2) EPC, even more so if the parties are informed of it before the oral proceedings. Therefore, the request for apportionment of costs was refused.

The board also refused appellant 2's request for reimbursement of the appeal fee under R. 103(4)(a) EPC, since no statement of appellant 2 was on file by which it had withdrawn its appeal. However, in view of decision T 488/18 and the respondent's letter dated 24 November 2022, the board decided to order of its own motion reimbursement of 25% of the appeal fee under R. 103(4)(c) EPC for both appellants.

158-13-23

## Article 109 EPC | T 2381/19 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 109 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2381/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 109 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 103(1)(a) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	interlocutory revision – reimbursement of appeal fee (no) – substantial procedural violation (no) – objection maintained and new objections raised after interlocutory revision – second appeal
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0005/08, T 0919/95
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.11.4.4</a> , <a href="#">V.A.11.4.5</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2381/19](#) the board dealt with the second appeal filed by the applicant against the refusal of the application by the examining division.

In the first decision, the examining division had refused the application based on Art. 123(2) EPC, against which the applicant had appealed. The examining division had granted interlocutory revision by issuing a separate decision, which did not revise the initial refusal decision in the sense of immediately replacing it with a decision dealing with the substantive issues, but only set the initial refusal decision aside and continued the examination proceedings.

In its second decision refusing the application, the examining division had maintained the objections under Art. 123(2) EPC and added additional objections (under Art. 84, 52(1) and 56 EPC), although the requests had remained unchanged.

The applicant had then appealed the second refusal decision, requesting among other things the reimbursement of the second appeal fee. The appellant had argued that the "misuse of the rectification procedure by the examining division to add further objections to their first decision while maintaining the added-matter objection had to be considered a substantial procedural violation which justified the reimbursement of the appeal fee".

In [T 2381/19](#) the board confirmed the examining division's second refusal, based on Art. 123(2) EPC objections. The question that remained was then whether there were good reasons to reimburse the second appeal fee under R. 103(1)(a) EPC.

The board did not see a substantial procedural violation committed by the first instance in the procedure leading to the second refusal decision. In the present case the division did not only maintain the objections under Art. 123(2) EPC, but also raised in particular inventive step objections. In view of these objections, the applicant could not have reasonably expected the grant of the patent without a further refusal following the decision to grant the interlocutory revision. Put differently, already these additional inventive step objections made the payment of the further appeal fee necessary. Moreover, the board noted that, even assuming for the sake of argument that the division would not have allowed the interlocutory revision, the payment of a second appeal fee might still have become unavoidable. Since the first refusal decision only dealt with added subject-matter, it would still have been quite likely that the case would have been remitted to the examining division for examination of the outstanding substantive issues even after a successful (first) appeal.

The board further stated that, after granting interlocutory revision, once the examining division reopens the examination, it is formally not prevented from re-examining all the issues which were already the subject of the previous decision. The principle of prohibition of *reformatio in peius* does not apply in this situation.

The board concluded that there was no basis for the reimbursement of the second appeal fee, as no procedural violation was apparent and a reimbursement also did not appear equitable for any other reasons.

132-11-23



## Article 110 EPC | T 2503/18 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 110 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2503/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 107 and 110 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	reformatio in peius – opponent as sole appellant – patent proprietors' appeal withdrawn
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/92
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.3.1.5</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2503/18](#) both the patent proprietors and the opponent had appealed the opposition division's decision to maintain the patent in amended form.

After all the patent proprietors' requests had been discussed at the oral proceedings and the board had considered them not to be allowable, the patent proprietors had withdrawn their appeal before the board's decision was announced. Consequently, the opponent had become the sole appellant and the patent proprietors had become the respondents and party to the appeal proceedings as of right under Art. 107, second sentence, EPC.

In claim 1 of the patent as granted (main request) as well as in claim 1 of auxiliary requests 1 and 2ter, limiting feature 1.8 was absent compared to claim 1 of auxiliary request 4, which had been considered by the opposition division to meet all requirements of the EPC. Therefore, the subject-matter of claim 1 of these requests was either broader or an *aliud* compared to the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 but not a restriction of the claimed subject-matter of auxiliary request 4. This meant that maintaining the patent as granted or maintaining the patent as amended according to auxiliary requests 1 or 2ter would have put the sole appellant in a worse situation than if it had not filed an appeal. This would have contravened the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius as the opponent had become the sole appellant (see decision G 9/92, OJ 1994, 875 and Case Law, V.A.3.1. and V.A.3.1.5). The main request as well as auxiliary requests 1 and 2ter were thus to be rejected as inadmissible (see decision G 9/92, cited above, point 2 of the order). This conclusion did not apply to auxiliary request 3ter, which, although higher in rank, contained in claim 1 all the

features of claim 1 of auxiliary request 4. Accordingly, it was concluded that the claims of auxiliary request 3ter did not result in an extension in the scope of protection with respect to the claims of auxiliary request 4. Thus, to this extent at least, the amendments did not contravene the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius. Under these circumstances, auxiliary request 3ter was within the board's jurisdiction, and the board was empowered to decide upon this request in substance.

015-02-23

## Article 111 EPC | T 2916/19 | Board 3.3.03

### Article 111 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2916/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.19
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 111 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Art. 11 RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	remittal to the department of first instance (yes) – board not empowered to instruct first-instance department to accelerate proceedings
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.7.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.9.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2916/19](#) the appellant raised objections of lack of novelty and of lack of inventive step against claim 1 of the main request. The board noted that an objection had already been put forward during the opposition proceedings but that the opposition division had not deemed it necessary to deal with it. It was unclear to the board why and on which basis the appellant's objection of lack of inventive step of claim 1 of the main request had not been dealt with in the decision under appeal. It found said decision suffered from a substantial procedural violation in that the opponents' objections and arguments were not properly taken into account. According to established case law, such a substantial procedural violation was to be equated with a fundamental deficiency in the sense of Art. 11 RPBA 2020, and the board accordingly remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution (Art. 111(1) EPC).

The respondent requested that the board instruct the opposition division i) to deal with the present case in an accelerated manner and ii) to limit the further discussion to the documents on file in the event that the case was remitted to the opposition division. The request was made in view of the filing date of the application on which the patent in suit was based (2007) and the fact that this would be the second remittal to the opposition division.

The board considered that the question of when or at which pace the case was to be dealt with by the opposition division was a managerial decision to be taken by the department of first instance; the board was not empowered to impose any timeline/time constraints to the department of first instance which would be in charge of the case. The

board noted that the respondent could at any time request accelerated proceedings under the PACE programme, which may be done both at the opposition and appeal stages.

The board further considered it could not, in advance, decide to exclude from consideration any unknown and unforeseeable facts, pieces of evidence and/or submissions. Therefore, the respondent's request for the board to instruct the opposition division to limit the further discussion to the documents on file was rejected.

141-12-23

## Article 111(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1731/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.09.05
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 111(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	remittal – decision on remittal before decision on admittance of auxiliary requests (no) – party request to prioritise decision on remittal before admittance
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.9.1.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.9.2</a> , <a href="#">V.A.9.5</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1731/19](#) the board decided not to take auxiliary requests 1 to 3 into account because the respondent failed to substantiate these requests in its reply to the appellant's statement of grounds of appeal. These requests were identical to auxiliary requests 1 to 3 submitted during the opposition procedure. Nevertheless, when resubmitting these requests with its reply to the statement of grounds of appeal, the respondent had omitted any comment on why the amendments to the independent claims of the respective auxiliary request might overcome the outstanding objections and therefore might justify amending the impugned decision.

The respondent had requested that their request for remittal be dealt with before a decision was taken on the issue of admittance of the auxiliary requests. As justification for this prioritisation of the request for remittal, the respondent had submitted that in the event of a remittal to the opposition division, the requests that had been filed in the opposition proceedings, thus also including auxiliary requests 1 to 3, could then be further pursued since they were part of the opposition proceedings.

The board explained that according to Art. 111(1) EPC the board may either exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed or remit the case to that department for further prosecution. It was clear from this provision that it is up to the board to decide in which form it exercises its competences. This meant that there was no right of the parties to choose in which form the board should exercise its competences under Art. 111(1) EPC. Thus, the board was

entitled to decide on the issue of admittance of the auxiliary requests without being bound to the respondent's request for prioritisation of the request for remittal.

The board further set out that a case can only be remitted if it is clear on what basis the opposition division should further proceed. In the present case, the board decided on the respondent's main request and did not admit auxiliary requests 1 to 3 into the proceedings. The board also dealt itself with auxiliary request 4. Thus, there were no requests left on the basis of which the opposition division could proceed. The request for remittal was therefore rejected.

166-14-23

## Article 112(1)(a) EPC | T 0116/18

## Board 3.3.02

## Article 112(1)(a) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0116/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 111(2), 112(1)(a) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal – referral by a technical board of appeal – binding effect of a referring decision
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/98, G 0002/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.1.</a> , <a href="#">V.B.2.3.1</a> , <a href="#">V.B.2.3.3</a> , 10th edition

See also abstracts under [Article 56 EPC](#) and [Article 13\(2\) RPBA 2020](#).

In [T 116/18](#) (of 28 July 2023) the board made some introductory remarks on the question of what impact the referring decision had on the subsequent appeal proceedings, i.e. the appeal proceedings after G 2/21 had been issued. This question emerged in the second oral proceedings since it was contentious between the parties whether a certain issue had actually been decided upon by the board in the referring decision and, if so, whether it could be re-opened in the second oral proceedings.

The board recalled that the EPC does not mention anything with regard to this issue. Art. 111(2) EPC provides that if a board of appeal remits a case to the department of the EPO whose decision was appealed, that department is bound by the ratio decidendi of the board of appeal, in so far as the facts are the same. The board noted that Art. 111(2) EPC, however, was not applicable to the relationship between an earlier interlocutory decision of a board and the subsequent proceedings before the same board. In the absence of any provision, two opposing positions seemed possible in the abstract.

According to the board, the first option was that the referring decision together with its legal and factual assessments had no binding effect on the subsequent proceedings before the same board after the case came back from the Enlarged Board. In this case, the board would be free to re-examine the points already raised in the referring decision, and it would therefore be free to depart from the factual and legal assessments underlying the referring decision. The second option was to consider that

the referring board was bound by the referring decision's finding when the case came back from the Enlarged Board. In this approach, the scope of the subsequent proceedings would therefore be limited to the application of the Enlarged Board's decision to the unresolved issue that gave rise to the referral and to any other issues not dealt with in that decision.

The present board decided to follow the second position for the following reasons.

If, in the absence of an express legal provision providing for a binding effect the board were free to re-examine and redetermine all the factual and legal issues that had been subject of the referring decision, this would lead to a conflict with the requirements for referrals set out in Art. 112 EPC as interpreted by the case law.

Art. 112(1)(a) EPC was interpreted to mean that "the referred question does not have a merely theoretical significance for the original proceedings ... as would be the case if the referring board were to reach the same decision on the basis of the file regardless of the answer to the referred question" (G 3/98). Where several grounds for opposition had been raised by the opponent(s), the referral was admissible only when the board had concluded that the patent would be maintained despite the other invoked grounds for opposition which were not the subject of the referral.

If the board were to deny any binding effect of the referring decision and reopen the issues on which the board reached its conclusion in that decision, this would be in logical conflict with the requirements formulated for the admissibility of the referral. Indeed, it could lead to a situation in which the board departs from the assessment made in the referring decision and render the Enlarged Board's answer to the referred question ex post irrelevant, or, conversely, it could require a different referral from that originally made.

To the present board it therefore seemed consistent with this framework to regard as binding the assessments which had led the board to consider a referral both admissible and necessary. According to the board, this conclusion seems to be consistent, *mutatis mutandis*, with some decisions which consider themselves bound by their own first decision if a second appeal on the same subject-matter is brought before them, on the grounds that decisions by the boards of appeal are final and without any possibility to appeal, meaning that no EPO body, not even the boards of appeal, can take a new decision on facts which have already been decided.

The board concluded that as a consequence of this binding effect, the scope of the present proceedings was limited to applying the legal principle, as stated by the Enlarged Board, to the issues left unresolved in the referring decision. In accordance with this, the reasoning was divided into two main parts: the first deals in abstracto with the interpretation of Order no. 2 given in G 2/21, and the second deals with the application of this Order, as interpreted by the present board, i.e. the issues left unresolved in the referring decision.

178-15-23



## Article 112a(2)(c) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	R 0006/20
<b>Board</b>	EBA
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 112a(2)(c), 113(1), 114(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	petition for review – clearly unallowable – fundamental violation of the right to be heard (no) – compliance of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 with Art. 114(1) and 113(1) EPC (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	R 0017/10, R 0009/11, R 0010/11, R 0017/11, R 0001/13, R 0008/15, R 0010/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.B.3.4.3</a> , <a href="#">V.B.4.3.10a</a> , 10th edition

In [R 6/20](#) the petition for review was based on Art. 112a(2)(c) EPC, i.e. on the grounds that a fundamental violation of the right to be heard (Art. 113(1) EPC) had occurred, whereas the petitioner relied on two asserted procedural defects.

The Enlarged Board (EBA) thus assessed whether the decision under review had been tainted by a fundamental violation of the right to be heard for

- not addressing all the facts and arguments (first defect) and/or
- the way in which the facts and arguments relating to non-admittance of the submissions on public prior use were addressed (second defect).

As to the first asserted procedural defect, the petitioner indicated that the board had only addressed admittance of the submissions on public prior use, without even discussing whether these submissions had been *prima facie* relevant for assessing the question of novelty of the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent as granted. Referring to R 8/15, the petitioner held that, in order to comply with the right to be heard, the decision would have had to have made it possible to conclude that the board had "substantively considered" the submissions on public prior use.

The EBA expressed the view that the requirement that "the Board substantively considered those submissions" (catchword of R 10/18, point 1, second paragraph) should

be given the meaning that "the Board considered the contents of those submissions", with this consideration comprising matters pertaining to admittance of facts, evidence and requests, and/or relating to substantive law, i.e. the merits of a case. According to the EBA, the board had complied with the "substantively considered" requirement interpreted this way, especially since the board applying Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 had concluded that the submissions on public prior use should have been filed in the proceedings before the opposition division. Given that the submissions on public prior use had not been admitted, there had been no point in discussing their merits, i.e. whether the respective evidence had been novelty-destroying. The board had thus complied with the "substantive consideration" requirement of R 8/15 as affirmed in R 10/18, both in respect of admittance and merits.

With regard to the second asserted procedural defect, the EBA analysed its case law on the review of substantive law under Art. 112a EPC and recalled the principle set out therein according to which the petition for review may, under no circumstances, be a means to review the application of substantive law. The EBA had no competence under Art. 112a EPC to examine the merits of the decision and to go into the substance of a case. In the context of (non-) admittance, the EBA recalled that it could not be considered in review proceedings whether to admit a new request (R 10/11) or a new document (R 1/13). Referring to R 17/10, the EBA emphasised that admitting late-filed documents and/or other evidence was a matter for the board's discretion and, therefore, as such not subject to review under Art. 112a EPC, unless the exercise of discretion was arbitrary or manifestly illegal (R 10/11), thereby involving a fundamental violation of the right to be heard (R 9/11, R 17/11). Under the essence of this case law, the decision to not admit must be neither arbitrary nor manifestly illegal. The EBA held that these criteria were met in the case in hand: first, the applicable legal provision of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 complied with both the principle of ex officio examination and the right to be heard, and, second, so did its application in the case in hand.

The EBA emphasised that Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 was in line with Art. 114(1) and 113(1) EPC. Non-compliance with the admittance criterion of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007, correctly interpreted in a specific case, in itself justified not admitting submissions filed outside of a time limit, without the requirement to assess in addition prima facie relevance of the submissions or the state of the proceedings (procedural efficiency). Furthermore, in the case in hand, this provision had not been applied in a way that was arbitrary or manifestly incorrect.

The EBA concluded that none of the asserted defects had been established and the asserted fundamental violation of the right to be heard based thereupon was clearly unfounded. The EBA thus rejected the petition and refused the remaining requests.

142-12-23

Article 113 EPC

| T 1456/22

| Board 3.4.01

## Article 113(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1456/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 113(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 011(3) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	right to be heard – violation of the right to be heard (yes) – substantial procedural violation (yes) – formalities officer acted beyond its powers (yes) – higher-ranking request to defer grant overlooked
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.B.2.4.2</a> , <a href="#">III.K.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.2.2.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1456/22](#) the appeal was against the decision of the examining division to grant the patent. The applicant had requested the postponement of the examining division's decision to grant, as it wished to wait until the Unitary Patent system was in effect. The applicant had also requested that, only if the deferment request was refused, the patent be granted anyway. The formalities officer of the examining division had responded to the applicant's request in a letter dated 28 October 2021. This letter stated that the request for postponement had been rejected because there was no certainty as regards the start date of the Unitary Patent system. A few days later, the examining division issued its decision to grant the patent. In its decision, the examining division made no reference to the applicant's request to defer grant.

According to the board, the communication of the formalities officer dated 28 October 2021 set out why the request for delay could not be allowed. It was not a decision, but nevertheless, in sending it, the formalities officer had acted beyond the powers entrusted under R. 11(3) EPC. A communication of this nature should have been sent by the examining division itself, setting a clear date for the applicant to respond. The fact that the decision to grant overlooked the higher-ranking request for deferment was a further procedural violation, namely a further breach of the applicant's right to be heard under Art. 113(1) EPC.

The decision under appeal was set aside and the case remitted to the examining division for further prosecution.

046-05-23

## Article 113 EPC | T 1558/21 | Board 3.2.04

### Article 113 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1558/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 113 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 103(1)(a) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	right to be heard – violation of the right to be heard (yes) – substantial procedural violation (yes) – no opportunity to comment or text not submitted/agreed by patent proprietor – reimbursement of appeal fee (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.B.2.6.1a</a> , <a href="#">III.B.3.4.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Rule 139 EPC.](#)

In der Sache [T 1558/21](#) war für die Kammer von besonderer Bedeutung, dass der Einsprechende (Beschwerdegegner) den vom Patentinhaber (Beschwerdeführer) dargelegten Sachverhalt nicht nur kommentarlos unwidersprochen gelassen, sondern ausdrücklich bestätigt hatte. Demnach gingen alle Beteiligten im Einspruchsverfahren irrtümlich davon aus, bei dem während der mündlichen Verhandlung per E-Mail eingereichten Hilfsantrag 1' handele es sich um einen geänderten Hauptantrag, dessen erteilter Anspruch 1 lediglich um die Definition der Bestandshöhe ergänzt worden sei.

Die Kammer bestätigte, dass im Einspruchsverfahren anschließend Ausführbarkeit, Neuheit und erfinderische Tätigkeit ausschließlich im Hinblick auf diese neu eingeführte Definition als Unterscheidungsmerkmal diskutiert wurde, wie aus dem Protokoll der mündlichen Verhandlung hervorgeht. Das zusätzliche Merkmal des schriftlich eingereichten Hilfsantrags 1' bezüglich der Berechnung der Arbeitshöhe als Mittelwert blieb, zumindest nach dem Vortrag des Beschwerdeführers und dem Protokoll der mündlichen Verhandlung, gänzlich unbeachtet. Nach Ansicht der Kammer war davon auszugehen, dass die ursprüngliche Offenbarung des hinzugefügten "Mittelwert"-Merkmals eingehender thematisiert worden wäre, wenn denn tatsächlich der schriftlich eingereichte Hilfsantrag 1' Gegenstand der Diskussion gewesen wäre.

Die Kammer bestätigte, dass sie zwar keine festen Anhaltspunkte dafür habe, dass auch die Einspruchsabteilung den Gegenstand ihrer eigenen Entscheidung verkannt

hatte, denn die schriftliche Entscheidung behandelt das zusätzliche Merkmal des Mittelwerts, wenn auch nur sehr kurz. Nach Ansicht der Kammer musste dies aber nicht zwangsläufig zu dem Schluss führen, dass die Abteilung dieses Merkmal bereits in der mündlichen Verhandlung wahrgenommen hatte.

Der Kammer zufolge unterlagen zumindest der Patentinhaber (Beschwerdeführer) und der Einsprechende (Beschwerdegegner) am Ende der mündlichen Verhandlung dem Irrtum, dass die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung den diskutierten, auf dem Hauptantrag beruhenden Hilfsantrag 1 betreffe. Das Verständnis der Einspruchsabteilung bezüglich der Anträge ist nach Ansicht der Kammer nicht eindeutig. Einerseits sei es denkbar, dass sie demselben Irrtum unterlag wie die Parteien und über den erörterten, aber nicht eingereichten Antrag entschied. Andererseits sei es auch möglich, dass sie tatsächlich über den schriftlich eingereichten Hilfsantrag 1' entschieden hat, der auf dem früheren Hilfsantrag 1 basierte und zu dem sich die Beteiligten in Wirklichkeit nicht geäußert hatten.

Die Kammer befand, dass entweder die Einspruchsentscheidung auf unstreitig falschen Tatsachen beruht (davon ausgehend, dass alle Beteiligten einschließlich der Einspruchsabteilung einen anderen als den schriftlich eingereichten Antrag erörtert haben) und daher die schriftliche Entscheidung nicht die tatsächlich getroffene Entscheidung wiedergibt oder dass die Entscheidung auf einem Antrag beruht, zu welchem weder der Patentinhaber noch der Einsprechende angehört wurden. Daher entschied die Kammer, dass die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung aufzuheben ist, da sie auf einem schweren Verfahrensfehler beruhe.

Hinsichtlich der Rückerstattung der Beschwerdegebühr kam die Kammer zu dem Schluss, dass der wesentliche Verfahrensmangel im Sinne von R. 103 (1) a) EPÜ – nämlich die Nichtberücksichtigung des in der mündlichen Verhandlung diskutierten, „konkludent gestellten“, auf dem Hauptantrag beruhenden Hilfsantrags 1 und dessen Ersatz durch den „formal“ eingereichten, jedoch nicht diskutierten Hilfsantrag 1' – offensichtlich unmittelbar zur aufzuhebenden Entscheidung führte und damit die Notwendigkeit einer Beschwerde begründete. Daran änderte auch die Tatsache nichts, dass der Fehler in erster Linie auf ein Versehen des Patentinhabers zurückging. Daher vertrat die Kammer die Auffassung, dass die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in voller Höhe der Billigkeit im Sinne von R. 103 (1) a) EPÜ entspreche.

090-08-23

## Article 113 EPC | T 2054/19 | Board 3.2.02

### Article 113(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2054/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.02
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 094(3), 113(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 103(1)(a) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	right to be heard – violation of the right to be heard (yes) – substantial procedural violation (yes) – opportunity to comment (no) – arguments considered (no) – appellant taken by surprise by the timing of the decision (yes) – reimbursement of appeal fee (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.B.2.3.1</a> , <a href="#">III.B.2.4.2</a> , <a href="#">III.B.2.5.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2054/19](#) the board recalled that the right to be heard under Art. 113(1) EPC also included the right not to be surprised by a decision which had been taken against the expectation that the proceedings would be continued.

In the case in hand, the applicant had filed a first amended set of claims as a reaction to the European search report and the search opinion. Based on these claims the examining division issued its only substantive communication under Art. 94(3) EPC. In response the applicant filed a new set of claims. The examining division decided to refuse the application based on these claims. It relied on the views expressed in the European search opinion, as it considered claim 1 of the new set of claims to be identical in scope to claim 1 as originally filed and objected to in the European search report.

The board held that the immediate refusal of the application following the communication under Art. 94(3) EPC amounted to a violation of the right to be heard for the reasons set out below.

The communication under Art. 94(3) EPC had concerned an entirely different set of claims compared to the one underlying the decision, and in it the examining division indicated that it was "at present not practicable to carry out a full examination of the application". The board held that when the applicant had sought to remedy these

deficiencies by filing a new set of claims, they could expect that the examination proceedings would be continued.

The applicant had neither been made aware that the examining division had considered the scope of claim 1 before it to be identical to the scope of claim 1 as originally filed, nor of the fact that it had relied on the search opinion. The sentence "Should the applicant however insist on obtaining a patent on one of the claims which were found not to be patentable, a refusal under Art. 97(2) EPC is to be expected." stood at the end of a communication concerning a different set of claims and could thus not be read as an unambiguous reference to the search opinion which had been issued two years earlier. The board stated that where an examining division relies on arguments made in a search opinion, it has to do so in a manner which is clear and unambiguous. There should be no doubt to an ordinary reader about what is meant.

Moreover, the appellant had argued in its submission in response to the search opinion that D1 had only disclosed the appearance of gas bubbles in blood during decompression, but had failed to disclose a quantitative estimation ability. This argument, whilst made in the context of a different set of claims, had also been relevant to the claims as originally filed and to the claims underlying the decision. The decision failed, however, to address this argument. Hence, the argument was neither explicitly nor implicitly addressed.

The board concluded that for all these reasons the appellant had been taken by surprise by the timing and the content of the decision. The board considered these shortcomings to amount to a substantial procedural violation justifying remittal to the examining division for further prosecution and reimbursement of the appeal fee pursuant to R. 103(1)(a) EPC.

133-11-23



## Article 114 EPC | T 1776/18 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 114(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1776/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.05
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 056, 113(2), 114(1), 114(2), 123(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 079(1), 081(3), 116(1), 116(2) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA; Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	late submitted material – correct exercise of discretion (yes) – legal basis for not admitting late-filed requests – "not submitted in due time"
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/88, G 0010/91, G 0004/92, G 0007/93, R 0006/19, J 0014/19, T 0912/91, T 0171/03, T 0811/08, T 1100/10, T 1914/12, T 1933/12, T 2288/12, T 2385/12, T 2536/12, T 0108/14, T 0525/15, T 1758/15, T 688/16, T 0754/16, T 0966/17, T 1042/18, T 0256/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.5.1.4</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1776/18](#) the board first dealt with the legal basis for not admitting amended claim requests. It cited a long line of case law according to which claim requests may be disregarded under Art. 114(2) EPC, as well as examples of case law in which the opposition division's discretion not to admit claim requests was considered to have its legal basis in Art. 114(2) EPC in conjunction with R. 116(1) EPC. The board also outlined an alternative view set out in R 6/19, in which the Enlarged Board held that the first sentence of Art. 123(1) EPC provided a legal basis for the EPO's discretion as to whether or not to admit claim requests. The Enlarged Board left open whether or not Art. 114(2) EPC constituted such a legal basis as well. In T 256/19, the board stated that discretion to disregard an amended version of a patent could only emanate from Art. 123(1) EPC in conjunction with R. 79(1), 81(3) or 116(2) EPC. There were further views in the case law on the legal basis for not admitting amended claim requests, including that R. 116(2) EPC was the only legal basis (see T 688/16). There were also decisions in which Art. 114(2) EPC in conjunction with R. 116(2) EPC was considered to be the legal basis for not admitting amended claim requests (e.g. T 2536/12, T 525/15, T 1758/15). The present board agreed with the case law according to which Art. 114(2) EPC constituted a legal basis for not admitting claim requests, concluding that in submissions containing claim requests which were explicitly or implicitly substantiated, factual elements were present. The presence of these factual elements allowed

Art. 114(2) EPC to be relied on as a legal basis for disregarding claim requests which were not filed in due time (J 14/19). Applying Art. 114(2) EPC to amended claim requests and hence to the submissions of both opponents and patent proprietors also ensured that the parties were treated equally and according to the same criteria, which guaranteed equality of arms.

Secondly, the board analysed whether the concept of "not submitted in due time" in Art. 114(2) EPC relied on fixed criteria, such as a certain point in time in the proceedings, or, alternatively, on relative criteria, such as individual procedural developments. The board spoke against relying on relative criteria. It observed among other things that, for appeal proceedings, the RPBA 2020 implemented Art. 114(2) EPC in a manner which in principle was binding (T 1042/18) and relied on fixed criteria in order to determine whether a Board had the discretion not to admit a certain submission. In the board's view this approach was also preferable for opposition proceedings as an approach relying on relative criteria tied to individual procedural circumstances had the grave disadvantage that the opposition division's discretionary power was then not clearly and predictably delimited by the law itself.

The board noted that for opposition proceedings there were fixed points in time which allowed the deciding body to determine whether a submission had been filed "in due time" within the meaning of Art. 114(2) EPC. The board identified two such fixed points relevant to the present case (expiry of the period set under R. 79(1) EPC or the final date specified under R. 116(1) EPC). Since, in the case in hand, the relevant request had been filed only after the final date under R. 116(1) EPC, its submission was in any case late-filed. As to the exercise of its discretion, the opposition division had to bear in mind that in opposition proceedings more weight must be given to examination *ex officio* under Art. 114(1) EPC than in appeal proceedings (cf. G 9/91 and G 10/91, point 18 of the Reasons).

As to the interpretation of R. 116(2) EPC when applied to opposition proceedings, the board did not share the views expressed in T 754/16 in which it is stated that requests filed after the final date set for making written submissions, can only then not be admitted if the patent proprietor had been notified of the grounds prejudicing the maintenance of the patent. The board held that the primary purpose of inviting the patent proprietor to file amended claim requests under R. 116(2) EPC was to expedite the opposition proceedings, and to prevent the patent proprietor from filing such requests after the date specified in R. 116(1) EPC. The board found that R. 116(2) EPC did not limit the opposition division's discretionary power under Art. 114(2) EPC and R. 116(1) EPC. In the board's opinion, as a rule, this discretionary power did not depend on the contents of the opposition division's communication under R. 116(1) EPC. However, if the opposition division invited the patent proprietor to file an amended claim request to address a specific objection and the patent proprietor complied with this invitation by filing the required amendments by the date set under R. 116(1) EPC, the opposition division's discretion not to admit that claim request may effectively be reduced to zero.

016-02-23

## Article 114 EPC | T 1984/19 | Board 3.2.06

### Article 114(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1984/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.31
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 111(1), 114(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 111(2) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2007, Articles 11, 12(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	late submitted material – correct exercise of discretion (no) – document admitted by first instance (no) – document admitted (yes) – sufficiently reasoned (no) – remittal to the department of first instance (yes) – special reasons under Article 11 RPBA 2020
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0007/93, T 1557/05, T 1883/12
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.5.</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.4.5.3</a> , <a href="#">V.A.3.4.3a</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.9.3.3</a> , <a href="#">V.A.9.4.4b</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 1984/19](#) the board found that while an opposition division must have a certain freedom in admitting or disregarding late-filed evidence, the reasoning given in the contested decision for not admitting D16 into the opposition proceedings was insufficient in view of R. 111(2) EPC. From the decision and the minutes, the board was unable to comprehend which considerations had led the opposition division to the conclusion that the content of D16 did not go beyond the content of the documents on file and why D16 was considered not relevant for the outcome of the case, whether in view of novelty or inventive step.

With reference to G 7/93, the board stated that in order to ascertain whether the opposition division had exercised its discretion properly, it was essential for the board to know which principles the opposition division had taken into account and which interests it had balanced. The board could not however ascertain from the decision why the opposition division had found that D16 was not sufficiently relevant to outweigh any other considerations speaking against its admittance, if it had indeed made such considerations at all.

As to the sparse indications given by the opposition division as to why D16 was disregarded, the statement that D16 had been filed after the expiry of the period for filing an opposition was not part of the reasons for the discretionary decision, but a precondition for the exercise of any discretion. That D16 was not the only starting point used in one of several inventive step attacks was not considered by the board to be constituting reasoning

either. The board failed to see any connection between the relevance of a particular document and the number of other documents cited.

Regarding the opponent's (appellant's) statement that D16 did not contain any details with respect to the knitting structure, the fact that the closest prior art did not contain details with respect to the distinguishing feature was normally inherent to an inventive step attack and could not therefore have an impact on its relevance.

Finally, as to the opposition division's statement that D16 did not disclose more features than D1 or D2, the board found that determining whether late-filed documents were *prima facie* more relevant than those already on file was only one of several aspects that needed to be balanced when taking the discretionary decision to admit or not admit late-filed evidence into the proceedings. Other aspects included the point in time at which the evidence was first presented and the amount of time available for the other party to deal with it and prepare a meaningful reply, or the complexity of the new submission and the expected lengthening of the proceedings that its admittance would cause. It was not apparent from the contested decision (nor the minutes) whether the opposition division had considered any of these aspects. It was not even clear in which sense the opposition division had considered D16 as being less relevant than the documents already on file.

The board concluded that the opposition division's discretionary decision not to admit D16 into the proceedings was insufficiently reasoned on several levels. The contested decision was therefore to be set aside.

The board further considered that D16 was indeed *prima facie* relevant for assessing whether the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request was novel and/or for assessing whether it involved an inventive step. For these reasons, the board did not exercise its discretion under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 to disregard evidence that was not admitted in the proceedings before the opposition division. D16 (and D16a) were thus in the proceedings (Art. 12(4) in conjunction with Art. 12(1) and (2) RPBA 2007).

On the question of remittal, the board was unconvinced by the appellant's (opponent's) argument that remitting the case would be detrimental to procedural economy. Procedural economy may always be negatively affected when remitting a case. However, it may or may not be outweighed by other interests, not least the interest of the parties to have their case heard by two instances as the respondent (patent proprietor) had argued, and in particular for both parties to be able to fully develop their arguments concerning the newly found prior art during the administrative proceedings before the opposition division. In light of the foregoing, which the board considered to constitute "special reasons" under Art. 11 RPBA 2020, the board availed itself of its power under Art. 111(1) EPC to remit the case to the opposition division for further prosecution.

068-07-23

## Article 114 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0375/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.09
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 114 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correct exercise of discretion (no) – fresh ground for opposition admitted at first-instance – review of first-instance discretionary decision – first-instance admittance of fresh ground for opposition annulled – late-submitted material
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0010/91
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.3.4.5</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.3.4.1</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 375/21](#) la chambre a annulé la décision de la division d'opposition selon laquelle était admis un nouveau motif d'opposition soumis pour la première fois deux mois avant la procédure orale devant la division d'opposition. La chambre était d'avis que la division d'opposition avait exercé son pouvoir d'appréciation en la matière de manière déraisonnable.

La division d'opposition n'avait pas reconnu le caractère tardif du motif d'opposition, quand bien même celui-ci n'avait pas été évoqué dans l'acte d'opposition. Elle avait considéré qu'il n'était pas tardif au motif qu'il représentait une réaction à certains documents soumis par la titulaire en réponse au mémoire d'opposition.

La division d'opposition n'avait pas non plus indiqué en quoi le nouveau motif était de prime abord pertinent. Elle avait par ailleurs demandé aux titulaires de donner des raisons pour lesquelles le "motif ne serait pas pertinent". Or selon l'avis G 10/91, c'est plutôt à la division d'opposition qu'il revient d'expliquer pourquoi, de prime abord, le nouveau motif semble en tout ou en partie s'opposer au maintien du brevet contesté.

143-12-23

## Article 116 EPC | T 2303/19 | Board 3.3.07

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2303/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.07
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – videoconference (no) – G 1/21 – in-person oral proceedings
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2303/19](#) the parties were summoned to attend oral proceedings at the EPO premises. The appellant (patent proprietor) requested in its letter dated 3 November 2022 that the oral proceedings take place by videoconference (facilitating attendance of the appellant's in-house counsel and reducing the risk of any last-minute travel disruption due to uncertainty surrounding Covid-19 cases). The respondent did not consent to this request and suggested a mixed-mode format. In a communication dated 24 November 2022 the board informed the parties that it had decided to hold the oral proceedings in person. Oral proceedings took place at the EPO premises on 7 December 2022. At the beginning the Chair asked the parties whether they wished to comment on the format of the oral proceedings. The parties said that they did not.

The board agreed with the respondent that at the relevant time there were no Covid-19 related travel restrictions which would impair the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, and that in-person oral proceedings were at that time the optimum format as expressed in decision G 1/21. The board also considered that the possible attendance of an accompanying person could not determine the format of the oral proceedings.

032-04-23

## Article 116 EPC | T 1158/20 | Board 3.2.01

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1158/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.22
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – videoconference – lack of consent – Article 15a RPBA 2020 and G 1/21 – videoconference suitable and meanwhile equivalent alternative to in-person oral proceedings
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21, T 0996/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1158/20](#) the first point of the board's Catchword reads as follows: "Pursuant to Art. 15a(1) RPBA 2020 the boards have a discretionary power to hold oral proceedings by videoconference without the consent of all parties. When exercising this discretion, the board must primarily assess whether the case is suitable to be dealt with by videoconference and/or whether there are reasons that require holding oral proceedings in person. Such reasons may be seen in the complexity of the case or a need to inspect models."

In the case at issue, the oral proceedings were held by videoconference on 22 November 2022 with the consent of the respondent (patent proprietor). The appellant (opponent) had not consented to that format. The board decided of its own motion to hold oral proceedings by videoconference pursuant to Art. 15a(1) RPBA 2020. From the wording "if the board considers it appropriate" in this provision, it was evident that the board had discretion to decide whether to hold oral proceedings by videoconference. The provision does not explicitly set criteria to be applied when exercising this discretionary power. Nor does this provision require the consent of the parties. Before deciding the format of the oral proceedings, the board informed the parties it intended to hold the oral proceedings by videoconference in view of the increasing number of COVID-19 infections and because the case appeared suitable. The appellant disagreed.

The board stated that despite the appellant's allegation to the contrary, the COVID-19 pandemic was ongoing at that date; there were still restrictions in the premises of the



boards in Haar. Videoconference avoided the risk that a participant on quite short notice be barred from attending. The absence of travel restrictions was not a clear indication that oral proceedings must be held in person. The board still had the discretion to decide on the format of the oral proceedings. The board took the view that it was not possible to objectively define a threshold for the number of infections (or for any other parameter). Contrary to the appellant's suggestion, it could not be expected of the respondent's representative to find a colleague of the same firm located in Munich when the representative located in London was available to participate by videoconference. As regards the argument that the same board in T 996/20 did not grant oral proceedings by videoconference in the absence of consent of all parties (held in person on 02 November 2022), such decision was a discretionary one. In response to the appellant's argument that filing further auxiliary requests during oral proceedings would not be possible during a videoconference, the board noted that were the patent proprietor to submit further auxiliary requests, this could be accommodated by email filing, using a dedicated email address, during the videoconference. In fact, none of the parties experienced problems using this procedure. Since all pieces of relevant prior art were printed documents available on EPO databases and no particular difficulties were apparent, such as particular complexities or models to be inspected during the oral proceedings, the board saw no reason why a videoconference was not suitable.

The board further saw no conflict with G 1/21 (points 47-50 of the Reasons). And irrespective of this, the board also considered whether videoconference could be considered an equivalent alternative to in-person (stated to be the gold standard in G 1/21, point 45 of the Reasons). Firstly, the scope of the referral was restricted and G 1/21 was issued when the boards had little experience with videoconferencing (see point 46 "at this point in time...not provide same level"). Since then, the situation had changed; boards and parties had gained extensive experience such that holding oral proceedings by videoconference was no longer as far from the gold standard as it was when decision G 1/21 was taken. In the board's view, nowadays videoconference was often equivalent to a hearing in person (see Catchword 2.). In conclusion even in view of G 1/21, videoconference was in this case not only suitable but also represented an equivalent alternative to in-person oral proceedings.

033-04-23



## Article 116 EPC | T 1624/20 | Board 3.3.05

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1624/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 113(1), 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 106 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – videoconference – Article 15a RPBA 2020 and G 1/21 – change of format of oral proceedings without appellant's consent – specific circumstances – opportunity to present comments (yes) – violation of the right to be heard (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21, T 1499/16, T 0250/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , <a href="#">III.B.2.6.</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 1624/20](#), près de deux mois avant la procédure orale, la titulaire (intimée) a demandé que la procédure orale, initialement prévue en présentiel, soit transformée en visioconférence. Un mois avant la date de la procédure orale et au vu de la situation de la pandémie (COVID-19) à ce moment-là, la chambre a transformé la procédure orale en visioconférence qui a eu lieu le 13 décembre 2022.

La requérante formulant une objection au titre de la règle 106 CBE concluait à la violation de l'art. 113 CBE soutenant qu'elle n'avait pas consenti à ce format et qu'elle n'avait pas été invitée à présenter ses commentaires avant le changement de format.

Contestant le nouveau format, la requérante faisait notamment valoir la fin de l'état d'urgence lié au COVID-19, qu'imposer une visioconférence était en désaccord avec G 1/21, l'absence de déclaration officielle d'une agence gouvernementale, que l'art. 15bis RPCR 2020 ne pouvait pas être invoqué car il était dans le cas présent en contradiction avec G 1/21, qu'un mode hybride aurait mieux respecté les souhaits de chaque partie.

La chambre rappelle le libellé de l'art. 15bis et explique que dans le cas d'espèce la visioconférence n'est pas non plus en contradiction avec G 1/21. Conformément au point 50 des motifs de G 1/21, il appartient à la chambre d'apprécier l'existence d'une situation d'urgence générale qui compromet la possibilité pour les parties de participer

en présentiel. Des raisons ont été données qui peuvent justifier le rejet du présentiel (G 1/21, points 47 à 49). Premièrement, l'affaire ne doit pas être inadaptée à la visioconférence. La requérante n'a présenté aucune raison du caractère non approprié et la chambre sur la base de son expérience (affaire non excessivement complexe, deux parties) conclut que l'affaire s'y prête. Deuxièmement, il doit y avoir des circonstances propres à l'affaire justifiant de ne pas tenir la procédure orale en présentiel ; ces circonstances ne se limitent pas à des restrictions de voyage. La chambre constate que le taux d'incidence en Allemagne et en France, domiciles professionnels des mandataires, étaient en train de monter. Au vu de ce risque une situation d'urgence générale au sens de G 1/21 persistait.

Il y avait donc des circonstances spécifiques justifiant la décision de ne pas tenir la procédure orale en présentiel. Ainsi, la chambre a exercé son pouvoir d'appréciation pour protéger les parties et la chambre même sans le consentement de la requérante.

Plus particulièrement sur l'objection soulevée au titre de la règle 106 CBE, finalement rejetée par la chambre, la chambre citant T 250/19 énonce que la conformité de la visioconférence avec le droit d'une partie d'être entendue ne dépend pas de l'accord de cette partie mais uniquement du fait que cette partie a suffisamment eu la possibilité de prendre position et de présenter son cas. A l'issue de la procédure orale les parties ont confirmé n'avoir pas rencontré de problèmes techniques et la requérante ne s'est jamais plainte en cours de visioconférence d'une quelconque atteinte à sa faculté de prendre position ou de présenter son cas. La chambre était également d'avis que décider de changer le format en visioconférence sans donner à la requérante la possibilité de présenter ses commentaires au préalable n'a pas constitué une violation du droit d'être entendu. La chambre a noté qu'il y avait déjà eu un échange exhaustif d'arguments sur le format en amont de l'audience. De plus, la chambre avait aussi invité explicitement la requérante sur ce sujet en début de procédure orale. Enfin, la chambre a noté que la transformation du format en visioconférence n'était pas définitive ; si elle était arrivée à la conclusion, au vu des arguments en début de procédure orale, que la visioconférence n'était pas adaptée, elle aurait ajourné la procédure orale afin de la tenir ultérieurement en présentiel.

034-04-23

## Article 116 EPC | T 1041/21 | Board 3.2.04

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1041/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 111(1), 112(1)a, 116(1), (4) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Article 15a RPBA 2020
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – videoconference without consent – opposition proceedings – application of considerations set out in G 1/21 – referral to the Enlarged Board (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 12\(5\) RPBA 2020.](#)

In [T 1041/21](#) hatte die Einspruchsabteilung einen Antrag beider Parteien auf Verlegung der mündlichen Verhandlung, die als Videokonferenz anberaumt war, abgelehnt. Auf die Anträge auf Befassung der großen Beschwerdekammer mit verschiedenen Rechtsfragen zur Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung als Videokonferenz ohne Zustimmung der Parteien hin, stellte die Kammer fest, die Einschränkung in G 1/21 auf Beschwerdekammern sei nicht aus sachlichen Gründen erfolgt, also etwa weil an mündliche Verhandlungen vor Einspruchsabteilungen andere oder strengere Maßstäbe anzulegen wären, sondern weil darüber hinaus in dem damals vorgelegten Fall, in dem eine Beschwerdekammer zur mündlichen Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz geladen hatte, kein weiterer konkreter Klärungsbedarf bestanden habe. Die Kammer sah sich deshalb nicht daran gehindert, grundsätzliche Erwägungen der G 1/21 auch im vorliegenden Fall anzuwenden.

Danach sind mündliche Verhandlungen in Form einer Videokonferenz mündliche Verhandlungen im Sinne des Art. 116 EPC. Jedoch kann einer Partei der Wunsch nach einer Präsenzverhandlung nur dann versagt werden, wenn besondere Umstände vorliegen, die die persönliche Anwesenheit der Parteien behindern oder unmöglich machen. Die Reisebeschränkungen während der Covid-19-Pandemie zählten zu solchen Umständen, die andernfalls eine nicht hinnehmbare Verzögerung in der Entscheidungsfindung und Rechtsprechung nach sich gezogen hätten.

Im vorliegenden Fall war bereits einmal ein (für den 24. Juni 2020) anberaumter Verhandlungstermin aufgehoben und (auf den 27. Januar 2021) verschoben worden, bevor dann der zweite Termin von einer Präsenzverhandlung in eine Videokonferenz umgewandelt wurde. In diesem Zeitraum galten in der Bundesrepublik Kontakt- und Reisebeschränkungen aufgrund der anhaltenden Covid-19-Pandemie. Die Kammer stellte fest, dass diese objektiven Umstände die Durchführung mündlicher Präsenz-Verhandlungen aller Art gleichermaßen beeinträchtigten. Darüber hinaus konnte sie keine Gründe erkennen, die für eine größere Akzeptanz von Verfahrensverzögerungen oder eine geringere Eignung einer Videokonferenz zur Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung im Einspruchsverfahren im Vergleich zum Beschwerdeverfahren sprechen würden. Das Argument des Beschwerdegegners, das Beschwerdeverfahren diene mehr der rechtlichen Überprüfung und erfordere von vornherein weniger Sachverhaltsermittlungen als das Verfahren vor Prüfungs- und Einspruchsabteilungen, überzeugte die Kammer nicht. Daher lagen nach Ansicht der Kammer auch im vorliegenden Fall, die in G 1/21 definierten grundsätzlichen Voraussetzungen dafür vor, eine mündliche Verhandlung als Videokonferenz ohne Zustimmung der Parteien hierfür durchzuführen.

Die generelle Frage, ob die Begründung der Entscheidung G 1/21 auf die Situation, in der kein allgemeiner Notstand vorliegt, übertragbar ist, war nicht entscheidungserheblich und brauchte von der Kammer nicht beantwortet zu werden.

Bezüglich des Erfordernisses einer erneuten Ladung unter Einhaltung einer zweimonatigen Frist beim Übergang von einer Präsenzveranstaltung zu einer Videokonferenz verwies die Kammer auf das Fehlen einer ausdrücklichen Regelung für einen Ortswechsel in den Richtlinien. Zudem war es für die Kammer nicht ersichtlich, dass eine Umwandlung einer Präsenzverhandlung in eine Videokonferenz im Hinblick auf Planbarkeit und Organisation eine erneute zweimonatige Ladungsfrist erforderlich machen würde.

Die Kammer kam auch zu dem Schluss, dass ein Fehler im Verhandlungskalender des EPA keinen Verstoß gegen Art. 116(4) EPÜ darstellte.

Die beantragte Vorlage war nicht erforderlich und im Übrigen, wie auch vom Beschwerdeführer bestätigt, nur von abstrakter und theoretischer Relevanz.

047-05-23

## Article 116 EPC | T 0758/20 | Board 3.2.01

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0758/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.23
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 116, 112(1)(a) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – oral proceedings by videoconference (yes) – in-person oral proceedings (no) – G 1/21 – videoconference meanwhile equivalent alternative to in-person oral proceedings – referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/98, G 0001/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.2</a> , <a href="#">V.B.2.3.2</a> , <a href="#">V.B.2.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 758/20](#) the board decided of its own motion to hold oral proceedings by videoconference pursuant to Art. 15a(1) RPBA 2020. The oral proceedings were held by videoconference in November 2022 with the consent of the respondent (patent proprietor). The appellant (opponent) had not consented to that format. The board reasoned that from the wording "if the board considers it appropriate" in this provision, it was evident that the board had the discretion to decide whether to hold oral proceedings by videoconference. The provision did not set criteria to be applied when exercising this discretionary power. Nor did this provision require the consent of the parties.

Regarding whether there were circumstances specific to the case that justified the decision not to hold the oral proceedings in person, the board explained that the COVID-19 pandemic was ongoing at the date of the oral proceedings and access restrictions were at that time still in place for the premises of the Boards of Appeal in Haar. Holding oral proceedings by videoconference had avoided the risk that a participant on quite short notice be barred from attending. The absence of general travel restrictions was not a clear indication that oral proceedings had to be held in person. The board also took into account the risk for the parties and the members of the board of being infected.

Concerning the suitability of holding oral proceedings by videoconference in the case in hand, the board disagreed with the appellant's view that a discussion of the opposition division's allegations in the impugned decision would require an in-person hearing. The board found that it would be more appropriate to provide figures and sketches in advance of the oral proceedings instead of presenting them during the oral proceedings. Moreover, the Zoom software used for the videoconferences allowed for screen sharing, displaying figures and handmade sketches as well as for pointing to details using the mouse. Furthermore, it was possible to file figures and sketches by email to be distributed to the other participants of the oral proceedings.

Moreover, the board did not interpret G 1/21 as meaning that it was for the party to choose the format of the oral proceedings. The decision on whether good reasons justified a deviation from the preference of a party to hold the oral proceedings in person was a discretionary decision of the board summoning it to the oral proceedings. Furthermore, the board clarified that the order in G 1/21 could not be read as restricting the possibility of summoning for oral proceedings by videoconference contrary to the will of one party to only when there is a general emergency. The order did not exclude that there were other circumstances specific to the case that justified the decision not to hold the oral proceedings in person.

The board concluded that, in the case at issue, the three criteria mentioned in points 47 to 50 of decision G 1/21 were met. Hence the board saw no conflict with G 1/21. Irrespective of this, the board also found that nowadays oral proceedings held by videoconference were often equivalent to a hearing in person. This applied to the current case when using the available videoconference technology, as the case had involved no particular complexities and there had been no limitations on the interaction between the parties and the board or on the opportunity for the parties to argue their case. Therefore, the board concluded that oral proceedings by videoconference were in this case not only suitable but also represented an equivalent alternative to in-person oral proceedings.

Finally, the board refused the request by the appellant for referral under Art. 112(1)(a) EPC, since it did not see any deviation from the decision G 1/21; furthermore, it did not consider the question to be essential for it to reach a decision in the case at issue and had no doubt that it had discretion to decide to hold oral proceedings by videoconference, even without the consent of the appellant.

059-06-23

## Article 116 EPC | T 2432/19 | Board 3.2.06

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2432/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.25
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 15a, 23 RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – in-person oral proceedings (yes) – videoconference equivalent alternative to in-person oral proceedings (no) – ratio decidendi of G 1/21 applicable only to general emergency situations (no) – right to oral proceedings in form of a videoconference (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21, T 0758/20, T 0618/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2432/19](#), after the board had summoned the parties to oral proceedings at the EPO premises, the appellant (patent proprietor) requested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference but did not give any reasons for this request. The respondent (opponent) invoked no reasons against holding oral proceedings by videoconference. Oral proceedings took place in person in April 2023.

The board stressed that while it was evident from Art. 15a(1) RPBA 2020 that the board had the discretion to decide whether to hold oral proceedings by videoconference, the decision G 1/21 put certain limits on how this discretion was to be exercised. The board found that the Enlarged Board had set out in G 1/21 the conditions under which a party's request for in-person proceedings may be denied. It had set out principles which followed the spirit and purpose of the Convention (Art. 23 RPBA 2020) and which had to therefore be taken into account when exercising discretion under Art. 15a RPBA 2020. The fact that Art. 15a RPBA 2020 had not been referred to specifically was of no relevance. While G 1/21 was to a large degree directed to the situation of a general emergency, the Enlarged Board's basic reasoning used in arriving at its final conclusion was quite general and unrelated to any general emergency considerations.

The board did not share the view expressed in T 618/21 with regard to Art. 15a RPBA 2020 that the exercise of discretion in deciding on the format of the oral proceedings was to be based on the criterion of the "appropriateness" of the format only. According to the board, G 1/21 had established general criteria which needed to be taken into account for the denial



of a request for in-person oral proceedings, which applied not only to a situation of general emergency, but were valid also in non-emergency times. The board recalled that G 1/21 stated that in-person oral proceedings were the optimum format and that videoconferences – at least according to the then state of technology – did not meet this standard, i.e. were not equivalent to in-person oral proceedings. The board stressed that these statements held true regardless of the existence of an emergency situation, i.e. even in 'normal times'. The board considered this to be the ratio decidendi underlying G 1/21, the validity of which was not limited to any emergency situation. The board concluded that the ratio decidendi underlying G 1/21, at least with regard to a party's request for in-person oral proceedings, could not be simply assigned to situations of general emergency but were instead generally valid.

The board pointed out that even in the circumstances of a general emergency, the Enlarged Board had still imposed strict conditions on the possibility of denying a party's wish to hold oral proceedings in-person. A fortiori, it was therefore hardly justifiable that less strict requirements could apply for denying parties in-person oral proceedings in times when there was no general emergency. Since videoconferences, at least according to current technology, could only provide a suboptimal form of communication, parties had a right to the optimum format for oral proceedings, i.e. in-person oral proceedings, that could only be denied under very limited conditions. It also followed from G 1/21 that parties did not have a right to a format that had deficiencies, i.e. parties could not force boards to conduct videoconferences instead of in-person oral proceedings.

The board cited G 1/21, in which a hearing in person was held to be the "gold standard". The board concluded that communicating via videoconference could not, at least for the time being, be put on the same level as communicating in person. The board could not recognise any improvements that could be said to provide the level of communication which was possible when all participants were physically present in the same room. Unlike the boards in T 758/20 and T 618/21, the board in the present case held that the situation had not changed since the issue of G 1/21. At the time of issuing the present decision, the parties relied on the same kind of hardware and software as were available at the time of G 1/21. Furthermore, no significant improvements that had increased "immediacy" to the level of in-person hearings could be recognised.

In the present case, and despite the party's request, the board did not change the format of the oral proceedings, which remained as summoned. The board reasoned among others with the complexity and the circumstances of the case; experience of appeal cases in the technical field of the case in question had also shown that a party wishing to explain functional effects of structural features could often do this more easily by use of the flip chart, gradually building up features whilst explaining them in a dynamic situation of use, and of course allowing the same sketches to be used by the opposing party(ies).

069-07-23



# Article 116 EPC | T 0489/20 | Board 3.3.07

## Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0489/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.17
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a(1) and (2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – in-person oral proceedings (yes) – videoconference not considered appropriate – particular circumstances according to G 1/21 (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 489/20](#) the board summoned for in-person oral proceedings. It then informed the parties that it would consider the arrangement for the oral proceedings to take place by videoconference if all parties agreed to such format, but that it was not in the position to arrange a video link for the attendance of an individual participant (the appellant (patent proprietor) had requested this for an accompanying person). Respondent-opponent 2 and respondent-opponent 3 did not consent to the oral proceedings being held in the form of a videoconference. Respondent-opponent 4 announced they would not attend the oral proceedings if they were held in person. The board decided that the oral proceedings were to be held in person in March 2023.

The board reasoned that according to Art. 15a(1) RPBA 2020 the board may decide to hold oral proceedings by videoconference if the board considers it appropriate to do so, either upon request by a party or of its own motion. In view of the disapproval to hold the oral proceedings by videoconference expressed by respondent-opponent 2 and respondent-opponent 3, and in the absence of any particular circumstances as mentioned in G 1/21 (point 49 of the Reasons), the board did not consider it appropriate to hold the oral proceedings by videoconference.

The board noted that under Art. 15a(2) RPBA 2020, a party, representative or accompanying person may, upon request, be allowed to attend by videoconference if oral proceedings are scheduled to be held on the premises of the EPO. However, in the current case the board had not been in a position to arrange a video link for the attendance of individual participants.

070-07-23

**Article 116 EPC | T 0618/21 | Board 3.2.01**
**Article 116 EPC**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0618/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.29
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – oral proceedings by videoconference (yes) – videoconference considered appropriate – videoconference meanwhile equivalent alternative to in-person oral proceedings
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.2</a> , 10th edition

In der Sache [T 618/21](#) entschied die Kammer, die mündliche Verhandlung im März 2023 in Form einer Videokonferenz abzuhalten. Der Beschwerdeführer stimmte dem nicht zu, sondern beantragte die Durchführung der Verhandlung in Präsenz.

Die Kammer wies darauf hin, dass Art. 15a VOBK 2020 der Kammer ein Ermessen gebe bei der Entscheidung, die mündliche Verhandlung von Amts wegen als Videokonferenz durchzuführen. Nach Ansicht der Kammer werden folgende Punkte aus dem Wortlaut des Art. 15a (1) VOBK 2020 deutlich: (a) Die Entscheidung obliegt der Kammer und nicht den Parteien. (b) Die Entscheidung, die Verhandlung als Videokonferenz durchzuführen, kann auch gegen den Willen der Parteien gefällt werden. (c) Es handelt sich um eine Ermessensentscheidung. (d) Das eingeräumte Ermessen ist orientiert an Zweckdienlichkeitsüberlegungen auszuüben. (e) Die Regelung nennt keinerlei zwingend erforderlichen Punkte, die bei der Ermessensausübung berücksichtigt werden müssen. Somit sind alle Gründe zu berücksichtigen und gegeneinander abzuwägen, die für oder gegen eine Videokonferenz sprechen. (f) Insbesondere aber enthält die Regelung keinen Hinweis darauf, dass sie ausschließlich im Fall des Vorliegens eines allgemeinen Notfalls anzuwenden ist.

Der Kammer zufolge impliziert der Begriff "zweckmäßig" in Art. 15a VOBK 2020, dass etwas zur Erreichung eines oder mehrerer angestrebter Zwecke grundsätzlich geeignet und darüber hinaus auch sinnvoll (sachdienlich) erscheint. Das Kriterium der Sachdienlichkeit erfordere eine Gesamtabwägung aller relevanten Gesichtspunkte, die vorrangig auf objektiven Erwägungen beruhen sollte.

Dass auch eine als Videokonferenz durchgeführte mündliche Verhandlung grundsätzlich geeignet sein kann, die Ziele einer mündlichen Verhandlung (vgl. R 3/10) zu erreichen, habe die Große Beschwerdekammer in G 1/21 (Nr. 33-43 der Gründe) festgestellt. Der Umstand alleine, dass eine Partei eines der Formate ablehnt, könne schon nach dem Wortlaut des Art. 15a VOBK 2020 die Eignung nicht aufheben.

Im Rahmen der Sachdienlichkeitsabwägung berücksichtigte die Kammer alle für sie unmittelbar erkennbaren Vor- und Nachteile, insbesondere Gründe, die das Erscheinen der Parteien zu einer Präsenzverhandlung erschweren oder behindern könnten und Gründe, die geeignet wären, die Diskussion des Falles im Videoformat zu beeinträchtigen. Dabei hob sie hervor, dass eine Videokonferenz es den Parteien erlaube, die ansonsten anfallende Reisezeit sinnvoller zu verbringen, Kosten einzusparen und Umweltschäden zu verhindern. Gleichzeitig konnte die Kammer im konkreten Fall keine Nachteile einer Videokonferenz erkennen. Die Kammer befand, dass eine Videokonferenz sowohl im Regelfall, als auch im vorliegenden Fall eine annähernd gleichwertige Alternative zu einer Präsenzverhandlung darstelle, die es den Parteien ohne wesentliche Einschränkung ermögliche, ihren Standpunkt über den schriftlichen Vortrag hinaus erneut mündlich klarzumachen.

Die Kammer erläuterte ferner, dass Art. 15a VOBK 2020 weder höherrangigem Recht (Art. 116 EPÜ, Art. 113 EPÜ, Art. 6 EMRK), noch den wesentlichen Schlussfolgerungen in G 1/21 widerspreche. Sie hob hervor, dass Art. 15a VOBK 2020 die zum Vorlagezeitpunkt von G 1/21 bestehende Regelungslücke geschlossen habe. Sie wies auch darauf hin, dass die Schlussfolgerungen aus G 1/21 nicht mehr uneingeschränkt auf die Gegenwart angewandt werden könnten, da die Eingangsvoraussetzung der Entscheidung G 1/21 (und zwar der Qualitätsunterschied zwischen Videokonferenz und Präsenzverhandlung) nicht mehr gegeben sei. Die Große Beschwerdekammer habe auch nicht festgestellt, dass eine Präsenzverhandlung einer Videokonferenz grundsätzlich immer überlegen sei, sondern beschränkte sich auf die im Februar 2021 vorgefundene Situation. Die Kammer betonte jedoch auch, dass es auch zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt noch Situationen geben könne, bei denen eine Videoverhandlung nicht als gleichwertig zu einer Präsenzverhandlung angesehen werden kann.

Art. 15a VOBK 2020 regle nunmehr auch Situationen ohne Notlage, die bewusst von der Großen Beschwerdekammer in G 1/21 ausgespart worden seien. Art. 15a VOBK 2020 habe das Ermessen der Kammern aus G 1/21 kodifiziert und verlange, dass eine Videokonferenz zumindest "zweckmäßig" sein muss, was letztlich als Synonym zu "sie ist geeignet" und "es gibt gute Gründe dafür" im Sinne der G 1/21 anzusehen sei. Bei der Ermittlung der "Eignung" und der "guten Gründe" obliege es den Parteien, Gründe für oder gegen eine mündliche Verhandlung, die ihrer Sphäre entstammen der Kammer zur Kenntnis zu bringen. Dies sei keine unzulässige Beweislastumkehr, sondern logisch zwingende Voraussetzung für eine nach Möglichkeit alle Gründe umfassende Entscheidung zur Form der Verhandlung.

071-07-23

## Article 116 EPC | T 1171/20 | Board 3.5.06

### Article 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1171/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 113(1), 116 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 15(4), 15a RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 6 ECHR
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – in-person oral proceedings (yes) – G 1/21 applicable only to general emergency situations (no) – board’s discretion to hold in-person oral proceedings without a party’s consent (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/93, G 0003/08, G 0001/21, T 2432/19, T 0618/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1171/20](#) fand die mündliche Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer im Mai 2023 entgegen dem ohne Begründung vorgetragenen Antrag des Einsprechenden (Beschwerdeführer) in Präsenz statt.

Die Kammer wies darauf hin, dass Art. 15a VOBK 2020 der Kammer ein Ermessen einräumt, die mündliche Verhandlung als Videokonferenz durchzuführen, wenn sie dies für zweckmäßig erachtet. Dabei lasse die Vorschrift offen, wie Zweckmäßigkeit zu bewerten und wie das Ermessen der Kammer auszuüben ist. Bei Ausübung dieses Ermessens lasse sich die Kammer von den Grundsätzen eines fairen Verfahrens leiten (Art. 6 EMRK), insbesondere denen der fairen Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung (Art. 15 (4) VOBK 2020), des rechtlichen Gehörs (Art. 113 (1) EPÜ) und der Öffentlichkeit der mündlichen Verhandlung (Art. 116 (4) EPÜ). Bei der Abwägung, ob die Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung als Videokonferenz zweckmäßig ist, berücksichtige die Kammer alle relevanten Aspekte, so z.B. die Frage, ob sich der Fall – insbesondere unter Berücksichtigung seiner Komplexität oder einer gegebenenfalls erforderlichen Verdolmetschung – für diese Art der Durchführung eignet.

Die Kammer betonte ferner, dass die Große Beschwerdekammer in ihrer Begründung in G 1/21 über den Umstand der allgemeinen Notlage hinausgegangen sei und festgestellt habe, dass eine mündliche Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz eine mündliche Verhandlung im Sinne des Art. 116 EPÜ sei und nicht grundsätzlich gegen das

rechtliche Gehör nach Art. 113 (1) EPÜ oder das Recht auf ein faires Verfahren verstoße. Darüber hinaus habe sie in G 1/21 die Frage diskutiert, ob eine Videokonferenz als gleichwertig ("equivalent") mit einer Präsenzveranstaltung zu gelten hätte, und ob sie ein "geeignetes" Format zur Durchführung von mündlichen Verhandlungen sei. Der Kammer zufolge mag man diese Ausführungen in G 1/21 angesichts der rechtlich höherrangigen, und möglicherweise rechtlich allein entscheidenden, Feststellungen zu Art. 113 und 116 EPÜ und dem Recht auf ein faires Verfahren als "obiter dicta" ansehen. Allerdings hätten auch solche Überlegungen Gewicht (vgl. G 3/08 mit Verweis auf G 3/93).

Die Kammer war auch nicht der Meinung, dass, wie in T 618/21 vertreten, Art. 15a VOBK 2020 "als Nachfolgeregelung von G 1/21 angesehen werden muss". Die Kammer konnte daher nicht erkennen, dass die weite Formulierung des Art. 15a VOBK 2020 alleine die Ausführungen der Großen Beschwerdekammer in G 1/21 einschränken könnte (vgl. dazu auch T 2432/19).

Nach Ansicht der Kammer befand die Große Beschwerdekammer in G 1/21 im Ergebnis, dass mündliche Verhandlungen per Videokonferenz und in Präsenz – jedenfalls noch, aber unabhängig von einer allgemeinen Notlage – nicht gleichwertig seien und bezeichnete die Präsenzverhandlung als optimales Format (vgl. T 2432/19). Es sei auch das Format, an das der Gesetzgeber gedacht habe, als er Art. 116 EPÜ entwarf. Daher sollten Anhörungen in Präsenz die Standardoption sein (s. G 1/21, Nr. 45 der Gründe). Die Große Beschwerdekammer leitete daraus insbesondere ab, dass der Antrag eines Beteiligten auf mündliche Verhandlung in Präsenz nur unter besonderen Umständen abgelehnt werden könne. Die Kammer stimmte der Entscheidung T 2432/19 darin zu, dass die Umstände, deretwegen eine mündliche Verhandlung in Präsenz vorzuziehen sein mag, auch der Kammer selbst zur Verfügung stehen, wenn sie ihr Ermessen unter Art. 15a (1) VOBK 2020 ausübt. Die Kammer könne somit grundsätzlich auch aus eigenem Ermessen und gegen den Willen der Parteien entscheiden, eine mündliche Verhandlung in Präsenz durchzuführen (vgl. T 2432/19).

Der Kammer zufolge war im vorliegenden Fall angesichts der Vielzahl von Anträgen und teilweise technisch schwierigen Einwänden und Auslegungsfragen mit einer ausgedehnten mündlichen Verhandlung zu rechnen. Für die Kammer sprach allein dieser Umstand schon gegen eine mündliche Verhandlung als Videokonferenz, die nach Einschätzung der Kammer ungleich anstrengender sei als eine Präsenzveranstaltung (vgl. auch T 2432/19). Darüber hinaus hatte der Einsprechende den Wunsch, die mündliche Verhandlung als Videokonferenz durchzuführen, weder begründet, noch die Mitteilung der Kammer bzgl. der Aufrechterhaltung der mündlichen Verhandlung in Präsenz in der Sache kommentiert.

111-10-23

## Article 116(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>J 0006/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.1.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 116(1), 125 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 136(1) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 6(1) ECHR, Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – no "absolute" right to oral proceedings – "Eventualmaxime" principle – "principe de concentration des moyens" – interpretation of the EPC – dynamic interpretation of Article 116(1) EPC – legal certainty in due time
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/97, G 0003/97, G 0003/98, G 0002/12, G 0002/13, G 0002/19, G 0003/19, J 0019/05, J 0011/09, T 1573/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.2.1.</a> , <a href="#">III.C.4.3.3.</a> , <a href="#">III.H.1.2.5.</a> , <a href="#">III.H.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [J 6/22](#) the Legal Board handed down its decision that the request for re-establishment and the appeal be rejected as inadmissible without the oral proceedings requested by the appellant. In its decision, the Legal Board recalled R. 136(1) EPC corresponding to the principle of "Eventualmaxime", under which the request must state all grounds for re-establishment and means of evidence without the possibility of submitting these at a later stage. Only if this requirement is complied with may it be permissible to complement the facts and evidence in later submissions, provided that they do not extend beyond the framework of the previous submissions (see e.g. J 19/05). According to the Legal Board, this was not the case for either of the requests for re-establishment in the proceedings at hand. Thus, no further procedural steps were permissible, notably no further communication and no appointment of oral proceedings. Neither would serve any legitimate purpose.

The Legal Board noted that it was not the purpose of oral proceedings in the context of proceedings for re-establishment to give the appellant a (further) chance to substantiate their factual assertions or to provide evidence despite the absence of factual assertions (see e.g. J 11/09). It was undisputed that the right to oral proceedings as guaranteed by



Art. 116(1) EPC was a cornerstone of proceedings before the EPO. The jurisprudence of the boards generally followed the assumption of an "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon request. However, even this "absolute" right to oral proceedings upon a party's request was subject to inherent restrictions by the EPC and procedural principles generally recognised in the contracting states of the EPO (Art. 125 EPC). Such limits had also been recognised in the jurisprudence of the boards (see e.g. G 2/19, T 1573/20). The jurisprudence of the boards had repeatedly underlined that the requirement of legal certainty in due time was recognised as a fundamental principle enshrined in the EPC (e.g. G 1/97, G 3/97). This principle had also been reflected in the RPBA 2020. If oral proceedings did not serve any legitimate purpose, as in the case at hand, the requirement of legal certainty in due time would trump and even prevent a board from appointing oral proceedings.

As to the interpretation of Art. 116(1) EPC, the Legal Board cited Art. 31(1) Vienna Convention, which provides that the starting point for the interpretation of the terms used in a treaty provision is their ordinary meaning in their context in light of the provision's object and purpose. However, the jurisprudence of the boards had also reiterated the importance of a "dynamic" interpretation of the EPC in light of its object and purpose (G 2/12, G 2/13, G 3/19, G 3/98). In this context, the Legal Board referred, among others, to the development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Art. 6(1) ECHR. The ECtHR had also identified occasions where oral proceedings could or even should be dispensed with in pursuit of a party's right to a fair trial.

In the Legal Board's view, a literal interpretation of Art. 116(1) EPC conflicted with the legislature's aims when oral proceedings would serve no purpose and thus only prolong proceedings to no one's avail. A narrow interpretation of Art. 116(1) EPC therefore had to make way for a dynamic and evolutive understanding instead, in light of the provision's object and purpose. The very purpose of Art. 116(1) EPC could be seen as providing for the essential right to be heard in oral proceedings only insofar as these served a legitimate purpose and thus did not run counter to the requirement of legal certainty in due time as a further essential element of a fair trial for all parties. In a case like the current one, legal certainty in due time, just as procedural economy, as a further essential cornerstone of a fair trial, had to prevail.

144-12-23

## Article 116(1) EPC | T 2024/21 | Board 3.2.06

### Article 116(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2024/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.10.30
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 084, 113, 116(1), 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 103(1)(a), 137(3) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 11 RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – request for oral proceedings – substantial procedural violation (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0006/22, T 0283/88, T 0668/89
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.B.2.2.2</a> , <a href="#">III.B.2.6.</a> , <a href="#">III.C.2.1.</a> , <a href="#">III.C.4.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2024/21](#) the appellant submitted that it had been deprived of its right to oral proceedings during the examination procedure.

The board recalled that according to established case law the right to an oral hearing was an extremely important procedural right which the EPO should take all reasonable steps to safeguard (e.g. T 668/89). This provision was mandatory and left no room for discretion (e.g. T 283/88), i.e. parties had an absolute right to oral proceedings. Considerations such as the speedy conduct of the proceedings, equity or procedural economy could not take precedence over this right.

The board noted in passing that a discussion of the recent decision J 6/22 did not appear necessary in the context of the present case, as this decision endorsed a restrictive interpretation of the right to oral proceedings for very specific procedural circumstances. However, a dynamic interpretation restricting explicitly regulated procedural rights of the parties did not seem to be considered in J 6/22 for the central area of the European grant procedure.

The board was of the view that the reasoning contained in the contested examining division's decision (by reference to the communication of 25 January 2021) was thus based on a manifestly incorrect understanding of the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in the EPC. None of the following were reasons not to comply with the appellant's repeatedly expressed wish to hold oral proceedings: (i) the fact that oral proceedings caused costs, (ii) the reminder in the contested decision of the applicant's duty to submit an EPC-compliant version of the application documents, or (iii) the



repeated indication in the examination division's communications that amendments would not be admitted to the proceedings or had not been admitted under R. 137(3) EPC, so that no version of the application documents approved by the applicant would exist in the proceedings.

In the present case the appellant had requested oral proceedings for the first time in its reply to the European Search Opinion. This request had been later on repeated in particular for the discussion of the objections under Art. 84 and 123(2) EPC. However, instead of summoning to oral proceedings, the examining division had elaborated on the objections under Art. 84 and 123(2) EPC. According to the board, the examining division's approach of informing the applicant at that stage of the proceedings that it had denied approval of the amended documents of the patent application under R. 137(3) EPC and that there had therefore been no valid text to which the applicant had given its consent under Art. 113(2) EPC constituted a substantial procedural violation. Due to its valid request for oral proceedings the appellant had had the right to be heard in oral proceedings at least on the topic of admittance of the amended application documents under R. 137(3) EPC. Since the examining division had based its non-admittance of the amended application documents on the failure to overcome objections raised under Art. 84 and 123(2) EPC, the appellant would thus also have had to be heard at the oral proceedings on the question of whether these objections had been overcome.

The board stated that it was evident from the further course of the proceedings that this procedural deficiency had adversely affected the entire further proceedings. The board concluded that the examining division's continual refusal to appoint oral proceedings and indeed its explanation for not doing so, had made it evident that the appellant had been left with no realistic possibility to have its request for oral proceedings met. Thus, maintenance of the request for oral proceedings had clearly been rendered futile. The board thus considered that withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings under these particular circumstances had not therefore absolved the examining division from its duty to hold the originally requested oral proceedings. In view of the overall course of the examination proceedings it was to be noted that although the appellant had ultimately withdrawn its request for oral proceedings and requested a decision on the state of the file, it had been deprived of its right to be heard in oral proceedings as enshrined in Art. 113(1) and 116(1) EPC.

Due to this substantial procedural violation, the contested decision had to be set aside, the appeal fee reimbursed (R. 103(1)(a) EPC) and the case remitted to the examining division for further prosecution (Art. 11 RPBA 2020).

167-14-23

## Article 116(1) EPC | T 0245/19 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 116(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0245/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.09.27
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 113(1), 116(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(8), 15(3) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – request for oral proceedings – non-attendance of party – decision issued in written proceedings (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21, J 0011/87, J 0011/94, J 0027/94, J 0019/03, T 0003/90, T 0696/02, T 1027/03
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.4.3.1</a> , <a href="#">III.C.4.3.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 245/19](#) both appellants had requested oral proceedings in the event the board had not granted their main request. In the board's preliminary opinion communicated to the parties pursuant to Art. 15(1) RPBA 2020, the board expressed its intention to allow the appellants' main request. Later on, both appellants and the respondent announced they would not be attending the oral proceedings, with the appellants explicitly maintaining their request for oral proceedings.

The board held that in such a situation, it was not necessary for oral proceedings to be held in order to hear the respondent. According to the board, the reasons for this were as follows.

In several decisions of the boards of appeal (e.g. T 3/90, T 696/02, T 1027/03), it had been held that an announcement that a party would not be participating in oral proceedings was equivalent to the withdrawal of that party's request for oral proceedings and that as a consequence there had been no need for oral proceedings to be held.

The present board had doubts as to whether a declaration of non-attendance could in fact be construed as a withdrawal of a party's request for oral proceedings, with all legal implications, including that the party was bound thereby. The board referred to J 11/94 in which it had been stated that any procedural declaration must be unambiguous, particularly declarations terminating the proceedings because of the consequences thereof. In the board's view, this also applied to declarations of withdrawal of the

request for oral proceedings. Furthermore, in J 19/03, citing decisions J 11/87 and J 27/94, it had been held that a party was normally bound by its procedural acts provided the procedural statement was clear and unconditional.

The board was of the opinion that a party's announcement that it would not be appearing at the hearing did not necessarily entail the withdrawal of a previously made request to present their arguments orally. Notwithstanding this, it was not mandatory for oral proceedings to be held in these circumstances. The announcement of a party that it would not be appearing at the hearing resulted in its request for oral proceedings becoming ineffective, irrespective of a declaration that the request for oral proceedings was explicitly maintained.

According to the board, the right to oral proceedings enshrined in Art. 116(1) EPC must be seen in the context of the right to be heard under Art. 113(1) EPC (see G 1/21). It was therefore a right to be heard in oral proceedings. The right to oral proceedings could not be understood as the right to have the board hold oral proceedings with the other parties to the proceedings. Such an understanding, which separated the right to oral proceedings from the right to be heard at oral proceedings, had no basis in the EPC as interpreted by the boards of appeal.

The board found that once a party's request for oral proceedings became ineffective, the board may dispense with oral proceedings if no other reason made it necessary or desirable to hold them. In the present case, there was no such reason, because the board had decided to allow the appellants' main request, i.e. to maintain the patent as granted, and also because all parties had announced they would not be attending the oral proceedings. The board concluded that the case was ready for decision on the basis of the parties' written submissions, which had been fully taken into account by the board (Art. 12(8) and Art. 15(3) RPBA 2020). Therefore, the board decided not to hold oral proceedings and to issue the decision in writing.

179-15-23

## Article 117 EPC | T 1117/16 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 117 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1117/16</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.22
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 104(1), 117(1)(d), 117(2), EPC; Articles 125, 131(2) EPC 1973
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 120, 122, 150 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	evidence – hearing witness before a national court – requested by opponent – first instance’s discretion – witness not compelled to testify – deposit of an advance payment – substantial procedural violation (no) – apportionment of costs
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 10/07
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.G.2.4.1e</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 13\(1\) RPBA 2020.](#)

In [T 1117/16](#) hatten die Zeugen des vormaligen Einsprechenden 2 während des Einspruchsverfahren auf die zweite Zeugenladung hin erklärt, nicht (mehr) zu einer Aussage bereit zu sein. Der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechende 1) machte geltend, dass die Einspruchsabteilung einen schweren Verfahrensfehler begangen habe, indem sie entschied, die nunmehr vom Einsprechenden 1 (späterer Beschwerdeführer) als Beweis für die behaupteten offenkundigen Vorbenutzungen oV1 und oV2 angebotenen Zeugen nicht vor einem nationalen Gericht vernehmen zu lassen, obwohl diese Vorbenutzungen von ihr als relevant angesehen worden seien und die Zeugen vor dem zuständigen nationalen Gericht kein Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht gehabt hätten.

Die Kammer prüfte, ob ein wesentlicher Verfahrensfehler im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren vorlag. Dazu erläuterte sie, dass sich aus dem Wortlaut der R. 120 (1) Satz 2 EPÜ keine gesetzliche Verpflichtung für das EPA ergebe, das zuständige Gericht im Wohnsitzstaat eines Zeugen in Anwendung von Art. 131 (2) EPÜ 1973 zu ersuchen, diesen Zeugen zu vernehmen, sondern dass dies ausweislich des Wortlauts dieser Vorschrift im Ermessen des EPA liegt. Damit stehe den Organen der ersten Instanz im Grundsatz ein Beurteilungsspielraum im Einzelfall zu, der nach der Rechtsprechung nur sehr begrenzt der gerichtlichen Überprüfung zugänglich sei.

Die Kammer befand, dass die Einspruchsabteilung ihre Ermessensentscheidung ausreichend begründet hatte. Darüber hinaus sei keine der beiden in R. 120 (1) EPÜ genannten Voraussetzungen im vorliegenden Fall erfüllt gewesen, da keiner der geladenen Zeugen einen entsprechenden Antrag gestellt habe und alle Zeugen innerhalb der in der Zeugenladung gesetzten Frist reagiert hätten. Nach Auffassung der Kammer war daher die R. 120 (1) EPÜ im vorliegenden Fall nicht anwendbar. Der Beschwerdeführer argumentierte, dass R. 120 (1) EPÜ nicht so ausgelegt werden könne, dass Zeugen von einem nationalen Gericht zu vernehmen wären, wenn sie sich innerhalb der in der Ladung festgesetzten Frist nicht geäußert hätten, nicht aber, wenn sie sich weigerten, als Zeugen in einem Verfahren vor dem EPA auszusagen. Nach Auffassung der Kammer hingegen kann nach den Vorschriften des EPÜ niemand in den Verfahren vor dem Europäischen Patentamt zu einer Zeugenaussage gezwungen werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund sah die Kammer keinen Grund, R. 120 (1) EPÜ auf den vorliegenden Fall anzuwenden. Selbst wenn man der Ansicht wäre, dass R. 120 (1) EPÜ auch in diesem Fall entsprechend anwendbar wäre, so bestand auch insoweit keine grundsätzliche Verpflichtung seitens des Europäischen Patentamts, von dieser Möglichkeit Gebrauch zu machen. Die Frage, ob sich Zeugen auf ein nach Art. 125 EPÜ zu berücksichtigendes Aussage- oder Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht berufen könnten, stelle sich daher nicht. Die Erklärung der vom Beschwerdeführer angebotenen Zeugen, keine Aussage machen zu wollen, hätte laut der Kammer bei der Beweiswürdigung eine Rolle spielen können, nicht aber für die Frage, ob diese Zeugen vor dem jeweils zuständigen nationalen Gericht hätten vernommen werden müssen.

Nach Ansicht der Kammer ist bei der Frage einer Zeugenvernehmung vor dem zuständigen nationalen Gericht von Bedeutung, ob für diese Zeugenvernehmung ein Kostenvorschuss entrichtet wurde bzw. ob die betreffenden Zeugen eine Kostenverzichtserklärung abgegeben haben. Die Einspruchsabteilung hatte in ihrem zweiten Beweisbeschluss die Beweisaufnahme gemäß R. 122 (1) EPÜ von der Zahlung von Kostenvorschüssen bzw. der Einreichung von Kostenverzichts-erklärungen bezüglich der zweiten Zeugenladung abhängig gemacht. Die Zeugen hatten aber auf die zweite Zeugenladung hin ausdrücklich erklärt, dass sie nicht auf eine Kostenerstattung und/oder Kostenvorschüsse verzichten würden, und der Beschwerdeführer war der Aufforderung einer Kostenvorschusszahlung ausdrücklich nicht nachgekommen. Daher hatte die Einspruchsabteilung nach dem EPÜ keine Verpflichtung, den Beschwerdeführer nochmals zu einer Zahlung von Kostenvorschüssen für den Fall einer Zeugenvernehmung vor dem zuständigen nationalen Gericht aufzufordern. Die Kammer hob diesbezüglich hervor, dass die Kostenverzichtserklärungen, die die Zeugen für die im Rahmen der ersten mündlichen Verhandlung terminierte Beweisaufnahme abgegeben hatten, für die im Rahmen der zweiten mündlichen Verhandlung terminierte Beweisaufnahme zu recht nicht berücksichtigt wurden. Zum Schluss konnte die Kammer nicht erkennen, worin genau der gerügte "schwere Verfahrensfehler" zu sehen sei, zumal die Ablehnung des vom Beschwerdeführer gestellten Antrags auf Vernehmung vor einem nationalen Gericht hinreichend begründet worden war.

Die Kammer war der Ansicht, dass die Anordnung einer anderen Kostenverteilung gemäß Art. 104 (1) EPÜ zugunsten des Beschwerdegegners nicht der Billigkeit entsprach und hob daher die Entscheidung über eine anderweitige Kostenverteilung auf.

035-04-23

## Article 117 EPC | T 1708/18 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 117 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1708/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.02.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 117 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	law of evidence – standard of proof – standard of disclosure for assessing novelty – distinction
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0943/93, T 0464/94, T 0189/01, T 2101/09
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.G.4.3.1</a> , <a href="#">I.C.4.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1708/18](#) the argument of the patent proprietor (appellant I) in relation to novelty was that the correct standard for the assessment of novelty was "beyond reasonable doubt", i.e. it had to be beyond doubt, and not merely probable, that the claimed subject-matter was directly and unambiguously derivable from the prior art. The opponents' two-step assessment of novelty was not backed up by case law. The opponents submitted in that respect that novelty was a matter of two questions. An assessment had to be made both as to what matter was known in the art and how the properties of the known matter compared with the claimed subject-matter.

The opposition division had considered that the subject-matter of claim 5 was novel over the disclosure of each of the documents cited by the opponents, including D3, irrespective of the interpretation of the expression "binds specifically to". According to the opposition division, the opponents "did not show beyond doubt that one of the antibodies disclosed in documents D3, D5, D6, ... or D35 is able to bind the antigen ...". At least the commercially available antibodies could have been tested experimentally to demonstrate a specific binding.

The board disagreed with this assessment. The question of whether or not a given known antibody bound to a particular polypeptide was a question of fact. It was correct that the inherent binding property of the antibody concerned must be demonstrated by the party making the allegation, i.e., in the case at hand, the burden to prove that the antibody disclosed in document D3 bound to the PCSK9b and/or PCSK9c polypeptides laid with the opponents; however, the standard of proof generally applied at the EPO for deciding on an issue of fact was the balance of probabilities. The board under point 2 of its Catchword wrote that: "The standard of proof generally applied at the EPO for

deciding on an issue of fact is the balance of probabilities. According to this standard, the EPO must base its decisions on statements of fact which, based on the available evidence, are more likely than not to be true. This standard also applies when examining factual issues in the context of novelty."

The board was not persuaded by the arguments of the opposition division and the patent proprietor that, by way of exception, a higher standard must apply in the present case. In its reasoning, the opposition division appeared to mix up two issues which were distinct and unrelated. Indeed, under point 1 of its Catchword the board stated that: "the issue of which standard of disclosure applies when assessing the legal question of novelty and the issue of which standard of proof applies when assessing evidence and factual questions are distinct and unrelated. The fact that the standard of disclosure required for a finding of lack of novelty (or for allowing an amendment to the application under Article 123(2) EPC) is the standard of a direct and unambiguous disclosure is immaterial for the question of what standard of proof applies when considering evidence and factual issues in the context of novelty (or inventive step)."

The factual question to be decided upon in the present case was whether it was more likely than not that a known PCSK9 antibody would bind specifically to the PCSK9b and/or the PCSK9c polypeptide. In assessing this question, any evidence submitted by the parties was considered by the board and such evidence did not necessarily have to be in the form of "wet lab" experiments, as argued by the patent proprietor.

The board concluded that, based on the applicable standard of proof, the polyclonal antibody disclosed in document D3 also specifically bound to the PCSK9b and PCSK9c polypeptides comprising the same peptide.

The subject-matter of claim 5 in each of the claim requests on file therefore lacked novelty over the polyclonal antibodies disclosed in document D3.

036-04-23



## Article 117 EPC | T 0042/19 | Board 3.2.01

## Article 117 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0042/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.19
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 117 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	evidence – evaluation of evidence by the department of first instance – review
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0007/93, T 1418/17, T 1604/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.G.4.2.2b</a> , 10th edition

In [T 42/19](#) the board summarised in its catchword the extent to which the board's power extended to reviewing the first instance decision in respect of the evaluation of evidence:

“1. A board's power to review appealed decisions is not limited to points of law but extends to points of facts (in agreement with T 1604/16).

2. However, it is settled case law that a board is not obliged to take all the evidence anew and that parties do not have the right to have the taking of evidence repeated at their request before the board.

3. The principle of free evaluation of evidence, meaning that there are no firm rules on the probative value of the various types of evidence but that the deciding body is entrusted with weighing up all the evidence and basing its decision on what it is then satisfied has been established, implies a degree of freedom comparable to the one referred to by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in decision G 7/93, Reasons 2.6.

4. Thus, it is wise to similarly respect this freedom, especially when taking into account that a board, except when only reviewing documentary evidence, does not have the same first-hand impression of the probative value of a means of evidence as a department of first instance that has itself heard a witness or expert or inspected an object.

5. Although the board is not limited in its decision, it normally seems useful to apply the test set out in decision T 1418/17, Reasons 1.3: Unless the law has been misapplied (e.g. application of the wrong standard of proof), a board of appeal should overrule a department of first instance's evaluation of evidence and replace it with its own only if it is apparent from that department's evaluation that it: (i) disregarded essential points, (ii)



also considered irrelevant matters or (iii) violated the laws of thought, for instance in the form of logical errors and contradictions in its reasoning.

6. The evaluation of evidence only refers to establishing whether an alleged fact has been proven to the satisfaction of the deciding body. The discretion-like freedom is restricted to this question and does not extend to the further question of how the established facts are to be interpreted and what the legal consequences are (see Reasons 3.2 to 3.6)."

In the case at issue, the appellant (opponent) requested a reversal of the opposition division's decision that an alleged public prior use of an insulin injection device marked named GensuPen had not been sufficiently proven.

The board recalled in its reasons the principles which can be found in the catchword above and also stated that the boards usually just reviewed the way in which the evidence was taken by the departments of first instance and, where they did not find any deficiencies, applied the law on the basis of the facts found in the decisions. A board, being a deciding body as well, was also entrusted with the weighing of evidence under the principle of free evaluation of evidence. As a consequence, it could not be excluded that a board might come to a different conclusion than the body that issued the impugned decision. But being under the obligation to give reasons for its decision, the board had to be able to convincingly demonstrate where the competent division had erred. In this respect the test set out in T 1418/17 gives valuable guidance. In the present case none of the circumstances which would justify a review could be identified in the first instance's reasoning. Notably, the balance of probabilities was the correct standard of proof. And concerning the witness Ms S., relevant information was completely missing (for example, in what capacity she had accessed the consultation room of the medical centre, the precise circumstances under which she had obtained the GensuPen, whether she was a member of the public, why she wrote on the same day a declaration that was used six years later), casting a shadow on the plausibility of her statement, and justified to the opposition division that the public prior use, even under the lower standard of proof of the balance of probabilities, was not sufficiently proven because the circumstances were not fully and clearly specified. This lack of factual basis did not substantially change with the new submissions in appeal proceedings. And without this fundamental information, it was irrelevant whether the burden of proof rested on the respondent (proprietor) that certain persons like hospital personal or patients in a study were bound by a confidentiality agreement. The board did not see any reason to overrule the decision concerning the alleged prior use of GensuPen and therefore confirmed the opposition division's conclusion.

In exercise of the discretion provided by Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007, the board further decided to disregard the appellant's request to hear another witness submitted at the appeal stage to fill the gaps identified by the opposition division, since doubts and objections in this respect were already raised by the proprietor (respondent) during the written opposition proceedings.

072-07-23

## Article 117 EPC | T 0423/22 | Board 3.2.01

### Article 117 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0423/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.24
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 112(1), 113(1), 117(1)(d), 117(2), EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 117, 118, 119(1), 119(3), EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 21 RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	evidence – taking of evidence – hearing witness by videoconference before first instance – legal basis – right to be heard – possibilities of interaction with the witness not significantly limited – credibility of a witness – body language – witness employee located in the opponent's office
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21, T 1418/17, T 0042/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.B.2.6.4</a> , <a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , <a href="#">III.G.3.1.7</a> , <a href="#">V.B.2.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 423/22](#) the opposition division had heard witness M by videoconference without the consent of the appellant (patent proprietor).

The board considered that Art. 117(1)(d) and R. 117 EPC provided a legal basis for hearing a witness by videoconference. The board furthermore emphasised that hearing the witness by videoconference in the case in hand had not infringed the appellant's right to be heard and it had not substantially limited the interaction between the opposition division, the parties and the witness compared to hearing a witness in the courtroom.

As to the appellant's argument that it had not been able to observe the witness's body language during their hearing, and therefore it had been deprived of the opportunity to objectively judge their credibility, the board noted the following:

Firstly, it was the deciding body's responsibility, not the parties', to judge the personal credibility of a witness and the plausibility of a witness's statement. It was up to the relevant department to decide which possible way to hear a witness.

Secondly, the credibility of a witness was not determined largely by their body language. On the contrary, the credibility of a witness depended primarily on the plausibility and

conclusiveness of their testimony and the absence of contradictions, in particular contradictions within the witness's own testimony, but also contradictions between the testimonies of several witnesses and/or contradictions between the witness's testimony and the evidence on file (see also Catchword).

Thirdly, most of the body language relevant for determining secondary information such as whether a witness was nervous could be perceived in the camera-section visible to the other participants of the videoconference anyway. According to the board the appellant did not give any reason related to the present case as to why the body language not visible during the videoconference could have influenced the opposition division's decision such that it would have come to a different conclusion on the witness's credibility. And even if part of the body language could not be seen, this drawback could never affect a party's right to be present and to put questions to the witness (R. 119(3) EPC) to such an extent that its right to be heard, i.e. the "opportunity to present comments on grounds or evidence" (Art. 113(1) EPC), would be violated.

The board further pointed out that its considerations with regard to hearing a witness by videoconference did not contradict decision G 1/21. Furthermore, under the current technical possibilities it could not be assumed that the EBA would have considered there to be a general obstacle against holding a witness hearing via videoconference. Whether G 1/21 required a general emergency in order to hear a witness by videoconference did not have to be addressed since G 1/21 did not concern oral proceedings in opposition proceedings nor taking of evidence, but instead was limited to oral proceedings in appeal proceedings.

Finally the board examined the question of whether the opposition division had made an error of judgment when deciding to hold the witness hearing by videoconference. According to the legal framework applied in first instance, the opposition division may deviate from the standard of holding oral proceedings by videoconference if there are serious reasons against it. The board held that neither the "importance" of the prior use nor the fact that the outcome of the case hinged on the question of whether this prior use was public could constitute such "serious reason". The appellant had further alleged at the appeal stage that the witness being an employee of the opponent and being located in the opponent's office during their hearing constituted a special reason. However, this had not been raised during the opposition proceedings. Furthermore the minutes of the taking of evidence showed that the opposition division had made sure that the witness was sitting alone in the room. The mere fact that the witness was an employee of the opponent did not necessarily cast doubts on the witness's reliability that were serious enough for a hearing by videoconference to be ruled out. Regarding the review of the evaluation of evidence by the first instance, the board adhered to T 1418/17 and T 42/19.

The referral of a question of law to the Enlarged Board was not considered necessary in view of the requirements of Art. 112(1)(a) EPC and Art. 21 RPBA 2020.

101-09-23

# Article 117 EPC | T 1138/20 | Board 3.5.03

## Article 117 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1138/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.25
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 54(2), 111(1), 114(1), 117 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 6(1) ECHR, Articles 32, 41.4 TRIPS
<b>Keywords</b>	law of evidence – standard of proof – only one standard of proof – conviction of the deciding body – reviewing errors in the fact-finding process
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/91, G 0010/91, G 0007/93, G 0003/97, G 0002/21, T 0545/08, T 0660/16, T 1604/16, T 1418/17, T 1634/17, T 0042/19, T 0768/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.G.4.3</a> , <a href="#">III.G.4.3.2</a> , <a href="#">III.G.4.2.2b</a> ), <a href="#">III.G.5.1.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.3.4.1</a> , <a href="#">VII.1.2.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1138/20](#), the main question was whether the opposition division had correctly found that NPL1 was made available to the public. The appellant (patent proprietor) challenged the opposition division's findings of fact that NPL1 was the presentation that had been delivered to the European Space Agency (ESA) and then published on its website. On whether NPL1 was indeed prior art within the meaning of Art. 54(2) EPC, the appellant and the opposition division were of the opinion that the facts had to be proven "beyond reasonable doubt"; the appellant had no involvement in the alleged events.

The board noted that, for the issue concerning whether evidence demonstrates the prior art's availability to the public, sometimes the standard of "balance of probabilities" and sometimes the standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" or "up to the hilt" is applied in the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal. The present board considered that making a distinction between the above-mentioned standards was neither necessary nor mandated by case law (in line with T 545/08, T 768/20, T 660/16, T 1634/17). If only the opponent had access to the relevant evidence, this fact had to be given due consideration in the deciding body's assessment as to what weight and importance are to be attached to such evidence. This was not the same as to say that a different standard of proof should apply. Therefore, the board considered that there is only one standard of proof in the proceedings before the EPO: the deciding body, taking into

account the circumstances of the case and the relevant evidence before it, must be convinced that the alleged fact has occurred.

The evaluation of evidence was the genuine task of the trier of fact, that is, the deciding body that establishes the facts of a case; in the context of the EPC, the departments of first instance and the boards of appeal. Evidence is to be assessed in accordance with the principle of the free evaluation of evidence. Whether or not a fact can be regarded as proven has to be assessed on the basis of all the relevant evidence on file. The deciding body that establishes the facts of the case has to weigh all relevant evidence before it. In this regard, the first instance is the first deciding body competent to undertake this task. Depth and detail of such finding varied and in particular depended on whether or not certain facts were disputed. As with any other findings of a deciding body, a finding of fact must be reasoned (see e.g. G 2/21, point 31 of the Reasons). This was particularly important if there was contradictory evidence on file. Then, the process of weighing the different pieces of evidence must be properly reflected in the reasoning of the final decision. Concerning their competence the boards have the power, at any stage of the appeal proceedings, to establish the relevant facts of the case before them and thereby substitute the findings of fact of the departments of first instance. However, the boards have no obligation to establish facts *de novo* already established by the departments of first instance. The review of findings of fact had simply nothing to do with the review of discretionary decisions. Discretionary decisions could only be reviewed for a particular type of errors (cf. G 7/93, point 2.6 of the Reasons), while a review of findings of fact had no such limitation.

The board also said that the burden is on the party challenging a fact on appeal to demonstrate that the first-instance department erred in its finding of fact. For demonstrating an error in the fact-finding process, it will generally not be sufficient to argue on appeal that the evidence on file would have allowed a different conclusion and that this conclusion was equally likely, plausible or reasonable. Rather, in order to show an error, the party must demonstrate that no body competent to establish the facts and acting in a reasonable way could have come to this conclusion. In such a situation, the contesting party may successfully allege on appeal that the first-instance department did not fulfil its duty of giving reasons for its finding of fact.

The boards may also at any stage of the appeal proceedings decide to establish the facts on their own motion – even if no error was demonstrated by a party. And concerning reviewing errors in the fact-finding process, the boards have full competence to review findings of fact, and reference was made to T 42/19 and T 1604/16 (among others).

The board decided that the appellant had failed to demonstrate an error and it saw no reason to overturn the finding of the opposition division.

112-10-23

# Article 117 EPC | T 1076/21 | Board 3.3.05

## Article 117 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1076/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 100(b), 117 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 076(2)(c), 099(2) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), 12(3), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	law of evidence – apportioning the burden of proof – appeal after revocation of the patent by opposition division – no automatic shift of the burden to the patent proprietor – necessity for the opponent to discharge its burden – benefit of the doubt
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/91, G 0010/91, T 0182/89, T 0019/90, T 0585/92, T 0499/00, T 0072/04, T 1210/05, T 0063/06, T 0066/07, T 2006/08, T 0338/10, T 0518/10, T 1558/11, T 0325/13, T 1608/13, T 0030/15, T 0430/15, T 1596/16, T 2218/16, T 0720/17, T 1911/17, T 0055/18, T 0188/18, T 1487/18, T 0428/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.G.5.1.1</a> , <a href="#">III.G.5.2.1</a> , <a href="#">II.C.9</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1076/21](#), with reference to T 585/92, the respondent (opponent) argued that the appellant (patent proprietor) bore the burden to prove that the patent was sufficiently disclosed because the opposition division had revoked the patent. The appellant contested that the respondent had successfully discharged its initial burden of proof.

The board concluded that the burden of proof regarding the facts, arguments and evidence on the substance (which initially lay with the opponent) did not shift to the proprietor just because the patent had been revoked due to an alleged insufficient disclosure.

The board recalled that only if there are serious doubts, substantiated by verifiable facts, may an application (or a patent) be objected to for insufficient disclosure (T 19/90). After the grant of the patent a legal presumption exists that the patent meets the requirements of the EPC. This presumption can be rebutted. The weight of the submissions required to rebut the presumption depends on its strength (T 63/06, T 55/18). The initial burden on the opponent to provide facts, arguments and evidence for an assertion of an insufficient disclosure may shift to the patent proprietor once the



opponent has successfully discharged its burden of proof by submitting sufficient facts, arguments and evidence to rebut the presumption (T 338/10, T 2218/16). However, this shift can only be caused by sufficient submissions on the substance; formal reasons alone, like the mere existence of the opposition division's decision to revoke the patent, do not lead to a shift of the burden of proof on the substance. If the reasoning in the impugned decision as such is found to be wrong, there cannot be any shift of the "burden of proof on the substance" (T 499/00, T 1608/13).

Linked to the burden of proof is the "burden to substantiate a case". Thus, the opponent first has to provide facts and argue why these facts support its assertion (T 182/89). This burden to substantiate facts and arguments is then followed by the burden to prove these facts, normally done by submitting evidence. Only in the exceptional case of a weak presumption of validity due to a lack of information in the patent may the submission of plausible arguments alone be sufficient (T 63/06, T 1558/11). Often both aspects are together referred to as the burden of proof.

This might have led to the misconception that any decision finding insufficiency would lead to the burden of proof being shifted to the patent proprietor. However, when distinguishing the "burden to substantiate a case" from the "burden of proof on the substance" the board found that it could be clearly deduced from the case law that after a decision by the opposition division allowing an objection of insufficiency, it was down to the patent proprietor to substantiate on appeal why that decision was wrong. The burden of proof on the substance (and in consequence the benefit of the doubt), however, was only shifted when the opposition division's assessment that the presented facts, arguments and evidence were sufficient to discharge the opponent's burden of proof turned out to be correct. The appellant bore the burden to substantiate the appeal. Yet the board noted that an appeal case need not necessarily be substantiated by submitting facts and evidence that counter the arguments and evidence presented by the opponent. It may also be substantiated by submitting why the opposition division's reasoning on insufficiency was flawed and why the burden of proof on the substance still lies with the opponent.

The patent proprietor here substantiated its appeal. The respondent did not submit evidence that the guidance in the patent was insufficient, and also did not show that the alleged unusual parameter was indeed unusual; it did not discharge its burden of proof on the substance. The opposition division could not base its decision on verifiable facts as required. There was no shift of the burden to the patent proprietor. Concerning another aspect, the board concluded that since the parties had made contradictory but unsubstantiated assertions concerning facts, the patent proprietor ought to be given the benefit of the doubt (T 72/04).

134-11-23

## Article 122 EPC | T 2012/20 | Board 3.3.05

### Article 122 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2012/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 122 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 02(1), item 11 RFees
<b>Keywords</b>	re-establishment of rights (yes) – due care on the part of the professional representative
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0012/91
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.E.5.5.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2012/20](#) the appellant's representative had instructed the assistant via email on 13 November 2020 to promptly file an appeal. It was also indicated in the email that filing the appeal well before the expiry of the time limit would allow any possible shortcomings to be addressed, if needed. The appeal was filed on the same day and an appeal fee was paid. The board concluded from the evidence presented that the assistant knew how to file the appeal and how to pay the appeal fee, but, for whatever reason, paid the reduced fee instead of the normal fee.

The board referred to the EPO's Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section on its home page concerning Art. 2(1), item 11 RFees relating to the reduction of the appeal fee. The question "What does the EPO do if a declaration appears to be missing on the date of payment of the reduced fee for appeal?" was answered as follows: "If an appellant pays the reduced amount of the appeal fee without filing the necessary declaration, the EPO will proceed as follows: If the period for paying the appeal fee has not yet expired, a warning letter will be issued to inform the appellant that no declaration has been received by the EPO. If the time limit under Article 108 EPC has not yet expired, the appellant can either pay the missing amount to the full fee or file the missing declaration. Should the appellant omit to pay the missing amount or not file the declaration within the time limit under Article 108 EPC, the appeal may be deemed not to have been filed or the appeal may be considered inadmissible."

This information had already been available when the notice of appeal was filed in the present case. According to the board, it was evident that a representative reading this information would expect to be promptly warned if a deficiency was apparent. In the



case at hand, such a deficiency was readily recognised by the EPO, as could be seen from EPO Form 2901. This form was generated on 17 November 2020 (date at the bottom of the form), but post-dated 24 November 2020 - which is the normal procedure within the EPO (see, for example, G 12/91, point 9.1 of the Reasons) - and sent via registered mail. It was received by the appellant on 9 December 2020. Although registered mail was the official way of communication of the EPO, a representative reading the above response of the EPO to the FAQ would have expected the warning to be forwarded by the fastest possible means, especially if the time limit for paying the appeal fee had not yet expired, but was close to expiry.

In the board's opinion, this was all the more applicable, since at that time the restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic were highly likely to impact the normal functioning of postal services. In particular, the EPO itself used electronic means, namely the Zoom platform, to hold oral proceedings, and it was thus very surprising that appropriate electronic means were not used to warn applicants. In addition, the change in format of oral proceedings before the examining division to videoconference was announced by telephone on 9 July 2020 and this was promptly confirmed via email by the appellant. Registered mail was not used in either case.

The fact that the representative specifically indicated in her email to the assistant that the appeal should be filed some time before expiry of the time limit to allow possible shortcomings to be overcome indicated that the representative probably relied on the information provided by the EPO.

In view of all these factors (COVID-19, information provided in FAQ, electronic means previously used by the EPO, filing of appeal more than two weeks before the deadline), the board considered that in the particular situation of the case at hand there were exceptional circumstances leading to the conclusion that due care had been taken and consequently justifying the re-establishment of rights. Consequently, the appeal was deemed to have been filed.

102-09-23

## Article 122 EPC | T 1482/21 | Board 3.2.02

### Article 122 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1482/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 016, 021(1), 021(2), 087(1), 107, 122 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 010, 052(2), 136(1), 136(4) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	re-establishment of rights (yes) – priority period – competence of the Receiving Section (yes) – grant of re-establishment by Receiving Section final and binding – effects of re-establishment – legitimate expectations – legal certainty – decision by Receiving Section can be reviewed only by the Legal Board
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/11, J 0003/13
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.E.6.1.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Rule 124\(1\) EPC.](#)

In [T 1482/21](#) the appellant (opponent 2) argued that the decision of the Receiving Section granting a request for re-establishment of rights in relation to the priority period was invalid, due to the Receiving Section's lack of competence to take this decision. Moreover, according to the appellant, it had to be possible to assess and review all preconditions for an entitlement to priority in opposition and opposition appeal proceedings, including whether or not the 12-month priority period pursuant to Art. 87(1) EPC had been observed.

Under Art. 16 EPC in conjunction with R. 10 EPC the Receiving Section is responsible for the examination on filing and as to formal requirements of a European patent application up to the time when the examining division becomes responsible for the examination of the same. In the present case search had started on 15 February 2016 and the request for examination was only filed on 20 January 2017. Hence, when the Receiving Section took its decision of 14 January 2016, it was still responsible for the examination on filing and as to formal requirements.

Under R. 136(4) EPC, the department competent to decide on the omitted act shall decide on the request for re-establishment of rights. In the case in hand, the omitted act was the filing of the application within the 12-month priority period pursuant to Art. 87(1) EPC. The Receiving Section was therefore competent to decide on the request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the priority period.

The board found that the Receiving Section's decision of 14 January 2016 granting the request for the re-establishment of rights was final. If the Receiving Section rejects a request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the priority period, an applicant can lodge an appeal against this decision with the Legal Board of Appeal under Art. 21(1) and (2) EPC (see J 3/13). If the Receiving Section grants a request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the priority period, the applicant is not adversely affected under Art. 107 EPC. There is also no other party to the proceedings before the Receiving Section. Thus, a positive decision on such a request becomes final immediately.

The board then went on to assess the binding nature of the Receiving Section's decision. It firstly referred to the effect of granting a request for re-establishment of rights under Art. 122(3) EPC, pursuant to which the legal consequences of the failure to observe the time limit concerned are deemed not to have ensued. The wording of Art. 122(3) EPC did not limit said effect to the proceedings in which the decision to grant that request was taken. Secondly, a decision on re-establishment of rights presupposed that there was a corresponding request to be decided upon. In the case in hand, such a request was only made in the proceedings before the Receiving Section and decided upon only in these proceedings. As under Art. 21(2) EPC the Legal Board is exclusively competent to review decisions of the Receiving Section (G 1/11), neither the opposition division nor the present technical board would have any power to review the Receiving Section's decision on re-establishment of rights. They could also not do so indirectly by reassessing the same matter of their own motion. Thirdly, any subsequent reopening of a favourable decision of the Receiving Section on re-establishment of rights would lead to considerable legal uncertainty for the party whose request was granted. It would also be in conflict with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. The opposition division was correct in saying that it had to acknowledge the Receiving Section's decision to grant the request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the priority period.

Therefore, the Receiving Section's decision was final. Other departments of the EPO such as an opposition division or a technical board of appeal which would decide on questions of priority in other, subsequent proceedings were prevented from reviewing and overturning the Receiving Section's decision granting the request for re-establishment of rights.

113-10-23

## Article 122 EPC | J 0006/22 | Board 3.1.01

### Article 122 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>J 0006/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.1.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 108, 122 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 101(1), 127(2), 136(2) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	re-establishment of rights (no) – time limit for paying renewal fee – time limit for filing statement of grounds – request not duly substantiated – all due care (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0015/10, T 0287/84, T 0742/11
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.E.4.4.</a> , <a href="#">III.E.5.5.1</a> , <a href="#">III.E.5.5.2</a> , 10th edition

In [J 6/22](#) the appellant had requested re-establishment of rights with respect to the time limit for the statement of the grounds of appeal, citing merely the medical condition of its European professional representative. This was complemented by the representative's declaration, essentially outlining that in the period from 27 April 2022 to end of June 2022 the representative began to suffer from a medical condition which continued developing and that said representative was the sole attorney in the office who was empowered to act before the EPO. Sick leave certificates for the representative were also submitted, merely stating the representative's inability to work from 24 August to 28 September 2022, without giving any further details.

The Legal Board recalled that a request for re-establishment must set out, in a sufficiently substantiated fashion, the grounds on which it is based, the facts on which it relies and the precise cause of non-compliance with the time limit concerned, and it must specify when and under which circumstances the cause occurred and when it was removed (see J 15/10). The Legal Board then referred to the jurisprudence of the boards to observe that the reference to a declaration like the representative's might suffice for the request for re-establishment to be properly substantiated if the necessary facts and reasons are given in that declaration (see T 287/84). In the case at hand, no reasons could be found as to why the representative would not have been in a position throughout the whole two-month time limit for the subsequent filing of the grounds of appeal to take any action. No reasons were given on how far-reaching the representative's medical condition was or what actions might have become impossible because of it. The medical certificates also laid out no conclusive details. Moreover,

they covered a period that was completely different (August to September 2022) from the one in question (April to June 2022).

Lastly, nothing was said about a system of staff substitution that should have kicked in in case of the representative's inability to act. If said representative was the only one capable to act before the EPO, provisions would have had to be made to provide for substitution from outside the office. Notably, the office in question was part of a large IP consulting group operating worldwide, and they should have provided a backup. The request for re-establishment being pursued by their colleagues in the sister office at least showed that such a substitution would have been feasible, and no reasons to the contrary were given.

Thus, the Legal Board found on the basis of the appellant's own submissions and factual assertions that it could not be said that all due care had been taken as required by the circumstances. Absent any kind of provisions for the representative's substitution, the request for re-establishment into the time limit for the grounds of appeal had to fail for this reason alone. Since the request for re-establishment of rights was refused, the grounds of appeal were late-filed and the appeal was rejected as inadmissible (R. 101(1) EPC in conjunction with Art. 108 EPC).

The Legal Board went on to observe for the sake of completeness that the appeal against the examining division's decision rejecting the request for re-establishment into the time limit for the payment of the seventh renewal fee plus the additional fee would also not have been successful on the merits. In claiming that all parties had exercised all due care for the payment of the fees in question, the appellant had overlooked that all acts of its "US agent", an intermediary between it and the European professional representatives, tasked "to supervise the procedure and communicate with the agent empowered to act before the EPO", were also fully attributed to it (see T 742/11). No reasons had been given to conclude that the US agent had exercised all due care. To the contrary, from the appellant's own arguments, it was apparent that the US agent, by not monitoring the time limits properly, not proactively reaching out to the appellant, not responding to a large number of emails and not making provisions for staff losses, had not exercised all due care. For these reasons alone, there would also have been no need to look further into the appellant's own or its European professional representatives' behaviour.

145-12-23

## Article 123(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0088/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 054, 087 and 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendments – disclaimers – undisclosed disclaimers – priority – first application – partial priority – multiple priorities
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/98, G 0001/03, G 0002/10, G 0001/15, G 0001/16, T 0248/88, T 1843/09, T 1222/11, T 0282/12, T 0872/14, T 0311/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.1.7.3</a> , <a href="#">II.D.5.3.3</a> , 10th edition

In [T 88/21](#) the board held that the basis for the assessment of the allowability of an undisclosed disclaimer was the claim before the insertion of the disclaimer.

The current application and D1 were both filed by the appellant. The current application claimed priority from D0. D1 claimed priority from unpublished D1a, which was filed prior to D0. It had not been contested that D0 and D1a belonged to the appellant.

The board explained that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the current application before the addition of the undisclosed disclaimer was anticipated by examples 4A-D and 5A of D1. The effective date of these examples in D1 was the filing date of D1a, which was earlier than the filing date of D0. Hence, as far as the subject-matter of examples 4A-D and 5A of D1/D1a was concerned, D1a – and not D0 – was the first application within the meaning of Art. 87(1) together with (4) EPC. Therefore, the current application could not validly claim the priority of D0 for the subject-matter of these examples. Since D1 was published prior to the filing date of the current application, D1 was prior art under Art. 54(2) EPC for this subject-matter. D1 was not an accidental disclosure because it was directed to the same technical field as the current application. Furthermore, exclusion from patentability for non-technical reasons was irrelevant to this case. Consequently, the criteria developed in G 1/03 together with G 1/16 were not fulfilled and the undisclosed disclaimer introduced in claim 1 of the main request contravened Art. 123(2) EPC.

The board could not endorse the argument put forward by the appellant that, in essence, D1 was prior art under Art. 54(3) EPC, and not under Art. 54(2) EPC. The applicant argued that the claim currently on file, i.e. the claim with the disclaimer, had to be considered; not the notional claim without the disclaimer. As none of the subject-matter remaining in current claim 1 was disclosed in D1/D1a, the applicant understood that D0 was the first application within the meaning of Art. 87(1) EPC. Hence, the applicant derived that the priority of the main request based on D0 was valid and the disclaimer was allowable to restore novelty over D1 as an Art. 54(3) EPC document.

The board explained that the argument presented by the applicant was based on the incorrect assumption that the claim with (i.e. after the inclusion of) the disclaimer was decisive. In G 1/03, the insertion of the undisclosed disclaimer was occasioned by a lack of novelty objection pursuant to Art. 54(3) EPC, meaning that the objection concerned the claim without (i.e. before the insertion of) the disclaimer. By contrast, under the appellant's approach, the insertion of the disclaimer would restore novelty when a novelty objection under Art. 54(2) EPC (still) applied. The disclaimer would have the effect of removing the subject-matter from the claim which was objectionable under Art. 54(2) EPC.

The board found support in T 1222/11. Although T 1222/11 was explicitly rejected by T 1872/14, as cited by the appellant, subsequent case law was in line with T 1222/11. G 1/16 (in particular, Reasons 43 ff) confirmed that only the criteria of G 1/03 were to be considered when the allowability of an undisclosed disclaimer was assessed, while the gold standard test of G 2/10 had no relevance under these circumstances. G 1/16 explicitly cited T 1872/14 as thus incorrectly applying the gold standard test (in a modified form) to undisclosed disclaimers (see Reasons 24(2)(a) and (b)). G 1/15 moreover confirmed the conceptual identification of alternative subject-matter when assessing partial priorities and endorsed the approach of T 1222/11 in determining the relevant disclosure of a priority document vis-à-vis a subsequent application. Furthermore, in T 282/12, the board held that, for reasons of consistency, the rationale of G 1/15 must also apply for deciding whether an application from which priority was claimed was the first application within the meaning of Art. 87(1) EPC.

Finally, the board addressed the argument by the appellant that following T 1222/11 would amount to an unfair disadvantage for applicants because of "self-collision", as under the same circumstances a third party would be allowed to insert a disclaimer. The board recalled that G 2/98 advocated a "narrow or strict interpretation" of the concept of the same invention and the right to priority. Moreover, the appellant had known the content of their documents D1a/D1 at the time of filing the current application, and it had been in their hands to avoid the current situation.

029-03-23



## Article 123(2) EPC | T 1099/21 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 123(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1099/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 083, 084, 100(c), 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendments – claims – grounds for opposition – added subject-matter – deletion of features – extension beyond the content of the application as filed
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.1.4.3</a> , <a href="#">II.A.3.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1099/21](#) claim 1 of the application as originally filed essentially related to a coating composition comprising a microencapsulated biocide and a free (i.e. not microencapsulated) isothiazolone biocide or antifouling agent.

The feature relating to the upper concentration limit of the free isothiazolone biocide or antifouling agent was defined functionally in terms of a result to be achieved ("up to a concentration that does not reduce the glass transition temperature of the film forming polymer by more than 20°C").

The board concluded that the functionally defined upper limit of the concentration range for the free isothiazolone biocide was set out as being necessary for solving the technical problems addressed by the application as filed, namely maintaining the integrity of the paint film and avoiding prolongation of the drying time of the coating composition. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the appellant, this functional feature was disclosed in the application as filed as an essential feature of the invention and did not merely relate to a preferred embodiment thereof.

Claim 1 of the main request was amended by deleting the functionally defined upper limit of the concentration range for the free isothiazolone biocide from claim 1 as filed. As a result, the upper limit was defined numerically ("to 15% by weight of the film forming polymer or binder solids").

The board explained that, according to established case law, deleting from an independent claim a feature which the application as filed consistently presented as



being an essential feature of the invention resulted in an extension of the claimed subject-matter beyond the content of the application as filed.

The respondent argued that the functional feature of claim 1 as filed had not been deleted but replaced by the numerical upper limit. The board did not agree. It was very readily conceivable, and this was acknowledged by the respondent at the oral proceedings, that claim 1 of the main request encompassed film forming polymers for which amounts of free isothiazolone biocides close or identical to the numerical upper limit of 15% actually reduced the glass transition temperature by more than 20°C, contrary to claim 1 as filed.

The respondent also submitted that the plasticising effect of certain biocides on film forming polymers was well-known to the skilled person. The wording of claim 1 of the main request stated the concentration of the free isothiazolone biocide in relation to the weight of the film forming or binder solids. This was a pointer to the skilled person that the coating composition of claim 1 of the main request should not contain too much free isothiazolone biocide, depending on the film forming polymer actually used. For this reason, compositions in which, for example, concentrations of 15% of free isothiazolone biocide caused a T<sub>g</sub> reduction of more than 20°C did not actually fall within the subject-matter of claim 1. The board disagreed. The subject-matter of a claim was determined by its wording, which in the present case provided for an explicit upper limit of 15% for any film forming polymer.

Thirdly, the respondent argued that the functional feature in claim 1 as filed could not be meaningfully interpreted by the skilled person as defining a boundary. The replacement of the functional feature in claim 1 as filed by the numerical upper limit in claim 1 of the main request was made to address the examining division's objections in this respect under Art. 83 and 84 EPC. The board did not agree with this contention. It was already clear from the wording of the functional feature that it was intended to define an upper limit for the concentration of the free isothiazolone biocide in the coating composition. The fact that claim 1 as filed did not define an exact numerical upper limit might be due to the fact that the actual upper limit depended on the composition under consideration. However, any lack of clarity that might arise from an ambiguity in an application as filed was to the detriment of a patent proprietor, who was ultimately responsible for the drafting of the application as filed and its claims. The fact that a feature in the application as filed was unclear could not therefore justify or excuse the complete deletion of the unclear feature or its replacement by another feature if this resulted in an extension beyond the content of the application as filed. In fact, what prompted a patent proprietor to make a particular amendment to the claims (in this case to address the examining division's objections) could not have any influence on the outcome of the assessment of the ground for opposition under Art. 100(c) EPC.

The board explained that the above reasoning for claim 1 of the main request applied to all the auxiliary requests. None of the auxiliary requests were allowable because the subject-matter of claim 1 of each of the auxiliary requests extended beyond the content of the application as filed.

073-07-23

## Article 123(2) EPC | T 0532/20 | Board 3.5.02

### Article 123(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0532/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.08
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 100(c), 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendments – added subject-matter (yes) – extension beyond the content of the application as filed
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.1.3.2</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 13\(2\) RPBA 2020.](#)

In [T 532/20](#), the board held that claim 1 as granted defined subject-matter that extended beyond the content of the application as originally filed. This concerned in essence the feature that the generator remained connected to and synchronised with the grid during a low-voltage event of less than 50%.

As argued by the appellants (opponents) and the intervener, a skilled person was therefore faced with new information that a continuing connection and synchronisation of the generator with the power grid even at voltage drops to less than 50% of the rated voltage, could be achieved by a UPS-powered blade pitch control system and turbine controller alone.

The board was not convinced by the arguments of the respondent (patent proprietor). Rather than identifying a direct and unambiguous original disclosure, the respondent argued that precisely those amendments that were added to the subject-matter of original claims 1 and 3 had been implicitly part of these claims from the beginning. However, the board explained that, on any objective reading, neither claim 1 nor claim 3 as originally filed specified that the claimed generators were capable of low-voltage ride through or that they remained connected and synchronised during a low-voltage event of any size.

The respondent argued furthermore that the appellants and the board in reality raised an objection of missing essential features against claims 1 and 3 of the main request in the guise of an objection of added subject-matter. The board held that this was not

correct. Claim 1 was amended so as to be limited – only after the amendment – to a generator that was capable of remaining connected and synchronised during low voltages of under 50% of rated voltage. However, the measures that were originally disclosed to be necessary to achieve that result, in particular a protective circuit for the inverters and a blade pitch system controlled so as not to trip the generator, were not added to the amended claim. The fact that the claimed generator could achieve this technical effect without the originally disclosed corresponding measures represented new information.

The respondent also argued that a protective circuit, in particular in the form of a crowbar circuit, was originally disclosed only as an embodiment or an optional feature, reasoning that if an applicant drafted an application by representing a protective circuit as optional, then this represented an original disclosure to the skilled person. This argument did not convince the board. A skilled person did not read an application as a linguist would, but rather on the basis of their technical understanding. The application clearly taught the skilled person that a severe voltage drop at the generator terminals caused high currents in the generator windings, which could damage the semiconductor switches in the inverter. If this happened, the generator could not remain connected and synchronised. The original application did not contain a single technically useful piece of information as to how a severe voltage drop could be accommodated otherwise than with a protective circuit. It also did not contain a single piece of credible disclosure of conditions under which a low-voltage event did not cause excess currents in the generator. In view of this, a skilled person saw beyond the respondent's strategic choice to represent most parts of the disclosure as optional. In this context, it was simply irrelevant how often the words "in one embodiment" were used correctly or not.

The respondent also adopted the opposition division's argument from the decision under appeal that generator synchronisation with the power grid and the damage of components were two different problems which were not inextricably linked to each other. A low-voltage event could also be addressed by increasing the capacity in various components such as the motor, generator and/or converter. The board was not convinced by this argument. The variable frequency current produced in the generator was transformed in the converters to the stable grid frequency before being fed to the grid. If the inverter was destroyed, the generator could not remain connected and synchronised to the grid. Hence protecting the inverter was a prerequisite for, and hence inextricably linked with, the claimed technical effect expressed in claim 1 after the amendment.

114-10-23

## Article 123(2) EPC | T 1133/21 | Board 3.3.09

### Article 123(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1133/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.09
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendments – added subject-matter – extension beyond the content of the application as filed – selection from lists of converging alternatives
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/10, T 1621/16, T 0350/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.1.6.1a</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.6.2a</a> , <a href="#">II.E.1.6.2d</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1133/21](#) the respondent (patent proprietor) submitted that although multiple selections had to be made to arrive at the claimed subject-matter, the teaching of the application as filed taught toward the claimed combination of features. In essence, the respondent argued that since i) the ranges in amended claim 1 were selected from lists of converging alternatives and ii) there was a pointer to the claimed combination of features, claim 1 met the criteria set out in decision T 1621/16 for the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC to be fulfilled.

The board was not convinced by the arguments of the respondent. The board explained that the gold standard for assessing compliance with Art. 123(2) EPC was that amendments to the claims, description and drawings of a European patent application or patent could only be made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from the whole of these documents as filed (G 2/10).

It was established case law that the content of an application must not be used as a reservoir from which features pertaining to separate embodiments could be combined to artificially create an embodiment. In the absence of any pointer to the combination, the combined selection of features did not, for the person skilled in the art, emerge clearly and unambiguously from the content of the application as filed.

Decision T 1621/16 did not provide for an exception to this rule. It required, in fact, that a claim amended on the basis of multiple selections from lists of converging alternatives may only be considered to meet the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC if the application

as filed included a pointer to the combination of features resulting from the multiple selections. This meant that the mere fact that features were described in terms of lists of more or less converging alternatives did not give the proprietor carte blanche to freely combine features selected from a first list with features selected from a second list disclosed in the application as filed. Any such amendment would only be allowable under Art. 123(2) EPC if it complied with the gold standard.

The assessment of whether this standard was complied with was very case specific. It required taking into account the teaching of the application as filed as a whole, avoiding artificial semantic constructions. Factors which might play a role in the assessment were, inter-alia, the number of alternatives disclosed in the application; the length, convergence and any preference in the lists of enumerated features; and the presence of examples pointing to a combination of features. For instance, if the values in a number of examples were clustered within specific ranges, this might provide a pointer to those ranges. In the current case, the application for the opposed patent was drafted to provide a large reservoir of options and alternatives to be selected and combined to create a vast number of embodiments.

The respondent also argued that the current case was similar to that underlying T 350/18. In that decision, the board found that claim 1 was in line with the examples and that, in the absence of a contradiction or specific interrelation of individual features which would require additional adaptation or modification, the claimed combinations of numerical ranges defined by the broadest range which converged down towards the most preferred range met the requirements of Art. 123(2) EPC. According to the respondent, this same approach had to be applied to the current case.

The board did not find this argument persuasive either. The board held that the assessment of whether Art. 123(2) EPC was complied with was very case specific. In view of the very broad teaching of the application as filed and the vast number of alternative options disclosed in the application, the current case could not be compared to T 350/18.

The board concluded that claim 1 of the main request contained subject-matter extending beyond the content of the application as filed (Art. 123(2) EPC).

115-10-23

## Article 123(3) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2257/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.04.18
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 123(2), 123(3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(1), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendments – added subject-matter (yes) – inescapable trap (yes) – amendment after summons – amendment gives rise to new objections (yes) – objection not overcome
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.3.1.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.4.5g</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.5.10b</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 2257/19](#) the invention concerned a security element having magnetic elements in which the magnetic difference of the regions (magnetic codes) could not be detected by normal instruments, but exclusively by means of dedicated sensors.

The appellant held that feature (H) was not disclosed in the underlying original patent application. As to feature (G), it was allegedly based on the originally filed description. However, by removing feature (G) from the specific context of the corresponding embodiment and by placing it in the context of the originally claimed features (A) to (F) together with the new feature (H), new subject-matter was created. Amended feature (G) meant that the magnetic areas had to be separated in the horizontal as well as in the vertical direction. However, such a vertical separation was not disclosed anywhere in the originally filed application. Removing the feature of vertical separation would infringe the requirements of Art. 123(3) EPC. Feature (G) thus represented an inescapable trap. Therefore, new auxiliary requests 4A to 4C could not overcome the objections and therefore should not be admitted.

The board agreed with the arguments of the appellant. By filing auxiliary requests 4A to 4C the respondent attempted to overcome the "Art. 123(2)/(3) EPC trap" situation by better defining the horizontal separation of the magnetic areas and excluding vertical separation of the magnetic areas. However, the board observed that as usual with an "Art. 123(2)/(3) EPC trap", the exclusion of vertical separation would lead to a violation of Art. 123(3) EPC, as this would broaden the scope of protection granted. On the other

hand, healing of the violation of Art. 123(2) EPC was impossible as the original application documents did not provide a sufficient basis for the presence of a vertical separation. The elimination of feature (G) (and (H)) as a whole would be all the more contrary to the requirements of Art. 123(3) EPC.

An inescapable trap intrinsically precluded the admission of new requests under Art. 13(1) and (2) RPBA 2020, as the requirements of Art. 123(2) and (3) EPC could not both be satisfied. Consequently, and irrespective of the discussion as to whether there were exceptional circumstances that would justify filing the new requests at this very last stage of the procedure, auxiliary requests 4A to 4C were not admitted into the proceedings under Art. 13(2) and (1) RPBA 2020 because they prima facie could not overcome the objections under Art. 123(2) EPC without infringing the requirements of Art. 123(3) EPC.

103-09-23



## Article 125 EPC | T 2726/17 | Board 3.4.01

### Article 125 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2726/17</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.16
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 125 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 2 of the Decision of the President of the EPO of 10 September 2014 (OJ 2014, A98)
<b>Keywords</b>	general principles – protection of legitimate expectations – obligation to draw attention to easily remediable deficiencies – notice of appeal filed via the EPO Web-Form Filing service (valid) – sufficient time for informing appellant
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0014/89
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.A.4.1.1</a> , <a href="#">III.A.4.2.3</a> , <a href="#">V.A.2.5.1</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2726/17](#) the board applied the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of good faith (citing T 14/89 as an example) and considered a notice of appeal filed via the EPO web-form filing service as having been duly received.

The board pointed out that according to Art. 2 of the Decision of the President of the EPO of 10 September 2014 (the "Decision") the filing of appeal documents via the EPO web-form filing service was not permitted. The consequence of doing so was that such documents were deemed not to have been received, see Art. 2(2) of the Decision. Pursuant to the last sentence of Art. 2(2) of the Decision, the sender of such web-form filed documents, if identifiable, was to be notified without delay of this deemed non-receipt. In the present case, the sender of the notice of appeal was identifiable. According to the board, between the actual filing of the notice of appeal on 13 September 2017 and the final date of the time limit for filing the notice of appeal (6 October 2017) there had been sufficient time for the EPO to notice the irregularity in the filing of the notice of appeal, inform the appellant (applicant) thereof and for the appellant to resubmit the notice of appeal by accepted means. It appeared from the file that no such notification was issued. The appellant confirmed this in its letter dated 4 January 2018.

017-02-23



## Article 125 EPC | T 1128/19 | Board 3.3.04

### Article 125 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1128/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 076(1), 097(2), 125 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	general principles – double patenting (yes) – same subject-matter (yes) – divisional application
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0004/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.F.5.3.</a> , 10th edition

[T 1128/19](#) was an appeal against the decision of the examining division to refuse the European patent application. The application was a divisional application of an earlier application which was subsequently granted (the parent patent). The examining division had held that the main request and auxiliary requests 1 to 3 were not allowable under Art. 97(2) EPC together with Art. 125 EPC because they contravened the principle of prohibition of double patenting with respect to the parent patent.

The board observed that, since the filing of the appeal, decision G 4/19 had been issued. In this decision, the Enlarged Board had held that:

"1. A European patent application can be refused under Articles 97(2) and 125 EPC if it claims the same subject-matter as a European patent which has been granted to the same applicant and does not form part of the state of the art pursuant to Article 54(2) and (3) EPC.

2. The application can be refused on that legal basis, irrespective of whether it a) was filed on the same date as, or b) is an earlier application or a divisional application (Article 76(1) EPC) in respect of, or c) claims the same priority (Article 88 EPC) as the European patent application leading to the European patent already granted".

The board stated that the parent patent had been granted to the same applicant as the applicant of the application under appeal. To decide if the application under appeal had been correctly refused because it contravened the principle of prohibition of double patenting, the board had to determine whether it claimed the same subject-matter as the parent patent.

According to the board, claim 1 of the main request was a combination of claims 1 and 4 and a single embodiment (aa) from claim 5 of the parent patent. The wording of claim 1 of the application under appeal differed from that of the above-mentioned claims of the parent patent in that it specified that the first binding domain "is an antigen-interaction site". The subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request was an explicit alternative defined in the claims of the parent patent. The appellant had submitted that claim 1 of the main request related to an antibody whereas claim 1 of the parent patent was not defined to be an antibody. In other words, the subject-matter of claim 1 was alleged to be a narrower selection from the subject-matter of claim 1 of the parent patent. The board did not find this argument convincing because the claim was for "a bispecific single chain antibody molecule". There was no technical reason to differentiate between an antibody and an antibody molecule, since it went without saying that an antibody was a molecule. The same considerations applied to claim 1 of auxiliary request 1, which was identical to claim 1 of the main request.

In the board's opinion, claim 1 of auxiliary request 2 differed from claim 1 of the main request in that the subject-matter (and wording) of granted dependent claims 2 and 3 had been incorporated into claim 1. This subject-matter was therefore also an explicit embodiment of the granted claims. Claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 differed from claim 1 of the parent patent in that embodiments from dependent claim 7 had been incorporated. In addition, as was the case for claim 1 of the main request, the wording "which is an antigen-interaction site" had been added.

The board concluded that the main request and auxiliary requests 1 to 3 were not allowable because they claimed the same subject-matter as claimed in the parent patent.

074-07-23

## Article 125 EPC | T 2907/19 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 125 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2907/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 076(1), 097(2), 125 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	general principles – double patenting (no) – same subject-matter (no) – divisional application
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0004/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.F.5.3.</a> , 10th edition

[T 2907/19](#) was an appeal against the decision of the examining division to refuse the European patent application. The invention concerned a method of manufacturing a semiconductor device on a silicon carbide substrate. The application was a divisional application of a parent European application for which a European patent (the parent patent) was granted. The fifth auxiliary request was filed after notification of the summons to attend oral proceedings. It was admitted into the appeal proceedings as, in the board's opinion, it overcame all objections raised by the board in its communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA 2020 and those raised by the examining division in the impugned decision.

The board concluded that the fifth auxiliary request did not contain unallowable added matter and that it met the requirements of clarity and inventive step.

The board then considered whether the prohibition of double patenting was pertinent. It recalled that according to the headnotes of G 4/19, a European patent application could be refused under Art. 97(2) and 125 EPC if it claimed the same subject-matter as a European patent which had been granted to the same applicant and did not form part of the state of the art pursuant to Art. 54(2) and (3) EPC. The application could be refused on that legal basis, irrespective of whether it a) was filed on the same date as, or b) was an earlier application or a divisional application (Art. 76(1) EPC) in respect of, or c) claimed the same priority (Art. 88 EPC) as the European patent application leading to the European patent already granted. The board pointed out that the definition of the "same subject-matter" was not the subject of the referral and of decision G 4/19.

In the board's opinion, claim 1 according to the fifth auxiliary request differed from claim 1 of the parent patent by the step of separating the epitaxial layer from the carrier substrate. Hence, independent claim 1 of the fifth auxiliary request was different from independent claim 1 of the granted parent application and thus did not define the same subject-matter. The prohibition of double patenting was therefore not pertinent to the claims of the fifth auxiliary request. This was not precluded by the fact that claim 1 of the fifth auxiliary request corresponded to dependent claim 2 of the granted parent application.

The case was remitted to the examining division with the order to grant a patent based on the application in the version according to the appellant's fifth auxiliary request.

075-07-23

## Article 135 EPC | T 1283/19 | Board 3.5.07

### Article 135 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1283/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.07
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 106(1), 135 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 155 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	request for conversion – request for conversion not admissible – suspensive effect of the appeal
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.1.3.</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 1283/19](#), la chambre a rappelé que selon l'art. 135(1)a) et b) CBE le service central de la propriété industrielle d'un état contractant désigné engage, sur requête du demandeur, la procédure de délivrance d'un brevet national si la demande de brevet européen est réputée retirée en vertu de l'art. 77, paragraphe 3 CBE ou dans les autres cas prévus par la législation nationale où, en vertu de la CBE, la demande de brevet européen est soit rejetée, soit retirée, soit réputée retirée.

L'art. 135(3) CBE stipule que dans les cas visés au paragraphe 1 b), la requête en transformation doit être présentée à l'Office européen des brevets conformément au règlement d'exécution. L'Office européen des brevets transmet la requête aux services centraux de la propriété industrielle des États contractants qui y sont mentionnés.

Selon la règle 155(1) CBE, la requête en transformation visée à l'art. 135(1)b) CBE doit être présentée dans un délai de trois mois à compter soit du retrait de la demande de brevet européen, soit de la notification signalant que la demande est réputée retirée, soit de la décision de rejet de la demande du brevet européen. La demande de brevet européen cesse de produire les effets visés à l'art. 66 CBE si la requête n'est pas présentée dans les délais.

La chambre a conclu que compte tenu de l'effet suspensif du recours (art. 106(1), deuxième phrase, CBE), la requête en transformation des requérants ne pouvait pas être considérée pendant la procédure de recours, car une telle requête en transformation ne peut pas être émise avant que la demande ne soit réputée retirée, retirée ou rejetée. En tenant compte de ce qui précède, la chambre ne pouvait donc pas traiter la requête en transformation selon l'art. 135(1)b) CBE.

159-13-23

## Rule 6 EPC

## | T 0084/19

## | Board 3.3.08

## Rule 006 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0084/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.21
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 006(4), (5) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Article 2 Rules relating to fees EPO Notice dated 18 December 2017 concerning the reduced fee for appeal (Article 108 EPC) for an appeal filed by a natural person or an entity referred to in Rule 6(4) EPC, OJ 2018, A5 Articles 2 and 3 Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003
<b>Keywords</b>	fees – reduced appeal fee – entitlement to reduced appeal fee – straw man
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/97, G 0004/97, T 1839/18, T 0225/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.2.5.4c</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Art. 13\(2\) RPBA 2020.](#)

In [T 84/19](#) the board held that the entitlement to pay a reduced appeal fee under the conditions set by Art. 2, item 11, RFees and R. 6(4), (5) EPC must be assessed vis-à-vis the entity which has assumed the procedural status of an appellant.

In the case at hand, the opponent patent attorney firm which had filed the appeal was the only appellant in the proceedings. It had exercised its own right as a member of the public to file an opposition, even if a third party (the "principal") had incited the opponent to file the opposition. In such a case the opponent could not be regarded to act on the basis of the principal's personal entitlement. Whether the opponent's acts accorded with the intentions or instructions of the principal was relevant only to the internal relationship between the latter and the opponent, and had no bearing on the opposition proceedings. Accordingly, there could not be another true opponent apart from the formally authorised opponent so that the principal could under no circumstances be treated as a party (cf. G 3/97, Reasons 2.1 and 2.2).

As such, the patent attorney firm qualified as a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) within the meaning of Art. 2 of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003. The board did not find support in the present case for applying the concept of "linked enterprises" according to Art. 3(3) of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 to the situation of an appeal filed by a straw man opponent.

048-05-23

## Rule 76 EPC

## | T 1408/19

## | Board 3.4.03

## Rule 076 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1408/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 099(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 076, 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	admissibility of opposition (yes) – opposition substantiated (yes) – admissibility of appeal (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0344/88
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.2.2.1</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.2.2.8</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1408/19](#) the appeal was against the decision of the opposition division rejecting the opposition. The opposition division had held that the opposition was admissible and, in particular, that the requirements of R. 76(2)(c) EPC had been met. The respondent (patent proprietor) argued that said opposition was insufficiently substantiated and therefore was not admissible due to the erroneous citation of the publication number of document E2 which meant it was not possible to identify the correct publication number of E2; unacceptable independent enquiries and further investigations would therefore have been necessary to enable the proprietor to understand the objections raised.

The opposition division had cited T 344/88, in which the board concluded that it would be taking formal requirements too far to reject the opposition simply because the wrong number had been given for a cited patent specification. It accepted a correction according to R. 139 EPC and did not qualify the opposition as inadmissible. The board agreed with the opposition division that the correct publication number of E2 was retrievable without undue effort. It observed that R. 76(2)(c) EPC merely required an indication of the facts and evidence presented in support of the argued grounds for opposition, but that not necessarily every piece of evidence need already be presented along with the notice of opposition. According to the board in the case in hand, it should also be sufficient if the indications given in the notice of opposition permitted the substantive content of the evidence offered to be established only at a later stage, provided that this substantive content could be established without undue effort and still within a reasonable time.



In the present case, the notice of opposition stated that the subject-matter was not new and/or inventive in view of a European patent, and detailed reasons were provided, making it at least plausible that such a patent indeed existed. The description of the citation was sufficiently detailed in the notice of opposition that the proprietor and the opposition division could clearly identify the document from the available material based on the information provided by the opponent. According to the board, the facts and evidence submitted in accordance with R. 76(2)(c) EPC were sufficient for the ground of opposition to be correctly understood by the opposition division and the proprietor.

During the oral proceedings before the board, the respondent also relied on T 344/88, which, in its view, held that the opposition division should have been able to identify the correct publication number within the nine-month period according to Art. 99(1) EPC. It argued that this would not have been possible in the present case, because the notice of opposition was filed on the last day of said nine-month period. The board took the view that such a requirement could not be derived from T 344/88. The relevant passage stated the following: "It is not relevant whether the Office has actually corrected the error in the period remaining between receipt of the notice of opposition and the expiry of the opposition period. The only decisive factor is that, within the opposition period, the oversight was evident and that the description of the document enabled the opposition division to identify it beyond any doubt" (point 6.2 of the Reasons, as translated by the board). In the board's reading, the required "enablement" of the division only meant that the necessary information should be available within the time limit, not that the division also had to check whether it was indeed in a position to correct the error by itself and still within the time limit. It concluded this was the only sensible interpretation of the cited findings of T 344/88. It would be completely unrealistic to expect the opposition division to immediately check such errors.

In view of the above, and in agreement with decision T 344/88, the board also took the view that in the case at hand it was decisive that all material and information necessary for (possibly later on) establishing the correct publication number of E2 was submitted prior to expiry of the nine-month period according to Art. 99(1) EPC. Thus, the admissibility of the opposition was not called into question by the erroneous publication number of E2 in the notice of opposition.

168-14-23

## Rule 88(2) EPC | T 2024/20 | Board 3.3.05

### Rule 088(2) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2024/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.07
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	FR
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 088(2), 097(2) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	decision fixing amount of costs – preparation of oral proceedings – amount of hours
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 0161/17
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.R.3.4.</a> , 10th edition

Dans l'affaire [T 2024/20](#), le recours de la titulaire (requérante) concernait la décision de la division d'opposition fixant le montant des frais de la procédure d'opposition selon la règle 97(2) CBE. Le recours ne concernait pas la répartition des frais de la procédure d'opposition, cette décision étant passée en force de chose jugée. Par conséquent, la chambre pouvait seulement vérifier si la fixation du montant des frais correspondait à la répartition des frais et si la présomption des frais était établie (règle 88(2) CBE).

Dans la décision fixant le montant des frais, la division d'opposition avait décidé que les frais de préparation de la procédure orale, le voyage à la Haye pour la procédure orale et la nuit d'hôtel avant la procédure orale étaient à payer par la titulaire. La chambre a estimé que la seule conclusion qui pouvait être déduite de cette décision était que les frais de préparation de la procédure orale étaient à rembourser alors que les frais de participation ne l'étaient pas. Les spéculations selon lesquelles la division d'opposition avait voulu implicitement inclure les frais de participation et qu'elle s'était seulement mal exprimée dans sa décision ne pouvaient pas justifier qu'une décision contraire au texte de la décision attaquée soit prise.

La requérante avait fait valoir qu'une journée était suffisante pour préparer la procédure orale. La chambre a noté que cette opinion était en désaccord avec toutes les informations et pièces justificatives soumises par les opposantes 2-4. De plus, rien ne démontrait qu'une journée de travail aurait permis de préparer la procédure orale dans le cas d'espèce, cette opinion de la requérante étant seulement basée sur une présomption. En tenant compte de l'ampleur du dossier, de la date de la réponse de la titulaire aux oppositions, de l'avis préliminaire de la division d'opposition (février 2017), de la date de la procédure orale (30 mai 2018) et du temps écoulé entre les deux, il

semblait qu'une journée de travail n'était pas suffisante pour se familiariser à nouveau avec le dossier et surtout pour préparer diligemment le dossier pour la procédure orale.

La requérante avait aussi allégué qu'une préparation de 30 heures, indiquée par l'opposante 4, semblait exagérée. La chambre a considéré qu'elle n'avait pas de raison de douter de l'exactitude des données fournies par l'opposante 4. L'opposante 2 avait indiqué un temps de préparation de 22,5 heures et l'opposante 3 de 20,5 heures ce qui était certes différent du nombre d'heures indiqué par l'opposante 4, mais toujours largement supérieur à un jour de préparation comme soutenu par la requérante. Or, il est bien connu que selon l'importance d'une même affaire pour l'une ou l'autre partie, le temps investi pour préparer une procédure orale peut varier. La chambre n'avait pas d'indications concrètes permettant de mettre en doute l'exactitude des chiffres fournis par l'opposante 4.

La chambre a annulé la décision attaquée et a jugé que la requérante devait rembourser 6827,77 € à l'opposante 2, 7207,10 € à l'opposante 3 et 10605,27 € à l'opposante 4.

076-07-23

## Rule 99 EPC

## | T 2197/16

## | Board 3.2.05

## Rule 099(1)(c) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2197/16</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.05.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 104(1), 106(3), 107, 108 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 097(1) and 099(1)(c) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	notice of appeal – request defining subject of appeal – decision on apportionment of costs not subject of the appeal proceedings
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/92, G 0004/93, G 0001/99, T 0753/92, T 0762/96, T 0689/09
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.R.4.1.</a> , <a href="#">III.R.4.3.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.2.5.2c</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 2197/16](#) the appellant (opponent) had appealed the opposition division's decision to maintain the patent. In the decision under appeal, the opposition division had also ordered the patent proprietor to pay the costs of the oral proceedings to the opponent under Art. 104(1) EPC. The respondent (patent proprietor) requested that the decision on the apportionment of costs be admitted in the appeal proceedings and set aside.

The board ruled that the respondent's requests concerning the opposition division's decision on apportionment of costs were inadmissible for the following reasons.

According to Art. 108, first sentence, EPC and R. 99(1)(c) EPC, the notice of appeal had to contain "a request defining the subject of the appeal". The appellant's initial request defined the extent of the appeal proceedings and the appellant could file an appeal against the decision taken as a whole or in part (see G 9/92 and G 4/93, point 1 of the Reasons; and G 1/99, point 6.2 of the Reasons). This was the principle of free party disposition (*ne ultra petita*).

In the case in hand, the notice of appeal clearly showed that the appellant (opponent) did not appeal the opposition division's decision on the apportionment of costs. Nor did the statement of grounds of appeal refer to the issue of the apportionment of costs. Therefore, the opposition division's decision in this respect was not the subject of the appeal.

The board further noted that the situation in this case was different from that where the patent proprietor appealed a decision of the opposition division which adversely affected them alone and the opponent raised further objections to the patent as granted or amended. In such a case the opponent's objections related to the subject of the appeal and therefore did not extend the subject of the patent proprietor's appeal.

In view of the above, the board concluded that the issue of the apportionment of costs was a legal issue which could not be dealt with and decided on in the appeal proceedings, since it was not the subject of the appeal. For that reason alone, the respondent's requests regarding the decision on the apportionment of costs were not admissible.

The board also made a point to refer to decisions T 753/92 and T 762/96, stating that the general considerations of these decisions were applicable here *mutatis mutandis* since, if the respondent had lodged an appeal against the opposition division's decision on apportionment of costs, the appeal, with the apportionment of costs as its sole subject, would have been inadmissible under Art. 106(3) and R. 97(1) EPC. The respondent was only a party to the proceedings under Art. 107, second sentence, EPC, and did not have the right to file a "cross-appeal" without limit of time and, unlike the rights the respondent would have as appellant, its requests were therefore subject to restrictions (see G 9/92, point 16 of the Reasons).

007-01-23

## Rule 99 EPC | T 1828/19 | Board 3.3.10

### Rule 099 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1828/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.10
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 108 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 099 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	admissibility of appeal (yes) – notice of appeal – request defining subject of appeal – requests in the grounds of appeal different from requests in the notice of appeal
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.2.5.2c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1828/19](#) the board recalled that R. 99(1)(c) EPC requires that the notice of appeal contain a request defining the subject of the appeal. R. 99(2) EPC required that the appellant indicate in the statement of grounds of appeal the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned and the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based.

In the notice of appeal, the appellant (patent proprietor) had requested that the decision under appeal be set aside, and identified the appealed decision. It had also requested that the patent be maintained "as amended during oral proceedings". This request defined the subject of the appeal, as required by R. 99(1)(c) EPC. The opposition division had revoked the patent because it had considered the claimed invention not sufficiently disclosed for it to be carried out by a skilled person. In the grounds of appeal, the appellant had given reasons why the opposition division's conclusion was to be considered incorrect, as required by R. 99(2) EPC. The appellant's main request could be identified without any doubt, namely that the decision be set aside and the patent maintained as granted. The appeal was thus admissible.

In its notice of appeal, the appellant had requested that "the decision be set aside and the patent maintained as amended during oral proceedings". In the statement of grounds of appeal, however, the appellant had requested that the decision be set aside and the patent be maintained "as granted or in amended form". The respondent (opponent) had argued that the appeal was inadmissible solely in view of this discrepancy.

The board disagreed with the respondent. The appealed decision had a single legal effect: revocation of the patent. The appellant had clearly requested in its notice that this decision be set aside; this was the subject of the appeal. There was no legal basis for the assumption that the request in the notice of appeal "that the patent be maintained as amended in the oral proceedings" was a withdrawal of any other request pending before the opposition division and forming the basis of the impugned decision, thus irrevocably limiting the scope of the appeal by excluding from it the patent as granted. It was settled case law that, as required by R. 99(2) EPC, the proprietor needed to specify the scope of its request for maintenance of the patent only in the statement of grounds of appeal. This was implied by the wording of R. 99(2) EPC: "the appellant shall indicate ... the extent to which [the decision impugned] is to be amended". The grounds of appeal did not need to be limited by the requests in the notice of appeal. There was no reason why the legal consequence of a discrepancy between the notice and the grounds should be the inadmissibility of an appeal. R. 99 EPC was silent in this respect, and no other relevant legal provision was known to the board that would stipulate such a legal effect. Nor was the board aware of any applicable case law to that effect.

The respondent had argued that the requests in the statement of grounds of appeal did not restrict the original requests in the notice of appeal but went beyond them. However, the board failed to find any legal basis for the inadmissibility of an appeal as a consequence of a change in the scope of claim requests between the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal. In the absence of any legal basis that would prohibit such a change of scope, the appellant was free not to define its claim requests until later, within the time limit for filing the grounds of appeal as stipulated by Art. 108 EPC, last sentence. Thus, no procedural error was apparent to the board, let alone an error that would result in inadmissibility of the appeal.

The respondent had also argued that the appellant's requests were unclear and that some were not sufficiently reasoned. These arguments too failed to convince the board that the appeal should be held inadmissible.

120-10-23

## Rule 116 EPC | T 1219/19 | Board 3.3.08

### Rule 116 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1219/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.18
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 076(1), 084, 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 081(3), 116 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Guidelines E-VI, 2.2(2) and 2.2(3), November 2018 version
<b>Keywords</b>	opposition proceedings – discretion of the opposition division not to admit amended claims filed at the oral proceedings (yes) – change of subject of proceedings (no) – discretion exercised correctly by opposition division (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0007/93, R 0006/19, T 1213/19, T 0966/17
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.5.1.4d</a> , 10th edition

In the decision at issue in [T 1219/19](#), the opposition division had decided not to admit auxiliary request 6, which was filed by the appellant during the oral proceedings. According to the opposition division, it had been filed late, was an attempt to address an issue already raised in the notices of opposition, was prima facie unsuitable to solve the issue of added subject-matter (Art. 123(2) EPC), and appeared to lack clarity (Art. 84 EPC). The appellant disputed whether the opposition division had indeed had discretion not to admit this request and, in the event that it did, whether it had exercised its discretion in accordance with the proper criteria.

The appellant invoked R. 116(2) EPC to argue that the opposition division did not have discretion to disregard this auxiliary request or to apply the criterion of prima facie allowability. It argued that since the opposition division had changed its view in oral proceedings, expressed in the preliminary opinion sent with the summons, that omitting the feature "template-directed" did not result in added subject-matter, auxiliary request 6, although filed after the time limit under R. 116 EPC, could not be regarded as late-filed and should have been admitted. Under R. 116(2) EPC, requests filed after the final date set for making written submissions in preparation for oral proceedings could only then not be admitted if the patent proprietor had been notified of the grounds prejudicing the maintenance of the patent.



The board found that under the circumstances in hand the opposition division was entitled to exercise its discretion accorded by Art. 123(1) in conjunction with R. 81(3) EPC (see R 6/19, T 966/17, T 1213/19), and that it had exercised it in accordance with the right principles. The opposition division could not be deprived of that discretion merely because it had expressed a different opinion at the oral proceedings from that provisionally set out in the communication accompanying the summons. Moreover, the opposition division's preliminary opinion had discussed the added-matter objections raised by the opponents and had clearly indicated that those objections were to be the subject of further discussion at the oral proceedings. In the board's view, the preliminary conclusion that claim 1 did not add subject-matter was expressed in a careful manner and could not be understood to mean that the opposition division thereby gave up its discretionary power to disregard submissions filed later. A different conclusion would penalise the useful practice of providing a detailed discussion of the relevant issues in preparation for oral proceedings.

The appellant also referred to the Guidelines for Examination to argue that the opposition division's change of opinion at the oral proceedings constituted a change of subject of the proceedings, justifying the later filing of auxiliary request. The board agreed that, in principle, it did change the subject of the proceedings, especially where the opposition division had introduced a new objection at a relatively late stage. However, the Guidelines did not exclude the possibility that, under particular circumstances, a change from the preliminary opinion would not necessarily involve a change of subject of the proceedings. In this regard, the board found that the content of the preliminary opinion, taken as a whole, was articulate and could not be read in a manner limited to the conclusion that claim 1 did not add subject-matter. The objection that the single-molecule sequencing process had no basis in the parent application had been raised by both opponents at the outset of the opposition proceedings and was not introduced into the proceedings by the opposition division. The issue had been discussed at length in preparation for the oral proceedings, it had been considered an issue by the opposition division in the preliminary opinion, and it was also sufficiently clear that it was a crucial one. Thus the appellant had indeed been notified of the grounds prejudicing the maintenance of the patent.

The board therefore found that the different conclusion reached at the oral proceedings by the opposition division could not be regarded as a change of subject of the proceedings. Auxiliary request 6 had thus not been submitted in due time and the opposition division had had discretion to disregard it, pursuant to the correct criterion of *prima facie* allowability (or non-allowability). That auxiliary request 6 raised clarity issues was an additional criterion for non-admittance. The board therefore saw no reason to revise the opposition division's decision or to exercise its own discretion in favour of admitting auxiliary request 6 into the appeal proceedings (Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007).

146-12-23

## Rule 124(1) EPC | T 1482/21 | Board 3.2.02

### Rule 124(1) EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1482/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 124(1) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 06(4) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	minutes of oral proceedings – request to correct minutes (refused)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	R 0007/17, T 0212/97, T 0642/97, T 0468/99, T 0263/05, T 1721/07, T 1891/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.10.3</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 122 EPC.](#)

In [T 1482/21](#) the appellant requested that the minutes of the oral proceedings be corrected and that the written decision be based on the corrected minutes. As the request had been made before the written decision terminating the appeal proceedings was issued, it was dealt with therein (T 1891/20).

The board noted that under R. 124(1) EPC, minutes of oral proceedings are to be drawn up, containing the essential points of the oral proceedings and the relevant statements made by the parties. Under Art. 6(4) RPBA 2020, these minutes are to be drawn up by a member of the deciding board or the registrar, as designated by the chair. Citing T 1891/20, T 212/97, T 642/97, T 468/99 and R 7/17, the board recalled that it was in the discretion of the minute writer what to consider "essential" or "relevant". The board added that a summary of the arguments made by the parties during the oral proceedings was usually not included in the minutes (T 1721/07, T 263/05), and that the board was responsible for deciding what needs to be recorded in the minutes, not the parties (T 468/99, T 1721/07).

The appellant argued that the presentation of facts in the minutes was incorrect as far as the (non-)maintenance of the objections of insufficiency of disclosure was concerned. According to the unanimous recollection of all five members of the board, the representative of the appellant had explicitly stated in the oral proceedings before the board that it did not maintain the objections as to insufficiency of disclosure and lack of novelty against the new auxiliary request. The appellant thus requested the insertion of

a paragraph into the minutes which was, according to the unanimous recollection of all members of the board, factually incorrect.

Furthermore, the appellant argued that the following statement in the minutes was an incorrect representation of that part of the oral proceedings: "[t]he respondent then filed a corresponding amended version of the description, to which neither the appellant nor the Board objected". The appellant stated that after an amended version of the description had been presented, it had objected by indicating some further parts of the description requiring amendment. One of these objections had been allowed by the board and had resulted in a further (hand-written) amendment. The board noted in this regard that the minutes stated that "[t]he need for adaptation of the description to the claims of the new auxiliary request was discussed". According to the unanimous recollection of all members of the board, the appellant had initially argued that several passages of the description needed adaptation, only some of which, however, had also been considered by the board to be in need of adaptation. The board recalled that a summary of arguments provided by the parties was usually not included in the minutes. It was thus neither incomplete nor incorrect that the minutes stated that, after discussion on the need for adaptation, the board "provided the parties with its conclusion on the required adaptations." The chairman had stressed that the appellant's explicit confirmation that it did not have any objections against the amended version of the description, had meant that the additional objections against the description which had been raised at the beginning of the discussion on adaptation would not be dealt with in the written decision, and the appellant had agreed.

The board noted that it was immaterial whether, in the course of the discussion on the adaptation of the description, all adaptations to the description which had been considered necessary by the board had been implemented by the respondent in one go or in multiple, subsequent steps. What mattered was that the final version of the adapted description which had been in the end filed by the respondent in the appeal proceedings – and which was attached to the minutes – was the one against which the appellant had had no objections. This was correctly reflected in the minutes.

The request for amendment of the minutes of the oral proceedings was therefore refused.

121-10-23

## Rule 139 EPC | T 0433/21 | Board 3.3.06

### Rule 139 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0433/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 036, 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error (no) – correction of appeal withdrawal (no) – retraction of the appeal withdrawal (no) – re-opening of proceedings – ancillary proceedings – divisional application
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/12, R 0003/22, J 0010/87, J 0011/87, J 0004/97, J 0019/03, J 0014/04, J 0001/11, J 0002/15, T 1244/08, T 0610/11, T 0695/18, T 2148/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.7.3.2</a> , <a href="#">V.A.7.3.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 433/21](#) the board noted that one line of cases has held that for the withdrawal of an appeal, no rescission under R. 139 EPC or under any other legal basis should be possible: T 1244/08 of 7 July 2011 and T 695/18 of 3 March 2023. The board agreed with T 695/18 on needing to set limits to requests under R. 139 EPC. However, it did not agree with the narrow reading of G 1/12 in T 695/18. According to this narrow reading, R. 139 EPC would only apply if proceedings before the EPO for some other purpose are pending when a request for correction is received by the EPO. Hence, R. 139 EPC would not apply after an appeal withdrawal, as from such point onwards it would be considered that there are no longer any appeal proceedings pending.

By contrast, the board in the present case concluded that the concept of "appeals" mentioned in point 35 of the Reasons of G 1/12 should not be construed narrowly as referring to "admissibly pending appeals", but broadly as also encompassing appeal cases that would be pending if the correction under R. 139 EPC was allowed. With reference to R 3/22, the board emphasised that a request to correct a declaration of withdrawal of the appeal under R. 139 EPC can potentially be successful, which implies that R. 139 EPC applies.

On the facts of the case at issue, the board refused the request for correction. It was true that according to G 1/12 omissions in a document could be corrected under R. 139 EPC. However, such an omission has to relate to a document which was actually filed with the EPO. Errors in the run-up to a declaration being made, such as errors relating to the general motivation for the declaration, the decision-making process or the assumptions on which the declaration is based, are irrelevant. In the present case, the applicant had instructed the professional representative to file a divisional application and withdraw the appeal; the representative had done only the latter. This omission was not a drafting error in the document to withdraw the appeal.

The board then explained the consequences of refusing the request for correction, in particular with regard to R. 36 EPC according to which a divisional application can only be filed in relation to a pending earlier patent application. After a withdrawal of the appeal, providing a forum for arguing a case of an allegedly erroneous termination of the appeal proceedings happens in the context of "ancillary proceedings", i.e. proceedings arising out of or in connection with the earlier appeal proceedings, once those proceedings have been concluded. However, such "ancillary proceedings" did not re-open the earlier (concluded) appeal proceedings. This was relevant for the purposes of R. 36 EPC.

169-14-23

## Rule 139 EPC | T 1678/21 | Board 3.5.04

### Rule 139 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1678/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 108 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 06(4) and (5), 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Articles 02(1), 05(1), 05(2), 07(2), 08 RFees, Arrangements for deposit accounts valid as from 1 October 2019, Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 (OJ EU L 124, p. 36 of 20 May 2003)
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error (yes) – payment of the reduced appeal fee using form 1038E – clear intention to pay the regular appeal fee (no) – correction of ADA debit order (yes) – appeal fee (paid)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/12, G 0001/18, J 0008/80, J 0010/87, J 0006/91, J 0003/01, J 0006/02, J 0019/03, J 0005/19, J 0001/20, T 0152/82, T 3023/18, T 0225/19, T 0317/19, T 1060/19, T 1474/19, T 3098/19, T 0333/20, T 0444/20, T 1146/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.U.2.2.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.2.5.4c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1678/21](#) the appellant (applicant) had filed a notice of appeal within the time limit prescribed in Art. 108 EPC. The notice, filed on 6 September 2021, included instructions on Form 1038E to debit the reduced appeal fee. Moreover, the final sentence of the notice of appeal read as follows: "Any additional fees that may be required can be debited from our deposit account [xxx]". Following a communication from the board, the appellant identified that these instructions were erroneous as the regular appeal fee should have been paid. The appellant filed three requests to undo the consequences of this error, including a request for correction under R. 139 EPC.

The board referred to T 152/82, which it understood as holding that obvious errors in the amount of EPO fees in debit orders under the ADA need not be corrected if the intention to pay the correct amount was clear. Although not expressly mentioned in T 152/82, it was obvious to the present board that this intention had to be clear before expiry of the appeal period. According to the board, both T 152/82 and the summary of the subsequent case law endorsing it given in T 1474/19 could be followed, but only under the condition that it was known to a board from the file as it stood at the end of the appeal period that the appellant,

at the point in time of authorising the debit of the reduced appeal fee, was not entitled to the reduction of the appeal fee under R. 6(4) and (5). In the case in hand the board could not spot the appellant's failure to qualify as an SME from the file as it stood at the end of the appeal period. The board noted in its Catchword that from the company name of an appellant alone it could generally not be derived that the appellant did not meet the conditions of R. 6(4) and (5) in conjunction with the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 for payment of the reduced appeal fee. This applied even if a company name was well known. In the absence of proof of the appellant's legal nature in the file at the end of the appeal period, its statements made with a view to paying the appeal fee, both in the notice of appeal and Form 1038E, could not be assessed as reflecting the clear intention to pay the regular appeal fee and thus, effectively, as payment of that fee pursuant to the principles of T 152/82.

In its Catchword, the board also stated that an appellant who gave a debit order for payment of the reduced appeal fee even though it clearly did not meet the conditions of R. 6(4) and (5) EPC committed an obvious mistake within the meaning of J 8/80 and G 1/12.

The board then turned to the appellant's request for correction under R. 139, first sentence, EPC and discussed a selection of decisions handed down since 1980 that set out general principles and specific criteria governing corrections under this provision. According to the board, the four criteria for assessing whether a request for correcting a document filed with the EPO pursuant to R. 139 EPC could be granted were "principles" (a) to (c) of G 1/12, i.e. essentially those of J 8/80, points 4 and 6:

(a) the correction must introduce what was originally intended;

(b) where the original intention is not immediately apparent, the requester bears the burden of proof, which must be a heavy one. The same applies, pursuant to J 8/80, point 6, where the making of the mistake is not self-evident; and

(c) the error to be remedied may be an incorrect statement or an omission,

complemented by criterion

(d) balancing of the public interest in legal certainty with the interest of the party requesting correction, with the factors (i.e. sub-criteria of this criterion) relevant to the specific case.

As a rule, criteria (a) to (d) were to be assessed in the order (c), (a), if applicable, together with (b), and (d). The board concluded that all the criteria for correction applicable in this case had been met. Furthermore, when the erroneous instruction to debit the reduced appeal fee was given, there were sufficient funds in the deposit account for the regular appeal fee to be debited. Thus, payment of the regular fee was deemed to have been made retroactively on 6 September 2021.

037-04-23



## Rule 139 EPC | J 0003/21 | Board 3.1.01

### Rule 139 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>J 0003/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.1.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.07
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 016, 123(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 010(1), 040, 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error (no) – obvious error – immediately evident that nothing else could have been intended – correction of originally filed application documents
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0002/95, J 0005/06, J 0016/13, T 0723/02, T 1248/08, T 0581/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.1.14.7</a> , <a href="#">II.E.4</a> , <a href="#">II.E.5</a> , <a href="#">II.A.3.1</a> , 10th edition

In [J 3/21](#) the appeal was filed against the decision of the Receiving Section to reject the applicants' (appellants') request for correction of the originally filed application documents.

The Legal Board recalled that, according to established jurisprudence, the general principle was that each party bears the burden of proof for the facts it alleges. This principle applied no less to a proposed correction under R. 139 EPC. In addition, the party had to establish such facts to the rigorous standard of "beyond reasonable doubt" (T 1248/08, T 723/02 and T 581/19).

The applicants had not provided any evidence for the alleged obvious errors of originally filing 25 Chinese claims instead of 15 (main request), and of originally filing the application in Chinese instead of in English as intended (first auxiliary request).

The indications in EPO Form 1001 itself regarding the number of claims and the specification in the admissible non-EPO language were, in light of the indicated filing language and of the de facto filing of 25 Chinese claims, not enough to dispel a reasonable doubt about the applicants' alleged facts.

Furthermore, the applicants had failed to prove the obviousness of the corrections sought, i.e. why it was immediately evident that nothing else would have been intended than what was offered as corrections by the main request and the first auxiliary request (R. 139, second sentence, EPC).



The applicants thus failed to fulfil their burden of proof. For this reason alone, neither the main request nor the first auxiliary request were allowable.

For the sake of argument, the Legal Board observed that the Receiving Section had not exceeded its competence (Art. 16 in conjunction with R. 10(1) EPC) when deciding on the request by the applicants to correct at least the description of the originally filed Chinese application by replacing it with at least that of the English translation filed on the same day. The ban on such corrections, established in G 2/95 on the basis of Art. 123(2) EPC and further developed in e.g. J 5/06 and J 16/13, was categorical and followed from the principle reflected in R. 40(1)(c) EPC that the accorded filing date is inseparable from the description as originally filed. An exchange of the description by way of correction would directly result in the separation of the filing date from the description in contravention of Art. 123(2) EPC. Refusing such a request for correction did not require any technical examination and technical qualifications, and this principle applied irrespective of any intention of the applicant.

060-06-23

## Rule 139 EPC | T 0158/21 | Board 3.5.02

### Rule 139 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0158/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error – set of claims – immediately evident that nothing else could have been intended (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/12
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.A.5.5.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 158/21](#) the appellant requested in essence that the set of claims annexed as a pdf-file to the electronically filed application be replaced by the set of claims contained in the zip-file which was also attached to the application. The appellant submitted that the version of the claims contained in the pdf-file was meant for another divisional application filed one day later and that the error was visible from the file names containing the representative's reference numbers for the different applications.

The board recalled that R. 139, first sentence, EPC allowed for the correction of linguistic errors, errors of transcription and mistakes in any document filed with the EPO. As a preliminary remark, the board observed that, in the present case, the request for correction was not directed to the correction of an error in the set of claims filed as a pdf-file. Instead it was aimed at the replacement of a document, i.e. the set of claims filed as a pdf-file, by another set of claims filed as a zip-file.

Furthermore, the board noted that the set of claims contained in the zip-file was submitted as a "pre-conversion" file. A pre-conversion file was foreseen if a document attached to the application form had been prepared by conversion from a different electronic format. Hence, a pre-conversion file was taken into account only to solve problems caused by the conversion of document formats. In the present case the set of claims contained in the pdf-file did not show any sign of corruption.

According to R. 139, second sentence, EPC when the request for correction concerns the description, claims or drawings, the correction must be obvious in the sense that it is immediately evident that nothing else would have been intended than what is offered as

the correction. The board concurred with the appellant insofar as it appeared evident that an error had occurred when filing the present application in view of the different reference numbers used for the pdf- and the zip-file. However, it was by no means obvious whether the mistake laid in the filing of an incorrect set of claims as a pdf-file or whether the reference numbers themselves were incorrectly chosen. In view of the fact that even the kind of error could not be identified in an unambiguous way, it was also not immediately evident how it should be corrected. Thus, it was not evident that the correction offered, i.e. the replacement of the set of claims contained in the pdf-file by the set of claims contained in the zip-file, was in line with the original intention when filing the application in suit.

In view of the above, the board refused the appellant's request for correction of the set of claims.

061-06-23

## Rule 139 EPC | T 0695/18 | Board 3.5.03

## Rule 139 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0695/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.03
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 112a(5) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 036(1), 108(3), 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error (no) – correction of appeal withdrawal (no) – withdrawal of the appeal withdrawal (no) – re-opening of proceedings
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/09, G 0001/12, R 0003/22, J 0010/87, J 0042/92, J 0019/03, J 0023/13, J 0002/15, J 0007/19, T 0824/00, T 0309/03, T 1244/08, T 0610/11, T 2148/18, T 0433/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.7.3.7</a> , <a href="#">V.B.3.13.1</a> , <a href="#">III.H.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 695/18](#) the appellant (applicant) had filed a letter on 28 September 2021 which read, among other things: "[w]e herewith respectfully inform the Boards of Appeal that the Applicant herewith withdraws the appeal. A partial refund of the appeal fee is requested". The board considered that the appellant had withdrawn its appeal and the appeal proceedings were accordingly closed without a substantive decision. The appellant requested a correction of its appeal withdrawal. However, considering that the appeal proceedings were terminated, the board held that it was not competent to deal with that request.

The Enlarged Board re-opened the proceedings by decision R 3/22. It held that the board had implicitly decided on the appeal without deciding on the request for correction. The Enlarged Board observed that according to the case law (with reference to the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10th ed. 2022, V.A.7.3.7), the success of such a request could not be ruled out a priori, and if the request was successful, a decision on the merits would have been possible. The board's refusal to decide on this request was seen as a fundamental procedural defect under Art. 112a(2)(d) and R. 104(b) EPC.

The first question to answer for the board was how Art. 112a(5) and R. 108(3) EPC were to be interpreted and, consequently, how the order of the Enlarged Board was to be understood. The board held that there was nothing textual in the EPC to suggest that the proceedings re-opened by the Enlarged Board in the present case were the appeal proceedings. If the appeal proceedings were intended, those proceedings and thus the

application would be pending again. In the board's view, that would also make no sense from a contextual point of view. The board thus saw the Enlarged Board's order in R 3/22 as one that opened "ancillary proceedings" for establishing whether the request for correction was allowable: if the request were found allowable, the appeal proceedings would continue; if not, the appeal proceedings would be regarded as terminated as of the date when the withdrawal of the appeal took effect.

According to the board, in the present case, immediately and automatically upon the EPO's receipt of the party's submission, the withdrawal had the legal effect of terminating the appeal proceedings as to the substantive issues settled by the refusal of the application, and of rendering the matters subject to that decision *res judicata*, i.e. finally settled. The question to answer was thus whether R. 139 EPC was applicable in the absence of pending proceedings.

The board was not convinced by the reasoning in T 2148/18 (in which the board had allowed a correction of an appeal withdrawal) and held that the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of R. 139 EPC includes the implicit, limiting condition that an error may only be corrected if proceedings before the EPO for some other purpose are pending when the request for correction is received by the EPO. R. 139 EPC was thus not applicable to the present request for correction of the withdrawal of the appeal. In line with the conclusion drawn in case T 1244/08, such a request was found to be inadmissible.

This meant the main request could not be granted. The next question was then whether the application was "pending" within the meaning of R. 36(1) EPC as of the day of the oral proceedings before the board, i.e. on 3 March 2023; the appellant had filed divisional applications relating to the application on 1 October 2021 and 2 March 2023. In the board's view, the EPO's receipt of the withdrawal of the appeal on 28 September 2021 had immediate substantive as well as procedural legal effects. Therefore, when the first divisional application was filed, the application was "dead" on the merits. There was nothing from which new shoots could form.

From the ancillary nature and limited scope of the proceedings at hand, it followed that potential substantive rights associated with the application would only arise if appeal proceedings were re-opened after a finding that R. 139 EPC was applicable, then after another finding that the request for correction was allowable. This was not the case here. As a result, the application was no longer pending on 29 September 2021 and had not been since (i.e. the application was not pending on the dates when the related divisional applications were filed).

The board concluded that, following the above reasoning, and contrary to the Enlarged Board's view set out in R 3/22, R. 139 EPC was indeed to be understood as ruling out *a priori* the success of the former appellant's request for correction by withdrawing its earlier unambiguous and unconditional withdrawal of the appeal.

091-08-23

**Rule 139 EPC | T 1558/21 | Board 3.2.04**
**Rule 139 EPC**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1558/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 139, 140 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	Correction of error (no) – claims – obvious error (no) – correction of errors in decisions (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/10
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.E.4.2.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 113 EPC.](#)

In [T 1558/21](#) war die Kammer aus den nachstehenden Gründen der Ansicht, dass die einmal in der mündlichen Verhandlung verkündete Entscheidung auf Aufrechterhaltung des Patents im Umfang des schriftlich eingereichten Hilfsantrags 1' im Nachhinein nicht mehr auf Grundlage der R. 139 und 140 EPÜ korrigierbar, sondern lediglich mit einer Beschwerde anfechtbar war.

Der schriftlich eingegangene Hilfsantrag 1' war integraler Bestandteil der von der Einspruchsabteilung verkündeten Entscheidung geworden. Trotzdem war eine Berichtigung seiner Ansprüche 1 und 8 nicht unter R. 140 EPÜ möglich, die nur Berichtigungen offener Unrichtigkeiten in Entscheidungen, wie bibliografischer Fehler gestattet, siehe RdBK, 10. Auflage 2022, III.L.2. und 2.1., G 1/10.

Zudem war die Voraussetzung einer offensichtlichen Unrichtigkeit im Sinne eines auch für einen unbeteiligten Dritten sofort erkennbaren Fehlers vorliegend nicht gegeben. Denn objektiv betrachtet war für einen Unbeteiligten aus dem Protokoll nicht offenkundig, dass die Entscheidung auf einem "falschen" Hilfsantrag beruhte.

Ferner war aus dem schriftlichen Hilfsantrag 1' selbst kein offensichtlicher Fehler erkennbar, geschweige denn, wie dieser offensichtlich zu beheben wäre. Dies galt auch im Vergleich mit dem ursprünglichen Hilfsantrag 1, der nach Angaben des Beschwerdeführers auf Seite 4 seines Schreibens vom 10. Mai 2021 zu Hilfsantrag II unnummeriert und weiterverfolgt worden war. Denn es ist nicht ungewöhnlich, dass niederrangige Hilfsanträge mit breiterem unabhängigem Anspruch (hier ohne die Bestandshöhe-Definition) zumindest so lange nicht zurückgezogen werden, bis die

Zulassung eines später eingereichten, höherrangigen Hilfsantrags zum Verfahren geklärt ist.

Dass im schriftlich eingereichten Hilfsantrag 1' weder Fehler noch deren Berichtigung für den Fachmann objektiv und offensichtlich erkennbar waren, führte auch dazu, dass eine Berichtigung gemäß R. 139, 2. Satz EPÜ nicht möglich war, siehe RdBK, 10. Auflage, II.E.4.2.

Der Beschwerdeführer war der Auffassung, es handle sich vorliegend nicht um den in R. 139, 2. Satz behandelten speziellen Fall einer Berichtigung von Patentansprüchen, sondern um den im 1. Satz der R. 139 EPÜ angesprochenen, allgemeinen Fall einer Berichtigung von eingereichten Unterlagen, für den eine Offensichtlichkeit nicht erforderlich sei. Dafür konnte die Kammer jedoch keine Gründe erkennen und befand, dass ein Hilfsantrag, der Ansprüche enthält, unter Satz 2 der R. 139 EPÜ fällt.

Zusammenfassend stand deshalb der Einspruchsabteilung nach Verkündung ihrer fehlerhaften Entscheidung in der mündlichen Verhandlung die Möglichkeit einer Berichtigung unter den R. 139 oder 140 EPÜ nicht mehr offen.

092-08-23

## Rule 139 EPC | T 0130/19 | Board 3.3.03

### Rule 139 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0130/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 6(4), 6(5), 139 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error (yes) – erroneous indication of method of payment on Form 1038E – admissibility of appeal (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/12, T 0317/19, T 3098/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.U.2.2.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.2.5.4c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 130/19](#) the appellant (patent proprietor) filed a notice of appeal within the two-month time limit. However, due to the erroneous indication "not specified" in the "Method of payment" box on Form 1038E, the debit order for the payment of the appeal fee was not carried out before expiry of that time limit. The appellant requested a correction under R. 139, first sentence, EPC of Form 1038E.

According to the board, it was undisputed that the requested correction fulfilled the conditions set out in G 1/12. The board referred to T 317/19, which relied on G 1/12 and allowed a correction under R. 139 EPC in a similar factual situation concerning an appeal in an ex parte case. The board did not see why the reasoning in T 317/19 should not apply to an appeal in an inter partes case, since the ruling of G 1/12 clearly applied to both ex parte and inter partes cases. Moreover, T 3098/19, also applying G 1/12, authorised a correction under R. 139 EPC of the amount of the appeal fee in an inter partes case.

In the case at issue, the board was of the view that the indication "011 Appeal fee for an appeal filed by an entity other than those referred to in R. 6(4) and (5) EPC" in original Form 1038E showed that the intention of the patent proprietor was to pay the appeal fee at the same time as filing the notice of appeal. The request for correction was filed on the day that the appellant was informed by a telephone call from the registrar that the payment method had not been specified, i.e. without delay.

The board concluded that the request for correction of Form 1038E was to be allowed and that the appeal was therefore deemed to have been timely filed.

104-09-23



## Rule 140 EPC | T 0806/21 | Board 3.3.04

### Rule 140 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0806/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.06.17
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 071(3), 140 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of errors in decisions – grant decision – omission of pages – correction (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/10, T 2081/16, T 1003/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.L.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 806/21](#) the board held that, as ruled in decision G 1/10, R. 140 EPC is not available to correct patents. G 1/10 does not restrict the scope of the exclusion of the applicability of the rule in any way.

The appeal of the patent proprietors was against the decision of the examining division to refuse correction of the decision to grant. The decision under appeal acknowledged that the omission of pages 85 to 105 was an error of the examining division, which the patent proprietors did not raise with the examining division. However, the board held that the two cases that the appellants had relied on, T 1003/19 and T 2081/16, differed from the case at hand in that in those cases the decision to grant had not been final and had been appealed within the time limit for appeals.

Decision G 1/10 clearly expressed that, the exclusion of the applicability of R. 140 EPC was not restricted in scope in any way. The board therefore could not accept an interpretation of decision G 1/10 according to which, as argued by the appellants, R. 140 EPC could be applied to correct a patent if the communication under R. 71(3) EPC did not reflect the true intention of the examining division because it included an unintentional amendment to the application as filed. There was nothing in G 1/10 even hinting at such an approach. On the contrary, the arguments for the exclusion of the applicability of the rule, in particular legal certainty, equally applied to this situation.

In addition, decision G 1/10 (point 11 of the Reasons) appeared to eliminate any possible doubt by stating: "If, given the opportunity to check the patent text before approving it, an applicant does not draw any errors to the attention of the examining division and thus ensure his approval is limited to the correct text, then the responsibility for any errors remaining in that text after grant should be his alone, whether the error was made (or

introduced) by him or by the examining division". This was the situation in the present case. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

018-02-23

## Rule 140 EPC | T 1846/20 | Board 3.3.02

### Rule 140 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1846/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.09
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 002(2), 097 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 071(3), 140 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of errors in decisions – request refused
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/10, T 1003/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.L.2.1.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1846/20](#) the appeal was lodged by the patent proprietor (appellant) against the decision of the examining division refusing the request for the re-issue of the B-specification of the patent and the request for re-establishment of rights.

The application for the patent was filed on 16 June 2016 in Chinese as an international application under the PCT. The application was published on 23 December 2015 and included sheets 1/3 to 3/3 of drawings. These drawings contained text in Chinese.

When the application entered the European phase, the applicant checked the boxes in Form 1200P specifying that: the proceedings before the EPO were to be based on the application documents published by the International Bureau with all claims, description and drawings; and the translations of the international application documents, i.e. abstract, description, claims and any text in the drawings, in one of the official languages of the EPO were attached. However, no translation of text matter of the drawings was filed. On 5 April 2019, the examining division issued a communication under R. 71(3) EPC notifying the applicant about its intention to grant a European patent on the basis of the documents, with no mention of the drawings. The text intended for grant, i.e. the Druckexemplar, not containing any sheet of drawings, was attached to the communication. On 25 July 2019, the examining division issued the decision to grant a European patent with the documents indicated in its communication. No appeal against this decision to grant was filed.

By letter dated 4 November 2019, the applicant stated that the applicant's name in the B-specification of the patent was incorrect. Moreover, it noted that the B-specification of the patent did not include the drawings present in the PCT application. It requested re-issue of the B-specification of the patent, including the correct applicant's name and the

drawings filed with this letter. Drawings sheets 1/3 to 3/3 corresponding to sheets 1/3 to 3/3 as published under the PCT with Chinese text matter translated into English were enclosed. The examining division informed the appellant that the applicant's name had been corrected as requested, but that the request to correct the patent was not admissible. This decision was appealed.

The board held that since no errors had occurred in the process of converting the version as intended for grant into the B-specification, the discussion of affecting third parties was irrelevant. When receiving the communication under R. 71(3) EPC clarifying the examining division's position on the text intended for grant, the appellant should have realised that to safeguard its interests it should request the inclusion of the drawings. However, the appellant had failed to do this and instead approved the proposed text and did not file any appeal. As a consequence, the decision to grant became final (Art. 97(1) and (3) EPC)."

Decision T 1003/19 invoked by the appellant concerned a case in which an appeal against the decision to grant a European patent had been filed. In contrast, in the current case, the appellant did not file any appeal against the decision to grant. Therefore, the grant decision became final, and the granted patent ceased to be within the jurisdiction of the EPO (G 1/10).

As stated in G 1/10, from its grant, a European patent becomes, subject only to the possibility of later EPO proceedings by way of opposition or limitation, a bundle of national patents each of which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a designated Contracting State (see Art. 2(2) EPC). Therefore, since in the current case the decision to grant has become final, the EPO, except in opposition or limitation proceedings, has no jurisdiction to change the text of the granted patent or deal with the request for correction. The board concluded that the request for re-issue of the B-specification of the patent by including sheets 1/3 to 3/3 of the drawings as filed on 4 November 2019 was not allowable in view of decision G 1/10.

147-12-23

## Rule 140 EPC | T 0255/22 | Board 3.2.03

## Rule 140 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0255/22</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 139, 140 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	correction of error in decisions –first-instance decisions – correction of minutes of department of first instance
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0008/95, R 0004/18, T 0613/14
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.L.1.2</a> , 10th edition

In [T 255/22](#) the board held that it had no competence to correct or amend under R. 140 EPC the reasons given by a first-instance department in the written decision, or to order such a correction or amendment. The reasons for this were essentially twofold and rely on the Enlarged Board's findings in G 8/95. First, for a correction pursuant to R. 140 EPC, the manifest intention of the deciding body is decisive (see G 8/95, point 3.2 of the Reasons) and the board cannot interfere with this intention.

This was in accordance with the Enlarged Board's finding that the competence to correct errors in a decision under R. 140 EPC lies with the body which had given the decision (G 8/95).

As pointed out in G 8/95, the principle underlying R. 140 EPC was that an obvious clerical mistake can be corrected by the deciding body responsible for the decision in a situation where the decision does not express its manifest intention. It would go against this principle if the board could correct or amend the wording of the reasons in a way which deviated from the opposition division's manifest intention. Doing so should not be within the power of a board.

Second, the reasons given by the deciding body represent the very substance of the decision, which can be challenged by a party only in an appeal against this decision. If there is concern as to the substance of a decision, the correct way of addressing a deficiency therein is to appeal this decision. An appeal against the refusal to correct the decision under R. 140 EPC is not the correct avenue to pursue.

In its second and third requests, the appellant no longer requested that an amendment to the reasons be ordered. Rather, the board was requested to "confirm" that a specific wording in the main decision was an obvious mistake under R. 140 EPC (and, as an auxiliary measure, it was asked to confirm what the wording should be, namely the one suggested by the appellant), and the board should also "confirm" that the absence of a specific wording in the main decision was an obvious mistake under R. 140 EPC. These requests also failed. The board held that it had no competence to confirm that an "obvious mistake" within the meaning of R. 140 EPC had been made in the reasons given by a first-instance department in the written decision.

The reason for this was again that the board could not interfere with the manifest intention of what the opposition division had – in its view and as confirmed in its communication – correctly written in the reasons of the decision. Yet it was this that the board would have done if it had "confirmed" the existence of obvious mistakes in the reasoning given by the opposition division. This also applied to the request for the board to "confirm" what the party believed the wording of the reasons should be.

In addition, as also set out above, as long as it concerns the substance of the decision, an appeal against the refusal to correct the decision under R. 140 EPC is not the correct avenue to pursue.

Lastly, the board held that the Boards of Appeal have no competence to correct or amend the content of the minutes of oral proceedings before a first-instance department, or to order such a correction or amendment. The correction of the minutes falls neither under R. 139 EPC nor under R. 140 EPC:

The minutes are not a "document filed with the European Patent Office" within the meaning of R. 139 EPC. The board noted that, in R 10/08, the Enlarged Board referred to R. 139 EPC in the context of the correction of the minutes. However, the text of R. 139 EPC was clear in that it only referred to documents filed with the EPO, which is not the case for the minutes. The minutes are also not a "decision" within the meaning of R. 140 EPC. The case law of the Boards of Appeal is consistent in that the minutes do not constitute a decision, nor are they part of the decision announced at the oral proceedings (see T 613/14). That the minutes are not a "decision" was also confirmed by the Enlarged Board in R 4/18. The present board agreed with this case law.

148-12-23

## Rule 142 EPC | J 0009/21 | Board 3.1.01

### Rule 142 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>J 0009/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.1.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.23
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 020(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 142(1)(b) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Section 437D of the Australian Corporations Act
<b>Keywords</b>	interruption of proceedings (yes) - patent proprietor prevented by legal reasons from continuing the proceedings (yes) – competence of the Legal Division to declare interruption of proceedings (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0011/95, J 0018/12, J 0010/19, J 0014/19, T 0854/12, T 0054/17, T 1389/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.D.4.7</a> , 10th edition

In [J 9/21](#) the Legal Division had declared with its communication dated 26 July 2019 that the opposition proceedings had been interrupted as from 11 November 2016 (i.e. as from the day after the expiry of the opposition period) and that they would be resumed on 4 November 2019. After issuing a communication and holding oral proceedings, the Legal Division issued the decision on the interruption of the opposition proceedings on 9 July 2021. The opponent appealed.

During the aforementioned interruption period, the opposition division had revoked the European patent and the patent proprietor had filed an appeal against that decision (appeal number T 967/18). The appealed decision in J 9/21 was the decision of the Legal Division dated 9 July 2021.

The Legal Board of Appeal found that the Legal Division had the power to determine an interruption of the proceedings. On the question of whether the conditions of R. 142(1)(b) EPC had been fulfilled, the Legal Board noted that the mere fact that there was no bankruptcy judgment and that the former patent proprietor entered voluntarily into external administration under the Australian Corporations Act did not speak against the application of R. 142(1)(b) EPC. Once the external administrator had been appointed, voluntarily or involuntarily, according to Section 437D of the Australian Corporations Act only the external administrator could deal with a company's property.

As the disputed patent was part of the former patent proprietor's company property at the relevant point in time, the former patent proprietor was indeed "prevented by legal reasons from continuing the proceedings". Thus, the conditions for an interruption under R. 142(1)(b) EPC were fulfilled.

According to the Legal Board, the mere fact that an applicant or patent proprietor continued proceedings before the EPO did not allow any conclusions to be drawn as to whether they were legally prevented from doing so. The interruption of proceedings under R. 142(1)(b) EPC by force of law rather ensured that acts undertaken by applicants or patent proprietors which continued the proceedings even though they were not legally allowed to do so were invalid and therefore could not be detrimental to the legitimate interests of third parties. The Legal Board in the present case did not understand J 11/95, cited by the appellant, as relying merely on the factual continuation of the proceedings by the applicant to arrive at the conclusion that the applicant was legally not prevented from doing so. Rather, it seemed that the board in J 11/95 was of the opinion that, in view of the evidence provided, national bankruptcy in that specific case had not legally prevented the company concerned from continuing the proceedings before the EPO.

In relation to the appellant's request to set aside the decision under appeal, or, alternatively, to set 21 February 2017 as the new date of resumption of proceedings, the Legal Board noted that allowing the appellant's requests would require the interruption to be set aside with retroactive effect. According to the case law, this would not be possible even if the declaration of interruption was erroneous. Following this case law, the appellant's main and auxiliary requests could not be allowed for that reason alone. The Legal Board recalled that the reasons invoked in the case law included that otherwise time limits which had been declared by the Legal Division to be interrupted could, from the parties' perspectives, be shortened or expire retroactively. Furthermore, the public had legitimate expectations that the dates of interruption and resumption entered into the European Patent Register were correct.

Moreover, according to the Legal Board, the Legal Division was not barred from issuing a communication on the interruption of the proceedings without hearing the parties beforehand as a matter of principle. However, if it did not hear the parties beforehand, it had to hear them afterwards. Having heard the parties, the Legal Division had to be open to arrive at a conclusion deviating from its initial assessment. According to the case law, it may be that procedural acts which were carried out during the period for which the interruption was declared had to be repeated even if the Legal Division itself, after having heard the parties, considered its previous declaration of interruption erroneous. The Legal Board noted that in some cases, particularly if entire opposition proceedings had been conducted during the relevant period, the expected legal consequences of the interruption may indeed require the Legal Division to hear the parties before issuing a declaration of interruption.

038-04-23



## Rule 142 EPC | T 0956/19 | Board 3.3.04

### Rule 142 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0956/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.17
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 099(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 084(2), 142 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	interruption of proceedings – admissibility of opposition (yes) – interruption of opposition proceedings applies from time of effective filing of opposition, but cannot exclude it
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/93, G 0001/10, T 0854/12, T 0054/17
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.D.4.8.</a> , <a href="#">IV.C.2.2.2.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 956/19](#) machte der Beschwerdeführer I (Patentinhaber) mit seiner Beschwerde geltend, dass die Einsprüche der Einsprechenden 1 und 2 (Beschwerdeführer II und III) nicht wirksam eingelegt worden seien. Er argumentierte im Wesentlichen, dass die Einsprüche während einer nachträglich festgestellten Unterbrechung des Einspruchsverfahrens nach R. 142 (1) b) EPÜ und damit außerhalb einer laufenden Einspruchsfrist eingereicht worden seien. Nach Ansicht des Beschwerdeführers I hätten die Einsprüche nach Wiederaufnahme des Einspruchsverfahrens erneut innerhalb der gemäß R. 142 (4) EPÜ von Neuem laufenden Einspruchsfrist eingereicht werden müssen.

Die Kammer befand, dass – selbst wenn sich die Rechtsfolgen der Unterbrechung bereits aus dem Vorliegen der Unterbrechungsvoraussetzungen und nicht erst aus deren Feststellung und Eintragung ergeben (vgl. T 854/12) – diese Folgen nicht die dazwischen eingelegten Einsprüche betreffen können, welche die Zuständigkeit des EPA und die Anhängigkeit des Verfahrens begründen. Die "Unterbrechung des Verfahrens" im Sinne von R. 142 EPÜ könne mit anderen Worten nicht die "Beseitigung des Verfahrens" zur Folge haben, da dies auch eine Wiederaufnahme ausschließen würde. Wie die Beschwerdeführer II und III zutreffend ausgeführt hätten, stelle eine laufende Einspruchsfrist selbst noch kein anhängiges Verfahren vor dem EPA dar, sondern lediglich eine zeitliche Schranke für die Einlegung des Einspruchs. Eine Unterbrechung könne daher frühestens ab dem Zeitpunkt der wirksamen Einlegung der Einsprüche gelten, diese aber nicht ausschließen. Insofern verkenne die Feststellung im Schreiben der Rechtsabteilung des EPA vom 15. Oktober 2014, wonach das

Einspruchsverfahren ab dem 27. Dezember 2013 unterbrochen wurde, das Erfordernis eines anhängigen Verfahrens. Nach richtiger Auffassung sei das Einspruchsverfahren erst nach dessen Anhängigkeit durch rechtswirksame Einlegung der Einsprüche unterbrochen worden.

Die Kammer betonte, dass der Auffassung des Beschwerdeführers I auch deswegen nicht gefolgt werden könne, weil R. 142 (4) EPÜ nicht auf Fristen – wie die Einspruchsfrist nach Art. 99 (1) EPÜ – anwendbar sei, welche weder vom Anmelder noch vom Patentinhaber einzuhalten sind (s. bezogen auf die Einspruchsfrist G 9/93). Hierfür spreche schon der Wortlaut der R. 142 EPÜ. Da die Handlungsunfähigkeit anderer Verfahrensbeteiligter keinen Grund für eine Unterbrechung darstelle, blieben Fristen, die diesen Verfahrensbeteiligten gegenüber laufen, bei der Anwendung von R. 142 (4) EPÜ außer Betracht. Somit könnten bei nachträglich festgestellter Unterbrechung nur diejenigen Rechtsfolgen, die vom Beginn der Unterbrechung bis zu deren späterer Feststellung eingetreten sind, als unbeachtlich angesehen werden, welche sich aus dem Säumnis unterbrochener Fristen ergeben, die vom Anmelder oder Patentinhaber bzw. dessen Vertreter einzuhalten waren.

Die vorstehende Interpretation decke sich auch mit dem Normzweck. Die Unterbrechung solle einen Rechtsverlust oder nachteilige Verfahrensentwicklungen wegen eines Fristversäumnisses verhindern, wenn ein Anmelder oder Patentinhaber oder dessen Vertreter aus den in R. 142 (1) a) bis c) EPÜ genannten Gründen verhindert ist, Verfahrenshandlungen rechtzeitig vorzunehmen. Die Unterbrechung diene mithin dem Schutz des Anmelders oder Patentinhabers (T 54/17). R. 142 EPÜ schließe Einsprechende aber gewollt nicht als Schutzadressaten ein: Stirbt ein Einsprechender oder verliert er seine Geschäftsfähigkeit, so bestimmt R. 84 (2) EPÜ, dass das Einspruchsverfahren ohne die Beteiligung seiner Erben oder gesetzlichen Vertreter von Amts wegen fortgesetzt werden kann. Zum Schutz des Patentinhabers sei ausreichend, dass R. 142 (4) EPÜ während einer Unterbrechung des Verfahrens verhindert, dass Verfahrenshandlungen von Einsprechenden Fristen für den Patentinhaber in Gang setzen. Daher schließe auch der Normzweck eine Unterbrechung der Einspruchsfrist aus, soweit diese nach (frühzeitigem) Einlegen eines Einspruchs und Vorliegen eines Unterbrechungsgrunds noch laufen sollte.

Die Kammer schlussfolgerte, dass die am letzten Tag der Einspruchsfrist nach Art. 99 (1) EPÜ eingereichten Einsprüche der Einsprechenden 1 und 2 fristgerecht und rechtswirksam eingelegt worden und mithin zulässig seien. Die Beschwerde des Beschwerdeführers I wurde zurückgewiesen.

077-07-23

## Rule 142 EPC | T 0967/18 | Board 3.3.04

### Rule 142 EPC

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0967/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 106(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rule 142 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	interruption of proceedings (yes) – admissibility of appeal (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0009/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.D.4.8.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 104\(1\) EPC.](#)

In [T 967/18](#) the appeal was against the opposition division's decision of 5 February 2018 revoking the patent. After the filing of this appeal, the Legal Division had informed the appellant (patent proprietor) that the opposition proceedings had been interrupted with effect 11 November 2016 and that the proceedings would resume on 4 November 2019. The opponent had appealed the Legal Division's decision. The Legal Board of Appeal dismissed that appeal in J 9/21.

Hence, the opposition division had revoked the European patent and the patent proprietor had filed appeal T 967/18 during the aforementioned interruption period. In T 967/18 the board agreed with the Legal Board that it is not possible to set aside with ex-nunc effect a decision on interruption. It also agreed with the Legal Board's reasoning. In the current proceedings, it was only necessary to decide on the effects that the interruption had on the appeal. As correctly explained in J 9/21, in accordance with previous decisions of the boards, where the proceedings have been interrupted under R. 142(1)(b) EPC, acts done by the parties or the competent body of the EPO during the period of interruption are considered invalid.

Categories may be borrowed from legal national traditions to argue whether they are invalid, devoid of effect or even non-existent. Irrespective of this qualification issue, the result and impact on appeals lodged against decisions taken during an interruption remain the same: the appeal and the appeal proceedings have no valid subject eligible for judicial review. In line with established case law, an admissible appeal requires the existence of an appealable decision. Thus, the appeal in question had to be regarded

as not satisfying the requirements set out in Art. 106(1) EPC and was therefore inadmissible.

122-10-23

## Article 12(2) RPBA 2007

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1842/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2021.12.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2),(4), 13(1) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	reply to the statement of grounds of appeal – party's complete case – late-filed auxiliary request – request not examined by the opposition division – unsubstantiated request
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.3.2.2</a> , <a href="#">V.A.5.11.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.5.12.5</a> , <a href="#">V.A.5.12.6</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1842/18](#) wurde der Hilfsantrag 10-alt im Beschwerdeverfahren erst mit der Erwiderung des Patentinhabers auf die Beschwerdebegründung des Einsprechenden 1 eingereicht. Der Antrag war identisch mit dem Hilfsantrag 9, welcher der Einspruchsabteilung in Antwort auf die Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung vorgelegt worden war. Dieser wurde nicht in der angegriffenen Entscheidung behandelt, da er dem Hilfsantrag, auf dessen Basis die angegriffene Entscheidung erging, nachgeordnet war. Die Beschwerdeerwiderung des Patentinhabers enthielt keine Substantiierung im Zusammenhang mit Hilfsantrag 10-alt.

Dazu trug der Patentinhaber später vor, dass es die Aufgabe eines Einsprechenden sei, die Zulässigkeit bzw. Gewährbarkeit von Hilfsanträgen im Beschwerdeverfahren in Frage zu stellen und der Patentinhaber bis dahin nicht verpflichtet sei, die Zulässigkeit der Hilfsanträge zu begründen. Zudem seien gemäß der Verfahrensordnung lediglich Beweismittel und Argumente anzuführen, weshalb eine ergangene Entscheidung abzuändern, zu bestätigen oder aufzuheben ist. Über den betreffenden Hilfsantrag sei aber überhaupt nicht entschieden worden. Darüber hinaus argumentierte der Patentinhaber, eine Begründung für die Hilfsanträge sei bereits bei Einreichung vor der Einspruchsabteilung vorgelegt worden.

Die Kammer wies aber darauf hin, dass gemäß Art. 12 (2) VOBK 2007 die Beschwerdebegründung und die Erwiderung den vollständigen Sachvortrag der

Beteiligten enthalten müssen, wozu auch eine Begründung für in diesem Verfahrensstadium neu eingereichte Hilfsanträge gehört. Der Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern ist in ihrer Gesamtheit zu entnehmen, dass das Beschwerdeverfahren primär ein schriftliches ist, wobei Art. 12 (2) VOBK 2007 festlegt, dass das vollständige Vorbringen der Beteiligten bereits zu Beginn des Verfahrens zu erfolgen hat. Zweck dieser Bestimmung ist es, ein faires Verfahren für alle Beteiligten sicherzustellen und es der Kammer zu ermöglichen, ihre Arbeit auf der Basis eines vollständigen Vorbringens beider Seiten zu beginnen. Wenn Hilfsanträge vorgelegt werden, erfordert dies in der Regel auch eine Begründung, inwiefern die bisherigen Einwände hierdurch ausgeräumt werden.

Die Kammer rief zudem in Erinnerung, dass das Beschwerdeverfahren ein vom Verfahren vor der Einspruchsabteilung vollständig getrenntes, unabhängiges Verfahren ist und daher allgemeine Rückbezüge auf vorheriges, erstinstanzlich vorgebrachtes Vorbringen im Beschwerdeverfahren außer Betracht gelassen werden. Erst recht kann eine eventuelle Substantiierung eines Hilfsantrags im Einspruchsverfahren nicht im Beschwerdeverfahren berücksichtigt werden, wenn ein solcher Rückbezug fehlt.

Der Hilfsantrag 10-alt, der erstmals in Vorbereitung auf die mündliche Verhandlung vor der Kammer begründet wurde, war somit als verspätet anzusehen. Bei Ausübung ihres Ermessens nach Art. 12 (4) und 13 VOBK 2007 prüfte die Kammer das Konvergenzkriterium, d.h. ob die geänderten Ansprüche gegenüber dem vorher beanspruchten Gegenstand konvergierten oder divergierten, also den Gegenstand des unabhängigen Anspruchs eines Hauptantrags in eine Richtung bzw. in Richtung eines Erfindungsgedankens zunehmend einschränkend weiterentwickelten oder durch Aufnahme jeweils verschiedener Merkmale unterschiedliche Weiterentwicklungen verfolgten. Der Hilfsantrag divergierte im vorliegenden Fall aber von einem höherrangigen Hilfsantrag und die Kammer entschied daher, ihn nicht zuzulassen.

019-02-23

## Article 11 RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2907/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.08
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 084, 123 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 11 RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	remittal to the opposition division (no) – special reasons for remittal (no) – claim feature interpretation as product-by-process feature overturned
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.9.3.2d</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 2907/18](#) the board overturned the opposition division's finding that feature P7 of claim 1 was to be understood as a product-by-process feature and therefore held that claim 1 of the patent lacked novelty. In the opinion of the respondent (patent proprietor), this constituted special reasons within the meaning of Art. 11 RPBA 2020, justifying remittal of the case to the opposition division without the board considering admissibility or allowability of any of the auxiliary requests.

The board noted that the different interpretation regarding feature P7 was not raised for the first time by the board, but rather also by the appellant who was confronted with the product-by-process interpretation of the opposition division for the first time at oral proceedings before the opposition division. The consequence of the board finding that feature P7 was clearly not a product-by-process feature was merely that claim 1 was interpreted to have a broader scope than that seen by the opposition division. Such a broader interpretation of a feature, however, was not in general seen as an exceptional circumstance justifying a departure from established practice of remitting a case only on the basis of a request found to meet at least Art. 84 and 123 EPC.

The respondent's further argument that the board's conclusion represented a complete reversal of the reasons on which the decision was based and that the three examiners in the opposition division were technical specialists in that particular technical area such that these should be tasked with the new situation based on the board's finding, was also not accepted as a reason for remittal.

049-05-23

## Article 12(4) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0714/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.01
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 116(2) and 137(3) EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4), (6) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – late-filed requests – no longer maintained in first-instance proceedings (yes) – admitted in first-instance (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1134/11
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.3.4</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.6</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 714/20](#) the appellant (applicant) had requested that a patent be granted on the basis of a main request or one of two auxiliary requests, all filed with the grounds of appeal. These requests corresponded respectively to the main request filed in advance of the oral proceedings before the examining division, but later replaced by the main request underlying the decision, to this latter main request, and to the first auxiliary request underlying the decision, all further amended in the same way to remedy the clarity objection noted in the decision in respect of the then main request.

This amendment used wording employed by the examining division itself when construing the claim. The board therefore considered this to be an appropriate response to the grounds for refusal and did not see it as an obstacle to admittance under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020. The first auxiliary request (main request underlying the decision) was therefore admitted.

The main request, on the other hand, was based on a request not maintained at first instance. The board, referring to the statement in Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020 that "[t]he Board shall not admit requests ... which were no longer maintained, in the proceedings leading to the decision under appeal", observed that since the non-maintained request had been amended, this provision did not apply as such. However, in the board's view the principle expressed in the cited passage could be considered in the exercise of discretion to admit amendments under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020.

Examining the appellant's arguments, the board pointed out, among other things, that it had been the appellant's choice not to re-file the current main request before the



examining division. As a consequence, this request was not part of the decision under appeal and its admittance was therefore within the board's discretion. Moreover, the board rejected the appellant's allegation that the new main request on appeal was merely filed to solve the clarity issue. It noted that the amendment which had been carried out as a response to the mentioned clarity objection was unrelated to the amendment carried out at first instance when the previous main request was replaced with the one underlying the appealed decision. Thus the board did not see any circumstances that would justify the admittance of this request (Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020, in view of Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020).

The second auxiliary request was based on the first auxiliary request underlying the decision under appeal, which was not admitted by the examining division pursuant to R. 116(2) EPC and R. 137(3) EPC. The board considered that, again, Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020 did not apply as such, but was of the opinion that the principle expressed in it, according to which "[t]he Board shall not admit requests ... which were not admitted in the proceedings leading to the decision under appeal, unless the decision not to admit them suffered from an error in the use of discretion", may be considered in the exercise of discretion to admit amendments under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020.

The board observed that, in the case in hand, the second auxiliary request differed from the one not admitted by the examining division in a way (amendment for clarity) which was unrelated to the reasons given for non-admittance (late filing and divergence). The board was further of the opinion that the discretionary decision of the examining division not to admit the first auxiliary request underlying the decision was taken in a reasonable manner. It also did not see other circumstances that would justify the admittance in appeal of a new request based on it. Thus the second auxiliary request was not admitted (Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020, in view of Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020).

With regard to patentability of the first auxiliary request, the board concluded that, under a technically meaningful claim construction, claim 1 lacked novelty in view of D1 (Art. 54 EPC).

030-03-23

**Article 12(4) RPBA 2020 | T 0108/20 | Board 3.2.04**

**Article 12(4) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0108/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.02
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – request – admissibly raised and maintained (yes) – objection – references to first-instance submissions – unrebutted submissions
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.1c</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.5</a> , 10th edition

In [T 108/20](#) war Hilfsantrag 3 identisch mit dem Hilfsantrag 3, der mit Schreiben vom 26. Juni 2019 (d.h. vor dem nach R. 116 EPC festgelegten Datum) der Einspruchsabteilung vorgelegt wurde. Die angefochtene Entscheidung erging nur auf Basis der erteilten Fassung, da der Einspruch zurückgewiesen wurde. Die Kammer befand, dass der Hilfsantrag 3 zwar nicht Gegenstand der Entscheidung war, jedoch unbestritten im Einspruchsverfahren in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten worden war (Art. 12(4) VOBK 2020).

Des Weiteren entschied die Kammer auch die Einwände gegen Hilfsantrag 3 zum Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen. Diese waren erstmals mit Eingabe vom 18. Juli 2019 vor der Einspruchsabteilung erhoben worden. Die Beschwerdebegründung enthielt Einwände gegen die Ansprüche wie erteilt und darüber hinaus nur eine allgemeine Bezugnahme auf das erstinstanzliche Vorbringen. Erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung erhob der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechende 2) die in erster Instanz vorgebrachten Einwände gegen Hilfsantrag 3. Die Kammer entschied aus folgenden Gründen, diese nach Art. 12(4) VOBK 2020 zuzulassen:

Aus Sicht der Kammer kann sich im streitigen Verfahren Gerechtigkeit nur über die Verfahrensgerechtigkeit definieren, nämlich durch den auf Rechtsfindung gerichteten Diskurs: Rede und Gegenrede. Aus dem diskursiven Charakter des Verfahrens ergebe sich, dass von einer Partei nur dann erwartet werden könne sich zu äußern, wenn zu ihrem Vorbringen Stellung genommen worden sei, sei es durch das Amt, die Kammer oder durch die andere Partei. Im Hinblick auf seine Einwände gegen den Hilfsantrag 3

hatte der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechende 2) auf seine Eingabe an die Einspruchsabteilung vom 18. Juli 2019 verwiesen. Die Kammer bestätigte zwar, dass in der Regel allgemeine Rückbezüge auf Vorbringen in erster Instanz im Beschwerdeverfahren außer Betracht gelassen werden (RdBK V.A.2.6.5). Sie hob jedoch hervor, dass im vorliegenden Fall die Entscheidung zur Zurückweisung des Einspruchs auf Basis der erteilten Ansprüche ergangen war und der Hilfsantrag 3 nicht in der angefochtenen Entscheidung behandelt wurde. Zudem waren die Hilfsanträge erst nach Erlass der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung gestellt worden, so dass auch der beigefügte Bescheid der Abteilung nicht auf diese Hilfsanträge eingegangen war. Somit gab es aus Sicht der Kammer im vorliegenden Fall keine von der Einspruchsabteilung genannten Gründe gegen den Hilfsantrag 3, auf welche der Beschwerdeführer in seinem schriftlichen Beschwerdevorbringen hätte eingehen können. Nach Ansicht der Kammer lag daher ein Fall vor, in welchem ein pauschaler Verweis auf ein Vorbringen vor der Einspruchsabteilung ausreichte, um dieses Vorbringen zum Gegenstand des Beschwerdeverfahrens zu machen.

050-05-23

## Article 12(4) RPBA 2020 | T 0221/20 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 12(4) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0221/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.07
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(2), (4) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case (no) – request – evidence – admissibly raised and maintained (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.1c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 221/20](#) the board had to decide on the admittance of auxiliary requests 1 and 2 and documents K7 and K8. Auxiliary requests 1 and 2 were filed within the time limit set by the opposition division in its summons to attend oral proceedings. Documents K7 and K8 were filed some two weeks later by the opponent. The documents and auxiliary requests were re-filed in the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply to it, respectively.

The board examined whether these submissions constituted an amendment to a party's case within the meaning of Art. 12(2) and (4) RPBA 2020. It noted that the decision under appeal was not based on auxiliary requests 1 and 2 and documents K7 and K8 were not discussed by the opposition division. However, as auxiliary requests 1 and 2 were filed within the time limit set by the opposition division in its summons and because the filing of documents K7 and K8 two weeks later constituted a direct reaction to the submission of these amended requests, the board was satisfied that auxiliary requests 1 and 2 as well as documents K7 and K8 were admissibly raised in the proceedings leading to the decision under appeal. Moreover, auxiliary requests 1 and 2 and documents K7 and K8 were maintained until the department of first instance took its decision.

Therefore, the board concluded that in accordance with Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020, auxiliary requests 1 and 2 and documents K7 and K8 were not to be regarded as an amendment to the parties' respective cases. Since they were part of the appeal proceedings, the board had no discretion not to admit these requests and documents. This conclusion was uncontested by the parties and also confirmed in the explanatory remarks to Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020 (section VI. of document CA/3/19, [Supplementary publication 2](#),

[OJ 2020, p. 56](#)). The board remitted the case to the opposition division for further prosecution under Art. 111(1), second sentence, EPC and Art. 11 RPBA 2020.

062-06-23

## Article 12(4) RPBA 2020 | T 0019/20 | Board 3.3.03

### Article 12(4) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0019/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.03.08
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 069(1), 123(3) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), 12(4), 12(6), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – basis of the proceedings – appeal case directed to objections on which decision was based (yes) – requirements of Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020 met (yes) – admissibly raised and maintained (yes) – amendment to appeal case – amendment after summons – exceptional circumstances (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 2920/18, T 2988/18, T 0247/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.2.2</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 19/20](#) claim 1 of the main request (patent as maintained by the opposition division) corresponded to claim 1 as granted, in which a part had been deleted. The board had to decide on admittance of the appellant's (opponent's) objection under Art. 123(3) EPC against this claim. According to the respondent, the opponent had not raised any objections under Art. 123(3) EPC against this claim during the oral proceedings before the opposition division. Indeed, it was clear from the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division and from the contested decision that no specific objection under Art. 123(3) EPC had been raised against what was then auxiliary request 2 (later main request). However, as underlined by the board, it was also undisputed between the parties that the present objection under Art. 123(3) EPC was exactly the same as the objection raised against the main request of the opposition proceedings. The amendments in auxiliary request 2 were unrelated to the objection. This objection was discussed at the oral proceedings and fully dealt with by the opposition division. Moreover, the board considered that the objection had been maintained also against lower ranking requests such as auxiliary request 2, which differed from the main request by amendments unrelated to the objection, even if not explicitly repeated. In this respect, the board considered that the statement of the appellant that there were no objections under Art. 123(3) EPC against auxiliary request 2 had to be understood as expressing that there were no further objections. Hence, the condition of the second sentence of Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020 did not apply to the objection at issue. For these

reasons, the board took the view that the appellant's submission under Art. 123(3) EPC was directed to an objection on which the decision was based and was therefore not an amendment of the appellant's case. The board had therefore no discretion not to take it into account.

The board also had to deal with the admittance of a new line of defence against this objection under Art. 123(3) EPC, raised for the first time at the oral proceedings before the board. The respondent argued that the deletion did not change the scope of claim 1 because claim 1 was implicitly limited by said feature in view of the description of the patent, whereas previously in the rejoinder to the statement of grounds of appeal the respondent had argued that the deleted part was an added undisclosed feature without any technical meaning that could be deleted without violating Art. 123(3) EPC. The board held that the new line of defence raised new legal and technical issues and thus constituted a change of the legal and factual framework of the appeal, this was therefore an amendment of the respondent's case within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. The respondent offered no explanation for the submission of this line of defence only at this stage, nor could the board discern any. In the absence of any exceptional circumstances, the new line of defence was not taken into account.

135-11-23

**Article 12(4) RPBA 2020 | T 1800/20 | Board 3.4.02**
**Article 12(4) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1800/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.09.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), 12(4), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case (yes) – requirements of Article 12(2) RPBA 2020 met (no) – request filed in first instance but not decided – admissibly raised and maintained (no) – convergence – amendment after summons – taken into account (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1903/13
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.1</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1800/20](#) war der gut einen Monat vor der mündlichen Verhandlung in der Beschwerde eingereichte Hilfsantrag 2' als Hilfsantrag 4 bereits im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren gestellt worden. Die Einspruchsabteilung hatte jedoch weder über dessen Zulassung entschieden, noch hatte eine Debatte über die Patentierbarkeit des beanspruchten Gegenstandes stattgefunden, da das Patent auf der Grundlage eines höherrangigen Hilfsantrages aufrechterhalten wurde. Die Kammer hob hervor, dass ein Antrag mit einem Anspruchssatz, der im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren eingereicht, jedoch nicht verbeschieden wurde, im Beschwerdeverfahren nicht automatisch zugelassen wird. Vielmehr gilt nach Art. 12 (4) Satz 1 VOBK 2020: Wenn ein Teil des Beschwerdevorbringens eines Beteiligten nicht die Erfordernisse des Art. 12 (2) VOBK 2020 erfüllt, wie im vorliegenden Fall, so ist dieser Teil als Änderung zu betrachten, sofern der Beteiligte nicht zeigt, dass dieser Teil in dem Verfahren, das zu der angefochtenen Entscheidung geführt hat, in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht und aufrechterhalten wurde.

Wie die Kammer erläuterte, werden bei der Überprüfung, ob ein Teil des Beschwerdevorbringens im erstinstanzlichen Einspruchsverfahren in zulässiger Weise vorgebracht wurde, u.a. folgende Aspekte berücksichtigt:



- a) der Zeitpunkt des Vorbringens;
- b) die Eignung des Vorbringens, die Einwände gegen den höherrangigen Antrag auszuräumen;
- c) ob das Vorbringen neue Probleme aufwirft;
- d) die Eignung des Vorbringens, Teil einer konvergenten Entwicklung des erstinstanzlichen Verfahrens zu sein (vgl. T 1903/13).

Anspruch 1 des erstinstanzlichen Hilfsantrages 4 unterschied sich vom Anspruch 1 des nächst höherrangigen Antrages dadurch, dass ein Merkmal gestrichen wurde und ein neues Merkmal hinzugefügt wurde. Die Kammer stellte fest, dass dadurch bereits zum Zeitpunkt des Vorbringens im Einspruchsverfahren die Konvergenz mit diesem höherrangigen Antrag fehlte.

Darüber hinaus trug der Einsprechende vor, dass der erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung eingereichte Hilfsantrag 4 verspätet vorgebracht worden sei. Da der Patentinhaber keine Gründe für diese Verspätung angab, sah die Kammer den Hilfsantrag 2' auch aus diesem Grund als nicht „in zulässiger Weise“ im Einspruchsverfahren vorgebracht an. Das Vorbringen von Hilfsantrag 2' stellte somit eine Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens dar, dessen Zulassung im Ermessen der Kammer stand. Die Kammer übte dieses Ermessen dahingehend aus, den Hilfsantrag 2' nicht in das Verfahren zuzulassen, da seine Behandlung wegen fehlender Konvergenz mit dem Gebot der Verfahrensökonomie nicht vereinbar gewesen wäre (vgl. T 1456/20, Nr. 4.5 der Entscheidungsgründe).

Jedoch ließ die Kammer den ca. einen Monat vor der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer eingereichten Hilfsantrag 3' aus folgenden Gründen gemäß Art. 13 (2) VOBK 2020 in das Beschwerdeverfahren zu: Die angefochtene Entscheidung bestand in der Aufrechterhaltung des Patents auf der Grundlage des später im Beschwerdeverfahren als Hilfsantrags 1' bezeichneten Antrags. Insofern hatte der Patentinhaber nach Auffassung der Kammer keine Veranlassung, bereits im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren oder mit der Beschwerdebegründung einen Hilfsantrag zu stellen. Erst mit Beschwerdeeinlegung durch den Einsprechenden, habe der Patentinhaber die Notwendigkeit erkennen können, Hilfsanträge zu stellen, um unter anderem den Einwand mangelnder erfinderischer Tätigkeit zu überwinden. Dies habe der Patentinhaber getan, indem er mit seiner Beschwerdeerwiderung Hilfsanträge 1 bis 6 einreichte. Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 3' sei lediglich eine Kombination von Ansprüchen, die bereits Gegenstand des erstinstanzlichen Verfahrens gewesen seien, und weise daher nur Merkmale auf, die dem Einsprechenden bereits bekannt gewesen seien. Zudem sei unstreitig, dass Hilfsantrag 3' eine konvergente Weiterentwicklung des Verfahrens darstelle.

170-14-23

## Article 12(4) RPBA 2020 | T 0364/20 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 12(4) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0364/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.10.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 114(2) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	Rules 079(1), 116 EPC
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(3), 12(4), 12(5), 13(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – requests – requirements of Art. 12(2) RPBA met (no) – admissibly raised and maintained
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/91, R 0006/19, T 0084/17, T 0966/17, T 1270/18, T 1695/18, T 1776/18, T 2114/19, T 0221/20, T 0602/20, T 1800/20, T 1214/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.5.1.4</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.2.1c</a> , 10th edition

In [T 364/20](#) auxiliary requests 1 to 16 were filed before the opposition division on the final date for making written submissions (R. 116 EPC); auxiliary requests 5, 6 and 16 were identical to auxiliary requests 1 to 3 filed with the reply to the opposition within the time limit set under R. 79(1) EPC. The opposition division decided to reject the opposition and thus did not decide on the admittance of auxiliary requests 1 to 16, which were later refiled by the respondent (proprietor) with its reply to the statement of grounds of appeal. In the board's view, to judge whether a claim request was admissibly raised in opposition proceedings within the meaning of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020, a board had to decide whether the opposition division should have admitted the claim request, had a decision on admittance been required. If so, the claim request was admissibly raised.

With regard to auxiliary requests 5, 6 and 16 (identical to requests filed within the time limit set under R. 79(1) EPC), the board first explained that, for the purposes of Art. 114 EPC, a patent claim was to be regarded as a statement of technical facts in legal terms and thus qualified as "facts or evidence" within the meaning of Art. 114(2) EPC (T 1776/18). Since said requests had been filed at the earliest opportunity, Art. 114(2) EPC did not apply. Nevertheless, in the board's view, auxiliary requests filed within the time limit under R. 79(1) EPC could, in truly exceptional situations, be considered not to have been admissibly raised within the meaning of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020. The board based this view on R 6/19, according to which the basis for an opposition division's discretion to admit or not claim requests was Art. 123(1) EPC, and on the wording of

R. 79(1) EPC ("where appropriate"). However, since auxiliary requests 5, 6 and 16 in the case in hand were convergent and clearly reasonable in number, they were considered admissibly raised in terms of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020.

With regard to auxiliary requests 1 to 4 and 7 to 15 the board observed that they were filed after the time limit set under R. 79(1) EPC but before the expiry of the time limit under R. 116(1) EPC. The board held that it could not be considered that requests filed at this stage of proceedings were automatically filed in due time. Whether or not they were, depended on whether they were submitted as a direct and timely response to a change of the subject of the proceedings introduced by the opponent or the opposition division. In the case in hand, no reasons were mentioned by the respondent as to why auxiliary requests 1 to 4 and 7 to 15 had not been filed earlier. The board did not see any reasons either, especially since the opposition division's preliminary opinion had been in the respondent's favour and no substantial new submissions had been filed by the appellant in reply to this opinion. In other words, the subject of the proceedings had not changed. Therefore, the board considered auxiliary requests 1 to 4 and 7 to 15 to have been filed late and the opposition division had the discretion not to admit them.

Concerning the exercise of discretion, the board referred to G 9/91 and held that to properly defend its patent a patent proprietor had in principle to be permitted to redefine its fallback positions in terms of auxiliary claim requests also at a late stage of opposition proceedings. The board acknowledged that lack of clear allowability could be a reason not to admit a late-filed claim request filed after the expiry of the time limit set under R. 79(1) EPC and before the expiry of the time limit set under R. 116(1) EPC, however not the sole reason. Whether an opponent had sufficient time to deal with an amended claim request was another criterion the opposition division might consider. However, at this stage of proceedings, if the appellant had considered that it did not have enough time to properly respond, it should have requested a postponement of the oral proceedings. Moreover, according to the board, the criteria generally used by the boards when exercising their discretion to admit or not a party's submission in appeal under the RPBA 2020 could also be considered when deciding whether or not a late-filed claim request submitted at this stage of proceedings should have been admitted by the opposition division and was thus admissibly raised in the opposition proceedings. However, when taking this decision, in view of the administrative character of opposition proceedings, these criteria should be used by the boards in a more lenient way than for a party's submission filed during appeal proceedings. In the case in hand, the board came to the conclusion that the auxiliary requests 1 to 4 and 7 to 15 had been admissibly raised, in particular since the divergence of the auxiliary requests was justified in view of the different inventive-step attacks and they constituted a reasonable redefinition of fall-back positions.

180-15-23

## Article 12(5) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1041/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.10
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(3), (5) and 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	reply to statement of grounds of appeal – reasons set out clearly and concisely (no) – discretion not to admit submission – submission admitted (no) – requirements of Art. 12(3) RPBA 2020 met (no) – amendment after summons – exceptional circumstances (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.3.5</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Art. 116 EPC.](#)

In der Sache [T 1041/21](#) ließ die Kammer in Ausübung ihres Ermessens nach Art. 12 (5) VOBK 2020 die Hilfsanträge, weil nicht substantiiert, nicht zum Verfahren zu. Der Beschwerdegegner (Patentinhaber) hatte in seiner Beschwerdeerwiderung lediglich auf erstinstanzliche Hilfsanträge und allgemein "auf die Schriftsätze des erstinstanzlichen Verfahrens" sowie auf drei spezifische in erster Instanz eingereichte Schriftsätze verwiesen, um sein erstinstanzliches Vorbringen insoweit "durch Bezugnahme zum Gegenstand des Beschwerdeverfahrens" zu machen.

Die Kammer rief die Rechtsprechung zu pauschalen Verweisen auf erstinstanzlichen Vortrag in Erinnerung und stellte unter anderem klar, dass auch der Verweis auf die drei einzelnen Schriftsätze pauschal blieb, da wegen der wiederholten Ergänzung und Umbenennung der Hilfsanträge im Einspruchsverfahren ohne eine inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Schriftsätzen nicht offensichtlich war, welches Vorbringen in welchem Schriftsatz zu welchem Hilfsantrag gehörte. Es könne weder von anderen Beteiligten, noch von der Kammer erwartet werden, dass sie sich die Argumente des Beschwerdegegners für dreizehn Hilfsanträge aus drei Schriftsätzen selbst zusammensuchten. Nach Ansicht der Kammer hätte dies im vorliegenden Fall bedeutet, dass sie aktiv für eine Partei hätte tätig werden müssen, was insbesondere unter dem Gesichtspunkt der erforderlichen Unparteilichkeit der Kammer nicht in

Betracht gekommen sei. Wie die Kammer feststellte, ließ sich entgegen der Auffassung des Beschwerdegegners auch aus Art. 12 (3) VOBK nicht ableiten, dass ein pauschaler Verweis unter dem Gebot der Knappheit zulässig sei. Die Kammer wies auch darauf hin, dass es keinen Unterschied gemacht hätte, wenn der Beschwerdegegnern die drei Schriftsätze als Unterlagen, auf die Bezug genommen wird, nochmals in Kopie eingereicht hätte. Ausschlaggebend sei vielmehr, dass durch die Bezugnahme oder durch die bloße Wiederholung von im Einspruchsverfahren gebrachten Argumenten weder für die Kammer noch für die andere Partei sofort ersichtlich gewesen sei, welche Einwände, die der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechender) in seiner Beschwerde gegen den Hauptantrag erhoben habe, durch die in den Hilfsanträgen vorgenommenen Änderungen ausgeräumt worden seien, in welchem Maße und warum.

Die Kammer hob hervor, dass daran auch der Umstand nichts ändere, dass im vorliegenden Fall eine Auseinandersetzung mit etwaigen Feststellungen der angefochtenen Entscheidung zu den Hilfsanträgen nicht möglich war, da der Patentinhaber erstinstanzlich mit seinem höherrangigen Antrag erfolgreich war. Denn der Patentinhaber hätte sich trotzdem auf eine Verteidigung der Hilfsanträge im Beschwerdeverfahren vorbereiten müssen. Es sei nämlich vorhersehbar gewesen, dass diese zum Tragen kämen, wenn der Hauptantrag nicht standhielte.

Der nach Zustellung der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer eingereichte Hilfsantrag 0.2 blieb nach Art. 13 (2) VOBK 2020 unberücksichtigt, da keine außergewöhnlichen Umstände vorlagen. Die Bestätigung von Argumenten des Beschwerdeführers durch die Kammer in ihrer Mitteilung stellte nach Ansicht der Kammer keinen solchen Umstand dar.

051-05-23

**Article 12(5) RPBA 2020 | T 0503/20 | Board 3.2.01**

**Article 12(5) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0503/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(3), 12(5) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	party's complete appeal case (no) – requirements of Article 12(3) RPBA met (no) – reference to first instance submissions – discretion not to admit submission – submission admitted (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1792/17, T 1041/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.3.5</a> , 10th edition

In [T 503/20](#) beantragte der Beschwerdegegner (Patentinhaber) die Vorlage von Fragen an die Große Beschwerdekammer. Diese betrafen insbesondere den Fall, dass ein Verfahrensbeteiligter sein Vorbringen im Einspruchsverfahren durch einen Verweis "zum Gegenstand des Vortrags im Beschwerdeverfahren" macht und dabei auf konkrete Randnummern der Einspruchserwiderung Bezug nimmt. Unter anderem wurde dabei die Frage aufgeworfen, ob es eine Rolle spielt, dass dieser Verfahrensbeteiligte im Einspruchsverfahren obsiegt hat.

Die Kammer hielt es nicht für veranlasst, die Große Beschwerdekammer mit den vorgelegten Fragen zu befassen, unter anderem weil sie diese selbst auf der Grundlage der gesetzlichen Regelung beantworten konnte. Sie verwies auf den Wortlaut von Art. 12 (3) und (5) VOBK 2020 und auf die Erläuterungen zu Art. 12 (5) VOBK 2020, wonach ein Beteiligter "ausdrücklich" alle Anträge, Tatsachen usw., auf die Bezug genommen wird, "im Einzelnen anführen" muss.

Die Kammer schloss daraus, dass auch Passagen der Einspruchserwiderung, auf die unter Angabe ihrer konkreten Randnummern verwiesen wird, nicht zwangsläufig zugelassen werden müssen. Ihre Zulassung stehe vielmehr im Ermessen der Kammer und hänge von den Umständen des Einzelfalles ab, etwa von der Frage, ob eine ausreichende Auseinandersetzung mit der angegriffenen Entscheidung erfolgt ist und – sofern es sich um Punkte handelt, die für die Entscheidung nicht relevant wurden – ob aus dem Gesamtvortrag beider Parteien ausreichend klar wird, welche Punkte mit

welcher konkreten Begründung weiterverfolgt werden und wie sich diese zum Vortrag der Gegenseite verhalten.

Im vorliegenden Fall entschied die Kammer, den Teil des Vorbringens in der Beschwerdeerwiderung des Patentinhabers, der lediglich pauschal auf Vorbringen im Einspruchsverfahren Bezug nahm, unberücksichtigt zu lassen. Dies begründete sie insbesondere damit, dass es insoweit vollkommen an einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Entscheidung fehlte, die im Einzelnen ausgeführt hatte, warum sie die betreffende offenkundige Vorbenutzung für nachgewiesen erachtete und welche patentgemäßen Merkmale sie in ihr offenbart sah. Die bloße Bezugnahme auf das Einspruchsvorbringen könne eine sachgerechte Begründung im Beschwerdeverfahren nicht ersetzen; vielmehr sei die in Art. 12 (3) Satz 1 und Satz 2, 2. Halbsatz VOBK 2020 (weiterhin) geforderte Vollständigkeit des Beschwerdevorbringens bereits deshalb geboten, weil es nicht Aufgabe der Kammer sein kann, nachzuforschen, welche der Argumente aus dem Einspruchsverfahren im Lichte der angefochtenen Entscheidung und den darin getroffenen Feststellungen weiterhin relevant bleiben könnten (so bereits T 1792/17 zur VOBK 2007).

Ebenso ließ die Kammer die in einen späteren Schriftsatz im Beschwerdeverfahren integrierten Auszüge aus der Einspruchserwiderung und aus der Replik im Einspruchsverfahren nicht in das Verfahren zu, weil damit die Argumente aus diesen erstinstanzlichen Schriftsätzen wörtlich wiederholt wurden, ohne dass der Patentinhaber sich mit der Feststellung der Einspruchsabteilung näher befasst hätte, wie aber von Art. 12 (3) Satz 2 VOBK 2020 gefordert. Wie bereits in T 1041/21 festgehalten, bestehe kein Unterschied, ob verwiesen werde oder diese ohne Anpassung an den Fall nochmal eingereicht würden.

171-14-23



## Article 12(6) RPBA 2020 | T 1617/20 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 12(6) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1617/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.07
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(3), (4), (5), (6) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	late-filed request – amended description – should have been submitted in first-instance proceedings (no) – amendment to case (yes) – admitted (yes) – claims identical to non-admitted claims – error in use of discretion in first-instance (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0007/93, T 0222/16, T 0879/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">IV.C.5.1.4d</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.3.4.3a</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.3.4</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.5</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.6</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.3.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1617/20](#) the appellant (proprietor) filed as main request a set of claims identical to the claims of auxiliary request 2 underlying the appealed decision as well as amended pages of the description.

As regards the amended description, the board examined whether it should have been submitted in opposition proceedings (Art. 12(6), second sentence, RPBA 2020). It pointed out that it was common practice in proceedings before the opposition division that when amended claims are filed, corresponding amendments to the description are carried out only once (and only if) the amended claims are admitted into the proceedings and found to be allowable. In the current case, the proprietor had filed the claims of auxiliary request 2 at the oral proceedings before the opposition division and explained that the description was still to be amended. The board held that since this claim request had not been admitted by the opposition division, there was no need for the appellant to file description pages in line with this claim request in the opposition proceedings.

The board then observed that the amendment to the description had not been dealt with in the appealed decision and thus represented an amendment of the appellant's case within the meaning of Art. 12(4), first paragraph, RPBA 2020. Hence, in addition to the above-mentioned criterion under Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020, the further criteria under Art. 12(4), third paragraph, RPBA 2020 also needed to be considered for the board's discretionary decision



on the admittance of the amendment. The amendment at issue was not complex since it merely consisted of the deletion of a sentence. Moreover, it had been made to overcome an objection raised in the appealed decision and thus directly addressed an issue leading to the decision under appeal. Finally, no detriment to procedural economy associated with this amendment could be recognised. Therefore, the board saw no reasons why the amended description according to the main request should not be admitted into the proceedings.

As regards the claims of the main request, the board noted that these were identical to the claims of auxiliary request 2 as filed at the oral proceedings before the opposition division. Said auxiliary request 2 had been examined by the opposition division as regards its prima facie allowability and was not admitted. The board held that this decision on the admittance of auxiliary request 2 was part of the appealed decision and thus, contrary to the respondent's view, the filing of this request as the main request in appeal did not represent an amendment of the appellant's case within the meaning of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020. Art. 12(4), second and third paragraph, RPBA 2020 did not apply.

Still regarding the claims of the main request, the board further considered Art. 12(6), first sentence, RPBA 2020. The board explained that in order to decide whether the opposition division's discretionary decision suffered from an error, i.e. was based on a wrong principle, or was taken by applying the right principle in an unreasonable way, the file history of the present case had to be considered. In the case in hand the proprietor had filed auxiliary request 1 in response to a conclusion of the opposition division during oral proceedings deviating from its preliminary opinion. Auxiliary request 1 had been admitted, but not allowed. Thereafter, the appellant had filed auxiliary request 2. The opposition division, instead of applying the same criteria as for auxiliary request 1, applied the criterion of prima facie allowability under Art. 123(2) EPC to a feature that had already been present in claim 1 as granted, and in claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 as admitted by the opposition division. More importantly, this feature had never been objected to before under Art. 123(2) EPC, either by the respondent or by the opposition division. The board held that basing the decision on admittance of auxiliary requests 1 and 2 on different criteria resulted in an inconsistent approach. Moreover, using the prima facie allowability criterion to object for the first time at oral proceedings to a feature of the late-filed claim request that was already present in higher-ranking claim requests and had never been objected to before, not even when deciding on the allowability or admittance of those higher-ranking claim requests, went against the principles of fairness and good faith. For these reasons, the board decided to overturn the opposition division's decision on the non-admittance of what was then auxiliary request 2, and to admit the current main request into the appeal proceedings pursuant to Art. 12(6) RPBA 2020.

Moreover, the board decided on admittance of a new objection of the respondent under Art. 123(3) EPC, raised in its reply to the grounds of appeal. The opposition division had concluded that the amendment in claim 1 of the main request had restricted the claimed subject-matter. By not explaining in its reply why this conclusion was not correct, the respondent failed to substantiate its objection as required by Art. 12(3) RPBA 2020. In exercising its discretion under Art. 12(5) RPBA 2020, the board decided not to admit the respondent's objection into the proceedings.

063-06-23

## Article 12(6) RPBA 2020 | T 0141/20 | Board 3.3.10

### Article 12(6) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0141/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.10
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.20
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4), 12(6) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – late-filed request – should have been submitted in first instance (no) – patent maintained in amended form by opposition division – no duty to present auxiliary requests to address objections considered unfounded by the opposition division
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.3.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 141/20](#) wurde das Patent im Einspruchsverfahren gemäß dem Hilfsantrag 1 aufrechterhalten. Die dagegen vorgebrachten Einwände (insbesondere nach Art. 123 (2) bzw. 76 (1) EPÜ) wurden von der Einspruchsabteilung als nicht überzeugend angesehen. In der Beschwerde konnte nach Ansicht der Kammer weder dem Hauptantrag des Patentinhabers (Zurückweisung der Einsprüche) stattgegeben werden, noch konnte das Patent auf der Grundlage der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 12, die bereits im Einspruchsverfahren Verfahrensgegenstand gewesen waren, aufrechterhalten werden. Die Kammer musste sich daher mit der Zulassung in das Beschwerdeverfahren des mit der Beschwerdebegründung eingereichten Hilfsantrags 13 befassen.

Die Kammer stellte zunächst fest, dass die Einwände der Einsprechenden gegen die Zulassung dieses Antrags auf Art. 12 (6) VOBK basierten, der insofern eine *lex specialis* zu Art. 12 (4) VOBK darstelle. Die Einsprechenden hatten hierzu argumentiert, dass sich der Einwand, der durch diesen Antrag ausgeräumt werden sollte, nämlich der Einwand nach Art. 76 (1) bzw. 123 (2) EPÜ, schon von Anfang an im Einspruchsverfahren befunden habe. Hilfsantrag 13 hätte daher bereits im Einspruchsverfahren eingereicht werden müssen.

Die Kammer teilte diese Auffassung nicht. Sie hob hervor, dass es nach Art. 12 (6) VOBK nicht ausreichend ist, dass die Anträge im Einspruchsverfahren hätten eingereicht werden können. Dass die Anträge „vorzubringen gewesen wären“ hätte

eines Anlasses bedurft. Einen solchen Anlass vermochte die Kammer aber nicht zu erkennen, da ja die Einspruchsabteilung im Verlauf des Verfahrens deutlich gemacht hatte, dass sie dem von den Einsprechenden vorgebrachten Einwand nicht folgt, und auch dementsprechend entschieden hatte. Die Kammer erläuterte, dass das Vorhandensein des Einwands im Verfahren als solches nicht als Anlass ausreiche. Es könne dem Patentinhaber im Einspruchsverfahren nicht zugemutet werden, grundsätzlich jedem vorgebrachten Einwand, und jeder Permutation von vorgebrachten Einwänden, durch die Einreichung von Hilfsanträgen zu begegnen. Dies würde auch eine ungebührliche Belastung für die Einspruchsabteilung und die anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten darstellen. Es liege in der Verantwortung des Patentinhabers, Einwänden, die er für unbegründet hält, lediglich argumentativ entgegenzutreten. Folge die Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer Entscheidung diesem Vorbringen, so könne eine Nichtzulassung von am Beginn des Beschwerdeverfahrens eingereichten Hilfsanträgen, die diesen Einwänden Rechnung tragen, gemäß Art. 12 (6) VOBK 2020 nicht ausschließlich damit begründet werden, der Antrag hätte bereits im Einspruchsverfahren eingereicht werden können. In die Zulassungsentscheidung müsse vielmehr einfließen, ob im Einspruchsverfahren eine Notwendigkeit bestand, den Antrag einzureichen.

Die Kammer wies überdies darauf hin, dass der Antrag im vorliegenden Fall zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt im Beschwerdeverfahren eingereicht wurde und den Einsprechenden daher ausreichend Zeit blieb, ihm argumentativ zu begegnen. Der Sachverhalt an sich sei bereits ausführlich im Einspruchsverfahren diskutiert worden und auch in der angefochtenen Entscheidung detailliert abgehandelt.

Die Kammer kam nach eingehender Prüfung zu dem Ergebnis, dass das Patent auf der Grundlage des Hilfsantrags 13 aufrechterhalten werden konnte.

105-09-23

## Article 12(6) RPBA 2020 | T 1362/20 | Board 3.2.08

### Article 12(6) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1362/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.08.01
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4), 12(6) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – new objection against features added from the description during oral proceedings before the opposition division – should have been submitted in first instance proceedings (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.3.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1362/20](#) erhob der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechender) erstmals mit der Beschwerdebegründung den Einwand, dass ein bestimmtes Anspruchsmerkmal (Merkmal 1.13b) die Klarheitserfordernisse des Art. 84 EPÜ nicht erfülle. Der Beschwerdegegner beantragte, diesen Einwand nach Art. 12 (4) und (6) VOBK 2020 nicht zuzulassen. Er begründete dies damit, dass bereits die in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung eingereichten Hilfsanträge 1a, 1b und 2a dieses Merkmal enthielten und der Einsprechende bereits zu diesem Zeitpunkt Gelegenheit gehabt hätte, den Einwand zu erheben.

Die Kammer teilte jedoch die Auffassung, dass der Einwand bereits in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung vorzubringen gewesen wäre, nicht.

Sie verwies darauf, dass der Patentinhaber in dieser mündlichen Verhandlung keinen der im schriftlichen Verfahren eingereichten Hilfsanträge verteidigte, sondern am Nachmittag des Verhandlungstages neue Hilfsanträge einreichte, nachdem der Hauptantrag, wie in der vorläufigen Meinung schon vorgezeichnet, für nicht gewährbar erachtet wurde. Die eingereichten Hilfsanträge umfassten jeweils Merkmale, die der Beschreibung entnommen waren. Der Einsprechende hatte jeweils etwa eine halbe Stunde Zeit, sich mit den neu eingereichten Anträgen zu befassen.

Die Kammer war der Auffassung, dass es in diesem Zeitrahmen zwar möglich gewesen wäre, einen Klarheitsmangel zu erkennen, der Einsprechende also den Einwand hätte

vorbringen können. Allerdings konnte dies im Hinblick auf den engen Zeitrahmen nicht von ihm verlangt werden, so dass der Einwand nicht im Sinne von Art. 12 (6), 2. Satz VOBK 2020 vorzubringen gewesen wäre. Da die Änderungen der Beschreibung entnommen waren und im Einspruchsverfahren zu einem sehr späten Zeitpunkt noch in das Verfahren zugelassen wurden, entspreche es dem Gebot der Fairness, neue Einwände gegen die geänderten Ansprüche noch zuzulassen, wenn diese Einwände bei erster Gelegenheit im Beschwerdeverfahren erhoben wurden. Dies gelte umso mehr im vorliegenden Fall, als der erstmals mit der Beschwerdebegründung erhobene Einwand mangelnder Klarheit hoch relevant sei.

Die Kammer übte daher ihr Ermessen nach Art. 12 (6) VOBK 2020 dahingehend aus, diesen Einwand in das Verfahren zuzulassen.

160-13-23

## Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 | T 1303/18 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 13(1) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1303/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.21
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 Article 12(2), (4) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to appeal case (yes) – late-filed defence – argument about interpretation of the law (no) – justification by party (no) – amendment detrimental to procedural economy (yes) – taken into account (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/93, G 0001/15, T 2988/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2n</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.4.6</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 87\(1\) EPC.](#)

In [T 1303/18](#) the board did not admit the appellant's defence relying on entitlement to partial priority into the proceedings pursuant to Art. 13(1) RPBA 2020, Art. 12(2), (4) RPBA 2007. The appellant (proprietor) argued for the first time after the filing of the grounds of appeal and replies, and before the summons to oral proceedings was issued that, should the priority from D49 be considered invalid, the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted should at least be entitled to a partial priority from D49 in accordance with decision G 1/15.

The board observed that an objection as to the validity of the earliest priority claimed from D49 had already been raised by the respondents in their notices of opposition. Decision G 1/15 had been published in the Official Journal of the EPO before the oral proceedings were held before the opposition division. Therefore, the appellant's defence claiming a right to partial priority could and should have been presented before the opposition division or included at the latest in the statement of grounds of appeal.

The appellant argued with reference to T 2988/18 that this defence did not constitute an amendment of its appeal case. It only concerned interpretation of law by means of an

argument based on a decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal. Therefore, the appellant was allowed to make this defence at any point during the proceedings.

The board held that, contrary to the appellant's view, the defence by which a right to partial priority was invoked was not merely a presentation of a new argument pertaining to the interpretation of law but comprised a new allegation of fact. Indeed the appellant had asserted that priority application D49 directly and unambiguously disclosed in an enabling manner part of the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted, and specifically that claim 1 as granted encompassed this part as an alternative subject-matter by virtue of a "generic "OR"-claim" within the meaning of decision G 1/15. The board considered that the submitted defence would have involved a new factual assessment of the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted and of priority application D49, namely as to precisely which part of claim 1 it was that allegedly enjoyed partial priority and where it was disclosed in D49. Decision T 2988/18, invoked by the appellant, could not support the appellant's submission. In that decision the entrusted board had concluded that the new argument at issue was not an amendment of the appeal case since it only concerned how the interpretation of Art. 123(2) EPC provided by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G 1/93 applied to the facts of the case at issue. Therefore, contrary to the current case, no new factual allegations were derived from the new argument submitted. Hence, the rationale developed in T 2988/18 was not applicable to the case at hand. This was also consistent with the explanatory remarks to the RPBA 2020 (supplementary publication 2, OJ 2020, page 57). The appellant's defence did not "concern only the interpretation of the law" but constituted a new allegation of fact.

The defence relying on partial priority therefore constituted an amendment to the appellant's appeal case within the meaning of Art. 13(1) RPBA 2020. The board decided not to admit it into the proceedings, as the required new factual assessment would have been complex and the appellant had provided no justification for this late amendment.

020-02-23

**Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 | T 1117/16 | Board 3.2.05**

**Article 13(1) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1117/16</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.22
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Article 117(1) EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), 13(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to appeal case – exercise of discretion – amendment overcomes issues raised (no) – amendment detrimental to procedural economy (yes) – alleged public prior use
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G0009/91, G 0010/91, T 0129/88, T 0691/12
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.4.6</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 117 EPC.](#)

In [T 1117/16](#) wurde die behauptete offenkundige Vorbenutzung oV3 erstmals nach dem Einreichen der Beschwerdebeurteilung und vor der Zustellung der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung geltend gemacht. Der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechender 1) begründete das späte Vorbringen damit, dass er von dieser Vorbenutzung oV3, an der er nicht beteiligt gewesen sei, erst einige Monate zuvor Kenntnis erlangt habe, indem er von Dritten darauf aufmerksam gemacht worden sei, und dass er deshalb diese Vorbenutzung nicht früher in das Verfahren habe einführen können.

Die Kammer sah aber in den vom Beschwerdeführer angegebenen Gründen keine Rechtfertigung für das erstmalige Vorbringen der Vorbenutzung oV3 nach Einreichung der Beschwerdebeurteilung. Sie rief mit Verweis auf die zur VOBK 2007 ergangene Rechtsprechung in Erinnerung, dass in Anbetracht des vorrangigen Ziels des Beschwerdeverfahrens, das nun in Art. 12 (2) VOBK 2020 verankert ist, der faktische und rechtliche Rahmen des Einspruchsverfahrens weitestgehend für das nachfolgende Beschwerdeverfahren bestimmend ist. Damit sind den Beteiligten in ihrer Verfahrensführung gewisse Grenzen gesetzt, die sich im zweiseitigen Verfahren namentlich aus dem Prinzip der Fairness gegenüber den anderen Beteiligten sowie generell aus den Anforderungen an ein ordnungsgemäßes Verfahren ergeben. Insbesondere sind die Beteiligten im zweiseitigen Verfahren auch zur sorgfältigen und beförderlichen Verfahrensführung verpflichtet. Dazu gehört es, alle relevanten Tatsachen, Beweismittel, Argumente und Anträge so früh und vollständig wie möglich



vorzulegen. Die Kammer hob hervor, dass ein Einsprechender keinen Rechtsanspruch darauf hat, dass neues Vorbringen im Beschwerdeverfahren zugelassen wird. Die Zulassung von neuem Vorbringen hänge von der Erfüllung bestimmter Voraussetzungen ab und liege im Ermessen der Kammer. Diese Grundsätze spiegelten sich auch in Art. 13 (1) VOBK 2020 nieder.

Die Kammer sah es als unerheblich an, ob der Beschwerdeführer von der behaupteten offenkundigen Vorbenutzung tatsächlich erst einige Monate nach Einreichung der Beschwerdebegründung Kenntnis erlangt hatte. Sie betonte, dass die Suche nach möglichen Entgegnungen in den Verantwortungsbereich des Einsprechenden fällt. Die Tatsache, dass dieser einen Stand der Technik nicht rechtzeitig entdeckte, rechtfertige nicht, das Gebot der Verfahrensökonomie oder das Prinzip der Fairness gegenüber anderen Beteiligten zu missachten. Die spät erlangte Kenntnis von der angeblichen offenkundigen Vorbenutzung dürfe also dem Beschwerdegegner nicht zum Nachteil gereichen.

In Bezug auf die in Art. 13 (1) Satz 4 VOBK 2020 genannten Kriterien für die Ermessensausübung vermochte die Kammer ferner nicht zu erkennen, inwiefern die Änderung des Vorbringens des Beschwerdeführers zur Lösung von Fragen, die der Beschwerdegegner in zulässiger Weise aufgeworfen hatte, geeignet sein sollten. Vielmehr stelle dieses geänderte Vorbringen einen ganz neuen Angriff gegen das Streitpatent dar, der nicht durch das Vorbringen des Beschwerdegegners veranlasst worden war.

Zudem wäre die Zulassung der Änderung der Verfahrensökonomie abträglich gewesen, da die eingereichten Unterlagen nach Auffassung der Kammer die behauptete Vorbenutzung prima facie nicht lückenlos belegen konnten. Insoweit ließ die Kammer offen, ob es sich bei den eingereichten Erklärungen um eidesstattliche Versicherungen handelte, was allenfalls für deren Beweiskraft von Belang sein könnte, da jedenfalls keine Verkaufsbelege oder Beweisstücke für die Lieferung des angeblich vorbenutzten Produktes vorgelegt oder angeboten wurden. Es wären deshalb weitere Ermittlungen und Nachweise erforderlich gewesen, welche dem Gebot einer fairen, zügigen Verfahrensführung zuwidergelaufen wären. Darüber hinaus war die behauptete offenkundige Vorbenutzung, selbst wenn bewiesen, prima facie nicht relevanter als der druckschriftliche Stand der Technik.

Die behauptete Vorbenutzung wurde aus diesen Gründen nicht zum Verfahren zugelassen. Nach Ansicht der Kammer konnte dahingestellt bleiben, ob das Verhalten des Beschwerdeführers bezüglich des verspäteten Vorbringens als verfahrensmissbräuchlich anzusehen war.

039-04-23

## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0574/17 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0574/17</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.09.16
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(1), (2) RPBA 2020 Article 12(4) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – late filed evidence – legitimate response (no) – late filed objections – taken into account (no) – exceptional circumstances (no) – prima facie relevance (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0010/91, G 0004/19, T 0055/01, T 0172/17, T 0882/17, T 2787/17, T 1767/18, T 2117/18
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.5.8i</a> , <a href="#">V.A.5.11.3a</a> , 10th edition

In [T 574/17](#) the board had to decide, among other things, on the admittance under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 of evidence (for a public prior use) submitted for the first time on appeal and on the admittance under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 of objections based on Art. 123(2) and 54 EPC against auxiliary request 14.

Regarding the admittance of A32a under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007, the board was not persuaded by the appellant's (opponent's) argument that filing A32a with its statement of grounds of appeal was a legitimate response to the contested decision. The board pointed out that public prior use allegations had to be sufficiently substantiated during the opposition proceedings. The appellant had had several opportunities to complete its case during opposition proceedings. Moreover, the existence of the feature to be proven was at the heart of the substantive discussion in the opposition proceedings and A32a, which was intended to overcome a time gap in the evidence, could and should have been filed during the opposition proceedings.

The board also dealt with the admittance under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 of new objections based on Art. 123(2) and 54 EPC raised for the first time during oral proceedings against auxiliary request 14, which had been filed by the respondent (proprietor) with its reply to the statement of grounds of appeal.

The board confirmed that when applying Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, a board may also rely on the criteria referred to in Art. 13(1) RPBA 2020 (T 2117/18; see also the explanatory remarks in document CA/3/19, page 43). In the board's view, relying on these criteria was part of the board's exercise of discretion under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. This discretion was inherent to the assessment of whether there were "exceptional circumstances" and was furthermore expressed by the phrase "in principle" (T 172/17). The board noted that the criteria referred to in Art. 13(1) RPBA 2020 included the suitability of the amendment to resolve the issues raised. In the case in hand, this translated into whether the newly raised objections against auxiliary request 14, namely under Art. 54 and 123(2) EPC, would *prima facie* be successful.

The board pointed out however that it was not necessary to assess the *prima facie* relevance of an objection in order to conclude that there were no exceptional circumstances under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 (see T 2787/17). Whether it was appropriate to conduct this kind of *prima facie* assessment depended on the specific circumstances of the case. The board noted that the case at issue was characterised by the fact that the opposition division had maintained the patent as granted whereas the board concluded that the patent as granted was not allowable. Auxiliary request 14 had never before been examined or objected to. In this specific procedural situation, the board found it appropriate to consider the *prima facie* relevance of the two objections raised for the first time in the oral proceedings before the board.

The board rejected the appellant's argument that both objections had to be admitted and examined because a board always had to fully examine claim amendments for compliance with Art. 123(2) EPC, even of the board's own motion. The board explained in this context that the obiter dictum in G 10/91, Reasons 19, could not be construed as an obligation for the boards of appeal to fully examine any claim amendments made in the appeal proceedings in the same way an examining division would. According to the board, this would be at odds with Art. 114(2) EPC (see T 1767/18) and the settled case law under which appeal proceedings were never intended to be the mere continuation of first-instance proceedings (CLB, 10th ed., V.A.1.1). Furthermore, the Enlarged Board's statement had to be interpreted in the context of the current legal framework, which had changed significantly since that statement was made. The board concluded that, taking into account Art. 114(2) EPC and the RPBA 2020, the Enlarged Board's obiter dictum in G 10/91, Reasons 19, was fully respected when the *prima facie* relevance of an objection was considered in the context of assessing whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying its admittance pursuant to Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. Since neither of the two objections were *prima facie* persuasive, no exceptional circumstances could be ascertained.

008-01-23

## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 1968/18 | Board 3.2.05

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1968/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.08.31
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	Articles 084, 111 EPC
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 11, 12(2), 13(1) and (2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – admittance of the amended description (yes) – exceptional circumstances (yes) – remittal to the opposition division for adaptation of the description
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0014/19, T 0977/94, T 0713/14, T 1294/16, T 0545/18, T 0661/18, T 1024/18, T 1598/18, T 1989/18, T 0121/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">II.A.5.3.</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.2.2a</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.5.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.5.5g</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.9.9.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1968/18](#) appellant I (patent proprietor) filed amended description pages during the oral proceedings before the board. Appellant II (opponent) took the view that an amended description constituted an amendment to the patent proprietor's appeal case within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020.

The board noted that in J 14/19 the Legal Board had found that, in a systematic interpretation, the question of whether a submission resulted in an "amendment to a party's appeal case" within the meaning of Art. 13 RPBA 2020 had to be answered using the list of possible components of an appeal case in Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020. The Legal Board had concluded that submissions not directed to requests, facts, objections, arguments or evidence relied on in the statement of grounds of appeal or in the reply amounted to an amendment to the appeal case. In the board's view, applying this systematic interpretation in the case at hand meant that the filing of amended description pages resulted in an amendment to the patent proprietor's appeal case, even if they had been filed so that the description was consistent with the amended claims of the main request which were considered allowable.

However, the board did not follow appellant II (opponent) according to which exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 were only new or unforeseen developments in the appeal proceedings themselves. The term

"exceptional circumstances" could also be interpreted more broadly (see e.g. T 713/14, T 1294/16, T 545/18, T 661/18 and T 1598/18).

The board pointed out that it was established case law that if the claims of a patent as granted were amended, the description had to be made consistent therewith (see e.g. T 977/94 and further decisions cited in CLB, 10th ed., II.A.5.3.). While the board was aware of decision T 1989/18, it agreed with other, more recent, decisions (see e.g. T 1024/18 and T 121/20), in which adaptation of the description was still considered necessary in the event of inconsistency with the amended claims.

In the board's view, in the case at hand, it was important to bear in mind that it was established practice of the boards of appeal to deal with the question of adapting the description only after the board had concluded that the claims of the patent as amended were allowable. It was therefore quite common for the description of the patent as granted not to be adapted until the oral proceedings, even if a set of amended claims had already been filed prior to the oral proceedings. In accordance with common practice, a remittal "with a description to be adapted" could be decided on even if the patent proprietor had not yet filed a description adapted to the allowable amended claims in the appeal proceedings (CLB, V.A.9.9.).

Against this background, the board saw the exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 as already existing in that the amended description pages were filed in order to adapt the description to the claims of the main request, which were considered to be allowable.

The board remitted the case to the department of first instance with the order to maintain the patent with claims 1 to 12 of the main request filed by letter dated 12 December 2019 and a description to be adapted thereto. The board noted that Art. 11 RPBA 2020 only applied to cases that were remitted "for further prosecution". In the board's view, it did not apply to cases that were remitted with an order by the board to grant a patent or to maintain a patent in amended form, be it with or without adaptation of the description (see document CA/3/19, section VI, explanatory remarks on Art. 11 RPBA 2020, second paragraph).

009-01-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 2599/19 | Board 3.4.02**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2599/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 Article 12(4) RPBA 2007
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – exceptional circumstances (no) – hypothetical objections
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.6d</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 2599/19](#) the board decided that the main and sole request was not taken into account under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, as it was unable to see any exceptional circumstances justifying filing the request in response to the board's summons to oral proceedings.

Claim 1 of this new main request was an extensively reworded version of claim 1 of the previous main request. The latter had been filed with the statement of grounds of appeal. According to the appellant (applicant), the amendments to claim 1 had been intended to overcome the objections under Art. 123(2), 84 and 56 EPC raised in the board's communication pursuant to Art. 15(1) RPBA 2020.

The board, however, pointed out that it had informed the appellant (applicant) in this communication that it was considering not admitting the previous main request under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007. It confirmed in its decision that this request would indeed not have been admitted, as it could and should have been submitted during first-instance proceedings. Since the beginning of the examination proceedings, novelty and inventive-step objections had been raised by the examining division in view of document D1. The applicant had responded with arguments without attempting to overcome these objections by substantively amending claim 1. An amended set of claims submitted before the oral proceedings responded only to later objections based on D6 and D7. In spite of the discussion during the oral proceedings dealing with the patentability issues, the applicant refrained from submitting amendments, which could have been in the form of auxiliary requests, to overcome these objections. As a result of the applicant's approach, there could be no in-depth exchange of views on novelty and inventive step

of the now-claimed subject-matter between the applicant and the examining division, thereby shifting the discussion on patentability to the appeal proceedings without any good reason.

The board concluded from the fact that the initial main request would not have been admitted under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007, that the objections raised against this request in the board's summons were only of a hypothetical nature. In the board's view, in no case could hypothetical objections serve as a valid justification for submitting remedial amendments. In view of this, the appellant's main and sole request was not taken into account, and the appeal dismissed.

010-01-23



## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 2866/18 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2866/18</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – new inventive step objection – taken into account (no) – exceptional circumstances (no) – prima facie relevance (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	J 0014/19, T 0184/17, T 0574/17, T 1179/17, T 1816/17, T 2360/17, T 1042/18, T 2161/18, T 2920/18, T 0151/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2a</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.2.2l</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.5.8i</a> , 10th edition

In the case underlying [T 2866/18](#) the opponent had raised lack of novelty objections against claim 1 of the main request on the basis of documents D10 to D13 as well as an inventive step objection starting from D13. In the decision under appeal, the opposition division had considered claim 1 of the main request to lack novelty over D10 and D11. In its reply to the statement of grounds of appeal of the patent proprietor, the opponent did not raise any inventive step objections against the main request, but simply announced that it would comment on inventive step during the oral proceedings before the board if the board did not accept its view on novelty regarding claim 1. At the oral proceedings, the board confirmed its preliminary opinion outlined in its communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA 2020 and concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1 was novel over D10 and D11. Subsequently, for the first time in the proceedings before the departments of both instances, the opponent raised inventive step objections starting from either document D10 or D11 in combination with any of documents D2, D5, D6 or D13.

The board noted that, since the opponent's inventive step objections were not contained in its reply to the statement of grounds of appeal, raising them for the first time at the oral proceedings before the board constituted an amendment to the opponent's appeal case under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 (see J 14/19), the admittance of which was subject to the board's discretion. Whether or not these objections stayed within the same overall "factual and legal framework" was not decisive for the purpose of determining what constituted an amendment of the appeal case under the RPBA 2020 (see T 2360/17). It



could, however, play a role in the board's exercise of discretion under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 (see T 574/17 and T 2920/18).

The board further observed that the question of whether there had been an amendment to a party's appeal case under the RPBA 2020 had to be distinguished from the question of whether a fresh ground of opposition had been raised. Whether the documents taken as starting points for new inventive step objections were previously used for objections regarding a lack of novelty had no bearing for determining whether these inventive step objections constituted an amendment to the opponent's appeal case under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 (see T 1042/18; see also T 1179/17, T 1816/17, T 2161/18 and T 151/19). The board further noted that, in any case, combining D10 or D11 with new documents went beyond the "factual and evidentiary framework" of the previous novelty objections within the meaning of T 184/17.

The opponent put forward that its inventive step objections raised at the oral proceedings were prima facie relevant. The board considered it appropriate in the present case to conduct such a prima facie assessment, although this was not a necessary precondition in order to come to the conclusion that there were no exceptional circumstances under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 (see T 574/17). The board concluded that none of the inventive step objections were prima facie relevant and consequently did not admit them into the proceedings pursuant to Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020.

040-04-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0084/19 | Board 3.3.08**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0084/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.10.21
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), (3) and 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to appeal case (yes) – deletion of a claim – exercise of discretion – exceptional circumstances (no) – no justification for late filing
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 494/18, T 2091/18, T 2920/18, T 2295/19, T 247/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2d</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.5.6</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under R. 6 EPC.](#)

In [T 84/19](#) the respondent (patent proprietor) filed auxiliary request 1 only two weeks before the oral proceedings. In support of admittance, the respondent argued this request merely consisted in the deletion of claim 14 of the main request and thus could not be regarded as an amendment of the party's appeal case. The remaining subject-matter did not imply a change of the legal and factual framework of the appeal, and no objections were raised against the subject-matter remaining in appeal proceedings.

The board did not agree with the respondent's argumentation. With regard to the question of whether a new request filed after the statement of grounds of appeal or the reply thereto constituted an amendment to the party's appeal case within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, the board concurred with the line of case law considering that a new request filed after the statement of grounds of appeal or the reply thereto with a set of claims that was different to that of the previous requests was to be regarded as an "amendment to the party's appeal case", even if the amendment consisted only in the deletion of claims and the remaining claims were already part of a request in appeal (see e.g. T 2295/19, T 2920/18, T 2091/18, T 494/18 and T 247/20). In the board's view, this interpretation followed from a systematic reading of the RPBA, according to which the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply thereto must contain a party's complete appeal case (Art. 12(3) RPBA 2020). Moreover, a party's appeal case should be directed inter alia to the requests on which the decision under appeal was based (Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020). Accordingly, all parties' requests had to be expressly specified at the onset of the appeal proceedings. The filing of a new claim request at later stages

of the appeal proceedings had to be considered an amendment of the party's case, a procedural step that formally changed the factual and legal situation of the appeal proceedings.

The board decided to exercise its discretion under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 and not to admit auxiliary request 1 into the appeal proceedings. It underlined that the respondent would have had reasons to file this amendment already in reply to the statement of grounds of appeal, since the subject-matter of auxiliary request 1 had not been attacked by the appellant at that stage of the proceedings. The respondent neither provided an explanation for the late filing of auxiliary request 1 nor referred to any circumstances, let alone exceptional ones, that had prevented the respondent from filing auxiliary request 1 at the onset of the appeal proceedings. The board also failed to see any justification for the late filing of this amendment.

The board did however admit auxiliary request 2 under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007. This request had been filed during the proceedings before the first instance as well as at the outset of the appeal proceedings. Since no ground of opposition had been raised against the subject-matter of auxiliary request 2, the board concluded that this set of claims complied with the requirements of the EPC.

052-05-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 1058/20 | Board 3.3.06**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1058/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.3.06
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.11.04
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), (4), (6), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to appeal case (no) – amendment to case (no) – late-filed request – should have been submitted in first-instance proceedings (yes) – exceptional circumstances (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0009/91, T 1224/15, T 0168/16, T 0682/16, T 1439/16, T 1480/16, T 1597/16, T 0494/18, T 0908/18, T 1151/18, T 2091/18, T 2243/18, T 2920/18, T 1792/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.1b</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.2.2d</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.5.6d</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.5.6k</a> ), 10th edition

In [T 1058/20](#) claim 1 of the new first auxiliary request, filed after notification of the summons to oral proceedings, was limited to only one of three alternative embodiments (alternative (iii)) claimed in claim 1 of the main request. The board, referring to case law cited in T 2920/18 and in T 494/18, held that the deletion of a claim or an alternative within a claim was to be regarded as an "amendment to the party's appeal case" within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, and also an amendment in view of the requests on which the impugned decision was based (Art. 12(2) and (4) RPBA 2020). The board explained that the question of what could be defined as an "amendment to a party's appeal case" could be answered in the systematic context of the provisions on appeal proceedings. Art. 12(3) RPBA 2020 provided that the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply had to contain a party's complete appeal case. Accordingly, all requests had to be specified expressly at this stage. It followed from this that only requests filed with the party's statement of grounds of appeal or the reply formed part of a party's appeal case. Consequently, a new request filed afterwards with a set of claims different to that of the previous requests was usually to be regarded as an "amendment to a party's appeal case". In the board's view, whether the new request was to be qualified as an amendment (a factual condition) was to be assessed in a first step without anticipating the criterion of procedural economy, which was only applied in a second step as a criterion of discretion when determining the legal consequence.

The board then assessed whether to admit the new first auxiliary request in exercise of its discretion under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. In the board's view exceptional circumstances which could justify the admittance of the new first auxiliary request were not present because the filing of a request limited to alternative (iii) would have been reasonable during the examining proceedings and the circumstances had not changed in view of the impugned decision or during the appeal proceedings. The principles underlying Art. 12(2), (4) and (6) RPBA 2020 could also be applied when assessing whether exceptional circumstances were present according to Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, because an amendment that would not have been admitted at the beginning of the appeal proceedings (as it could and should have been submitted during the first-instance proceedings) could normally not be justified at a later stage of the appeal proceedings either.

The board distinguished the case from T 2920/18 and observed that in the case in hand refraining from the submission of the new request in the first-instance proceedings contravened procedural economy because the appeal could have been superfluous if the examining division had had the opportunity to assess the allowability of the new claim request. In this respect, the board pointed out that the principles of procedural economy are not to be assessed isolated from the course of the appeal proceedings but rather in view of the proceedings as a whole.

Finally, in response to the appellant's argument that the request should be admitted because it was clearly allowable, the board pointed out that *prima facie* allowability as such would not justify exceptional circumstances under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. Moreover, this assertion was not entirely accurate since at most the request would be allowable under Art. 123(2) EPC so that, if admitted, the board would remit the case to the examining division for further prosecution. The primary object of the appeal proceedings was to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner (Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020; G 9/91, OJ 1993, 408, point 18 of the Reasons). However, in the case in hand, the filing of the new first auxiliary request did not aim to rectify an error in the decision but rather the appellant's failure to file a request in time. Admitting this request would not only be at odds with the purpose of the appeal proceedings but would also devalue the first-instance proceedings.

064-06-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0218/20 | Board 3.2.04**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0218/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.04
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 12(2), 12(4), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment to case – requests – amendment within meaning of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020 – fair and appropriate reaction – amendment to appeal case (no) – reordering of requests – lack of convergence
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2j</a> ), <a href="#">V.A.4.3.4</a> , 10th edition

In [T 218/20](#) the respondent (proprietor) initially requested as main request that the appeal be dismissed and alternatively that the patent be maintained on the basis of one of the auxiliary requests 1 to 5, first filed together with the reply to the grounds of appeal. The board accepted that the latter requests had been filed in response to new inventive step objections first raised in the oral proceedings before the opposition division. In the board's view (already outlined in its unchallenged preliminary opinion), there was no need at that moment to file any further auxiliary requests as the opposition division was not convinced by these objections. Thus, the respondent had availed itself of the first opportunity to respond to these attacks. The board further held that the requests seemed to be fair and appropriate reactions and therefore justified in the sense of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020.

Moreover, the board did not consider changing the original order of the requests filed with the reply to the grounds of appeal – especially promoting the original fourth auxiliary request to main request – as an amendment to the respondent's (proprietor's) appeal case. The appellant had argued that this new main request should not be admitted since changing the original order of the requests at the beginning of the oral proceedings before the board represented an amendment falling under Art. 13 RPBA 2020. The appellant had also argued that the new main request was not clearly allowable and that the new order of requests resulted in non-converging requests. The board, however, did not see how merely changing the order of requests that were all filed as early as possible in the appeal, and which the parties and the board had had ample opportunity to consider, should mean that the much stricter provisions of Art. 13

RPBA 2020 had to apply for their admission. In the case in hand the subject of the proceedings and the issues raised had clearly not changed. Indeed, promoting a lower, more limited request to main request could benefit procedural economy: if the newly promoted request was held allowable, issues raised against previously higher requests would become moot. If not, it could (at worst) mean that the same issues would have to be discussed, possibly in a different order. The lack of convergence of the remaining now lower ranking auxiliary requests with the present request could play no role in the admission of the higher-ranking request.

The board concluded from the above that the relevant provisions for admission remained those of Art. 12(2) and 12(4) RPBA 2020. Thus, the criteria mentioned in Art. 13 RPBA, such as clear allowability, did not apply. The board decided to admit the main request under Art. 12(2) and (4) RPBA 2020. The board maintained the patent in amended form according to the main request.

078-07-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 1807/15 | Board 3.5.02**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1807/15</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2022.12.02
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	Articles 12(2), 12(3), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – taken into account (no) – meaning of “a summons to oral proceedings” if more than one summons are issued
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 2279/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.1</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 104\(1\) EPC.](#)

In [T 1807/15](#) the board exercised its discretion pursuant to Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 not to admit documents E7 and E8. The board held that, if more than one summons were issued in appeal proceedings (all after the entry into force of the RPBA 2020), Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 referred to the first summons.

In the present case a first summons to oral proceedings to be held in Haar was issued in January 2020. The oral proceedings had to be rescheduled due to the Corona pandemic and took place in the form of a videoconference in February 2021. During these first oral proceedings the appellant filed a request that a question of law be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, to which the board acceded. Documents E7 and E8 were filed in July 2021 together with objections based on them. Following the closure of the case before the Enlarged Board, the board summoned the parties in February 2022 to attend second oral proceedings which took place in December 2022.

The board held that the applicable provision for the exercise of the discretion on admittance was Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. It was not convinced by the appellant's (opponent's) arguments according to which the rationale behind the convergent approach was procedural economy and its main object and purpose was to ensure that the board could decide at the end of oral proceedings.

The board underlined that, most importantly, the appellant's stance was not reconcilable with the wording of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. There was nothing to indicate that the



application of this provision was dependent on the subsequent procedural history of the case. Moreover, the appellant's stance was not reconcilable with the object and purpose of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 in the context of the revised version of the Rules of Procedure. According to Art. 12(3) RPBA 2020 the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply, respectively, had to contain the parties' complete appeal cases. The notification of the summons then set an objective and predictable trigger for the third level of the convergent approach. This was the point in the procedure when the board, in ordinary circumstances, could safely assume that all submissions of the parties were on file, so that the board could outline in the communication pursuant to Art. 15(1) RPBA 2020, what the most important issues to be discussed would be. At this point normally, the framework of the discussion at the oral proceedings was defined, and further amendments to the appeal case were only taken into account in exceptional circumstances. It followed that also in view of the object and purpose of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, the subsequent procedural development was entirely immaterial for the function of the summons as an objective and predictable start point for the third level of convergence.

The board further explained that the appellant also erred in that procedural economy was the sole rationale behind the convergent approach. Another rationale was the implementation of the appeal proceedings as a judicial review of the decision under appeal (Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020). This principle limited the possibility to leave the legal and factual framework of the first instance proceedings at any point in the appeal procedure. Further reasons for the application of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 detailed by the board concerned among other things the function of the summons as predictable trigger for the third level of the convergent approach and a possible asymmetrical treatment of the two trigger points for the third level of the convergent approach, summons on the one hand and communication under R. 100(2) EPC on the other.

106-09-23

## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0532/20 | Board 3.5.02

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0532/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.02.08
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons (yes) – taken into account (no) – combination of granted dependent claims as new independent claim – deletion of claims – respondent not taken by surprise
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0003/14, J 0014/19, T 0713/14, T 1224/15, T 2222/15, T 1439/16, T 1480/16, T 1597/16, T 2638/16, T 0853/17, T 1569/17, T 0306/18, T 0884/18, T 0914/18, T 0995/18, T 1151/18, T 2091/18, T 0482/19, T 1857/19
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2d</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Article 123\(2\) EPC.](#)

In [T 532/20](#) the board decided not to take into account auxiliary request A, filed during the oral proceedings before the board, pursuant to Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. In the board's view, auxiliary request A, the sole claim of which was a combination of granted claims 1, 4 and 8, represented an amendment to the respondent's appeal case. The respondent had argued in essence that according to decision G 2/98, dependent claims were to be seen as individual claims containing back references as short-form notation. Auxiliary request A therefore corresponded merely to the cancellation of all claims save one granted dependent claim.

The board (besides noting that decision G 2/98 did not appear to support this contention, but potentially G 3/14) pointed to the fact that only in part of the case law the boards had considered the deletion of a claim category, of dependent claims or of alternatives within claims not to be an amendment within the meaning of Art. 13 RPBA 2020 in the respective circumstances (T 1480/16, T 2638/16, T 884/18, T 914/18, T 995/18, T 1151/18 and T 1857/19), whereas in other decisions the boards had considered such deletions to constitute an amendment of the appeal case (T 713/14,

T 1224/15, T 2222/15, T 1597/16, T 1439/16, T 1569/17, T 853/17, T 306/18 and T 482/19).

The board, analysing the first line of case law, came to the following conclusions. First, whether the deleted claims (or alternatives) were granted claims did not play any role in reaching the conclusion that certain deletions did not represent an amendment to the appeal case. Second, none of these decisions contained the unreserved statement that certain claim deletions were per se not to be considered an amendment. What was clearly essential in this line of case law was that the deletions did not shift the subject of the proceedings or did not lead to new issues to be examined, but that they represented mere restrictions of the subject of the proceedings. Third, none of the above decisions dealt with the deletion of an independent claim and simultaneous maintenance of a dependent claim. The board expressed that it had reservations against the first line of case law and rather agreed with the analysis in J 14/19 and T 2091/18, according to which any change from the appeal case as defined in Art. 12(2) RPBA 2020 was an amendment. In the board's view it was dogmatically more consistent to acknowledge that deletions of claims represented an amendment, but that, if this amendment merely had the effect to limit the issues to be examined, this should be a strong criterion in favour of admittance, or represent special circumstances within the meaning of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020.

The board held that in the case in hand auxiliary request A clearly introduced new issues to be examined into the proceedings, as in the normal course of events the discussion of a claim request could be limited to its independent claim, since they were (normally) the broadest claim. Auxiliary request A was now directed to the subject-matter of the combination of claims 1, 4 and 8 as granted, including features that had never been discussed before in the appeal proceedings.

Moreover, the board was not convinced by the respondent's argument according to which they had been taken by surprise by the board's decision that claim 1 of auxiliary requests 6 to 9 lacked clarity. This objection had been raised by appellant 2 in their letter dated 25.02.2022. The fact that this objection had not been specifically mentioned in the board's preliminary opinion did not justify any surprise on the part of the respondent. From the absence of a discussion of that particular clarity objection, the respondent could not infer that the board did not agree with it. The board further observed that none of the requests on file when the board issued its preliminary opinion were allowable because they all contained added-subject-matter. The board did not have to discuss all further objections, if there was one that appeared to be sufficient to decide on all requests.

116-10-23

## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 1361/19 | Board 3.4.03

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1361/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.01.11
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons (yes) – taken into account (yes) – deletion of claims – arguments and submissions on remaining part remained unchanged
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1569/17, T 2920/18, T 0247/20
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2d</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1361/19](#) the board had to decide on the admittance of the new main request filed during the oral proceedings before the board. The new main request was limited to "a method of manufacturing a semiconductor device", the device claims having been deleted.

The board noted that the question of whether the deletion of part of the claims in a pending request constituted an "amendment to a party's appeal case" within the meaning of Art. 13 RPBA 2020 was controversially discussed among the boards and answered differently (see e.g. T 2920/18 or T 1569/17).

The board was of the opinion that, in the case in hand, the limitation was not an amendment to the party's appeal case, as the factual situation with respect to the remaining part, namely the claims related to a "method of manufacturing", did not change at all compared to all submissions related to the manufacturing method prior to this amendment. The claimed "method of manufacturing" was part of the discussion before the examining division and the examining division had dealt with identical claims in its decision. Moreover, the discussion on inventive step of the claims of the previous main request (filed with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal and identical to the first auxiliary request of the impugned decision), which contained the claims directed to the "method of manufacturing" in unchanged form, was dealt with in the statement setting out the grounds of appeal. Therefore, the subject-matter of the present main request was already part of the examining division's decision and was entirely addressed by the appellant in its statement setting out the grounds of appeal.

Consequently, the deletion of the device claims resulted neither in a changed factual situation for the "method of manufacturing" nor in a different weighting of the remaining subject-matter due to the deletion of the device claims.

The board further observed that the fact that the manufacturing method was considered differently in the new main request was not a consequence of the deletion of the device claims, but merely due to a different consideration of the manufacturing method itself after discussion during the oral proceedings before the board.

In view of this, the new main request submitted at the oral proceedings before the board was not considered to be an amendment to the party's appeal case, as all of the appellant's arguments and submissions on this remaining part ("the method of manufacturing") remained unchanged. The board concluded that it had no discretion not to admit this new main request into the proceedings under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. Hence, the main request was admitted into the proceedings.

117-10-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0463/19 | Board 3.4.02**
**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0463/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.15
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 12(4) RPBA 2007, Articles 13(1), 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – late-filed documents – exceptional circumstances (yes) – highly relevant prior use which was difficult to find and could not have been filed earlier – documents not deliberately withheld
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.7</a> , 10th edition

In [T 463/19](#) machte der Beschwerdeführer (Einsprechende) erstmalig nach der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer die auf die Dokumente E65a bis E65e gestützte offenkundige Vorbenutzung einer Waage geltend, sowie das Benutzerhandbuch E65a zugleich als Stand der Technik. In der mündlichen Verhandlung trug er weitere Umstände und Argumente für die Zulassung vor.

Aufgrund der folgenden Aspekte war die Kammer der Ansicht, dass im vorliegenden Fall außergewöhnliche Umstände vorlagen, die die Berücksichtigung der verspätet eingereichten Dokumente rechtfertigten (Art. 13 (1) und (2) VOBK 2020):

Nach Ansicht der Kammer war das Auffinden der Dokumente schwierig bis unmöglich und konnte eigentlich nur zufällig erfolgen. Dies ergab sich für die Kammer aus den folgenden Umständen: Es handelte sich um die Dokumentation einer Vorbenutzung eines Massenprodukts eines außereuropäischen, vom Hauptstandort des Einsprechenden in Deutschland weit entfernten Herstellers. Weltweit gab es eine Vielzahl von Waagenherstellern, deren Produkte dem Einsprechenden nicht alle bekannt sein konnten. Darüber hinaus waren die Dokumente E65a bis E65e dem Einsprechenden erst während eines Einspruchsverfahrens durch einen Dritten zur Kenntnis gebracht worden.

Aus diesen Umständen schloss die Kammer auch, dass die Dokumente zweifellos nicht absichtlich zurückgehalten wurden.

Die Kammer berücksichtigte zudem, dass die geltend gemachte Vorbenutzung bzw. das Benutzerhandbuch prima facie zum Stand der Technik gehörten. Darüber hinaus waren die geltend gemachte Vorbenutzung bzw. das Benutzerhandbuch aus Sicht der Kammer prima facie sehr relevant, da eine im Benutzerhandbuch gezeigte Waage alle beanspruchten Bauteile zu enthalten schien.

Im Hinblick auf Argumente des Beschwerdegegners (Patentinhabers) hob die Kammer hervor, dass in der Tat nicht jedes schwierig auffindbare Dokument zu jedem verspäteten Zeitpunkt in das Verfahren eingeführt werden dürfe. Im vorliegenden Fall lägen jedoch zwei weitere besondere Umstände vor, nämlich die sehr hohe Relevanz und die Überzeugung der Kammer, dass die Dokumente vom Einsprechenden nicht absichtlich zurückgehalten wurden. Sie war zudem der Auffassung, dass im vorliegenden Fall eine Verzögerung des Verfahrens zur Erreichung einer erhöhten Rechtssicherheit (nach Überprüfung der Rechtsbeständigkeit in Bezug auf E65a bis E65e) hinnehmbar sei.

Hingegen ließ die Kammer die auf die Dokumente E66a bis E66d gestützte Vorbenutzung bzw. die Entgegenhaltung E66a als Stand der Technik nicht zu, da die sie nicht von deren hoher Relevanz überzeugt war.

Auch die auf die Dokumente E54 bis E58 gestützte Vorbenutzung, die bereits im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren hätten vorgelegt werden können und müssen, ließ die Kammer nicht zu (Art. 12 (4) VOBK 2007). Ebenso wenig berücksichtigte sie die verspätet eingereichte deutsche Patentanmeldung E59 bzw. Gebrauchsmusterschrift E61. Auch das erst nach der Zustellung der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichte Dokument E64 wurde nicht zugelassen, da die vorgebrachten Tatsachen, dass E64 dem Einsprechenden zufällig bekannt geworden sei bzw. angeblich falsch klassifiziert gewesen sei, nach ihrer Auffassung keine außergewöhnlichen Umstände darstellten, die eine Berücksichtigung des verspätet eingereichten Dokuments E64 rechtfertigten.

136-11-23

## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 1906/19 | Board 3.4.01

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1906/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.01
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.31
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – interpretation of “in principle” (“en principe”; “grundsätzlich”) – some limited leeway left for exceptions – amendment can be considered despite the absence of exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons – procedural economy primary reason for the convergent approach
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1294/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.5.4</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1906/19](#) the board raised different objections in its preliminary opinion and at oral proceedings to which the appellant (applicant) immediately reacted each time with the filing of a single new request that addressed the objections.

The board explained that it understood the wording of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 as laying down a basic rule but leaving some limited leeway for exceptions. The basic rule was that amendments were not considered unless there were exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons (by the submitting party). The leeway for deviating from this rule lay in the expression "in principle" ("en principe"; "grundsätzlich"), which the board read roughly as "as a rule", meaning that the provision's basic rule was not entirely without exception. This leeway, when applied, meant that an amendment could be considered despite the absence of exceptional circumstances justified by cogent reasons.

In the board's view, this textual understanding of Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 was supported by systematic and teleological considerations. Art. 13(1) and (2) RPBA 2020 define the second and third levels of the convergent approach. Together with the first level specified in Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020, these provisions set increasingly stringent hurdles for the admission of new requests and other amendments. The board held that this approach for deciding on the admittance of amendments would lose some of its coherence and convergence if the boards could exercise discretion on the first two



levels but not the third. The board thus interpreted the passage "shall, in principle, not" as indicative of a remaining (though restricted) discretion. It was not convinced that the lawmaker had put words without meaning into a provision as important as Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. Rather, the lawmaker had had the foresight to see that the otherwise harshly-worded Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 needed a caveat allowing for consideration of the particular circumstances of a case.

With regard to the case in hand, the board observed that the appellant had not followed the common practice, when submitting amended requests, of maintaining at least some previous requests. This practice sometimes meant that the board and the parties had to spend considerable time on requests that even the applicant or proprietor no longer thought viable. Instead, the appellant had given the board a single set of claims to consider. While it was true that the request was twice further amended during oral proceedings, these amendments were straightforward, within the limits of the debate, and finally led to a set of claims that was, *prima facie*, clearly allowable. The succession of requests in the present case was not detrimental to procedural economy. There was no inconvenience for the board, and no other party to the proceedings was affected.

The board emphasised that the primary reason for the convergent approach was procedural economy. It would be unfortunate if it were so strictly applied that appellants, in *ex parte* proceedings, were seriously discouraged from filing a promising and facilitating new request and dropping non-viable requests.

149-12-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 2465/19 | Board 3.4.03**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 2465/19</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.4.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.13
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – amendment filed on express invitation from the board – late-filed request – exceptional circumstances (no) – not detrimental to procedural economy – taken into account (yes)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	T 1294/16
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.1</a> , <a href="#">V.A.4.5.4</a> , 10th edition

In [T 2465/19](#) the claims and the adapted description (main request) had been filed as a response to the express invitation of the board in its communication under Art. 15(1) RPBA 2020 to file such amended application documents. The board was satisfied that the amendments addressed its objections and prima facie appeared suitable to overcome the outstanding objections and admitted the request under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020.

The board held that such a situation could not be considered to constitute truly "exceptional circumstances" as required by Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020, at least according to its plain wording. After all, such conduct of the proceedings could even be considered as perfectly normal in ex-parte appeal proceedings. Nevertheless, the board was convinced that the procedural situation in the case in hand was covered by the legislative intent underlying the structure of Art. 12 and 13 RPBA 2020, and that the request was admissible.

The board pointed out that since some of the objections addressed by the request at issue were not new, it could have come to the conclusion that the amendments were not admissible under Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020. On the other hand, there was a further procedural aspect that strongly supported the admittance of the request. The board noted that Art. 12 and 13 RPBA 2020 made no formal distinction between inter-partes and ex-parte cases. However, in the board's view, these provisions mainly served to prevent the raising of issues that could not be expected to be treated by other parties or

the board within the foreseeable extent of the appeal proceedings, and in particular in view of the expected decision at the end of the oral proceedings (Art. 15(6) RPBA 2020). In the case in hand, the board was satisfied that the amendments in fact did not raise new issues for the board. They were therefore not detrimental to procedural economy, and there was also no other party whose interest could be jeopardised by such late amendments (see also T 1294/16). The board also saw no reason to depart from the settled practice of adapting the description only after the establishment of an allowable claim set.

With regard to the appellant's duty to provide an explanation for the late filing of any amendments, the board observed that, in view of the totality of the circumstances of the present case, in particular in view of the fact that the amendments were filed following the express invitation from the board, requiring such an explanation from the appellant would be clearly counter-intuitive. The board was well aware for which purpose the amendments were filed and why they were filed at that stage. Thus no detailed arguments and reasons were required from the appellant in the present case.

150-12-23

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0599/21 | Board 3.5.05**

**Article 13(2) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 0599/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.5.05
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.06.26
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Ex parte
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – late-filed request – exceptional circumstances (no) – taken into account (no) – citation of passage in the description did not confront appellant with new facts
<b>Cited decisions</b>	
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.5.6b</a> , 10th edition

In [T 599/21](#) auxiliary requests 2.1 and 2.2 were filed in response to the board's preliminary opinion. The appellant argued that auxiliary request 2.1 should be admitted into the proceedings since the preliminary opinion of the board contained new arguments. In particular, the reference to page 14 of the description had not been brought up by the examining division and the term "content of the first interface" had been interpreted differently by the examining division.

The board did not agree. It underlined that its preliminary opinion confirmed the decision under appeal. The examining division had already considered that the wording of the claims was too broad, in particular due to the broad possible interpretation of the term "content of the first interface". The board using the description to confirm the examining division's broad interpretation of this term could not have taken the appellant by surprise. In the board's view, the board's citation of a passage of the description did not confront the appellant with facts previously unknown to it. In consequence, it did not constitute an "exceptional circumstance" which could justify amendments to the appeal case.

Moreover, regarding certain aspects of its feature analysis, the board held that this was merely a supplementary explanation of the mapping provided by the examining division. It did not constitute an alteration of the line of reasoning or a new argument and thus also could not serve as a cogent reason for amending the appeal case at this late stage of the proceedings. The same considerations applied to auxiliary request 2.2.

In view of the above, the board decided not to admit auxiliary requests 2.1 and 2.2 into the proceedings.

161-13-23

## Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 | T 0116/18 | Board 3.3.02

### Article 13(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	T 0116/18
<b>Board</b>	3.3.02
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.28
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	B
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 13(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	amendment after summons – exceptional circumstances (no) – argument about interpretation of the law (no) – argument that the factual and technical situation underlying an earlier decision is similar taken into account (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	R 0017/09, T 0873/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">V.A.4.2.2n</a> , 10th edition

See also abstracts under [Article 56 EPC](#) and [Article 112\(1\)\(a\) EPC](#).

In [T 116/18](#) (of 28 July 2023) the board decided at the oral proceedings not to admit the respondent's (patent proprietor's) submission that the facts underlying T 873/21 were analogous to the facts under consideration in the case in hand, so that, based on that decision, the effect demonstrated in D21 could be relied on.

The board's final decision in the proceedings in hand was to grant the respondent's main request, i.e. to dismiss the appeal. The board nevertheless considered it appropriate to explain why the respondent's argument that the reference to T 873/21 should be taken into account because it was always possible to refer to case law was not convincing.

According to the explanatory notes made as regards Art. 12(4) RPBA 2020, submissions by a party which concern only the interpretation of the law are not an amendment within the meaning of this Article. However, in the board's view, a distinction had to be made between an interpretation of the law based on a previous decision by the boards of appeal, on the one hand, and a reference to the specific factual and legal assessments of this previous decision and the allegation that this factual situation was the same as in the case pending before the board, on the other hand.

As regards the interpretation of the law, the board explained that the boards of appeal were expected to be familiar with the relevant case law. They had to apply the EPC correctly and examine the relevant case law *ex officio*. If there was a contradiction between the interpretation of the EPC the board intended to follow in the case pending before it and the interpretation adopted in the earlier decision, the board in the case pending before it had to explain the reason for its deviation. In some circumstances, a referral might even be appropriate or necessary. Therefore, any reference to principles of law or interpretation of the EPC set out in previous decisions had to be taken into account.

The board distinguished this case from the submission of a party that argued that the specific factual and technical situation underlying a particular earlier decision was similar to the factual and technical situation underlying the case pending before the board and that therefore the way in which the EPC was applied in that earlier decision should be followed. In the board's view, such a submission was not simply an interpretation of the law made by reference to an earlier decision. On the contrary, it contained both a statement of fact and its legal qualification. In order for the board to deal with such a submission in the case pending before it, it had to examine the factual situation on which the earlier decision was based and assess whether it was similar to or different from the one underlying the pending case. The board pointed out that, in general, doing so required not only a careful reading of the reasoning, but also consultation of the facts and submissions in the case underlying the earlier decision.

For these reasons, the submission that the specific factual and technical situation underlying a particular earlier decision was similar to the factual and technical situation underlying the case pending before the board, such that the way in which the EPC was applied in that earlier decision should be followed in the pending case, was not only an interpretation of the law, but included a new allegation of fact.

Since, in the case in hand, this new allegation of fact was made for the first time at the oral proceedings, the board concluded that it constituted an amendment to the respondent's appeal case. In the absence of any exceptional circumstances, the board decided not to admit this amendment (Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020).

182-15-23

**Article 15a(1) RPBA 2020 | T 1501/20 | Board 3.2.08**
**Article 15a(1) RPBA 2020**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1501/20</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.08
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.07.14
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	DE
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	D
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Articles 15(2)(b)(vi), 15a(1) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	oral proceedings – mixed-mode oral proceedings (yes) – G 1/21 – general emergency situation (no) – board’s discretion to hold oral proceedings by videoconference without a party’s consent (no)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0001/21, T 2432/19, T 1171/20, T 0618/21
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , 10th edition

In [T 1501/20](#) wurde die mündliche Verhandlung in Form einer Hybridverhandlung ("mixed-mode") durchgeführt. Die Beschwerdekammer hatte zunächst zu einer mündlichen Verhandlung in Präsenz am 14. Juli 2023 geladen. Im Hinblick auf den französischen Nationalfeiertag hatte daraufhin der Beschwerdeführer um eine Verschiebung der mündlichen Verhandlung bzw. um Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz ersucht. Der Beschwerdegegner hatte sich gegen die Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz ausgesprochen. Der Beschwerdegegner hatte jedoch – in Absprache mit dem Beschwerdeführer – der Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung in Form einer Hybridverhandlung zugestimmt.

Die Beschwerdekammer merkte zunächst an, dass das Bestehen eines nationalen Feiertages grundsätzlich keine ausreichende Begründung für die Verschiebung einer mündlichen Verhandlung darstelle, sofern nicht bereits ein Urlaub bzw. eine Reise fest gebucht worden sei (vgl. Art. 15 (2) b) vi) VOBK 2020). Eine Verschiebung der mündlichen Verhandlung kam für die Beschwerdekammer daher unter Verweis auf verfahrensökonomische Erwägungen nicht in Betracht. Da der Beschwerdegegner aber seine Zustimmung zur Durchführung einer Hybridverhandlung gegeben hatte, wurde die Verhandlung in Form einer Hybridverhandlung durchgeführt. Die Kammer erläuterte, dass somit den Anträgen beider Beteiligten entsprochen worden sei: dem Beschwerdegegner sei die Möglichkeit eingeräumt worden, im Verhandlungsraum des



EPA anwesend zu sein, und dem Beschwerdeführer sei die Teilnahme im Wege der Videotechnologie ermöglicht worden.

Im gegebenen Zusammenhang merkte die Beschwerdekammer an, dass Art. 15a (1) VOBK 2020 der Kammer zwar ein Ermessen einräumt, die mündliche Verhandlung als Videokonferenz durchzuführen, wenn sie dies für zweckmäßig erachtet. Sie sei dennoch der Ansicht, dass die Entscheidung der Großen Beschwerdekammer G 1/21 gewisse Grenzen für die Ausübung dieses Ermessens setze. Die Beschwerdekammer folgte diesbezüglich der Entscheidung T 2432/19, wonach Art. 15a (1) VOBK 2020 im Hinblick auf die Entscheidung G 1/21 restriktiv auszulegen sei. Demnach biete Art. 15a (1) VOBK 2020 keine rechtliche Grundlage, um die mündliche Verhandlung in Form einer Videokonferenz gegen den Willen eines der Verfahrensbeteiligten durchzuführen, sofern kein allgemeiner Notfall bestehe, der die Möglichkeit der Beteiligten einschränke, persönlich an einer mündlichen Verhandlung in den Räumlichkeiten des EPA teilzunehmen. Insbesondere sei zu berücksichtigen, dass die in G 1/21 vorgenommene Einschränkung auf die Situation eines allgemeinen Notfalls nicht erforderlich gewesen wäre, wenn die Große Beschwerdekammer der Auffassung gewesen wäre, dass eine rechtliche Grundlage bestünde, Videokonferenzen unabhängig vom Bestehen eines solchen Notfalls gegen den Willen der Verfahrensbeteiligten durchzuführen (vgl. T 1171/20). Hierbei sei zu berücksichtigen, dass die Entscheidung G 1/21 davon ausgegangen sei, dass die unterschiedlichen Formate mündlicher Verhandlungen (Präsenzverhandlung bzw. Videokonferenz) – jedenfalls im Hinblick auf die bestehenden Technologien – keine gleichwertigen Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten bieten würden (vgl. T 2432/19). Zudem sei auch zu berücksichtigen, dass G 1/21 den Verfahrensbeteiligten grundsätzlich ein Wahlrecht hinsichtlich des Formats der mündlichen Verhandlungen zugestehe, das jedenfalls für Präsenzverhandlungen bestehe (vgl. G 1/21, T 2432/19).

Darüber hinaus stellte die Beschwerdekammer klar, dass sie nicht der in der Entscheidung T 618/21 vertretenen Auffassung folgt, wonach Art. 15a VOBK 2020 "als Nachfolgeregelung von G 1/21 angesehen werden muss". Diesbezüglich verwies sie auf die entsprechenden Ausführungen in T 1171/20.

Im Hinblick auf die vorstehenden Ausführungen sah die Beschwerdekammer im vorliegenden Fall keine rechtliche Grundlage, die mündliche Verhandlung gegen den Willen des Beschwerdegegners in Form einer Videokonferenz durchzuführen. Die mündliche Verhandlung wurde deshalb mit dem Einverständnis beider Beteiligten in Form einer Hybridverhandlung ("mixed-mode") durchgeführt.

118-10-23

## Article 15a(2) RPBA 2020 | T 1946/21 | Board 3.2.03

### Article 15a(2) RPBA 2020

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>T 1946/21</b>
<b>Board</b>	3.2.03
<b>Date of decision</b>	2023.05.05
<b>Language of the proceedings</b>	EN
<b>Internal distribution code</b>	C
<b>Inter partes/ex parte</b>	Inter partes
<b>EPC Articles</b>	
<b>EPC Rules</b>	
<b>RPBA</b>	Article 15a(2) RPBA 2020
<b>Other legal provisions</b>	
<b>Keywords</b>	in-person oral proceedings – request for oral proceedings to be held in a hybrid format (refused)
<b>Cited decisions</b>	G 0004/95
<b>Case Law Book</b>	<a href="#">III.C.7.3.</a> , 10th edition

[See also abstract under Art. 87\(1\) EPC.](#)

In [T 1946/21](#) the appellant's and the intervener's representative requested oral proceedings be held in a hybrid format to allow the representatives to attend the hearing in person and other attendees to attend remotely.

The board recalled that under Art. 15a(2) RPBA 2020, if oral proceedings are scheduled to be held on the premises of the EPO (such as in the case in hand), a party, representative or accompanying person may, upon request, be allowed to attend by videoconference. In the board's view, any such request should normally be granted only if the participation of the person for whom the access by means of videoconferencing technology has been requested is related to a person whose participation in the oral proceedings is relevant to the case, in particular to the decision to be taken at the oral proceedings.

In the proceedings in hand, the appellant and the intervener were represented by professional representatives who would be attending the oral proceedings on their behalf. The board noted that from the request for hybrid-format oral proceedings, it had not been apparent how the participation of additional "other attendees" was relevant to the case. It had not even been clear to the board who these "other attendees" were.

According to the board, it was entirely possible that submissions made by persons who were not professional representatives (such as "accompanying persons" within the meaning of Art. 15a(2) RPBA 2020) were relevant for the decision to be taken. Citing G 4/95, the board stated that it might permit such submissions at oral proceedings but

this required a reasoned request to that effect, as explained in the board's communication under Art. 17 RPBA 2020 sent to the parties on 21 February 2023.

Absent any such request, the board saw no reasons which would outweigh the increased technical and organisational complexity caused by setting up and operating an additional parallel hybrid channel while running in-person proceedings at which all parties are already fully represented by the professional representatives present and in which all attendees may participate as well.

Therefore, the oral proceedings took place as originally summoned, i.e. in person.

119-10-23

#### Contact

Legal Research Service of the Boards of Appeal  
Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office  
[BOA\\_legalresearchservice@epo.org](mailto:BOA_legalresearchservice@epo.org)